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authorRich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>2015-05-04 18:00:15 -0400
committerRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>2015-05-05 22:18:59 -0400
commit16f8d4ebf0fd4847fa83d9c61f4150273cb4f533 (patch)
tree3c30094cad38433c24008c30efe3d93cf38d8ae9 /crypto
parent12048657a91b12e499d03ec9ff406b42aba67366 (diff)
downloadopenssl-new-16f8d4ebf0fd4847fa83d9c61f4150273cb4f533.tar.gz
memset, memcpy, sizeof consistency fixes
Just as with the OPENSSL_malloc calls, consistently use sizeof(*ptr) for memset and memcpy. Remove needless casts for those functions. For memset, replace alternative forms of zero with 0. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto')
-rw-r--r--crypto/LPdir_unix.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/LPdir_vms.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/LPdir_win.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/asn1/a_enum.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/asn1/a_int.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/asn1/a_verify.c10
-rw-r--r--crypto/asn1/ameth_lib.c3
-rw-r--r--crypto/bio/b_sock.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/bio/bss_acpt.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/bio/bss_conn.c4
-rw-r--r--crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c43
-rw-r--r--crypto/bn/bn_blind.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/bn/bn_intern.c4
-rw-r--r--crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h6
-rw-r--r--crypto/bn/bn_lib.c8
-rw-r--r--crypto/bn/bn_mont.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/bn/bn_mul.c14
-rw-r--r--crypto/bn/bn_shift.c5
-rw-r--r--crypto/bn/bn_sqr.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/comp/comp_lib.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/dso/dso_lib.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/dso/dso_win32.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c20
-rw-r--r--crypto/ec/ecp_nistp256.c19
-rw-r--r--crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c19
-rw-r--r--crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c14
-rw-r--r--crypto/engine/eng_dyn.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/engine/eng_lib.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/evp/bio_ok.c3
-rw-r--r--crypto/evp/digest.c4
-rw-r--r--crypto/evp/e_null.c3
-rw-r--r--crypto/evp/evp_enc.c5
-rw-r--r--crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/jpake/jpake.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/md2/md2_dgst.c8
-rw-r--r--crypto/modes/ocb128.c14
-rw-r--r--crypto/pqueue/pqueue.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c6
-rw-r--r--crypto/sha/sha512.c8
-rw-r--r--crypto/stack/stack.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/store/str_mem.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/ts/ts_rsp_sign.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/ts/ts_verify_ctx.c4
-rw-r--r--crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c10
-rw-r--r--crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c5
46 files changed, 131 insertions, 152 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/LPdir_unix.c b/crypto/LPdir_unix.c
index 3a14da19b1..1428cd16c6 100644
--- a/crypto/LPdir_unix.c
+++ b/crypto/LPdir_unix.c
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ const char *LP_find_file(LP_DIR_CTX **ctx, const char *directory)
errno = ENOMEM;
return 0;
}
- memset(*ctx, '\0', sizeof(**ctx));
+ memset(*ctx, 0, sizeof(**ctx));
(*ctx)->dir = opendir(directory);
if ((*ctx)->dir == NULL) {
diff --git a/crypto/LPdir_vms.c b/crypto/LPdir_vms.c
index 1e8f9e7d61..362918dae3 100644
--- a/crypto/LPdir_vms.c
+++ b/crypto/LPdir_vms.c
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ const char *LP_find_file(LP_DIR_CTX **ctx, const char *directory)
errno = ENOMEM;
return 0;
}
- memset(*ctx, '\0', sizeof(**ctx));
+ memset(*ctx, 0, sizeof(**ctx));
strcpy((*ctx)->filespec, directory);
strcat((*ctx)->filespec, "*.*;");
diff --git a/crypto/LPdir_win.c b/crypto/LPdir_win.c
index 78a796de80..4ff514f885 100644
--- a/crypto/LPdir_win.c
+++ b/crypto/LPdir_win.c
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ const char *LP_find_file(LP_DIR_CTX **ctx, const char *directory)
errno = ENOMEM;
return 0;
}
- memset(*ctx, '\0', sizeof(**ctx));
+ memset(*ctx, 0, sizeof(**ctx));
if (directory[dirlen - 1] != '*') {
extdirbuf = (char *)malloc(dirlen + 3);
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/a_enum.c b/crypto/asn1/a_enum.c
index 4abd80c122..aed3de5fee 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/a_enum.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/a_enum.c
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ int ASN1_ENUMERATED_set(ASN1_ENUMERATED *a, long v)
if (a->length < (int)(sizeof(long) + 1)) {
OPENSSL_free(a->data);
if ((a->data = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(long) + 1)) != NULL)
- memset((char *)a->data, 0, sizeof(long) + 1);
+ memset(a->data, 0, sizeof(long) + 1);
}
if (a->data == NULL) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ENUMERATED_SET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/a_int.c b/crypto/asn1/a_int.c
index 68a312b97a..228297803b 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/a_int.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/a_int.c
@@ -349,7 +349,7 @@ int ASN1_INTEGER_set(ASN1_INTEGER *a, long v)
if (a->length < (int)(sizeof(long) + 1)) {
OPENSSL_free(a->data);
if ((a->data = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(long) + 1)) != NULL)
- memset((char *)a->data, 0, sizeof(long) + 1);
+ memset(a->data, 0, sizeof(long) + 1);
}
if (a->data == NULL) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_INTEGER_SET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c b/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c
index b452999756..5b908f14ce 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c
@@ -121,11 +121,6 @@ int ASN1_verify(i2d_of_void *i2d, X509_ALGOR *a, ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature,
ret = 0;
goto err;
}
- /*
