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// Copyright 2013 The Chromium Authors
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
// found in the LICENSE file.
#include "extensions/browser/process_map.h"
#include <tuple>
#include "content/public/browser/child_process_security_policy.h"
#include "content/public/common/url_constants.h"
#include "extensions/browser/extension_registry.h"
#include "extensions/browser/process_map_factory.h"
#include "extensions/common/extension.h"
#include "extensions/common/features/feature.h"
namespace extensions {
// Item
struct ProcessMap::Item {
Item(const std::string& extension_id,
int process_id,
content::SiteInstanceId site_instance_id)
: extension_id(extension_id),
process_id(process_id),
site_instance_id(site_instance_id) {}
Item(const Item&) = delete;
Item& operator=(const Item&) = delete;
~Item() {
}
Item(ProcessMap::Item&&) = default;
Item& operator=(ProcessMap::Item&&) = default;
bool operator<(const ProcessMap::Item& other) const {
return std::tie(extension_id, process_id, site_instance_id) <
std::tie(other.extension_id, other.process_id,
other.site_instance_id);
}
std::string extension_id;
int process_id = 0;
content::SiteInstanceId site_instance_id;
};
// ProcessMap
ProcessMap::ProcessMap() {
}
ProcessMap::~ProcessMap() {
}
// static
ProcessMap* ProcessMap::Get(content::BrowserContext* browser_context) {
return ProcessMapFactory::GetForBrowserContext(browser_context);
}
bool ProcessMap::Insert(const std::string& extension_id,
int process_id,
content::SiteInstanceId site_instance_id) {
return items_.insert(Item(extension_id, process_id, site_instance_id)).second;
}
bool ProcessMap::Remove(const std::string& extension_id,
int process_id,
content::SiteInstanceId site_instance_id) {
return items_.erase(Item(extension_id, process_id, site_instance_id)) > 0;
}
int ProcessMap::RemoveAllFromProcess(int process_id) {
int result = 0;
for (auto iter = items_.begin(); iter != items_.end();) {
if (iter->process_id == process_id) {
items_.erase(iter++);
++result;
} else {
++iter;
}
}
return result;
}
bool ProcessMap::Contains(const std::string& extension_id,
int process_id) const {
for (auto iter = items_.cbegin(); iter != items_.cend(); ++iter) {
if (iter->process_id == process_id && iter->extension_id == extension_id)
return true;
}
return false;
}
bool ProcessMap::Contains(int process_id) const {
for (auto iter = items_.cbegin(); iter != items_.cend(); ++iter) {
if (iter->process_id == process_id)
return true;
}
return false;
}
std::set<std::string> ProcessMap::GetExtensionsInProcess(int process_id) const {
std::set<std::string> result;
for (auto iter = items_.cbegin(); iter != items_.cend(); ++iter) {
if (iter->process_id == process_id)
result.insert(iter->extension_id);
}
return result;
}
Feature::Context ProcessMap::GetMostLikelyContextType(
const Extension* extension,
int process_id,
const GURL* url) const {
// WARNING: This logic must match ScriptContextSet::ClassifyJavaScriptContext,
// as much as possible.
// TODO(crbug.com/1055168): Move this into the !extension if statement below
// or document why we want to return WEBUI_CONTEXT for content scripts in
// WebUIs.
// TODO(crbug.com/1055656): HasWebUIBindings does not always return true for
// WebUIs. This should be changed to use something else.
if (content::ChildProcessSecurityPolicy::GetInstance()->HasWebUIBindings(
process_id)) {
return Feature::WEBUI_CONTEXT;
}
if (!extension) {
// Note that blob/filesystem schemes associated with an inner URL of
// chrome-untrusted will be considered regular pages.
if (url && url->SchemeIs(content::kChromeUIUntrustedScheme))
return Feature::WEBUI_UNTRUSTED_CONTEXT;
return Feature::WEB_PAGE_CONTEXT;
}
if (!Contains(extension->id(), process_id)) {
// This could equally be UNBLESSED_EXTENSION_CONTEXT, but we don't record
// which processes have extension frames in them.
// TODO(kalman): Investigate this.
return Feature::CONTENT_SCRIPT_CONTEXT;
}
if (extension->is_hosted_app() &&
extension->location() != mojom::ManifestLocation::kComponent) {
return Feature::BLESSED_WEB_PAGE_CONTEXT;
}
// TODO(https://crbug.com/1339382): Currently, offscreen document contexts
// are misclassified as BLESSED_EXTENSION_CONTEXTs. This is not ideal
// because there is a mismatch between the browser and the renderer), but it's
// not a security issue because, while offscreen documents have fewer
// capabilities, this is an API distinction, and not a security enforcement.
// Offscreen documents run in the same process as the rest of the extension
// and can message the extension, so could easily - though indirectly -
// access all the same features.
// Even so, we should fix this to properly classify offscreen documents (and
// this would be a problem if offscreen documents ever have access to APIs
// that BLESSED_EXTENSION_CONTEXTs don't).
return is_lock_screen_context_ ? Feature::LOCK_SCREEN_EXTENSION_CONTEXT
: Feature::BLESSED_EXTENSION_CONTEXT;
}
} // namespace extensions
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