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authorNicola Tuveri <nicola.tuveri@ibm.com>2020-05-19 19:36:44 +0200
committerNicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>2020-05-22 15:35:21 +0200
commit2de64666a07cccf8477e6483de62ae31f463df64 (patch)
treefbed08dcd12d6a7db9868b57643055701fd91df6 /providers/implementations/signature
parente12813d0d31f4f7be2ccc592d382ef3e94bdb842 (diff)
downloadopenssl-new-2de64666a07cccf8477e6483de62ae31f463df64.tar.gz
Adjust length of some strncpy() calls
This fixes warnings detected by -Wstringop-truncation. Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11878)
Diffstat (limited to 'providers/implementations/signature')
-rw-r--r--providers/implementations/signature/rsa.c34
1 files changed, 29 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/providers/implementations/signature/rsa.c b/providers/implementations/signature/rsa.c
index 6f62c2b648..0e3885ec1d 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/signature/rsa.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/signature/rsa.c
@@ -227,17 +227,22 @@ static int rsa_setup_md(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
EVP_MD *md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops);
int md_nid = rsa_get_md_nid(md);
WPACKET pkt;
+ size_t mdname_len = strlen(mdname);
if (md == NULL
|| md_nid == NID_undef
|| !rsa_check_padding(md_nid, ctx->pad_mode)
- || !rsa_check_parameters(md, ctx)) {
+ || !rsa_check_parameters(md, ctx)
+ || mdname_len >= sizeof(ctx->mdname)) {
if (md == NULL)
ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
"%s could not be fetched", mdname);
if (md_nid == NID_undef)
ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED,
"digest=%s", mdname);
+ if (mdname_len >= sizeof(ctx->mdname))
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
+ "%s exceeds name buffer length", mdname);
EVP_MD_free(md);
return 0;
}
@@ -274,6 +279,8 @@ static int rsa_setup_md(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
static int rsa_setup_mgf1_md(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
const char *mdprops)
{
+ size_t len;
+
if (mdprops == NULL)
mdprops = ctx->propq;
@@ -285,7 +292,12 @@ static int rsa_setup_mgf1_md(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
"%s could not be fetched", mdname);
return 0;
}
- OPENSSL_strlcpy(ctx->mgf1_mdname, mdname, sizeof(ctx->mgf1_mdname));
+ len = OPENSSL_strlcpy(ctx->mgf1_mdname, mdname, sizeof(ctx->mgf1_mdname));
+ if (len >= sizeof(ctx->mgf1_mdname)) {
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
+ "%s exceeds name buffer length", mdname);
+ return 0;
+ }
return 1;
}
@@ -321,6 +333,7 @@ static int rsa_signature_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa, int operation)
int mgf1md_nid = rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenhashalg(pss);
int min_saltlen = rsa_pss_params_30_saltlen(pss);
const char *mdname, *mgf1mdname;
+ size_t len;
mdname = rsa_oaeppss_nid2name(md_nid);
mgf1mdname = rsa_oaeppss_nid2name(mgf1md_nid);
@@ -337,9 +350,20 @@ static int rsa_signature_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa, int operation)
return 0;
}
- strncpy(prsactx->mdname, mdname, sizeof(prsactx->mdname));
- strncpy(prsactx->mgf1_mdname, mgf1mdname,
- sizeof(prsactx->mgf1_mdname));
+ len = OPENSSL_strlcpy(prsactx->mdname, mdname,
+ sizeof(prsactx->mdname));
+ if (len >= sizeof(prsactx->mdname)) {
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
+ "hash algorithm name too long");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ len = OPENSSL_strlcpy(prsactx->mgf1_mdname, mgf1mdname,
+ sizeof(prsactx->mgf1_mdname));
+ if (len >= sizeof(prsactx->mgf1_mdname)) {
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
+ "MGF1 hash algorithm name too long");
+ return 0;
+ }
prsactx->saltlen = min_saltlen;
return rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, prsactx->propq)