- * we don't need to zero the 'ctx' because we just checked public
- * information
- */
- /* memset(&ctx,0,sizeof(ctx)); */
ret = 1;
err:
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
@@ -221,11 +216,6 @@ int ASN1_item_verify(const ASN1_ITEM *it, X509_ALGOR *a,
ret = 0;
goto err;
}
- /*
- * we don't need to zero the 'ctx' because we just checked public
- * information
- */
- /* memset(&ctx,0,sizeof(ctx)); */
ret = 1;
err:
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/ameth_lib.c b/crypto/asn1/ameth_lib.c
index c7acb468a6..de70f9b4b2 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/ameth_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/ameth_lib.c
@@ -288,8 +288,7 @@ EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *EVP_PKEY_asn1_new(int id, int flags,
if (!ameth)
return NULL;
- memset(ameth, 0, sizeof(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD));
-
+ memset(ameth, 0, sizeof(*ameth));
ameth->pkey_id = id;
ameth->pkey_base_id = id;
ameth->pkey_flags = flags | ASN1_PKEY_DYNAMIC;
diff --git a/crypto/bio/b_sock.c b/crypto/bio/b_sock.c
index 39499de591..e3a1ee94da 100644
--- a/crypto/bio/b_sock.c
+++ b/crypto/bio/b_sock.c
@@ -484,7 +484,7 @@ int BIO_get_accept_socket(char *host, int bind_mode)
if (!BIO_get_port(p, &port))
goto err;
- memset((char *)&server, 0, sizeof(server));
+ memset(&server, 0, sizeof(server));
server.sa_in.sin_family = AF_INET;
server.sa_in.sin_port = htons(port);
addrlen = sizeof(server.sa_in);
diff --git a/crypto/bio/bss_acpt.c b/crypto/bio/bss_acpt.c
index cde8da3346..48435b09eb 100644
--- a/crypto/bio/bss_acpt.c
+++ b/crypto/bio/bss_acpt.c
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ static BIO_ACCEPT *BIO_ACCEPT_new(void)
if ((ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ret))) == NULL)
return (NULL);
- memset(ret, 0, sizeof(BIO_ACCEPT));
+ memset(ret, 0, sizeof(*ret));
ret->accept_sock = INVALID_SOCKET;
ret->bind_mode = BIO_BIND_NORMAL;
return (ret);
diff --git a/crypto/bio/bss_conn.c b/crypto/bio/bss_conn.c
index b8fa8288eb..60f58e2d22 100644
--- a/crypto/bio/bss_conn.c
+++ b/crypto/bio/bss_conn.c
@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ static int conn_state(BIO *b, BIO_CONNECT *c)
case BIO_CONN_S_CREATE_SOCKET:
/* now setup address */
- memset((char *)&c->them, 0, sizeof(c->them));
+ memset(&c->them, 0, sizeof(c->them));
c->them.sin_family = AF_INET;
c->them.sin_port = htons((unsigned short)c->port);
l = (unsigned long)
@@ -298,7 +298,7 @@ BIO_CONNECT *BIO_CONNECT_new(void)
ret->ip[2] = 0;
ret->ip[3] = 0;
ret->port = 0;
- memset((char *)&ret->them, 0, sizeof(ret->them));
+ memset(&ret->them, 0, sizeof(ret->them));
return (ret);
}
diff --git a/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c b/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c
index fb1564cd12..53d8136d64 100644
--- a/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c
+++ b/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c
@@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ static int dgram_new(BIO *bi)
data = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*data));
if (data == NULL)
return 0;
- memset(data, 0x00, sizeof(bio_dgram_data));
+ memset(data, 0, sizeof(*data));
bi->ptr = data;
bi->flags = 0;
@@ -395,7 +395,7 @@ static int dgram_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
if (out != NULL) {
clear_socket_error();
- memset(&sa.peer, 0x00, sizeof(sa.peer));
+ memset(&sa.peer, 0, sizeof(sa.peer));
dgram_adjust_rcv_timeout(b);
ret = recvfrom(b->num, out, outl, 0, &sa.peer.sa, (void *)&sa.len);
if (sizeof(sa.len.i) != sizeof(sa.len.s) && sa.len.i == 0) {
@@ -569,7 +569,7 @@ static long dgram_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_DISCOVER:
# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX) && defined(IP_MTU_DISCOVER) && defined(IP_PMTUDISC_DO)
addr_len = (socklen_t) sizeof(addr);
- memset((void *)&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
+ memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
if (getsockname(b->num, &addr.sa, &addr_len) < 0) {
ret = 0;
break;
@@ -600,7 +600,7 @@ static long dgram_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU:
# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX) && defined(IP_MTU)
addr_len = (socklen_t) sizeof(addr);
- memset((void *)&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
+ memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
if (getsockname(b->num, &addr.sa, &addr_len) < 0) {
ret = 0;
break;
@@ -693,7 +693,7 @@ static long dgram_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
}
} else {
data->connected = 0;
- memset(&(data->peer), 0x00, sizeof(data->peer));
+ memset(&data->peer, 0, sizeof(data->peer));
}
break;
case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_PEER:
@@ -1028,7 +1028,7 @@ BIO *BIO_new_dgram_sctp(int fd, int close_flag)
# ifdef SCTP_AUTHENTICATION_EVENT
# ifdef SCTP_EVENT
- memset(&event, 0, sizeof(struct sctp_event));
+ memset(&event, 0, sizeof(event));
event.se_assoc_id = 0;
event.se_type = SCTP_AUTHENTICATION_EVENT;
event.se_on = 1;
@@ -1088,7 +1088,7 @@ static int dgram_sctp_new(BIO *bi)
data = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*data));
if (data == NULL)
return 0;
- memset(data, 0x00, sizeof(bio_dgram_sctp_data));
+ memset(data, 0, sizeof(*data));
# ifdef SCTP_PR_SCTP_NONE
data->prinfo.pr_policy = SCTP_PR_SCTP_NONE;
# endif
@@ -1149,8 +1149,7 @@ static int dgram_sctp_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
clear_socket_error();
do {
- memset(&data->rcvinfo, 0x00,
- sizeof(struct bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo));
+ memset(&data->rcvinfo, 0, sizeof(data->rcvinfo));
iov.iov_base = out;
iov.iov_len = outl;
msg.msg_name = NULL;
@@ -1229,7 +1228,7 @@ static int dgram_sctp_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
/* disable sender dry event */
# ifdef SCTP_EVENT
- memset(&event, 0, sizeof(struct sctp_event));
+ memset(&event, 0, sizeof(event));
event.se_assoc_id = 0;
event.se_type = SCTP_SENDER_DRY_EVENT;
event.se_on = 0;
@@ -1393,7 +1392,7 @@ static int dgram_sctp_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl)
* parameters and flags.
