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authordtucker <dtucker>2004-06-22 02:56:01 +0000
committerdtucker <dtucker>2004-06-22 02:56:01 +0000
commita9921605bf811b4183d1a2e8333052ac40d5de50 (patch)
treef51e46f9a12b6e14f4c9277ad9267ed4bbf1d51a
parent4358312fd5d17763e6af4ceed1e311447f5ef97b (diff)
downloadopenssh-a9921605bf811b4183d1a2e8333052ac40d5de50.tar.gz
- avsm@cvs.openbsd.org 2004/06/21 17:36:31
[auth-rsa.c auth2-gss.c auth2-pubkey.c authfile.c canohost.c channels.c cipher.c dns.c kex.c monitor.c monitor_fdpass.c monitor_wrap.c monitor_wrap.h nchan.c packet.c progressmeter.c scp.c sftp-server.c sftp.c ssh-gss.h ssh-keygen.c ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect1.c sshlogin.c sshpty.c] make ssh -Wshadow clean, no functional changes markus@ ok There are also some portable-specific -Wshadow warnings to be fixed in monitor.c and montior_wrap.c.
-rw-r--r--ChangeLog10
-rw-r--r--auth-rsa.c10
-rw-r--r--auth2-gss.c12
-rw-r--r--auth2-pubkey.c8
-rw-r--r--authfile.c10
-rw-r--r--canohost.c30
-rw-r--r--channels.c10
-rw-r--r--cipher.c18
-rw-r--r--dns.c8
-rw-r--r--kex.c10
-rw-r--r--monitor.c110
-rw-r--r--monitor_fdpass.c10
-rw-r--r--monitor_wrap.c28
-rw-r--r--monitor_wrap.h8
-rw-r--r--nchan.c6
-rw-r--r--packet.c34
-rw-r--r--progressmeter.c6
-rw-r--r--scp.c10
-rw-r--r--sftp-server.c18
-rw-r--r--sftp.c8
-rw-r--r--ssh-gss.h40
-rw-r--r--ssh-keygen.c10
-rw-r--r--ssh.c10
-rw-r--r--sshconnect.c12
-rw-r--r--sshconnect1.c10
-rw-r--r--sshlogin.c10
-rw-r--r--sshpty.c40
27 files changed, 252 insertions, 244 deletions
diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 21dd9679..fae8d6c6 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -10,6 +10,14 @@
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2004/06/20 19:28:12
[sftp.1]
mention new -n flag
+ - avsm@cvs.openbsd.org 2004/06/21 17:36:31
+ [auth-rsa.c auth2-gss.c auth2-pubkey.c authfile.c canohost.c channels.c
+ cipher.c dns.c kex.c monitor.c monitor_fdpass.c monitor_wrap.c
+ monitor_wrap.h nchan.c packet.c progressmeter.c scp.c sftp-server.c sftp.c
+ ssh-gss.h ssh-keygen.c ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect1.c sshlogin.c
+ sshpty.c]
+ make ssh -Wshadow clean, no functional changes
+ markus@ ok
20040620
- (tim) [configure.ac Makefile.in] Only change TEST_SHELL on broken platforms.
@@ -1332,4 +1340,4 @@
- (djm) Trim deprecated options from INSTALL. Mention UsePAM
- (djm) Fix quote handling in sftp; Patch from admorten AT umich.edu
-$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.3420 2004/06/22 02:31:23 dtucker Exp $
+$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.3421 2004/06/22 02:56:01 dtucker Exp $
diff --git a/auth-rsa.c b/auth-rsa.c
index 8a02b8a8..16369d47 100644
--- a/auth-rsa.c
+++ b/auth-rsa.c
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-rsa.c,v 1.59 2004/05/09 01:19:27 djm Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-rsa.c,v 1.60 2004/06/21 17:36:31 avsm Exp $");
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include <openssl/md5.h>
@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, BIGNUM *client_n, Key **rkey)
*/
while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) {
char *cp;
- char *options;
+ char *key_options;
linenum++;
@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, BIGNUM *client_n, Key **rkey)
*/
if (*cp < '0' || *cp > '9') {
int quoted = 0;
- options = cp;
+ key_options = cp;
for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) {
if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"')
cp++; /* Skip both */
@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, BIGNUM *client_n, Key **rkey)
quoted = !quoted;
}
} else
- options = NULL;
+ key_options = NULL;
/* Parse the key from the line. */
if (hostfile_read_key(&cp, &bits, key) == 0) {
@@ -254,7 +254,7 @@ auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, BIGNUM *client_n, Key **rkey)
* If our options do not allow this key to be used,
* do not send challenge.
