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authorAndrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>2008-05-05 15:23:57 +1000
committerAndrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>2008-05-05 15:23:57 +1000
commit7ee76eeae5b3e9e5f5b226039e7276897f5e6764 (patch)
treed2de6ee6008582b0d521a8b6a446fd2886aa8a37 /source4/auth/ntlm/ntlm_check.c
parent2c95244f1115c87a8ec3101427680a834d71ceaf (diff)
downloadsamba-7ee76eeae5b3e9e5f5b226039e7276897f5e6764.tar.gz
Move NTLM authentication details into auth/ntlm
This should help clarify the role of the various files around here (done on Jelmer's request). Andrew Bartlett (This used to be commit efa399037511ced8978f2e7661a71aac7a384883)
Diffstat (limited to 'source4/auth/ntlm/ntlm_check.c')
-rw-r--r--source4/auth/ntlm/ntlm_check.c603
1 files changed, 603 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/source4/auth/ntlm/ntlm_check.c b/source4/auth/ntlm/ntlm_check.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..0dbbce0edc5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/source4/auth/ntlm/ntlm_check.c
@@ -0,0 +1,603 @@
+/*
+ Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
+ Password and authentication handling
+ Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2001-2004
+ Copyright (C) Gerald Carter 2003
+ Copyright (C) Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton 1996-2000
+
+ This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+ (at your option) any later version.
+
+ This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+ You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+*/
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include "lib/crypto/crypto.h"
+#include "librpc/gen_ndr/netlogon.h"
+#include "libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h"
+#include "param/param.h"
+#include "auth/ntlm/ntlm_check.h"
+
+/****************************************************************************
+ Core of smb password checking routine.
+****************************************************************************/
+
+static bool smb_pwd_check_ntlmv1(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ const DATA_BLOB *nt_response,
+ const uint8_t *part_passwd,
+ const DATA_BLOB *sec_blob,
+ DATA_BLOB *user_sess_key)
+{
+ /* Finish the encryption of part_passwd. */
+ uint8_t p24[24];
+
+ if (part_passwd == NULL) {
+ DEBUG(10,("No password set - DISALLOWING access\n"));
+ /* No password set - always false ! */
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (sec_blob->length != 8) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("smb_pwd_check_ntlmv1: incorrect challenge size (%lu)\n",
+ (unsigned long)sec_blob->length));
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (nt_response->length != 24) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("smb_pwd_check_ntlmv1: incorrect password length (%lu)\n",
+ (unsigned long)nt_response->length));
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ SMBOWFencrypt(part_passwd, sec_blob->data, p24);
+
+#if DEBUG_PASSWORD
+ DEBUG(100,("Part password (P16) was |\n"));
+ dump_data(100, part_passwd, 16);
+ DEBUGADD(100,("Password from client was |\n"));
+ dump_data(100, nt_response->data, nt_response->length);
+ DEBUGADD(100,("Given challenge was |\n"));
+ dump_data(100, sec_blob->data, sec_blob->length);
+ DEBUGADD(100,("Value from encryption was |\n"));
+ dump_data(100, p24, 24);
+#endif
+ if (memcmp(p24, nt_response->data, 24) == 0) {
+ if (user_sess_key != NULL) {
+ *user_sess_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, NULL, 16);
+ SMBsesskeygen_ntv1(part_passwd, user_sess_key->data);
+ }
+ return true;
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+
+/****************************************************************************
+ Core of smb password checking routine. (NTLMv2, LMv2)
+ Note: The same code works with both NTLMv2 and LMv2.
+****************************************************************************/
+
+static bool smb_pwd_check_ntlmv2(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ const DATA_BLOB *ntv2_response,
+ const uint8_t *part_passwd,
+ const DATA_BLOB *sec_blob,
+ const char *user, const char *domain,
+ bool upper_case_domain, /* should the domain be transformed into upper case? */
+ DATA_BLOB *user_sess_key)
+{
+ /* Finish the encryption of part_passwd. */
+ uint8_t kr[16];
+ uint8_t value_from_encryption[16];
+ DATA_BLOB client_key_data;
+
+ if (part_passwd == NULL) {
+ DEBUG(10,("No password set - DISALLOWING access\n"));
+ /* No password set - always false */
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (sec_blob->length != 8) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("smb_pwd_check_ntlmv2: incorrect challenge size (%lu)\n",
+ (unsigned long)sec_blob->length));
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (ntv2_response->length < 24) {
+ /* We MUST have more than 16 bytes, or the stuff below will go
+ crazy. No known implementation sends less than the 24 bytes
+ for LMv2, let alone NTLMv2. */
+ DEBUG(0, ("smb_pwd_check_ntlmv2: incorrect password length (%lu)\n",
+ (unsigned long)ntv2_response->length));
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ client_key_data = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, ntv2_response->data+16, ntv2_response->length-16);
+ /*
+ todo: should we be checking this for anything? We can't for LMv2,
+ but for NTLMv2 it is meant to contain the current time etc.