*/
if (in[0] != 23) {
- memset(&handshake_sinfo, 0x00, sizeof(struct bio_dgram_sctp_sndinfo));
+ memset(&handshake_sinfo, 0, sizeof(handshake_sinfo));
# ifdef SCTP_SACK_IMMEDIATELY
handshake_sinfo.snd_flags = SCTP_SACK_IMMEDIATELY;
# endif
@@ -1433,7 +1432,7 @@ static int dgram_sctp_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl)
cmsg->cmsg_type = SCTP_SNDINFO;
cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(struct sctp_sndinfo));
sndinfo = (struct sctp_sndinfo *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg);
- memset(sndinfo, 0, sizeof(struct sctp_sndinfo));
+ memset(sndinfo, 0, sizeof(*sndinfo));
sndinfo->snd_sid = sinfo->snd_sid;
sndinfo->snd_flags = sinfo->snd_flags;
sndinfo->snd_ppid = sinfo->snd_ppid;
@@ -1446,7 +1445,7 @@ static int dgram_sctp_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl)
cmsg->cmsg_type = SCTP_PRINFO;
cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(struct sctp_prinfo));
prinfo = (struct sctp_prinfo *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg);
- memset(prinfo, 0, sizeof(struct sctp_prinfo));
+ memset(prinfo, 0, sizeof(*prinfo));
prinfo->pr_policy = pinfo->pr_policy;
prinfo->pr_value = pinfo->pr_value;
msg.msg_controllen += CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(struct sctp_prinfo));
@@ -1456,7 +1455,7 @@ static int dgram_sctp_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl)
cmsg->cmsg_type = SCTP_SNDRCV;
cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(struct sctp_sndrcvinfo));
sndrcvinfo = (struct sctp_sndrcvinfo *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg);
- memset(sndrcvinfo, 0, sizeof(struct sctp_sndrcvinfo));
+ memset(sndrcvinfo, 0, sizeof(*sndrcvinfo));
sndrcvinfo->sinfo_stream = sinfo->snd_sid;
sndrcvinfo->sinfo_flags = sinfo->snd_flags;
# ifdef __FreeBSD__
@@ -1553,7 +1552,7 @@ static long dgram_sctp_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
ret = -1;
break;
}
- memset(authkey, 0x00, sockopt_len);
+ memset(authkey, 0, sockopt_len);
authkey->sca_keynumber = authkeyid.scact_keynumber + 1;
# ifndef __FreeBSD__
/*
@@ -1750,7 +1749,7 @@ int BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(BIO *b)
/* set sender dry event */
# ifdef SCTP_EVENT
- memset(&event, 0, sizeof(struct sctp_event));
+ memset(&event, 0, sizeof(event));
event.se_assoc_id = 0;
event.se_type = SCTP_SENDER_DRY_EVENT;
event.se_on = 1;
@@ -1773,7 +1772,7 @@ int BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(BIO *b)
return -1;
/* peek for notification */
- memset(&snp, 0x00, sizeof(union sctp_notification));
+ memset(&snp, 0, sizeof(snp));
iov.iov_base = (char *)&snp;
iov.iov_len = sizeof(union sctp_notification);
msg.msg_name = NULL;
@@ -1795,7 +1794,7 @@ int BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(BIO *b)
/* if we find a notification, process it and try again if necessary */
while (msg.msg_flags & MSG_NOTIFICATION) {
- memset(&snp, 0x00, sizeof(union sctp_notification));
+ memset(&snp, 0, sizeof(snp));
iov.iov_base = (char *)&snp;
iov.iov_len = sizeof(union sctp_notification);
msg.msg_name = NULL;
@@ -1820,7 +1819,7 @@ int BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(BIO *b)
/* disable sender dry event */
# ifdef SCTP_EVENT
- memset(&event, 0, sizeof(struct sctp_event));
+ memset(&event, 0, sizeof(event));
event.se_assoc_id = 0;
event.se_type = SCTP_SENDER_DRY_EVENT;
event.se_on = 0;
@@ -1854,7 +1853,7 @@ int BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(BIO *b)
(void *)&snp);
/* found notification, peek again */
- memset(&snp, 0x00, sizeof(union sctp_notification));
+ memset(&snp, 0, sizeof(snp));
iov.iov_base = (char *)&snp;
iov.iov_len = sizeof(union sctp_notification);
msg.msg_name = NULL;
@@ -1900,7 +1899,7 @@ int BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(BIO *b)
/* Check if there are any messages waiting to be read */
do {
- memset(&snp, 0x00, sizeof(union sctp_notification));
+ memset(&snp, 0, sizeof(snp));
iov.iov_base = (char *)&snp;
iov.iov_len = sizeof(union sctp_notification);
msg.msg_name = NULL;
@@ -1923,7 +1922,7 @@ int BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(BIO *b)
dgram_sctp_handle_auth_free_key_event(b, &snp);
# endif
- memset(&snp, 0x00, sizeof(union sctp_notification));
+ memset(&snp, 0, sizeof(snp));
iov.iov_base = (char *)&snp;
iov.iov_len = sizeof(union sctp_notification);
msg.msg_name = NULL;
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c b/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c
index 9338cdd4c3..52f74d1e57 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ BN_BLINDING *BN_BLINDING_new(const BIGNUM *A, const BIGNUM *Ai, BIGNUM *mod)
BNerr(BN_F_BN_BLINDING_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return (NULL);
}
- memset(ret, 0, sizeof(BN_BLINDING));
+ memset(ret, 0, sizeof(*ret));
if (A != NULL) {
if ((ret->A = BN_dup(A)) == NULL)
goto err;
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_intern.c b/crypto/bn/bn_intern.c
index 139d11b78e..c3ea5619b2 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_intern.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_intern.c
@@ -211,8 +211,8 @@ int bn_copy_words(BN_ULONG *out, const BIGNUM *in, int size)
if (in->top > size)
return 0;
- memset(out, 0, sizeof(BN_ULONG) * size);
- memcpy(out, in->d, sizeof(BN_ULONG) * in->top);
+ memset(out, 0, sizeof(*out) * size);
+ memcpy(out, in->d, sizeof(*out) * in->top);
return 1;
}
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h b/crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h
index a24ae7fdc9..196df7ea10 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h
@@ -167,10 +167,10 @@ int RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
* *genuinely* constant variables that aren't mutable \
* wouldn't be constructed with top!=dmax. */ \
BN_ULONG *_not_const; \
- memcpy(&_not_const, &_bnum1->d, sizeof(BN_ULONG*)); \
+ memcpy(&_not_const, &_bnum1->d, sizeof(_not_const)); \
RAND_bytes(&_tmp_char, 1); /* Debug only - safe to ignore error return */\
- memset((unsigned char *)(_not_const + _bnum1->top), _tmp_char, \
- (_bnum1->dmax - _bnum1->top) * sizeof(BN_ULONG)); \
+ memset(_not_const + _bnum1->top, _tmp_char, \
+ sizeof(*_not_const) * (_bnum1->dmax - _bnum1->top)); \
} \
} while(0)
# ifdef BN_DEBUG_TRIX
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c b/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
