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authorTom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>2015-05-19 18:33:58 -0400
committerTom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>2015-05-19 18:33:58 -0400
commitbd9c6dc9ab9de8f07647015af65d6d2cec0057e3 (patch)
treedd07443b3578dbf8840168d2dd31c72ed47df9a6
parent2eb2fcd56b76ff7aef03f7de772e7459997e61ad (diff)
downloadpostgresql-bd9c6dc9ab9de8f07647015af65d6d2cec0057e3.tar.gz
Last-minute updates for release notes.REL9_4_2
Revise description of CVE-2015-3166, in line with scaled-back patch. Change release date. Security: CVE-2015-3166
-rw-r--r--doc/src/sgml/release-9.0.sgml26
-rw-r--r--doc/src/sgml/release-9.1.sgml26
-rw-r--r--doc/src/sgml/release-9.2.sgml26
-rw-r--r--doc/src/sgml/release-9.3.sgml26
-rw-r--r--doc/src/sgml/release-9.4.sgml33
5 files changed, 87 insertions, 50 deletions
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/release-9.0.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/release-9.0.sgml
index a3d9461fa6..9794b5b3b7 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/release-9.0.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/release-9.0.sgml
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
<note>
<title>Release Date</title>
- <simpara>2015-05-21</simpara>
+ <simpara>2015-05-22</simpara>
</note>
<para>
@@ -58,18 +58,24 @@
<listitem>
<para>
- Consistently check for failure of the <function>*printf()</> family of
- functions (Noah Misch)
+ Improve detection of system-call failures (Noah Misch)
</para>
<para>
- Most calls of these functions did not consider the possibility that
- the functions could fail with, eg, out-of-memory conditions. The usual
- result would just be missing output, but crashes or exposure of
- unintended information are also possible. To protect against such
- risks uniformly, create wrappers around these functions that throw an
- error on failure. Also add missing error checks to a few
- security-relevant calls of other system functions.
+ Our replacement implementation of <function>snprintf()</> failed to
+ check for errors reported by the underlying system library calls;
+ the main case that might be missed is out-of-memory situations.
+ In the worst case this might lead to information exposure, due to our
+ code assuming that a buffer had been overwritten when it hadn't been.
+ Also, there were a few places in which security-relevant calls of other
+ system library functions did not check for failure.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ It remains possible that some calls of the <function>*printf()</>
+ family of functions are vulnerable to information disclosure if an
+ out-of-memory error occurs at just the wrong time. We judge the risk
+ to not be large, but will continue analysis in this area.
(CVE-2015-3166)
</para>
</listitem>
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/release-9.1.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/release-9.1.sgml
index 82dde5e038..f6c0d13157 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/release-9.1.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/release-9.1.sgml
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
<note>
<title>Release Date</title>
- <simpara>2015-05-21</simpara>
+ <simpara>2015-05-22</simpara>
</note>
<para>
@@ -58,18 +58,24 @@
<listitem>
<para>
- Consistently check for failure of the <function>*printf()</> family of
- functions (Noah Misch)
+ Improve detection of system-call failures (Noah Misch)
</para>
<para>
- Most calls of these functions did not consider the possibility that
- the functions could fail with, eg, out-of-memory conditions. The usual
- result would just be missing output, but crashes or exposure of
- unintended information are also possible. To protect against such
- risks uniformly, create wrappers around these functions that throw an
- error on failure. Also add missing error checks to a few
- security-relevant calls of other system functions.
+ Our replacement implementation of <function>snprintf()</> failed to
+ check for errors reported by the underlying system library calls;
+ the main case that might be missed is out-of-memory situations.
+ In the worst case this might lead to information exposure, due to our
+ code assuming that a buffer had been overwritten when it hadn't been.
+ Also, there were a few places in which security-relevant calls of other
+ system library functions did not check for failure.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ It remains possible that some calls of the <function>*printf()</>
+ family of functions are vulnerable to information disclosure if an
+ out-of-memory error occurs at just the wrong time. We judge the risk
+ to not be large, but will continue analysis in this area.
(CVE-2015-3166)
</para>
</listitem>
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/release-9.2.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/release-9.2.sgml
index ff715efaa5..168a387d34 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/release-9.2.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/release-9.2.sgml
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
<note>
<title>Release Date</title>
- <simpara>2015-05-21</simpara>
+ <simpara>2015-05-22</simpara>
</note>
<para>
@@ -58,18 +58,24 @@
<listitem>
<para>
- Consistently check for failure of the <function>*printf()</> family of
- functions (Noah Misch)
+ Improve detection of system-call failures (Noah Misch)
</para>
<para>
- Most calls of these functions did not consider the possibility that
- the functions could fail with, eg, out-of-memory conditions. The usual
- result would just be missing output, but crashes or exposure of
- unintended information are also possible. To protect against such
- risks uniformly, create wrappers around these functions that throw an
- error on failure. Also add missing error checks to a few
- security-relevant calls of other system functions.