+ */
+
+ if (!ntv2_owf_gen(part_passwd, user, domain, upper_case_domain, kr)) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ SMBOWFencrypt_ntv2(kr, sec_blob, &client_key_data, value_from_encryption);
+
+#if DEBUG_PASSWORD
+ DEBUG(100,("Part password (P16) was |\n"));
+ dump_data(100, part_passwd, 16);
+ DEBUGADD(100,("Password from client was |\n"));
+ dump_data(100, ntv2_response->data, ntv2_response->length);
+ DEBUGADD(100,("Variable data from client was |\n"));
+ dump_data(100, client_key_data.data, client_key_data.length);
+ DEBUGADD(100,("Given challenge was |\n"));
+ dump_data(100, sec_blob->data, sec_blob->length);
+ DEBUGADD(100,("Value from encryption was |\n"));
+ dump_data(100, value_from_encryption, 16);
+#endif
+ data_blob_clear_free(&client_key_data);
+ if (memcmp(value_from_encryption, ntv2_response->data, 16) == 0) {
+ if (user_sess_key != NULL) {
+ *user_sess_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, NULL, 16);
+ SMBsesskeygen_ntv2(kr, value_from_encryption, user_sess_key->data);
+ }
+ return true;
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+
+/****************************************************************************
+ Core of smb password checking routine. (NTLMv2, LMv2)
+ Note: The same code works with both NTLMv2 and LMv2.
+****************************************************************************/
+
+static bool smb_sess_key_ntlmv2(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ const DATA_BLOB *ntv2_response,
+ const uint8_t *part_passwd,
+ const DATA_BLOB *sec_blob,
+ const char *user, const char *domain,
+ bool upper_case_domain, /* should the domain be transformed into upper case? */
+ DATA_BLOB *user_sess_key)
+{
+ /* Finish the encryption of part_passwd. */
+ uint8_t kr[16];
+ uint8_t value_from_encryption[16];
+ DATA_BLOB client_key_data;
+
+ if (part_passwd == NULL) {
+ DEBUG(10,("No password set - DISALLOWING access\n"));
+ /* No password set - always false */
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (sec_blob->length != 8) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("smb_sess_key_ntlmv2: incorrect challenge size (%lu)\n",
+ (unsigned long)sec_blob->length));
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (ntv2_response->length < 24) {
+ /* We MUST have more than 16 bytes, or the stuff below will go
+ crazy. No known implementation sends less than the 24 bytes
+ for LMv2, let alone NTLMv2. */
+ DEBUG(0, ("smb_sess_key_ntlmv2: incorrect password length (%lu)\n",
+ (unsigned long)ntv2_response->length));
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ client_key_data = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, ntv2_response->data+16, ntv2_response->length-16);
+
+ if (!ntv2_owf_gen(part_passwd, user, domain, upper_case_domain, kr)) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ SMBOWFencrypt_ntv2(kr, sec_blob, &client_key_data, value_from_encryption);
+ *user_sess_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, NULL, 16);
+ SMBsesskeygen_ntv2(kr, value_from_encryption, user_sess_key->data);
+ return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Compare password hashes against those from the SAM
+ *
+ * @param mem_ctx talloc context
+ * @param client_lanman LANMAN password hash, as supplied by the client
+ * @param client_nt NT (MD4) password hash, as supplied by the client
+ * @param username internal Samba username, for log messages
+ * @param client_username username the client used
+ * @param client_domain domain name the client used (may be mapped)
+ * @param stored_lanman LANMAN password hash, as stored on the SAM
+ * @param stored_nt NT (MD4) password hash, as stored on the SAM
+ * @param user_sess_key User session key
+ * @param lm_sess_key LM session key (first 8 bytes of the LM hash)
+ */
+
+NTSTATUS hash_password_check(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
+ const struct samr_Password *client_lanman,
+ const struct samr_Password *client_nt,
+ const char *username,
+ const struct samr_Password *stored_lanman,
+ const struct samr_Password *stored_nt)
+{
+ if (stored_nt == NULL) {
+ DEBUG(3,("ntlm_password_check: NO NT password stored for user %s.\n",
+ username));
+ }
+
+ if (client_nt && stored_nt) {
+ if (memcmp(client_nt->hash, stored_nt->hash, sizeof(stored_nt->hash)) == 0) {
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+ } else {
+ DEBUG(3,("ntlm_password_check: Interactive logon: NT password check failed for user %s\n",
+ username));
+ return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+ }
+
+ } else if (client_lanman && stored_lanman) {
+ if (!lp_lanman_auth(lp_ctx)) {
+ DEBUG(3,("ntlm_password_check: Interactive logon: only LANMAN password supplied for user %s, and LM passwords are disabled!\n",
+ username));
+ return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+ }
+ if (strchr_m(username, '@')) {
+ return NT_STATUS_NOT_FOUND;
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(client_lanman->hash, stored_lanman->hash, sizeof(stored_lanman->hash)) == 0) {
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+ } else {
+ DEBUG(3,("ntlm_password_check: Interactive logon: LANMAN password check failed for user %s\n",
+ username));
+ return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+ }
+ }
+ if (strchr_m(username, '@')) {
+ return NT_STATUS_NOT_FOUND;
+ }
+ return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Check a challenge-response password against the value of the NT or
+ * LM password hash.