index 6fc0e396bf..fec70a5ccc 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ void BN_free(BIGNUM *a)
void BN_init(BIGNUM *a)
{
- memset(a, 0, sizeof(BIGNUM));
+ memset(a, 0, sizeof(*a));
bn_check_top(a);
}
@@ -311,7 +311,7 @@ static BN_ULONG *bn_expand_internal(const BIGNUM *b, int words)
* function - what's important is constant time operation (we're not
* actually going to use the data)
*/
- memset(a, 0, sizeof(BN_ULONG) * words);
+ memset(a, 0, sizeof(*a) * words);
#endif
#if 1
@@ -355,7 +355,7 @@ static BN_ULONG *bn_expand_internal(const BIGNUM *b, int words)
}
}
#else
- memset(A, 0, sizeof(BN_ULONG) * words);
+ memset(A, 0, sizeof(*A) * words);
memcpy(A, b->d, sizeof(b->d[0]) * b->top);
#endif
@@ -492,7 +492,7 @@ void BN_clear(BIGNUM *a)
{
bn_check_top(a);
if (a->d != NULL)
- memset(a->d, 0, a->dmax * sizeof(a->d[0]));
+ memset(a->d, 0, sizeof(*a->d) * a->dmax);
a->top = 0;
a->neg = 0;
}
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c b/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c
index d07afccadb..613a384c51 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c
@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ static int BN_from_montgomery_word(BIGNUM *ret, BIGNUM *r, BN_MONT_CTX *mont)
rp = r->d;
/* clear the top words of T */
- memset(&(rp[r->top]), 0, (max - r->top) * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
+ memset(&rp[r->top], 0, sizeof(*rp) * (max - r->top));
r->top = max;
n0 = mont->n0[0];
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_mul.c b/crypto/bn/bn_mul.c
index 9b66e666b7..f3b48590bc 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_mul.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_mul.c
@@ -458,7 +458,7 @@ void bn_mul_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n2,
if (!zero)
bn_mul_comba4(&(t[n2]), t, &(t[n]));
else
- memset(&(t[n2]), 0, 8 * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
+ memset(&t[n2], 0, sizeof(*t) * 8);
bn_mul_comba4(r, a, b);
bn_mul_comba4(&(r[n2]), &(a[n]), &(b[n]));
@@ -468,7 +468,7 @@ void bn_mul_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n2,
if (!zero)
bn_mul_comba8(&(t[n2]), t, &(t[n]));
else
- memset(&(t[n2]), 0, 16 * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
+ memset(&t[n2], 0, sizeof(*t) * 16);
bn_mul_comba8(r, a, b);
bn_mul_comba8(&(r[n2]), &(a[n]), &(b[n]));
@@ -479,7 +479,7 @@ void bn_mul_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n2,
if (!zero)
bn_mul_recursive(&(t[n2]), t, &(t[n]), n, 0, 0, p);
else
- memset(&(t[n2]), 0, n2 * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
+ memset(&t[n2], 0, sizeof(*t) * n2);
bn_mul_recursive(r, a, b, n, 0, 0, p);
bn_mul_recursive(&(r[n2]), &(a[n]), &(b[n]), n, dna, dnb, p);
}
@@ -584,14 +584,14 @@ void bn_mul_part_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n,
bn_mul_comba4(&(t[n2]), t, &(t[n]));
bn_mul_comba4(r, a, b);
bn_mul_normal(&(r[n2]), &(a[n]), tn, &(b[n]), tn);
- memset(&(r[n2 + tn * 2]), 0, sizeof(BN_ULONG) * (n2 - tn * 2));
+ memset(&r[n2 + tn * 2], 0, sizeof(*r) * (n2 - tn * 2));
} else
# endif
if (n == 8) {
bn_mul_comba8(&(t[n2]), t, &(t[n]));
bn_mul_comba8(r, a, b);
bn_mul_normal(&(r[n2]), &(a[n]), tna, &(b[n]), tnb);
- memset(&(r[n2 + tna + tnb]), 0, sizeof(BN_ULONG) * (n2 - tna - tnb));
+ memset(&r[n2 + tna + tnb], 0, sizeof(*r) * (n2 - tna - tnb));
} else {
p = &(t[n2 * 2]);
bn_mul_recursive(&(t[n2]), t, &(t[n]), n, 0, 0, p);
@@ -607,7 +607,7 @@ void bn_mul_part_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n,
if (j == 0) {
bn_mul_recursive(&(r[n2]), &(a[n]), &(b[n]),
i, tna - i, tnb - i, p);
- memset(&(r[n2 + i * 2]), 0, sizeof(BN_ULONG) * (n2 - i * 2));
+ memset(&r[n2 + i * 2], 0, sizeof(*r) * (n2 - i * 2));
} else if (j > 0) { /* eg, n == 16, i == 8 and tn == 11 */
bn_mul_part_recursive(&(r[n2]), &(a[n]), &(b[n]),
i, tna - i, tnb - i, p);
@@ -615,7 +615,7 @@ void bn_mul_part_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n,
sizeof(BN_ULONG) * (n2 - tna - tnb));
} else { /* (j < 0) eg, n == 16, i == 8 and tn == 5 */
- memset(&(r[n2]), 0, sizeof(BN_ULONG) * n2);
+ memset(&r[n2], 0, sizeof(*r) * n2);
if (tna < BN_MUL_RECURSIVE_SIZE_NORMAL
&& tnb < BN_MUL_RECURSIVE_SIZE_NORMAL) {
bn_mul_normal(&(r[n2]), &(a[n]), tna, &(b[n]), tnb);
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_shift.c b/crypto/bn/bn_shift.c
index b6cd0d920e..9895646afa 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_shift.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_shift.c
@@ -154,10 +154,7 @@ int BN_lshift(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n)
t[nw + i + 1] |= (l >> rb) & BN_MASK2;
t[nw + i] = (l << lb) & BN_MASK2;
}
- memset(t, 0, nw * sizeof(t[0]));
- /*
- * for (i=0; i<nw; i++) t[i]=0;
- */
+ memset(t, 0, sizeof(*t) * nw);
r->top = a->top + nw + 1;
bn_correct_top(r);
bn_check_top(r);
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_sqr.c b/crypto/bn/bn_sqr.c
index f794c107bd..aa31f6e825 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_sqr.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_sqr.c
@@ -238,7 +238,7 @@ void bn_sqr_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, int n2, BN_ULONG *t)
if (!zero)
bn_sqr_recursive(&(t[n2]), t, n, p);
else
- memset(&(t[n2]), 0, n2 * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
+ memset(&t[n2], 0, sizeof(*t) * n2);
bn_sqr_recursive(r, a, n, p);
bn_sqr_recursive(&(r[n2]), &(a[n]), n, p);
diff --git a/crypto/comp/comp_lib.c b/crypto/comp/comp_lib.c
index 9feb0af43d..42d99364a9 100644
--- a/crypto/comp/comp_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/comp/comp_lib.c
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ COMP_CTX *COMP_CTX_new(COMP_METHOD *meth)
/* ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ */
return (NULL);
}
- memset(ret, 0, sizeof(COMP_CTX));
+ memset(ret, 0, sizeof(*ret));
ret->meth = meth;
if ((ret->meth->init != NULL) && !ret->meth->init(ret)) {
OPENSSL_free(ret);
diff --git a/crypto/dso/dso_lib.c b/crypto/dso/dso_lib.c
index a0e711c76b..c555398fca 100644
--- a/crypto/dso/dso_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/dso/dso_lib.c
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ DSO *DSO_new_method(DSO_METHOD *meth)
DSOerr(DSO_F_DSO_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return (NULL);
}
- memset(ret, 0, sizeof(DSO));
+ memset(ret, 0, sizeof(*ret));