+ Our replacement implementation of <function>snprintf()</> failed to
+ check for errors reported by the underlying system library calls;
+ the main case that might be missed is out-of-memory situations.
+ In the worst case this might lead to information exposure, due to our
+ code assuming that a buffer had been overwritten when it hadn't been.
+ Also, there were a few places in which security-relevant calls of other
+ system library functions did not check for failure.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ It remains possible that some calls of the <function>*printf()</>
+ family of functions are vulnerable to information disclosure if an
+ out-of-memory error occurs at just the wrong time. We judge the risk
+ to not be large, but will continue analysis in this area.
(CVE-2015-3166)
</para>
</listitem>
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/release-9.3.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/release-9.3.sgml
index 4c0d853543..38f3354bd8 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/release-9.3.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/release-9.3.sgml
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
<note>
<title>Release Date</title>
- <simpara>2015-05-21</simpara>
+ <simpara>2015-05-22</simpara>
</note>
<para>
@@ -58,18 +58,24 @@
<listitem>
<para>
- Consistently check for failure of the <function>*printf()</> family of
- functions (Noah Misch)
+ Improve detection of system-call failures (Noah Misch)
</para>
<para>
- Most calls of these functions did not consider the possibility that
- the functions could fail with, eg, out-of-memory conditions. The usual
- result would just be missing output, but crashes or exposure of
- unintended information are also possible. To protect against such
- risks uniformly, create wrappers around these functions that throw an
- error on failure. Also add missing error checks to a few
- security-relevant calls of other system functions.
+ Our replacement implementation of <function>snprintf()</> failed to
+ check for errors reported by the underlying system library calls;
+ the main case that might be missed is out-of-memory situations.
+ In the worst case this might lead to information exposure, due to our
+ code assuming that a buffer had been overwritten when it hadn't been.
+ Also, there were a few places in which security-relevant calls of other
+ system library functions did not check for failure.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ It remains possible that some calls of the <function>*printf()</>
+ family of functions are vulnerable to information disclosure if an
+ out-of-memory error occurs at just the wrong time. We judge the risk
+ to not be large, but will continue analysis in this area.
(CVE-2015-3166)
</para>
</listitem>
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/release-9.4.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/release-9.4.sgml
index ec5dce4486..e9d1d29aa3 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/release-9.4.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/release-9.4.sgml
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
<note>
<title>Release Date</title>
- <simpara>2015-05-21</simpara>
+ <simpara>2015-05-22</simpara>
</note>
<para>
@@ -87,22 +87,35 @@ Branch: REL9_3_STABLE [c669915fd] 2015-05-18 10:02:37 -0400
Branch: REL9_2_STABLE [01272d95a] 2015-05-18 10:02:37 -0400
Branch: REL9_1_STABLE [2cb9f2cab] 2015-05-18 10:02:38 -0400
Branch: REL9_0_STABLE [9b5e831e3] 2015-05-18 10:02:38 -0400
+Author: Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>
+Branch: master [0c071936e] 2015-05-19 18:19:38 -0400
+Branch: REL9_4_STABLE [2eb2fcd56] 2015-05-19 18:16:19 -0400
+Branch: REL9_3_STABLE [13341276e] 2015-05-19 18:16:58 -0400
+Branch: REL9_2_STABLE [221f7a949] 2015-05-19 18:17:42 -0400
+Branch: REL9_1_STABLE [0510cff6e] 2015-05-19 18:18:16 -0400
+Branch: REL9_0_STABLE [cf893530a] 2015-05-19 18:18:56 -0400
-->
<listitem>
<para>
- Consistently check for failure of the <function>*printf()</> family of
- functions (Noah Misch)
+ Improve detection of system-call failures (Noah Misch)
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ Our replacement implementation of <function>snprintf()</> failed to
+ check for errors reported by the underlying system library calls;
+ the main case that might be missed is out-of-memory situations.
+ In the worst case this might lead to information exposure, due to our
+ code assuming that a buffer had been overwritten when it hadn't been.
+ Also, there were a few places in which security-relevant calls of other
+ system library functions did not check for failure.
</para>
<para>
- Most calls of these functions did not consider the possibility that
- the functions could fail with, eg, out-of-memory conditions. The usual
- result would just be missing output, but crashes or exposure of
- unintended information are also possible. To protect against such
- risks uniformly, create wrappers around these functions that throw an
- error on failure. Also add missing error checks to a few
- security-relevant calls of other system functions.
+ It remains possible that some calls of the <function>*printf()</>
+ family of functions are vulnerable to information disclosure if an
+ out-of-memory error occurs at just the wrong time. We judge the risk
+ to not be large, but will continue analysis in this area.
(CVE-2015-3166)
</para>
</listitem>