+ *
+ * @param mem_ctx talloc context
+ * @param challenge 8-byte challenge. If all zero, forces plaintext comparison
+ * @param nt_response 'unicode' NT response to the challenge, or unicode password
+ * @param lm_response ASCII or LANMAN response to the challenge, or password in DOS code page
+ * @param username internal Samba username, for log messages
+ * @param client_username username the client used
+ * @param client_domain domain name the client used (may be mapped)
+ * @param stored_lanman LANMAN ASCII password from our passdb or similar
+ * @param stored_nt MD4 unicode password from our passdb or similar
+ * @param user_sess_key User session key
+ * @param lm_sess_key LM session key (first 8 bytes of the LM hash)
+ */
+
+NTSTATUS ntlm_password_check(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
+ uint32_t logon_parameters,
+ const DATA_BLOB *challenge,
+ const DATA_BLOB *lm_response,
+ const DATA_BLOB *nt_response,
+ const char *username,
+ const char *client_username,
+ const char *client_domain,
+ const struct samr_Password *stored_lanman,
+ const struct samr_Password *stored_nt,
+ DATA_BLOB *user_sess_key,
+ DATA_BLOB *lm_sess_key)
+{
+ const static uint8_t zeros[8];
+ DATA_BLOB tmp_sess_key;
+
+ if (stored_nt == NULL) {
+ DEBUG(3,("ntlm_password_check: NO NT password stored for user %s.\n",
+ username));
+ }
+
+ *lm_sess_key = data_blob(NULL, 0);
+ *user_sess_key = data_blob(NULL, 0);
+
+ /* Check for cleartext netlogon. Used by Exchange 5.5. */
+ if ((logon_parameters & MSV1_0_CLEARTEXT_PASSWORD_ALLOWED)
+ && challenge->length == sizeof(zeros)
+ && (memcmp(challenge->data, zeros, challenge->length) == 0 )) {
+ struct samr_Password client_nt;
+ struct samr_Password client_lm;
+ char *unix_pw = NULL;
+ bool lm_ok;
+
+ DEBUG(4,("ntlm_password_check: checking plaintext passwords for user %s\n",
+ username));
+ mdfour(client_nt.hash, nt_response->data, nt_response->length);
+
+ if (lm_response->length &&
+ (convert_string_talloc(mem_ctx, lp_iconv_convenience(lp_ctx), CH_DOS, CH_UNIX,
+ lm_response->data, lm_response->length,
+ (void **)&unix_pw) != -1)) {
+ if (E_deshash(unix_pw, client_lm.hash)) {
+ lm_ok = true;
+ } else {
+ lm_ok = false;
+ }
+ } else {
+ lm_ok = false;
+ }
+ return hash_password_check(mem_ctx,
+ lp_ctx,
+ lm_ok ? &client_lm : NULL,
+ nt_response->length ? &client_nt : NULL,
+ username,
+ stored_lanman, stored_nt);
+ }
+
+ if (nt_response->length != 0 && nt_response->length < 24) {
+ DEBUG(2,("ntlm_password_check: invalid NT password length (%lu) for user %s\n",
+ (unsigned long)nt_response->length, username));
+ }
+
+ if (nt_response->length > 24 && stored_nt) {
+ /* We have the NT MD4 hash challenge available - see if we can
+ use it
+ */
+ DEBUG(4,("ntlm_password_check: Checking NTLMv2 password with domain [%s]\n", client_domain));
+ if (smb_pwd_check_ntlmv2(mem_ctx,
+ nt_response,
+ stored_nt->hash, challenge,
+ client_username,
+ client_domain,
+ false,
+ user_sess_key)) {
+ *lm_sess_key = *user_sess_key;
+ if (user_sess_key->length) {
+ lm_sess_key->length = 8;
+ }
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+ }
+
+ DEBUG(4,("ntlm_password_check: Checking NTLMv2 password with uppercased version of domain [%s]\n", client_domain));
+ if (smb_pwd_check_ntlmv2(mem_ctx,
+ nt_response,
+ stored_nt->hash, challenge,
+ client_username,
+ client_domain,
+ true,
+ user_sess_key)) {
+ *lm_sess_key = *user_sess_key;
+ if (user_sess_key->length) {