ret->meth_data = sk_void_new_null();
if (ret->meth_data == NULL) {
/* sk_new doesn't generate any errors so we do */
diff --git a/crypto/dso/dso_win32.c b/crypto/dso/dso_win32.c
index bd96c5d2e3..81c983ccb3 100644
--- a/crypto/dso/dso_win32.c
+++ b/crypto/dso/dso_win32.c
@@ -310,7 +310,7 @@ static struct file_st *win32_splitter(DSO *dso, const char *filename,
return (NULL);
}
- memset(result, 0, sizeof(struct file_st));
+ memset(result, 0, sizeof(*result));
position = IN_DEVICE;
if ((filename[0] == '\\' && filename[1] == '\\')
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c
index c79e6dabe3..0e40db48a9 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c
@@ -317,7 +317,7 @@ static int BN_to_felem(felem out, const BIGNUM *bn)
unsigned num_bytes;
/* BN_bn2bin eats leading zeroes */
- memset(b_out, 0, sizeof b_out);
+ memset(b_out, 0, sizeof(b_out));
num_bytes = BN_num_bytes(bn);
if (num_bytes > sizeof b_out) {
ECerr(EC_F_BN_TO_FELEM, EC_R_BIGNUM_OUT_OF_RANGE);
@@ -1069,8 +1069,8 @@ static void select_point(const u64 idx, unsigned int size,
{
unsigned i, j;
limb *outlimbs = &out[0][0];
- memset(outlimbs, 0, 3 * sizeof(felem));
+ memset(out 0, sizeof(out));
for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
const limb *inlimbs = &pre_comp[i][0][0];
u64 mask = i ^ idx;
@@ -1113,7 +1113,7 @@ static void batch_mul(felem x_out, felem y_out, felem z_out,
u8 sign, digit;
/* set nq to the point at infinity */
- memset(nq, 0, 3 * sizeof(felem));
+ memset(nq, 0, sizeof(nq));
/*
* Loop over all scalars msb-to-lsb, interleaving additions of multiples
@@ -1390,7 +1390,7 @@ int ec_GFp_nistp224_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
BIGNUM *x, *y, *z, *tmp_scalar;
felem_bytearray g_secret;
felem_bytearray *secrets = NULL;
- felem(*pre_comp)[17][3] = NULL;
+ felem (*pre_comp)[17][3] = NULL;
felem *tmp_felems = NULL;
felem_bytearray tmp;
unsigned num_bytes;
@@ -1457,11 +1457,11 @@ int ec_GFp_nistp224_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
*/
mixed = 1;
}
- secrets = OPENSSL_malloc(num_points * sizeof(felem_bytearray));
- pre_comp = OPENSSL_malloc(num_points * 17 * 3 * sizeof(felem));
+ secrets = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*secrets) * num_points);
+ pre_comp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*pre_comp) * num_points);
if (mixed)
tmp_felems =
- OPENSSL_malloc((num_points * 17 + 1) * sizeof(felem));
+ OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(felem) * (num_points * 17 + 1));
if ((secrets == NULL) || (pre_comp == NULL)
|| (mixed && (tmp_felems == NULL))) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP224_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
@@ -1472,8 +1472,8 @@ int ec_GFp_nistp224_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
* we treat NULL scalars as 0, and NULL points as points at infinity,
* i.e., they contribute nothing to the linear combination
*/
- memset(secrets, 0, num_points * sizeof(felem_bytearray));
- memset(pre_comp, 0, num_points * 17 * 3 * sizeof(felem));
+ memset(secrets, 0, sizeof(*secrets) * num_points);
+ memset(pre_comp, 0, sizeof(*pre_comp) * num_points);
for (i = 0; i < num_points; ++i) {
if (i == num)
/* the generator */
@@ -1533,7 +1533,7 @@ int ec_GFp_nistp224_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
/* the scalar for the generator */
if ((scalar != NULL) && (have_pre_comp)) {
- memset(g_secret, 0, sizeof g_secret);
+ memset(g_secret, 0, sizeof(g_secret));
/* reduce scalar to 0 <= scalar < 2^224 */
if ((BN_num_bits(scalar) > 224) || (BN_is_negative(scalar))) {
/*
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp256.c b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp256.c
index 6ec569282c..b4cd24d1fe 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp256.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp256.c
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ static int BN_to_felem(felem out, const BIGNUM *bn)
unsigned num_bytes;
/* BN_bn2bin eats leading zeroes */
- memset(b_out, 0, sizeof b_out);
+ memset(b_out, 0, sizeof(b_out));
num_bytes = BN_num_bytes(bn);
if (num_bytes > sizeof b_out) {
ECerr(EC_F_BN_TO_FELEM, EC_R_BIGNUM_OUT_OF_RANGE);
@@ -1624,7 +1624,8 @@ static void select_point(const u64 idx, unsigned int size,
{
unsigned i, j;
u64 *outlimbs = &out[0][0];
- memset(outlimbs, 0, 3 * sizeof(smallfelem));
+
+ memset(out, 0, sizeof(out));
for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
const u64 *inlimbs = (u64 *)&pre_comp[i][0][0];
@@ -1668,7 +1669,7 @@ static void batch_mul(felem x_out, felem y_out, felem z_out,
u8 sign, digit;
/* set nq to the point at infinity */
- memset(nq, 0, 3 * sizeof(felem));
+ memset(nq, 0, sizeof(nq));
/*
* Loop over all scalars msb-to-lsb, interleaving additions of multiples
@@ -2005,7 +2006,7 @@ int ec_GFp_nistp256_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
BIGNUM *x, *y, *z, *tmp_scalar;
felem_bytearray g_secret;
felem_bytearray *secrets = NULL;
- smallfelem(*pre_comp)[17][3] = NULL;
+ smallfelem (*pre_comp)[17][3] = NULL;
smallfelem *tmp_smallfelems = NULL;
felem_bytearray tmp;
unsigned i, num_bytes;
@@ -2072,11 +2073,11 @@ int ec_GFp_nistp256_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
*/
mixed = 1;
}
- secrets = OPENSSL_malloc(num_points * sizeof(felem_bytearray));
- pre_comp = OPENSSL_malloc(num_points * 17 * 3 * sizeof(smallfelem));
+ secrets = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*secrets) * num_points);
+ pre_comp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*pre_comp) * num_points);
if (mixed)
tmp_smallfelems =
- OPENSSL_malloc((num_points * 17 + 1) * sizeof(smallfelem));
+ OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*tmp_smallfelems) * (num_points * 17 + 1));
if ((secrets == NULL) || (pre_comp == NULL)
|| (mixed && (tmp_smallfelems == NULL))) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP256_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
@@ -2087,8 +2088,8 @@ int ec_GFp_nistp256_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
* we treat NULL scalars as 0, and NULL points as points at infinity,
* i.e., they contribute nothing to the linear combination
*/
- memset(secrets, 0, num_points * sizeof(felem_bytearray));
- memset(pre_comp, 0, num_points * 17 * 3 * sizeof(smallfelem));
+ memset(secrets, 0, sizeof(*secrets) * num_points);
+ memset(pre_comp, 0, sizeof(*pre_comp) * num_points);