*/
- if (!auth_parse_options(pw, options, file, linenum))
+ if (!auth_parse_options(pw, key_options, file, linenum))
continue;
/* break out, this key is allowed */
diff --git a/auth2-gss.c b/auth2-gss.c
index 9249988d..3289ba18 100644
--- a/auth2-gss.c
+++ b/auth2-gss.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.7 2003/11/21 11:57:03 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.8 2004/06/21 17:36:31 avsm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ static void input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
static int
userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
- gss_OID_desc oid = {0, NULL};
+ gss_OID_desc goid = {0, NULL};
Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL;
int mechs;
gss_OID_set supported;
@@ -85,9 +85,9 @@ userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt)
if (len > 2 &&
doid[0] == SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE &&
doid[1] == len - 2) {
- oid.elements = doid + 2;
- oid.length = len - 2;
- gss_test_oid_set_member(&ms, &oid, supported,
+ goid.elements = doid + 2;
+ goid.length = len - 2;
+ gss_test_oid_set_member(&ms, &goid, supported,
&present);
} else {
logit("Badly formed OID received");
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt)
return (0);
}
- if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, &oid)))) {
+ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, &goid)))) {
xfree(doid);
return (0);
}
diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c
index 3063eecc..9898d4a6 100644
--- a/auth2-pubkey.c
+++ b/auth2-pubkey.c
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.6 2004/01/19 21:25:15 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.7 2004/06/21 17:36:31 avsm Exp $");
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, char *file)
found = key_new(key->type);
while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) {
- char *cp, *options = NULL;
+ char *cp, *key_options = NULL;
linenum++;
/* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */
for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, char *file)
/* no key? check if there are options for this key */
int quoted = 0;
debug2("user_key_allowed: check options: '%s'", cp);
- options = cp;
+ key_options = cp;
for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) {
if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"')
cp++; /* Skip both */
@@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, char *file)
}
}
if (key_equal(found, key) &&
- auth_parse_options(pw, options, file, linenum) == 1) {
+ auth_parse_options(pw, key_options, file, linenum) == 1) {
found_key = 1;
debug("matching key found: file %s, line %lu",
file, linenum);
diff --git a/authfile.c b/authfile.c
index 305e9473..76a60d02 100644
--- a/authfile.c
+++ b/authfile.c
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.56 2004/05/11 19:01:43 deraadt Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.57 2004/06/21 17:36:31 avsm Exp $");
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ key_save_private_rsa1(Key *key, const char *filename, const char *passphrase,
int fd, i, cipher_num;
CipherContext ciphercontext;
Cipher *cipher;
- u_int32_t rand;
+ u_int32_t rnd;
/*
* If the passphrase is empty, use SSH_CIPHER_NONE to ease converting
@@ -87,9 +87,9 @@ key_save_private_rsa1(Key *key, const char *filename, const char *passphrase,
buffer_init(&buffer);
/* Put checkbytes for checking passphrase validity. */
- rand = arc4random();
- buf[0] = rand & 0xff;
- buf[1] = (rand >> 8) & 0xff;
+ rnd = arc4random();
+ buf[0] = rnd & 0xff;
+ buf[1] = (rnd >> 8) & 0xff;
buf[2] = buf[0];
buf[3] = buf[1];
buffer_append(&buffer, buf, 4);
diff --git a/canohost.c b/canohost.c
index 54369d49..057f061b 100644
--- a/canohost.c
+++ b/canohost.c
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: canohost.c,v 1.39 2004/03/31 21:58:47 djm Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: canohost.c,v 1.40 2004/06/21 17:36:31 avsm Exp $");
#include "packet.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ static void ipv64_normalise_mapped(struct sockaddr_storage *, socklen_t *);
*/
static char *
-get_remote_hostname(int socket, int use_dns)
+get_remote_hostname(int sock, int use_dns)
{
struct sockaddr_storage from;
int i;
@@ -39,13 +39,13 @@ get_remote_hostname(int socket, int use_dns)
/* Get IP address of client. */
fromlen = sizeof(from);
memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
- if (getpeername(socket, (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
+ if (getpeername(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
cleanup_exit(255);
}
if (from.ss_family == AF_INET)
- check_ip_options(socket, ntop);
+ check_ip_options(sock, ntop);
ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen);
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ get_remote_hostname(int socket, int use_dns)
*/
/* IPv4 only */
static void
-check_ip_options(int socket, char *ipaddr)
+check_ip_options(int sock, char *ipaddr)
{
#ifdef IP_OPTIONS
u_char options[200];
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ check_ip_options(int socket, char *ipaddr)
else
ipproto = IPPROTO_IP;
option_size = sizeof(options);
- if (getsockopt(socket, ipproto, IP_OPTIONS, options,
+ if (getsockopt(sock, ipproto, IP_OPTIONS, options,
&option_size) >= 0 && option_size != 0) {
text[0] = '\0';
for (i = 0; i < option_size; i++)
@@ -227,7 +227,7 @@ get_canonical_hostname(int use_dns)
* The returned string must be freed.
