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authorLennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>2021-03-11 10:34:20 +0100
committerLennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>2021-03-26 12:20:52 +0100
commit99e9f896fb491d13c6d02f6f5bbfceabae833f05 (patch)
tree40971a8dc2844edc5b0646c356b343f615d5aae9 /src/sysusers
parentfc682be2612e7016188118f8ce82f9351dc2e9bf (diff)
downloadsystemd-99e9f896fb491d13c6d02f6f5bbfceabae833f05.tar.gz
sysusers: read passwords from the credentials logic
Let's make use of our own credentials infrastructure in our tools: let's hook up systemd-sysusers with the credentials logic, so that the root password can be provisioned this way. This is really useful when working with stateless systems, in particular nspawn's "--volatile=yes" switch, as this works now: # systemd-nspawn -i foo.raw --volatile=yes --set-credential=passwd.plaintext-password:foo For the first time we have a nice, non-interactive way to provision the root password for a fully stateless system from the container manager. Yay!
Diffstat (limited to 'src/sysusers')
-rw-r--r--src/sysusers/sysusers.c47
1 files changed, 47 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/sysusers/sysusers.c b/src/sysusers/sysusers.c
index b098eb27cd..9514098a33 100644
--- a/src/sysusers/sysusers.c
+++ b/src/sysusers/sysusers.c
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
#include "alloc-util.h"
#include "conf-files.h"
#include "copy.h"
+#include "creds-util.h"
#include "def.h"
#include "dissect-image.h"
#include "fd-util.h"
@@ -13,7 +14,9 @@
#include "format-util.h"
#include "fs-util.h"
#include "hashmap.h"
+#include "libcrypt-util.h"
#include "main-func.h"
+#include "memory-util.h"
#include "mount-util.h"
#include "nscd-flush.h"
#include "pager.h"
@@ -429,6 +432,8 @@ static int write_temporary_passwd(const char *passwd_path, FILE **tmpfile, char
}
ORDERED_HASHMAP_FOREACH(i, todo_uids) {
+ _cleanup_free_ char *creds_shell = NULL, *cn = NULL;
+
struct passwd n = {
.pw_name = i->name,
.pw_uid = i->uid,
@@ -446,6 +451,17 @@ static int write_temporary_passwd(const char *passwd_path, FILE **tmpfile, char
.pw_shell = i->shell ?: (char*) default_shell(i->uid),
};
+ /* Try to pick up the shell for this account via the credentials logic */
+ cn = strjoin("passwd.shell.", i->name);
+ if (!cn)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ r = read_credential(cn, (void**) &creds_shell, NULL);
+ if (r < 0)
+ log_debug_errno(r, "Couldn't read credential '%s', ignoring: %m", cn);
+ else
+ n.pw_shell = creds_shell;
+
r = putpwent_sane(&n, passwd);
if (r < 0)
return r;
@@ -530,6 +546,9 @@ static int write_temporary_shadow(const char *shadow_path, FILE **tmpfile, char
}
ORDERED_HASHMAP_FOREACH(i, todo_uids) {
+ _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *creds_password = NULL;
+ _cleanup_free_ char *cn = NULL;
+
struct spwd n = {
.sp_namp = i->name,
.sp_pwdp = (char*) "!*", /* lock this password, and make it invalid */
@@ -542,6 +561,34 @@ static int write_temporary_shadow(const char *shadow_path, FILE **tmpfile, char
.sp_flag = ULONG_MAX, /* this appears to be what everybody does ... */
};
+ /* Try to pick up the password for this account via the credentials logic */
+ cn = strjoin("passwd.hashed-password.", i->name);
+ if (!cn)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ r = read_credential(cn, (void**) &creds_password, NULL);
+ if (r == -ENOENT) {
+ _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *plaintext_password = NULL;
+
+ free(cn);
+ cn = strjoin("passwd.plaintext-password.", i->name);
+ if (!cn)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ r = read_credential(cn, (void**) &plaintext_password, NULL);
+ if (r < 0)
+ log_debug_errno(r, "Couldn't read credential '%s', ignoring: %m", cn);
+ else {
+ r = hash_password(plaintext_password, &creds_password);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to hash password: %m");
+ }
+ } else if (r < 0)
+ log_debug_errno(r, "Couldn't read credential '%s', ignoring: %m", cn);
+
+ if (creds_password)
+ n.sp_pwdp = creds_password;
+
r = putspent_sane(&n, shadow);
if (r < 0)
return r;