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authorGerald Carter <jerry@samba.org>2004-10-13 12:31:37 +0000
committerGerald (Jerry) Carter <jerry@samba.org>2007-10-10 10:11:30 -0500
commitc05ce87c028b0dc487f3bb62602c3d0dfb2bd04d (patch)
tree7c6c85ba26d43476a9cf05a59b5855b5a4b1c103
parentf5a7043aa9d1c71f54170c8dca67c5651e8c705c (diff)
downloadsamba-misc-tags/initial-v2-2-test.tar.gz
r2947: applying changes for 2.2.12samba-misc-tags/initial-v2-2-test
-rw-r--r--WHATSNEW.txt83
-rw-r--r--source/include/version.h2
-rw-r--r--source/smbd/vfs.c1
3 files changed, 82 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/WHATSNEW.txt b/WHATSNEW.txt
index d076c510762..32038e1054a 100644
--- a/WHATSNEW.txt
+++ b/WHATSNEW.txt
@@ -1,4 +1,85 @@
==============================
+ Release Notes for Samba 2.2.12
+ Sept 29, 2004
+ ==============================
+
+
+######################## SECURITY RELEASE ########################
+
+Summary: Potential Arbitrary File Access
+
+Affected
+Versions: Samba 2.2.x
+
+Summary: A remote attacker may be able to gain access
+ to files which exist outside of the share's
+ defined path. Such files must still be readable
+ by the account used for the connection.
+
+CVE ID: CAN-2004-0815
+ (http://cve.mitre.org/)
+
+This is the last stable release of the Samba 2.2 code base.
+There will be no further Samba 2.2.x releases.
+
+-------------
+CAN-2004-0815
+-------------
+
+A bug in the input validation routines used to convert DOS
+path names to path names on the Samba host's file system
+may be exploited to gain access to files outside of the
+share's path defined by smb.conf.
+
+
+Protecting Unpatched Servers
+----------------------------
+
+Samba file shares with 'wide links = no' (a non-default
+setting) in the service definition in smb.conf are *not*
+vulnerable to this attack.
+
+The Samba Team always encourages users to run the latest stable
+release as a defense of against attacks. However, under certain
+circumstances it may not be possible to immediately upgrade
+important installations. In such cases, administrators should
+read the "Server Security" documentation found at
+http://www.samba.org/samba/docs/server_security.html.
+
+
+Credits
+--------
+
+Both security issues were reported to Samba developers by
+iDEFENSE (http://www.idefense.com/). Karol Wiesek is
+credited with this discovery.
+
+--
+
+Older releases notes for 2.2.x distributions follow
+
+ ------------------------------------------------------
+ ==============================
+ Release Notes for Samba 2.2.11
+ Aug 12, 2004
+ ==============================
+
+This is the latest stable release of the Samba 2.2 code base.
+
+Please note that the Samba 2.2 code tree will reach its End-Of-Life
+on October 1, 2004. Administrators of existing Samba 2.2
+installations are encouraged to upgrade to the latest Samba 3.0.x
+release prior to that date.
+
+The Samba 2.2.11 release addresses the following bug:
+
+ o Crashes in smbd triggered by a Windows XP SP2 client sending
+ a FindNextPrintChangeNotify() request without previously
+ issuing FindFirstPrintChangeNotify().
+
+
+ ------------------------------------------------------
+ ==============================
Release Notes for Samba 2.2.10
July 22, 2004
==============================
@@ -27,8 +108,6 @@ the hash mangling method are encouraged to upgrade to Samba v2.2.10
or v3.0.5.
-Older releases notes for 2.2.x distributions follow
-
------------------------------------------------------
=============================
diff --git a/source/include/version.h b/source/include/version.h
index a7bb85e3be6..17549e1c7b7 100644
--- a/source/include/version.h
+++ b/source/include/version.h
@@ -1 +1 @@
-#define VERSION "2.2.11pre1"
+#define VERSION "2.2.13pre1"
diff --git a/source/smbd/vfs.c b/source/smbd/vfs.c
index c72a9a28874..3d3fb9c39ef 100644
--- a/source/smbd/vfs.c
+++ b/source/smbd/vfs.c
@@ -784,7 +784,6 @@ BOOL reduce_name(connection_struct *conn, char *s,char *dir,BOOL widelinks)
*dir2 = *wd = *base_name = *newname = 0;
if (widelinks) {
- unix_clean_name(s);
/* can't have a leading .. */
if (strncmp(s,"..",2) == 0 && (s[2]==0 || s[2]=='/')) {
DEBUG(3,("Illegal file name? (%s)\n",s));