*/
static char *
-get_socket_address(int socket, int remote, int flags)
+get_socket_address(int sock, int remote, int flags)
{
struct sockaddr_storage addr;
socklen_t addrlen;
@@ -238,11 +238,11 @@ get_socket_address(int socket, int remote, int flags)
memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
if (remote) {
- if (getpeername(socket, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen)
+ if (getpeername(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen)
< 0)
return NULL;
} else {
- if (getsockname(socket, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen)
+ if (getsockname(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen)
< 0)
return NULL;
}
@@ -261,29 +261,29 @@ get_socket_address(int socket, int remote, int flags)
}
char *
-get_peer_ipaddr(int socket)
+get_peer_ipaddr(int sock)
{
char *p;
- if ((p = get_socket_address(socket, 1, NI_NUMERICHOST)) != NULL)
+ if ((p = get_socket_address(sock, 1, NI_NUMERICHOST)) != NULL)
return p;
return xstrdup("UNKNOWN");
}
char *
-get_local_ipaddr(int socket)
+get_local_ipaddr(int sock)
{
char *p;
- if ((p = get_socket_address(socket, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST)) != NULL)
+ if ((p = get_socket_address(sock, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST)) != NULL)
return p;
return xstrdup("UNKNOWN");
}
char *
-get_local_name(int socket)
+get_local_name(int sock)
{
- return get_socket_address(socket, 0, NI_NAMEREQD);
+ return get_socket_address(sock, 0, NI_NAMEREQD);
}
/*
diff --git a/channels.c b/channels.c
index 68d85438..a72d9b93 100644
--- a/channels.c
+++ b/channels.c
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.206 2004/06/18 11:11:54 djm Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.207 2004/06/21 17:36:31 avsm Exp $");
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh1.h"
@@ -2903,7 +2903,7 @@ x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(int client_session_id,
char *new_data;
int screen_number;
const char *cp;
- u_int32_t rand = 0;
+ u_int32_t rnd = 0;
cp = getenv("DISPLAY");
if (cp)
@@ -2928,10 +2928,10 @@ x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(int client_session_id,
if (sscanf(data + 2 * i, "%2x", &value) != 1)
fatal("x11_request_forwarding: bad authentication data: %.100s", data);
if (i % 4 == 0)
- rand = arc4random();
+ rnd = arc4random();
x11_saved_data[i] = value;
- x11_fake_data[i] = rand & 0xff;
- rand >>= 8;
+ x11_fake_data[i] = rnd & 0xff;
+ rnd >>= 8;
}
x11_saved_data_len = data_len;
x11_fake_data_len = data_len;
diff --git a/cipher.c b/cipher.c
index c13ff586..255f840a 100644
--- a/cipher.c
+++ b/cipher.c
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: cipher.c,v 1.68 2004/01/23 19:26:33 hshoexer Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: cipher.c,v 1.69 2004/06/21 17:36:31 avsm Exp $");
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "log.h"
@@ -166,25 +166,25 @@ int
ciphers_valid(const char *names)
{
Cipher *c;
- char *ciphers, *cp;
+ char *cipher_list, *cp;
char *p;
if (names == NULL || strcmp(names, "") == 0)
return 0;
- ciphers = cp = xstrdup(names);
+ cipher_list = cp = xstrdup(names);
for ((p = strsep(&cp, CIPHER_SEP)); p && *p != '\0';
(p = strsep(&cp, CIPHER_SEP))) {
c = cipher_by_name(p);
if (c == NULL || c->number != SSH_CIPHER_SSH2) {
debug("bad cipher %s [%s]", p, names);
- xfree(ciphers);
+ xfree(cipher_list);
return 0;
} else {
debug3("cipher ok: %s [%s]", p, names);
}
}
debug3("ciphers ok: [%s]", names);
- xfree(ciphers);
+ xfree(cipher_list);
return 1;
}
@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ cipher_name(int id)
void
cipher_init(CipherContext *cc, Cipher *cipher,
const u_char *key, u_int keylen, const u_char *iv, u_int ivlen,
- int encrypt)
+ int do_encrypt)
{
static int dowarn = 1;
#ifdef SSH_OLD_EVP
@@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ cipher_init(CipherContext *cc, Cipher *cipher,
(encrypt == CIPHER_ENCRYPT));
#else
if (EVP_CipherInit(&cc->evp, type, NULL, (u_char *)iv,
- (encrypt == CIPHER_ENCRYPT)) == 0)
+ (do_encrypt == CIPHER_ENCRYPT)) == 0)
fatal("cipher_init: EVP_CipherInit failed for %s",
cipher->name);
klen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(&cc->evp);
@@ -302,7 +302,7 @@ cipher_cleanup(CipherContext *cc)
void
cipher_set_key_string(CipherContext *cc, Cipher *cipher,
- const char *passphrase, int encrypt)
+ const char *passphrase, int do_encrypt)
{
MD5_CTX md;
u_char digest[16];
