diff options
| author | Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz> | 2017-12-11 09:36:08 +1300 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> | 2017-12-18 04:38:20 +0100 |
| commit | 9ccf164550ab139edf123d00f68fd43d500d734c (patch) | |
| tree | 13eb754352225d2e368b0f151dcbf38bd496475f /ctdb | |
| parent | 8b3c58251146d2e982a6c9fdb3828ca65e307a96 (diff) | |
| download | samba-9ccf164550ab139edf123d00f68fd43d500d734c.tar.gz | |
ctdb/server/ctdb_daemon.c set socket close on exec
Set SOCKET_CLOEXEC on the sockets returned by accept. This ensures that
the socket is unavailable to any child process created by system().
Making it harder for malicious code to set up a command channel,
as seen in the exploit for CVE-2015-0240
Signed-off-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'ctdb')
| -rw-r--r-- | ctdb/server/ctdb_daemon.c | 1 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/ctdb/server/ctdb_daemon.c b/ctdb/server/ctdb_daemon.c index 459dd2932ee..35c1ab639b5 100644 --- a/ctdb/server/ctdb_daemon.c +++ b/ctdb/server/ctdb_daemon.c @@ -949,6 +949,7 @@ static void ctdb_accept_client(struct tevent_context *ev, if (fd == -1) { return; } + smb_set_close_on_exec(fd); ret = set_blocking(fd, false); if (ret != 0) { |