+ lm_sess_key->length = 8;
+ }
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+ }
+
+ DEBUG(4,("ntlm_password_check: Checking NTLMv2 password without a domain\n"));
+ if (smb_pwd_check_ntlmv2(mem_ctx,
+ nt_response,
+ stored_nt->hash, challenge,
+ client_username,
+ "",
+ false,
+ user_sess_key)) {
+ *lm_sess_key = *user_sess_key;
+ if (user_sess_key->length) {
+ lm_sess_key->length = 8;
+ }
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+ } else {
+ DEBUG(3,("ntlm_password_check: NTLMv2 password check failed\n"));
+ }
+ } else if (nt_response->length == 24 && stored_nt) {
+ if (lp_ntlm_auth(lp_ctx)) {
+ /* We have the NT MD4 hash challenge available - see if we can
+ use it (ie. does it exist in the smbpasswd file).
+ */
+ DEBUG(4,("ntlm_password_check: Checking NT MD4 password\n"));
+ if (smb_pwd_check_ntlmv1(mem_ctx,
+ nt_response,
+ stored_nt->hash, challenge,
+ user_sess_key)) {
+ /* The LM session key for this response is not very secure,
+ so use it only if we otherwise allow LM authentication */
+
+ if (lp_lanman_auth(lp_ctx) && stored_lanman) {
+ *lm_sess_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, stored_lanman->hash, 8);
+ }
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+ } else {
+ DEBUG(3,("ntlm_password_check: NT MD4 password check failed for user %s\n",
+ username));
+ return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+ }
+ } else {
+ DEBUG(2,("ntlm_password_check: NTLMv1 passwords NOT PERMITTED for user %s\n",
+ username));
+ /* no return, becouse we might pick up LMv2 in the LM field */
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (lm_response->length == 0) {
+ DEBUG(3,("ntlm_password_check: NEITHER LanMan nor NT password supplied for user %s\n",
+ username));
+ return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+ }
+
+ if (lm_response->length < 24) {
+ DEBUG(2,("ntlm_password_check: invalid LanMan password length (%lu) for user %s\n",
+ (unsigned long)nt_response->length, username));
+ return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+ }
+
+ if (!lp_lanman_auth(lp_ctx)) {
+ DEBUG(3,("ntlm_password_check: Lanman passwords NOT PERMITTED for user %s\n",
+ username));
+ } else if (!stored_lanman) {
+ DEBUG(3,("ntlm_password_check: NO LanMan password set for user %s (and no NT password supplied)\n",
+ username));
+ } else if (strchr_m(username, '@')) {
+ DEBUG(3,("ntlm_password_check: NO LanMan password allowed for username@realm logins (user: %s)\n",
+ username));
+ } else {
+ DEBUG(4,("ntlm_password_check: Checking LM password\n"));
+ if (smb_pwd_check_ntlmv1(mem_ctx,
+ lm_response,
+ stored_lanman->hash, challenge,
+ NULL)) {
+ /* The session key for this response is still very odd.
+ It not very secure, so use it only if we otherwise
+ allow LM authentication */
+
+ if (lp_lanman_auth(lp_ctx) && stored_lanman) {
+ uint8_t first_8_lm_hash[16];
+ memcpy(first_8_lm_hash, stored_lanman->hash, 8);
+ memset(first_8_lm_hash + 8, '\0', 8);
+ *user_sess_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, first_8_lm_hash, 16);
+ *lm_sess_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, stored_lanman->hash, 8);
+ }
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!stored_nt) {
+ DEBUG(4,("ntlm_password_check: LM password check failed for user, no NT password %s\n",username));
+ return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+ }
+
+ /* This is for 'LMv2' authentication. almost NTLMv2 but limited to 24 bytes.
