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author | Miss Islington (bot) <31488909+miss-islington@users.noreply.github.com> | 2023-05-17 16:06:06 -0700 |
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committer | GitHub <noreply@github.com> | 2023-05-17 16:06:06 -0700 |
commit | f48a96a28012d28ae37a2f4587a780a5eb779946 (patch) | |
tree | c9d5e9271a27e75b4f394ba441da49a8df4bd176 /Doc | |
parent | 425065bb002b9cbf9c12f61a6f3102f2ce2b8d14 (diff) | |
download | cpython-git-3.10.tar.gz |
[3.10] [3.11] gh-102153: Start stripping C0 control and space chars in `urlsplit` (GH-102508) (GH-104575) (#104592)3.10
gh-102153: Start stripping C0 control and space chars in `urlsplit` (GH-102508)
`urllib.parse.urlsplit` has already been respecting the WHATWG spec a bit GH-25595.
This adds more sanitizing to respect the "Remove any leading C0 control or space from input" [rule](https://url.spec.whatwg.org/GH-url-parsing:~:text=Remove%20any%20leading%20and%20trailing%20C0%20control%20or%20space%20from%20input.) in response to [CVE-2023-24329](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-24329).
I simplified the docs by eliding the state of the world explanatory
paragraph in this security release only backport. (people will see
that in the mainline /3/ docs)
---------
(cherry picked from commit 2f630e1ce18ad2e07428296532a68b11dc66ad10)
(cherry picked from commit 610cc0ab1b760b2abaac92bd256b96191c46b941)
Co-authored-by: Miss Islington (bot) <31488909+miss-islington@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Illia Volochii <illia.volochii@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Gregory P. Smith [Google] <greg@krypto.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'Doc')
-rw-r--r-- | Doc/library/urllib.parse.rst | 38 |
1 files changed, 36 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/Doc/library/urllib.parse.rst b/Doc/library/urllib.parse.rst index 96b3965107..1e85602951 100644 --- a/Doc/library/urllib.parse.rst +++ b/Doc/library/urllib.parse.rst @@ -159,6 +159,10 @@ or on combining URL components into a URL string. ParseResult(scheme='http', netloc='www.cwi.nl:80', path='/%7Eguido/Python.html', params='', query='', fragment='') + .. warning:: + + :func:`urlparse` does not perform validation. See :ref:`URL parsing + security <url-parsing-security>` for details. .. versionchanged:: 3.2 Added IPv6 URL parsing capabilities. @@ -324,8 +328,14 @@ or on combining URL components into a URL string. ``#``, ``@``, or ``:`` will raise a :exc:`ValueError`. If the URL is decomposed before parsing, no error will be raised. - Following the `WHATWG spec`_ that updates RFC 3986, ASCII newline - ``\n``, ``\r`` and tab ``\t`` characters are stripped from the URL. + Following some of the `WHATWG spec`_ that updates RFC 3986, leading C0 + control and space characters are stripped from the URL. ``\n``, + ``\r`` and tab ``\t`` characters are removed from the URL at any position. + + .. warning:: + + :func:`urlsplit` does not perform validation. See :ref:`URL parsing + security <url-parsing-security>` for details. .. versionchanged:: 3.6 Out-of-range port numbers now raise :exc:`ValueError`, instead of @@ -338,6 +348,9 @@ or on combining URL components into a URL string. .. versionchanged:: 3.10 ASCII newline and tab characters are stripped from the URL. + .. versionchanged:: 3.10.12 + Leading WHATWG C0 control and space characters are stripped from the URL. + .. _WHATWG spec: https://url.spec.whatwg.org/#concept-basic-url-parser .. function:: urlunsplit(parts) @@ -414,6 +427,27 @@ or on combining URL components into a URL string. or ``scheme://host/path``). If *url* is not a wrapped URL, it is returned without changes. +.. _url-parsing-security: + +URL parsing security +-------------------- + +The :func:`urlsplit` and :func:`urlparse` APIs do not perform **validation** of +inputs. They may not raise errors on inputs that other applications consider +invalid. They may also succeed on some inputs that might not be considered +URLs elsewhere. Their purpose is for practical functionality rather than +purity. + +Instead of raising an exception on unusual input, they may instead return some +component parts as empty strings. Or components may contain more than perhaps +they should. + +We recommend that users of these APIs where the values may be used anywhere +with security implications code defensively. Do some verification within your +code before trusting a returned component part. Does that ``scheme`` make +sense? Is that a sensible ``path``? Is there anything strange about that +``hostname``? etc. + .. _parsing-ascii-encoded-bytes: Parsing ASCII Encoded Bytes |