for (i = 0; i < num_points; ++i) {
if (i == num)
/*
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c
index e208a83113..6e572f18d8 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c
@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ static int BN_to_felem(felem out, const BIGNUM *bn)
unsigned num_bytes;
/* BN_bn2bin eats leading zeroes */
- memset(b_out, 0, sizeof b_out);
+ memset(b_out, 0, sizeof(b_out));
num_bytes = BN_num_bytes(bn);
if (num_bytes > sizeof b_out) {
ECerr(EC_F_BN_TO_FELEM, EC_R_BIGNUM_OUT_OF_RANGE);
@@ -1470,7 +1470,8 @@ static void select_point(const limb idx, unsigned int size,
{
unsigned i, j;
limb *outlimbs = &out[0][0];
- memset(outlimbs, 0, 3 * sizeof(felem));
+
+ memset(out, 0, sizeof(out));
for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
const limb *inlimbs = &pre_comp[i][0][0];
@@ -1513,7 +1514,7 @@ static void batch_mul(felem x_out, felem y_out, felem z_out,
u8 sign, digit;
/* set nq to the point at infinity */
- memset(nq, 0, 3 * sizeof(felem));
+ memset(nq, 0, sizeof(nq));
/*
* Loop over all scalars msb-to-lsb, interleaving additions of multiples
@@ -1834,7 +1835,7 @@ int ec_GFp_nistp521_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
BIGNUM *x, *y, *z, *tmp_scalar;
felem_bytearray g_secret;
felem_bytearray *secrets = NULL;
- felem(*pre_comp)[17][3] = NULL;
+ felem (*pre_comp)[17][3] = NULL;
felem *tmp_felems = NULL;
felem_bytearray tmp;
unsigned i, num_bytes;
@@ -1901,11 +1902,11 @@ int ec_GFp_nistp521_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
*/
mixed = 1;
}
- secrets = OPENSSL_malloc(num_points * sizeof(felem_bytearray));
- pre_comp = OPENSSL_malloc(num_points * 17 * 3 * sizeof(felem));
+ secrets = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*secrets) * num_points);
+ pre_comp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*pre_comp) * num_points);
if (mixed)
tmp_felems =
- OPENSSL_malloc((num_points * 17 + 1) * sizeof(felem));
+ OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*tmp_felemts) * (num_points * 17 + 1));
if ((secrets == NULL) || (pre_comp == NULL)
|| (mixed && (tmp_felems == NULL))) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP521_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
@@ -1916,8 +1917,8 @@ int ec_GFp_nistp521_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
* we treat NULL scalars as 0, and NULL points as points at infinity,
* i.e., they contribute nothing to the linear combination
*/
- memset(secrets, 0, num_points * sizeof(felem_bytearray));
- memset(pre_comp, 0, num_points * 17 * 3 * sizeof(felem));
+ memset(secrets, 0, sizeof(*secrets) * num_points);
+ memset(pre_comp, 0, sizseof(*pre_comp) * num_points);
for (i = 0; i < num_points; ++i) {
if (i == num)
/*
diff --git a/crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c b/crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c
index d801ae8f1c..49a398964b 100644
--- a/crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c
+++ b/crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c
@@ -478,7 +478,7 @@ cryptodev_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
return (0);
}
- memset(sess, 0, sizeof(struct session_op));
+ memset(sess, 0, sizeof(*sess));
if ((state->d_fd = get_dev_crypto()) < 0)
return (0);
@@ -770,7 +770,7 @@ static int cryptodev_digest_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
return (0);
}
- memset(state, 0, sizeof(struct dev_crypto_state));
+ memset(state, 0, sizeof(*state));
if ((state->d_fd = get_dev_crypto()) < 0) {
printf("cryptodev_digest_init: Can't get Dev \n");
@@ -1115,7 +1115,7 @@ cryptodev_bn_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
return (ret);
}
- memset(&kop, 0, sizeof kop);
+ memset(&kop, 0, sizeof(kop));
kop.crk_op = CRK_MOD_EXP;
/* inputs: a^p % m */
@@ -1166,7 +1166,7 @@ cryptodev_rsa_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
return (0);
}
- memset(&kop, 0, sizeof kop);
+ memset(&kop, 0, sizeof(kop));
kop.crk_op = CRK_MOD_EXP_CRT;
/* inputs: rsa->p rsa->q I rsa->dmp1 rsa->dmq1 rsa->iqmp */
if (bn2crparam(rsa->p, &kop.crk_param[0]))
@@ -1269,7 +1269,7 @@ static DSA_SIG *cryptodev_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen,
goto err;
}
- memset(&kop, 0, sizeof kop);
+ memset(&kop, 0, sizeof(kop));
kop.crk_op = CRK_DSA_SIGN;
/* inputs: dgst dsa->p dsa->q dsa->g dsa->priv_key */
@@ -1309,7 +1309,7 @@ cryptodev_dsa_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen,
struct crypt_kop kop;
int dsaret = 1;
- memset(&kop, 0, sizeof kop);
+ memset(&kop, 0, sizeof(kop));
kop.crk_op = CRK_DSA_VERIFY;
/* inputs: dgst dsa->p dsa->q dsa->g dsa->pub_key sig->r sig->s */
@@ -1382,7 +1382,7 @@ cryptodev_dh_compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh)
keylen = BN_num_bits(dh->p);
- memset(&kop, 0, sizeof kop);
+ memset(&kop, 0, sizeof(kop));
kop.crk_op = CRK_DH_COMPUTE_KEY;
/* inputs: dh->priv_key pub_key dh->p key */
diff --git a/crypto/engine/eng_dyn.c b/crypto/engine/eng_dyn.c
index ed1c220525..06a7018351 100644
--- a/crypto/engine/eng_dyn.c
+++ b/crypto/engine/eng_dyn.c
@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ static int dynamic_set_data_ctx(ENGINE *e, dynamic_data_ctx **ctx)
ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_SET_DATA_CTX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
- memset(c, 0, sizeof(dynamic_data_ctx));
+ memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c));
c->dynamic_dso = NULL;
c->v_check = NULL;
c->bind_engine = NULL;
diff --git a/crypto/engine/eng_lib.c b/crypto/engine/eng_lib.c
index 3bf06bb52b..c477c7efc5 100644
--- a/crypto/engine/eng_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/engine/eng_lib.c
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ ENGINE *ENGINE_new(void)
ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
- memset(ret, 0, sizeof(ENGINE));
+ memset(ret, 0, sizeof(*ret));
ret->struct_ref = 1;
engine_ref_debug(ret, 0, 1)
CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_ENGINE, ret, &ret->ex_data);
diff --git a/crypto/evp/bio_ok.c b/crypto/evp/bio_ok.c
index 9a65a9de12..7a38cd9e1a 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/bio_ok.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/bio_ok.c
@@ -337,8 +337,7 @@ static int ok_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl)
n = (inl + ctx->buf_len > OK_BLOCK_SIZE + OK_BLOCK_BLOCK) ?
