auth Move auth_sam_reply into the top level.

These functions provide conversions between some netlogon.idl and
auth.idl structures

Andrew Bartlett

Signed-off-by: Andrew Tridgell <tridge@samba.org>

1 files changed, 390 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/auth/auth_sam_reply.c b/auth/auth_sam_reply.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..52abb8a4df3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth/auth_sam_reply.c
@@ -0,0 +1,390 @@
+/*
+   Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
+
+   Convert a server info struct into the form for PAC and NETLOGON replies
+
+   Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2004
+   Copyright (C) Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>  2005
+
+   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+   the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+   (at your option) any later version.
+
+   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+   GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+   along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+*/
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include "librpc/gen_ndr/auth.h"
+#include "libcli/security/security.h"
+#include "auth/auth_sam_reply.h"
+
+NTSTATUS auth_convert_user_info_dc_sambaseinfo(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+					      struct auth_user_info_dc *user_info_dc,
+					      struct netr_SamBaseInfo **_sam)
+{
+	NTSTATUS status;
+	struct auth_user_info *info;
+	struct netr_SamBaseInfo *sam = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct netr_SamBaseInfo);
+	NT_STATUS_HAVE_NO_MEMORY(sam);
+
+	if (user_info_dc->num_sids > PRIMARY_USER_SID_INDEX) {
+		status = dom_sid_split_rid(sam, &user_info_dc->sids[PRIMARY_USER_SID_INDEX],
+					   &sam->domain_sid, &sam->rid);
+		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+			return status;
+		}
+	} else {
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	if (user_info_dc->num_sids > PRIMARY_GROUP_SID_INDEX) {
+		status = dom_sid_split_rid(NULL, &user_info_dc->sids[PRIMARY_GROUP_SID_INDEX],
+					   NULL, &sam->primary_gid);
+		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+			return status;
+		}
+	} else {
+		/* if we have to encode something like SYSTEM (with no
+		 * second SID in the token) then this is the only
+		 * choice */
+		sam->primary_gid = sam->rid;
+	}
+
+	info = user_info_dc->info;
+
+	sam->last_logon = info->last_logon;
+	sam->last_logoff =  info->last_logoff;
+	sam->acct_expiry = info->acct_expiry;
+	sam->last_password_change = info->last_password_change;
+	sam->allow_password_change = info->allow_password_change;
+	sam->force_password_change = info->force_password_change;
+
+	sam->account_name.string = info->account_name;
+	sam->full_name.string = info->full_name;
+	sam->logon_script.string = info->logon_script;
+	sam->profile_path.string = info->profile_path;
+	sam->home_directory.string = info->home_directory;
+	sam->home_drive.string = info->home_drive;
+
+	sam->logon_count = info->logon_count;
+	sam->bad_password_count = info->bad_password_count;
+	sam->groups.count = 0;
+	sam->groups.rids = NULL;
+
+	if (user_info_dc->num_sids > 2) {
+		size_t i;
+		sam->groups.rids = talloc_array(sam, struct samr_RidWithAttribute,
+						user_info_dc->num_sids);
+
+		if (sam->groups.rids == NULL)
+			return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+
+		for (i=2; i<user_info_dc->num_sids; i++) {
+			struct dom_sid *group_sid = &user_info_dc->sids[i];
+			if (!dom_sid_in_domain(sam->domain_sid, group_sid)) {
+				/* We handle this elsewhere */
+				continue;
+			}
+			sam->groups.rids[sam->groups.count].rid =
+				group_sid->sub_auths[group_sid->num_auths-1];
+
+			sam->groups.rids[sam->groups.count].attributes =
+				SE_GROUP_MANDATORY | SE_GROUP_ENABLED_BY_DEFAULT | SE_GROUP_ENABLED;
+			sam->groups.count += 1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	sam->user_flags = 0; /* w2k3 uses NETLOGON_EXTRA_SIDS | NETLOGON_NTLMV2_ENABLED */
+	sam->acct_flags = user_info_dc->info->acct_flags;
+	sam->logon_server.string = user_info_dc->info->logon_server;
+	sam->domain.string = user_info_dc->info->domain_name;
+
+	ZERO_STRUCT(sam->unknown);
+
+	ZERO_STRUCT(sam->key);
+	if (user_info_dc->user_session_key.length == sizeof(sam->key.key)) {
+		memcpy(sam->key.key, user_info_dc->user_session_key.data, sizeof(sam->key.key));
+	}
+
+	ZERO_STRUCT(sam->LMSessKey);
+	if (user_info_dc->lm_session_key.length == sizeof(sam->LMSessKey.key)) {
+		memcpy(sam->LMSessKey.key, user_info_dc->lm_session_key.data,
+		       sizeof(sam->LMSessKey.key));
+	}
+
+	*_sam = sam;
+