@@ -311,7 +311,7 @@ cipher_set_key_string(CipherContext *cc, Cipher *cipher,
MD5_Update(&md, (const u_char *)passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
MD5_Final(digest, &md);
- cipher_init(cc, cipher, digest, 16, NULL, 0, encrypt);
+ cipher_init(cc, cipher, digest, 16, NULL, 0, do_encrypt);
memset(digest, 0, sizeof(digest));
memset(&md, 0, sizeof(md));
diff --git a/dns.c b/dns.c
index ad634f1f..140ab604 100644
--- a/dns.c
+++ b/dns.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: dns.c,v 1.9 2003/11/21 11:57:03 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: dns.c,v 1.10 2004/06/21 17:36:31 avsm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2003 Wesley Griffin. All rights reserved.
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@
#include "uuencode.h"
extern char *__progname;
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: dns.c,v 1.9 2003/11/21 11:57:03 djm Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: dns.c,v 1.10 2004/06/21 17:36:31 avsm Exp $");
#ifndef LWRES
static const char *errset_text[] = {
@@ -56,9 +56,9 @@ static const char *errset_text[] = {
};
static const char *
-dns_result_totext(unsigned int error)
+dns_result_totext(unsigned int res)
{
- switch (error) {
+ switch (res) {
case ERRSET_SUCCESS:
return errset_text[ERRSET_SUCCESS];
case ERRSET_NOMEMORY:
diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
index cda8bf9b..a668346c 100644
--- a/kex.c
+++ b/kex.c
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.59 2004/06/13 12:53:24 djm Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.60 2004/06/21 17:36:31 avsm Exp $");
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ kex_finish(Kex *kex)
void
kex_send_kexinit(Kex *kex)
{
- u_int32_t rand = 0;
+ u_int32_t rnd = 0;
u_char *cookie;
int i;
@@ -168,9 +168,9 @@ kex_send_kexinit(Kex *kex)
cookie = buffer_ptr(&kex->my);
for (i = 0; i < KEX_COOKIE_LEN; i++) {
if (i % 4 == 0)
- rand = arc4random();
- cookie[i] = rand;
- rand >>= 8;
+ rnd = arc4random();
+ cookie[i] = rnd;
+ rnd >>= 8;
}
packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT);
packet_put_raw(buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my));
diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
index c287a2da..28872755 100644
--- a/monitor.c
+++ b/monitor.c
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.58 2004/06/13 12:53:24 djm Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.59 2004/06/21 17:36:31 avsm Exp $");
#include <openssl/dh.h>
@@ -350,9 +350,9 @@ monitor_set_child_handler(pid_t pid)
}
static void
-monitor_child_handler(int signal)
+monitor_child_handler(int sig)
{
- kill(monitor_child_pid, signal);
+ kill(monitor_child_pid, sig);
}
void
@@ -467,7 +467,7 @@ monitor_reset_key_state(void)
}
int
-mm_answer_moduli(int socket, Buffer *m)
+mm_answer_moduli(int sock, Buffer *m)
{
DH *dh;
int min, want, max;
@@ -497,12 +497,12 @@ mm_answer_moduli(int socket, Buffer *m)
DH_free(dh);
}
- mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI, m);
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI, m);
return (0);
}
int
-mm_answer_sign(int socket, Buffer *m)
+mm_answer_sign(int sock, Buffer *m)
{
Key *key;
u_char *p;
@@ -538,7 +538,7 @@ mm_answer_sign(int socket, Buffer *m)
xfree(p);
xfree(signature);
- mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN, m);
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN, m);
/* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
@@ -549,7 +549,7 @@ mm_answer_sign(int socket, Buffer *m)
/* Retrieves the password entry and also checks if the user is permitted */
int
-mm_answer_pwnamallow(int socket, Buffer *m)
+mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m)
{
char *login;
struct passwd *pwent;
@@ -593,7 +593,7 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(int socket, Buffer *m)
out:
debug3("%s: sending MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM: %d", __func__, allowed);
- mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, m);
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, m);
/* For SSHv1 allow authentication now */
if (!compat20)
@@ -612,14 +612,14 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(int socket, Buffer *m)
return (0);
}
-int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int socket, Buffer *m)
+int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int sock, Buffer *m)
{
char *banner;
buffer_clear(m);