(int)(OK_BLOCK_SIZE + OK_BLOCK_BLOCK - ctx->buf_len) : inl;
- memcpy((unsigned char *)(&(ctx->buf[ctx->buf_len])),
- (unsigned char *)in, n);
+ memcpy(&ctx->buf[ctx->buf_len], in, n);
ctx->buf_len += n;
inl -= n;
in += n;
diff --git a/crypto/evp/digest.c b/crypto/evp/digest.c
index 04ab3a09b9..c7856c6a94 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/digest.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/digest.c
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@
void EVP_MD_CTX_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
{
- memset(ctx, '\0', sizeof(*ctx));
+ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
}
EVP_MD_CTX *EVP_MD_CTX_create(void)
@@ -360,7 +360,7 @@ int EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
*/
ENGINE_finish(ctx->engine);
#endif
- memset(ctx, '\0', sizeof(*ctx));
+ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
return 1;
}
diff --git a/crypto/evp/e_null.c b/crypto/evp/e_null.c
index 488add499d..a585128096 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/e_null.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/e_null.c
@@ -86,7 +86,6 @@ const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_enc_null(void)
static int null_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
{
- /* memset(&(ctx->c),0,sizeof(ctx->c)); */
return 1;
}
@@ -94,6 +93,6 @@ static int null_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
{
if (in != out)
- memcpy((char *)out, (const char *)in, inl);
+ memcpy(out, in, inl);
return 1;
}
diff --git a/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c b/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c
index 4dfc1593e6..242874c5f6 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c
@@ -70,8 +70,7 @@ const char EVP_version[] = "EVP" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
void EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
{
- memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX));
- /* ctx->cipher=NULL; */
+ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
}
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(void)
@@ -546,7 +545,7 @@ int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c)
*/
ENGINE_finish(c->engine);
#endif
- memset(c, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX));
+ memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c));
return 1;
}
diff --git a/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c b/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c
index 397d342e18..eeee53a2ef 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c
@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ EVP_PKEY_METHOD *EVP_PKEY_meth_new(int id, int flags)
if (!pmeth)
return NULL;
- memset(pmeth, 0, sizeof(EVP_PKEY_METHOD));
+ memset(pmeth, 0, sizeof(*pmeth));
pmeth->pkey_id = id;
pmeth->flags = flags | EVP_PKEY_FLAG_DYNAMIC;
diff --git a/crypto/jpake/jpake.c b/crypto/jpake/jpake.c
index b494ac01dc..a8aa87d197 100644
--- a/crypto/jpake/jpake.c
+++ b/crypto/jpake/jpake.c
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ static void JPAKE_CTX_release(JPAKE_CTX *ctx)
OPENSSL_free(ctx->p.peer_name);
OPENSSL_free(ctx->p.name);
- memset(ctx, '\0', sizeof(*ctx));
+ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
}
JPAKE_CTX *JPAKE_CTX_new(const char *name, const char *peer_name,
diff --git a/crypto/md2/md2_dgst.c b/crypto/md2/md2_dgst.c
index e206b3fba6..70c19fba31 100644
--- a/crypto/md2/md2_dgst.c
+++ b/crypto/md2/md2_dgst.c
@@ -122,9 +122,9 @@ const char *MD2_options(void)
int MD2_Init(MD2_CTX *c)
{
c->num = 0;
- memset(c->state, 0, sizeof c->state);
- memset(c->cksm, 0, sizeof c->cksm);
- memset(c->data, 0, sizeof c->data);
+ memset(c->state, 0, sizeof(c->state));
+ memset(c->cksm, 0, sizeof(c->cksm));
+ memset(c->data, 0, sizeof(c->data));
return 1;
}
@@ -219,6 +219,6 @@ int MD2_Final(unsigned char *md, MD2_CTX *c)
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
md[i] = (UCHAR) (p1[i] & 0xff);
- memset((char *)&c, 0, sizeof(c));
+ memset(&c, 0, sizeof(c));
return 1;
}
diff --git a/crypto/modes/ocb128.c b/crypto/modes/ocb128.c
index 79b786260a..ed484606e5 100644
--- a/crypto/modes/ocb128.c
+++ b/crypto/modes/ocb128.c
@@ -226,9 +226,7 @@ OCB128_CONTEXT *CRYPTO_ocb128_new(void *keyenc, void *keydec,
int CRYPTO_ocb128_init(OCB128_CONTEXT *ctx, void *keyenc, void *keydec,
block128_f encrypt, block128_f decrypt)
{
- /* Clear everything to NULLs */
memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
-
ctx->l_index = 0;
ctx->max_l_index = 1;
ctx->l = OPENSSL_malloc(ctx->max_l_index * 16);
@@ -374,8 +372,8 @@ int CRYPTO_ocb128_aad(OCB128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char *aad,
ocb_block16_xor(&ctx->offset_aad, &ctx->l_star, &ctx->offset_aad);
/* CipherInput = (A_* || 1 || zeros(127-bitlen(A_*))) xor Offset_* */
- memset((void *)&tmp1, 0, 16);
- memcpy((void *)&tmp1, aad + (num_blocks * 16), last_len);
+ memset(&tmp1, 0, 16);
+ memcpy(&tmp1, aad + (num_blocks * 16), last_len);
((unsigned char *)&tmp1)[last_len] = 0x80;
ocb_block16_xor(&ctx->offset_aad, &tmp1, &tmp2);
@@ -453,8 +451,8 @@ int CRYPTO_ocb128_encrypt(OCB128_CONTEXT *ctx,
out + (num_blocks * 16));
/* Checksum_* = Checksum_m xor (P_* || 1 || zeros(127-bitlen(P_*))) */
- memset((void *)&tmp1, 0, 16);
- memcpy((void *)&tmp1, in + (len / 16) * 16, last_len);
+ memset(&tmp1, 0, 16);
+ memcpy(&tmp1, in + (len / 16) * 16, last_len);
((unsigned char *)(&tmp1))[last_len] = 0x80;
ocb_block16_xor(&ctx->checksum, &tmp1, &ctx->checksum);
}
@@ -526,8 +524,8 @@ int CRYPTO_ocb128_decrypt(OCB128_CONTEXT *ctx,
out + (num_blocks * 16));
/* Checksum_* = Checksum_m xor (P_* || 1 || zeros(127-bitlen(P_*))) */
- memset((void *)&tmp1, 0, 16);
- memcpy((void *)&tmp1, out + (len / 16) * 16, last_len);
+ memset(&tmp1, 0, 16);
+ memcpy(&tmp1, out + (len / 16) * 16, last_len);
((unsigned char *)(&tmp1))[last_len] = 0x80;
ocb_block16_xor(&ctx->checksum, &tmp1, &ctx->checksum);
}
diff --git a/crypto/pqueue/pqueue.c b/crypto/pqueue/pqueue.c
index d66efe1837..1378abc58a 100644
--- a/crypto/pqueue/pqueue.c
+++ b/crypto/pqueue/pqueue.c
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ pqueue_s *pqueue_new()
if (pq == NULL)
return NULL;
- memset(pq, 0x00, sizeof(pqueue_s));
+ memset(pq, 0, sizeof(*pq));
return pq;
}
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c