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+/* Note that the validity of the _sam3 structure is only as long as
+ * the user_info_dc it was generated from */
+NTSTATUS auth_convert_user_info_dc_saminfo3(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+					   struct auth_user_info_dc *user_info_dc,
+					   struct netr_SamInfo3 **_sam3)
+{
+	struct netr_SamBaseInfo *sam;
+	struct netr_SamInfo3 *sam3 = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct netr_SamInfo3);
+	NTSTATUS status;
+	size_t i;
+	NT_STATUS_HAVE_NO_MEMORY(sam3);
+
+	status = auth_convert_user_info_dc_sambaseinfo(sam3, user_info_dc, &sam);
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+		talloc_free(sam3);
+		return status;
+	}
+	sam3->base = *sam;
+	sam3->sidcount	= 0;
+	sam3->sids	= NULL;
+
+
+	sam3->sids = talloc_array(sam, struct netr_SidAttr,
+				  user_info_dc->num_sids);
+	NT_STATUS_HAVE_NO_MEMORY_AND_FREE(sam3->sids, sam3);
+
+	/* We don't put the user and group SIDs in there */
+	for (i=2; i<user_info_dc->num_sids; i++) {
+		if (dom_sid_in_domain(sam->domain_sid, &user_info_dc->sids[i])) {
+			continue;
+		}
+		sam3->sids[sam3->sidcount].sid = dom_sid_dup(sam3->sids, &user_info_dc->sids[i]);
+		NT_STATUS_HAVE_NO_MEMORY_AND_FREE(sam3->sids[sam3->sidcount].sid, sam3);
+		sam3->sids[sam3->sidcount].attributes =
+			SE_GROUP_MANDATORY | SE_GROUP_ENABLED_BY_DEFAULT | SE_GROUP_ENABLED;
+		sam3->sidcount += 1;
+	}
+	if (sam3->sidcount) {
+		sam3->base.user_flags |= NETLOGON_EXTRA_SIDS;
+	} else {
+		sam3->sids = NULL;
+	}
+	*_sam3 = sam3;
+
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Make a user_info_dc struct from the info3 returned by a domain logon
+ */
+NTSTATUS make_user_info_dc_netlogon_validation(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+					      const char *account_name,
+					      uint16_t validation_level,
+					      union netr_Validation *validation,
+					      struct auth_user_info_dc **_user_info_dc)
+{
+	struct auth_user_info_dc *user_info_dc;
+	struct auth_user_info *info;
+	struct netr_SamBaseInfo *base = NULL;
+	uint32_t i;
+
+	switch (validation_level) {
+	case 2:
+		if (!validation || !validation->sam2) {
+			return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+		}
+		base = &validation->sam2->base;
+		break;
+	case 3:
+		if (!validation || !validation->sam3) {
+			return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+		}
+		base = &validation->sam3->base;
+		break;
+	case 6:
+		if (!validation || !validation->sam6) {
+			return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+		}
+		base = &validation->sam6->base;
+		break;
+	default:
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_LEVEL;
+	}
+
+	user_info_dc = talloc(mem_ctx, struct auth_user_info_dc);
+	NT_STATUS_HAVE_NO_MEMORY(user_info_dc);
+
+	/*
+	   Here is where we should check the list of
+	   trusted domains, and verify that the SID
+	   matches.
+	*/
+	if (!base->domain_sid) {
+		DEBUG(0, ("Cannot operate on a Netlogon Validation without a domain SID"));
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	/* The IDL layer would be a better place to check this, but to
+	 * guard the integer addition below, we double-check */
+	if (base->groups.count > 65535) {
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	user_info_dc->num_sids = 2;
+
+	user_info_dc->sids = talloc_array(user_info_dc, struct dom_sid,  user_info_dc->num_sids + base->groups.count);
+	NT_STATUS_HAVE_NO_MEMORY(user_info_dc->sids);
+
+	user_info_dc->sids[PRIMARY_USER_SID_INDEX] = *base->domain_sid;
+	if (!sid_append_rid(&user_info_dc->sids[PRIMARY_USER_SID_INDEX], base->rid)) {
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	user_info_dc->sids[PRIMARY_GROUP_SID_INDEX] = *base->domain_sid;
+	if (!sid_append_rid(&user_info_dc->sids[PRIMARY_GROUP_SID_INDEX], base->primary_gid)) {
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < base->groups.count; i++) {
+		user_info_dc->sids[user_info_dc->num_sids] = *base->domain_sid;
+		if (!sid_append_rid(&user_info_dc->sids[user_info_dc->num_sids], base->groups.rids[i].rid)) {
+			return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+		}
+		user_info_dc->num_sids++;
+	}
+
+	/* Copy 'other' sids.  We need to do sid filtering here to
+	   prevent possible elevation of privileges.  See:
+
+           http://www.microsoft.com/windows2000/techinfo/administration/security/sidfilter.asp
+         */
+
+	if (validation_level == 3) {
+		struct dom_sid *dgrps = user_info_dc->sids;
+		size_t sidcount;
+
+		/* The IDL layer would be a better place to check this, but to
+		 * guard the integer addition below, we double-check */
+		if (validation->sam3->sidcount > 65535) {
