summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/lib
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorMartin Schwenke <martin@meltin.net>2020-06-09 11:52:50 +1000
committerMartin Schwenke <martins@samba.org>2020-06-09 19:46:37 +0000
commit922bce2668994dd2a5988c17060f977e9bb0c229 (patch)
tree4ab438a2cd518838a0282db70343dd5cecd710c1 /lib
parent7e36b1ec2e61d10da6dd33c5689769f20bf1e008 (diff)
downloadsamba-922bce2668994dd2a5988c17060f977e9bb0c229.tar.gz
util: Simplify input validation
It appears that snprintf(3) is being used for input validation. However, this seems like overkill because it causes szPath to be copied an extra time. The mostly likely protections being sought here, according to https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/20.html, look to be DoS attacks involving CPU and memory usage. A simpler check that uses strnlen(3) can mitigate against both of these and is simpler. Signed-off-by: Martin Schwenke <martin@meltin.net> Reviewed-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'lib')
-rw-r--r--lib/util/util_paths.c9
1 files changed, 4 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/lib/util/util_paths.c b/lib/util/util_paths.c
index c0ee5c32c30..dec91772d9e 100644
--- a/lib/util/util_paths.c
+++ b/lib/util/util_paths.c
@@ -69,21 +69,20 @@ static char *get_user_home_dir(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx)
struct passwd pwd = {0};
struct passwd *pwdbuf = NULL;
char buf[NSS_BUFLEN_PASSWD] = {0};
+ size_t len;
int rc;
rc = getpwuid_r(getuid(), &pwd, buf, NSS_BUFLEN_PASSWD, &pwdbuf);
if (rc != 0 || pwdbuf == NULL ) {
- int len_written;
const char *szPath = getenv("HOME");
if (szPath == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
- len_written = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s", szPath);
- if (len_written >= sizeof(buf) || len_written < 0) {
- /* Output was truncated or an error. */
+ len = strnlen(szPath, PATH_MAX);
+ if (len >= PATH_MAX) {
return NULL;
}
- return talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, buf);
+ return talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, szPath);
}
return talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, pwd.pw_dir);