+ - related to Win9X, legacy NAS pass-though authentication
+ */
+ DEBUG(4,("ntlm_password_check: Checking LMv2 password with domain %s\n", client_domain));
+ if (smb_pwd_check_ntlmv2(mem_ctx,
+ lm_response,
+ stored_nt->hash, challenge,
+ client_username,
+ client_domain,
+ false,
+ &tmp_sess_key)) {
+ if (nt_response->length > 24) {
+ /* If NTLMv2 authentication has preceeded us
+ * (even if it failed), then use the session
+ * key from that. See the RPC-SAMLOGON
+ * torture test */
+ smb_sess_key_ntlmv2(mem_ctx,
+ nt_response,
+ stored_nt->hash, challenge,
+ client_username,
+ client_domain,
+ false,
+ user_sess_key);
+ } else {
+ /* Otherwise, use the LMv2 session key */
+ *user_sess_key = tmp_sess_key;
+ }
+ *lm_sess_key = *user_sess_key;
+ if (user_sess_key->length) {
+ lm_sess_key->length = 8;
+ }
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+ }
+
+ DEBUG(4,("ntlm_password_check: Checking LMv2 password with upper-cased version of domain %s\n", client_domain));
+ if (smb_pwd_check_ntlmv2(mem_ctx,
+ lm_response,
+ stored_nt->hash, challenge,
+ client_username,
+ client_domain,
+ true,
+ &tmp_sess_key)) {
+ if (nt_response->length > 24) {
+ /* If NTLMv2 authentication has preceeded us
+ * (even if it failed), then use the session
+ * key from that. See the RPC-SAMLOGON
+ * torture test */
+ smb_sess_key_ntlmv2(mem_ctx,
+ nt_response,
+ stored_nt->hash, challenge,
+ client_username,
+ client_domain,
+ true,
+ user_sess_key);
+ } else {
+ /* Otherwise, use the LMv2 session key */
+ *user_sess_key = tmp_sess_key;
+ }
+ *lm_sess_key = *user_sess_key;
+ if (user_sess_key->length) {
+ lm_sess_key->length = 8;
+ }
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+ }
+
+ DEBUG(4,("ntlm_password_check: Checking LMv2 password without a domain\n"));
+ if (smb_pwd_check_ntlmv2(mem_ctx,
+ lm_response,
+ stored_nt->hash, challenge,
+ client_username,
+ "",
+ false,
+ &tmp_sess_key)) {
+ if (nt_response->length > 24) {
+ /* If NTLMv2 authentication has preceeded us
+ * (even if it failed), then use the session
+ * key from that. See the RPC-SAMLOGON
+ * torture test */
+ smb_sess_key_ntlmv2(mem_ctx,
+ nt_response,
+ stored_nt->hash, challenge,
+ client_username,
+ "",
+ false,
+ user_sess_key);
+ } else {
+ /* Otherwise, use the LMv2 session key */
+ *user_sess_key = tmp_sess_key;
+ }
+ *lm_sess_key = *user_sess_key;
+ if (user_sess_key->length) {
+ lm_sess_key->length = 8;
+ }
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+ }
+
+ /* Apparently NT accepts NT responses in the LM field
+ - I think this is related to Win9X pass-though authentication
+ */
+ DEBUG(4,("ntlm_password_check: Checking NT MD4 password in LM field\n"));
+ if (lp_ntlm_auth(lp_ctx)) {
+ if (smb_pwd_check_ntlmv1(mem_ctx,
+ lm_response,
+ stored_nt->hash, challenge,
+ NULL)) {
+ /* The session key for this response is still very odd.
+ It not very secure, so use it only if we otherwise
+ allow LM authentication */
+
+ if (lp_lanman_auth(lp_ctx) && stored_lanman) {
+ uint8_t first_8_lm_hash[16];
+ memcpy(first_8_lm_hash, stored_lanman->hash, 8);
+ memset(first_8_lm_hash + 8, '\0', 8);
+ *user_sess_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, first_8_lm_hash, 16);
+ *lm_sess_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, stored_lanman->hash, 8);
+ }
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+ }
+ DEBUG(3,("ntlm_password_check: LM password, NT MD4 password in LM field and LMv2 failed for user %s\n",username));
+ } else {
+ DEBUG(3,("ntlm_password_check: LM password and LMv2 failed for user %s, and NT MD4 password in LM field not permitted\n",username));
+ }
+
+ /* Try and match error codes */
+ if (strchr_m(username, '@')) {
+ return NT_STATUS_NOT_FOUND;
+ }
+ return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+}
+