+			return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+		}
+
+		sidcount = user_info_dc->num_sids + validation->sam3->sidcount;
+		if (validation->sam3->sidcount > 0) {
+			dgrps = talloc_realloc(user_info_dc, dgrps, struct dom_sid, sidcount);
+			NT_STATUS_HAVE_NO_MEMORY(dgrps);
+
+			for (i = 0; i < validation->sam3->sidcount; i++) {
+				if (validation->sam3->sids[i].sid) {
+					dgrps[user_info_dc->num_sids] = *validation->sam3->sids[i].sid;
+					user_info_dc->num_sids++;
+				}
+			}
+		}
+
+		user_info_dc->sids = dgrps;
+
+		/* Where are the 'global' sids?... */
+	}
+
+	user_info_dc->info = info = talloc_zero(user_info_dc, struct auth_user_info);
+	NT_STATUS_HAVE_NO_MEMORY(user_info_dc->info);
+
+	if (base->account_name.string) {
+		info->account_name = talloc_reference(info, base->account_name.string);
+	} else {
+		info->account_name = talloc_strdup(info, account_name);
+		NT_STATUS_HAVE_NO_MEMORY(info->account_name);
+	}
+
+	info->domain_name = talloc_reference(info, base->domain.string);
+	info->full_name = talloc_reference(info, base->full_name.string);
+	info->logon_script = talloc_reference(info, base->logon_script.string);
+	info->profile_path = talloc_reference(info, base->profile_path.string);
+	info->home_directory = talloc_reference(info, base->home_directory.string);
+	info->home_drive = talloc_reference(info, base->home_drive.string);
+	info->logon_server = talloc_reference(info, base->logon_server.string);
+	info->last_logon = base->last_logon;
+	info->last_logoff = base->last_logoff;
+	info->acct_expiry = base->acct_expiry;
+	info->last_password_change = base->last_password_change;
+	info->allow_password_change = base->allow_password_change;
+	info->force_password_change = base->force_password_change;
+	info->logon_count = base->logon_count;
+	info->bad_password_count = base->bad_password_count;
+	info->acct_flags = base->acct_flags;
+
+	info->authenticated = true;
+
+	/* ensure we are never given NULL session keys */
+
+	if (all_zero(base->key.key, sizeof(base->key.key))) {
+		user_info_dc->user_session_key = data_blob(NULL, 0);
+	} else {
+		user_info_dc->user_session_key = data_blob_talloc(user_info_dc, base->key.key, sizeof(base->key.key));
+		NT_STATUS_HAVE_NO_MEMORY(user_info_dc->user_session_key.data);
+	}
+
+	if (all_zero(base->LMSessKey.key, sizeof(base->LMSessKey.key))) {
+		user_info_dc->lm_session_key = data_blob(NULL, 0);
+	} else {
+		user_info_dc->lm_session_key = data_blob_talloc(user_info_dc, base->LMSessKey.key, sizeof(base->LMSessKey.key));
+		NT_STATUS_HAVE_NO_MEMORY(user_info_dc->lm_session_key.data);
+	}
+
+	*_user_info_dc = user_info_dc;
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Make a user_info_dc struct from the PAC_LOGON_INFO supplied in the krb5 logon
+ */
+NTSTATUS make_user_info_dc_pac(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+			      struct PAC_LOGON_INFO *pac_logon_info,
+			      struct auth_user_info_dc **_user_info_dc)
+{
+	uint32_t i;
+	NTSTATUS nt_status;
+	union netr_Validation validation;
+	struct auth_user_info_dc *user_info_dc;
+
+	validation.sam3 = &pac_logon_info->info3;
+
+	nt_status = make_user_info_dc_netlogon_validation(mem_ctx, "", 3, &validation, &user_info_dc);
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+		return nt_status;
+	}
+
+	if (pac_logon_info->res_groups.count > 0) {
+		size_t sidcount;
+		/* The IDL layer would be a better place to check this, but to
+		 * guard the integer addition below, we double-check */
+		if (pac_logon_info->res_groups.count > 65535) {
+			talloc_free(user_info_dc);
+			return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		  Here is where we should check the list of
+		  trusted domains, and verify that the SID
+		  matches.
+		*/
+		if (!pac_logon_info->res_group_dom_sid) {
+			DEBUG(0, ("Cannot operate on a PAC without a resource domain SID"));
+			return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+		}
+
+		sidcount = user_info_dc->num_sids + pac_logon_info->res_groups.count;
+		user_info_dc->sids
+			= talloc_realloc(user_info_dc, user_info_dc->sids, struct dom_sid, sidcount);
+		NT_STATUS_HAVE_NO_MEMORY_AND_FREE(user_info_dc->sids, user_info_dc);
+
+		for (i = 0; pac_logon_info->res_group_dom_sid && i < pac_logon_info->res_groups.count; i++) {
+			user_info_dc->sids[user_info_dc->num_sids] = *pac_logon_info->res_group_dom_sid;
+			if (!sid_append_rid(&user_info_dc->sids[user_info_dc->num_sids],
+					    pac_logon_info->res_groups.rids[i].rid)) {
+				return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+			}
+			user_info_dc->num_sids++;
+		}
+	}
+	*_user_info_dc = user_info_dc;
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}