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A single dot matches the official YAML 1.1 int regex.
This was probably unintended. The regex now requires at least
a digit before or after the dot.
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close #387
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Per suggestion https://github.com/yaml/pyyaml/issues/420#issuecomment-663888344
move a few constructors from full_load to unsafe_load.
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* Move most CI to GitHub Actions
* Build sdist
* Build manylinux1 wheels with libyaml ext (also tested with 2010 and 2014)
* Build MacOS x86_64 wheels with libyaml ext
* Windows wheel builds remain on AppVeyor until we drop 2.7 support in 6.0
* Smoke tests of all post-build artifacts
* Add PEP517/518 build declaration (pyproject.toml with setuptools backend)
* Fully move build to setuptools
* Drop Python 3.5 support
* Declare Python 3.9 support
* Update PyPI metadata now that setuptools lets it flow through
Co-authored-by: Matt Davis <mrd@redhat.com>
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* Prevents arbitrary code execution during python/object/new constructor
In FullLoader python/object/new constructor, implemented by
construct_python_object_apply, has support for setting the state of a
deserialized instance through the set_python_instance_state method.
After setting the state, some operations are performed on the instance
to complete its initialization, however it is possible for an attacker
to set the instance' state in such a way that arbitrary code is executed
by the FullLoader.
This patch tries to block such attacks in FullLoader by preventing
set_python_instance_state from setting arbitrary properties. It
implements a blacklist that includes `extend` method (called by
construct_python_object_apply) and all special methods (e.g. __set__,
__setitem__, etc.).
Users who need special attributes being set in the state of a
deserialized object can still do it through the UnsafeLoader, which
however should not be used on untrusted input. Additionally, they can
subclass FullLoader and redefine `get_state_keys_blacklist()` to
extend/replace the list of blacklisted keys, passing the subclassed
loader to yaml.load.
* Make sure python/object/new constructor does not set some properties
* Add test to show how to subclass FullLoader with new blacklist
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After #163, this adds some test data to check if the datetime objects
return the correct timezone
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* increase size of index, line, and column fields
* use size_t instead of unsigned long long
* better test infrastructure for test for large file
* only run large file test when env var is set
* fix review comments regarding env vars
* fix missing import on python 3
* force all tests in CI
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They were disabled in d6cbff662084dd94bde5421ece495482d1b14454
After #351 the tests are working again
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Loader.add_multi_constructor(None, myconstructor)
Also add test for add_multi_constructor('!', ...) etc.
See issue #317
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The `load` and `load_all` methods will issue a warning when they are
called without the 'Loader=' parameter. The warning will point to a URL
that is always up to date with the latest information on the usage of
`load`.
There are several ways to stop the warning:
* Use `full_load(input)` - sugar for `yaml.load(input, FullLoader)`
* FullLoader is the new safe but complete loader class
* Use `safe_load(input)` - sugar for `yaml.load(input, SafeLoader)`
* Make sure your input YAML consists of the 'safe' subset
* Use `unsafe_load(input)` - sugar for `yaml.load(input, UnsafeLoader)`
* Make sure your input YAML consists of the 'safe' subset
* Use `yaml.load(input, Loader=yaml.<loader>)`
* Or shorter `yaml.load(input, yaml.<loader>)`
* Where '<loader>' can be:
* FullLoader - safe, complete Python YAML loading
* SafeLoader - safe, partial Python YAML loading
* UnsafeLoader - more explicit name for the old, unsafe 'Loader' class
* yaml.warnings({'YAMLLoadWarning': False})
* Use this when you use third party modules that use `yaml.load(input)`
* Only do this if input is trusted
The above `load()` expressions all have `load_all()` counterparts.
You can get the original unsafe behavior with:
* `yaml.unsafe_load(input)`
* `yaml.load(input, Loader=yaml.UnsafeLoader)`
In a future release, `yaml.load(input)` will raise an exception.
The new loader called FullLoader is almost entirely complete as
Loader/UnsafeLoader but it does it avoids all known code execution
paths. It is the preferred YAML loader, and the current default for
`yaml.load(input)` when you get the warning.
Here are some of the exploits that can be triggered with UnsafeLoader
but not with FullLoader:
```
python -c 'import os, yaml; yaml.full_load("!!python/object/new:os.system [echo EXPLOIT!]")'`
python -c 'import yaml; print yaml.full_load("!!python/object/new:abs [-5]")'
python -c 'import yaml; yaml.full_load("!!python/object/new:eval [exit(5)]")' ; echo $?
python -c 'import yaml; yaml.full_load("!!python/object/new:exit [5]")' ; echo $?
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Revert "Make pyyaml safe by default."
This reverts commit bbcf95fa051fdba9bbf879332e2f7999b195cf95.
This reverts commit 7b68405c81db889f83c32846462b238ccae5be80.
This reverts commit 517e83e8058e9d6850ab432ef22d84c2ac2bba5a.
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Change yaml.load/yaml.dump to be yaml.safe_load/yaml.safe_dump, introduced yaml.danger_dump/yaml.danger_load, and the same for various other classes.
(python2 only at this moment)
Refs #5
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* Allow colon in a plain scalar in a flow context
* Restore behavior of flow mapping with empty value
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end of the stream.
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message in setup.py.
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all possible styles.
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