index 7d8fd39de3..f4aaa298ba 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c
@@ -293,14 +293,14 @@ int RSA_memory_lock(RSA *r)
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_MEMORY_LOCK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return (0);
}
- memset(p, 0, (off + j) * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
+ memset(p, 0, sizeof(*p) * (off + j));
bn = (BIGNUM *)p;
ul = (BN_ULONG *)&(p[off]);
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
b = *(t[i]);
*(t[i]) = bn_array_el(bn, i);
- memcpy((char *)bn_array_el(bn, i), (char *)b, bn_sizeof_BIGNUM());
- memcpy((char *)ul, bn_get_words(b), sizeof(BN_ULONG) * bn_get_top(b));
+ memcpy(bn_array_el(bn, i), b, bn_sizeof_BIGNUM());
+ memcpy(ul, bn_get_words(b), sizeof(*ul) * bn_get_top(b));
bn_set_static_words(bn_array_el(bn, i), ul, bn_get_top(b));
ul += bn_get_top(b);
BN_clear_free(b);
diff --git a/crypto/sha/sha512.c b/crypto/sha/sha512.c
index f934c74414..c58cc1b44b 100644
--- a/crypto/sha/sha512.c
+++ b/crypto/sha/sha512.c
@@ -107,9 +107,11 @@ int SHA512_Final(unsigned char *md, SHA512_CTX *c)
p[n] = 0x80; /* There always is a room for one */
n++;
- if (n > (sizeof(c->u) - 16))
- memset(p + n, 0, sizeof(c->u) - n), n = 0,
- sha512_block_data_order(c, p, 1);
+ if (n > (sizeof(c->u) - 16)) {
+ memset(p + n, 0, sizeof(c->u) - n);
+ n = 0;
+ sha512_block_data_order(c, p, 1);
+ }
memset(p + n, 0, sizeof(c->u) - 16 - n);
#ifdef B_ENDIAN
diff --git a/crypto/stack/stack.c b/crypto/stack/stack.c
index efabe166ed..c395d58230 100644
--- a/crypto/stack/stack.c
+++ b/crypto/stack/stack.c
@@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ void sk_zero(_STACK *st)
return;
if (st->num <= 0)
return;
- memset((char *)st->data, 0, sizeof(*st->data) * st->num);
+ memset(st->data, 0, sizeof(*st->data) * st->num);
st->num = 0;
}
diff --git a/crypto/store/str_mem.c b/crypto/store/str_mem.c
index 632ada89ba..b14e28908c 100644
--- a/crypto/store/str_mem.c
+++ b/crypto/store/str_mem.c
@@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ static void *mem_list_start(STORE *s, STORE_OBJECT_TYPES type,
STOREerr(STORE_F_MEM_LIST_START, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
- memset(context, 0, sizeof(struct mem_ctx_st));
+ memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context));
attribute_context = STORE_parse_attrs_start(attributes);
if (!attribute_context) {
diff --git a/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_sign.c b/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_sign.c
index 2d1e438833..077d03da2c 100644
--- a/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_sign.c
+++ b/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_sign.c
@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ TS_RESP_CTX *TS_RESP_CTX_new()
TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
- memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(TS_RESP_CTX));
+ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
/* Setting default callbacks. */
ctx->serial_cb = def_serial_cb;
diff --git a/crypto/ts/ts_verify_ctx.c b/crypto/ts/ts_verify_ctx.c
index 651b1d1373..75bf2dfa42 100644
--- a/crypto/ts/ts_verify_ctx.c
+++ b/crypto/ts/ts_verify_ctx.c
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ TS_VERIFY_CTX *TS_VERIFY_CTX_new(void)
TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ctx));
if (ctx)
- memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(TS_VERIFY_CTX));
+ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
else
TSerr(TS_F_TS_VERIFY_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return ctx;
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ TS_VERIFY_CTX *TS_VERIFY_CTX_new(void)
void TS_VERIFY_CTX_init(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx)
{
OPENSSL_assert(ctx != NULL);
- memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(TS_VERIFY_CTX));
+ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
}
void TS_VERIFY_CTX_free(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx)
diff --git a/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c b/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c
index 2ee9658d72..0696341632 100644
--- a/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c
+++ b/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c
@@ -585,7 +585,7 @@ static void pushsig(void)
# ifdef SIGACTION
struct sigaction sa;
- memset(&sa, 0, sizeof sa);
+ memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
sa.sa_handler = recsig;
# endif
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
index 8c0680beff..40a1e61342 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
@@ -2217,7 +2217,7 @@ X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
- memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
+ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
return ctx;
}
@@ -2337,11 +2337,9 @@ int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
/*
- * This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As
- * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a
- * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation.
+ * Since X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we
+ * put a corresponding "new" here.
*/
- /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */
if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
&(ctx->ex_data))) {
OPENSSL_free(ctx);
@@ -2376,7 +2374,7 @@ void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free);
ctx->chain = NULL;
CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
- memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
+ memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data));
}
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c b/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c
index 8870ec2238..6b0167b2e3 100644
--- a/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c
+++ b/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c
@@ -235,14 +235,11 @@ static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
return 0;
}
- memset(tree->levels, 0, n * sizeof(X509_POLICY_LEVEL));
-
+ memset(tree->levels, 0, sizeof(*tree->levels) * n);
tree->nlevel = n;
-
level = tree->levels;
/* Root data: initialize to anyPolicy */
-
data = policy_data_new(NULL, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_any_policy), 0);
if (!data || !level_add_node(level, data, NULL, tree))