banner = auth2_read_banner();
buffer_put_cstring(m, banner != NULL ? banner : "");
- mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, m);
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, m);
if (banner != NULL)
xfree(banner);
@@ -628,7 +628,7 @@ int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int socket, Buffer *m)
}
int
-mm_answer_authserv(int socket, Buffer *m)
+mm_answer_authserv(int sock, Buffer *m)
{
monitor_permit_authentications(1);
@@ -646,7 +646,7 @@ mm_answer_authserv(int socket, Buffer *m)
}
int
-mm_answer_authpassword(int socket, Buffer *m)
+mm_answer_authpassword(int sock, Buffer *m)
{
static int call_count;
char *passwd;
@@ -664,7 +664,7 @@ mm_answer_authpassword(int socket, Buffer *m)
buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
- mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD, m);
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD, m);
call_count++;
if (plen == 0 && call_count == 1)
@@ -678,7 +678,7 @@ mm_answer_authpassword(int socket, Buffer *m)
#ifdef BSD_AUTH
int
-mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int socket, Buffer *m)
+mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int sock, Buffer *m)
{
char *name, *infotxt;
u_int numprompts;
@@ -695,7 +695,7 @@ mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int socket, Buffer *m)
buffer_put_cstring(m, prompts[0]);
debug3("%s: sending challenge success: %u", __func__, success);
- mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY, m);
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY, m);
if (success) {
xfree(name);
@@ -708,7 +708,7 @@ mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int socket, Buffer *m)
}
int
-mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int socket, Buffer *m)
+mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int sock, Buffer *m)
{
char *response;
int authok;
@@ -727,7 +727,7 @@ mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int socket, Buffer *m)
buffer_put_int(m, authok);
debug3("%s: sending authenticated: %d", __func__, authok);
- mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m);
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m);
auth_method = "bsdauth";
@@ -737,7 +737,7 @@ mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int socket, Buffer *m)
#ifdef SKEY
int
-mm_answer_skeyquery(int socket, Buffer *m)
+mm_answer_skeyquery(int sock, Buffer *m)
{
struct skey skey;
char challenge[1024];
@@ -752,13 +752,13 @@ mm_answer_skeyquery(int socket, Buffer *m)
buffer_put_cstring(m, challenge);
debug3("%s: sending challenge success: %u", __func__, success);
- mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_SKEYQUERY, m);
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SKEYQUERY, m);
return (0);
}
int
-mm_answer_skeyrespond(int socket, Buffer *m)
+mm_answer_skeyrespond(int sock, Buffer *m)
{
char *response;
int authok;
@@ -776,7 +776,7 @@ mm_answer_skeyrespond(int socket, Buffer *m)
buffer_put_int(m, authok);
debug3("%s: sending authenticated: %d", __func__, authok);
- mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_SKEYRESPOND, m);
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SKEYRESPOND, m);
auth_method = "skey";
@@ -925,7 +925,7 @@ mm_append_debug(Buffer *m)
}
int
-mm_answer_keyallowed(int socket, Buffer *m)
+mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
{
Key *key;
char *cuser, *chost;
@@ -995,7 +995,7 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(int socket, Buffer *m)
mm_append_debug(m);
- mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, m);
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, m);
if (type == MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, allowed);
@@ -1116,7 +1116,7 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen, char *cuser,
}
int
-mm_answer_keyverify(int socket, Buffer *m)
+mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)
{
Key *key;
u_char *signature, *data, *blob;
@@ -1166,7 +1166,7 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int socket, Buffer *m)
buffer_clear(m);
buffer_put_int(m, verified);
- mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, m);
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, m);
return (verified);
}
@@ -1208,7 +1208,7 @@ mm_session_close(Session *s)
}
int
-mm_answer_pty(int socket, Buffer *m)
+mm_answer_pty(int sock, Buffer *m)
{
extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
Session *s;
@@ -1230,10 +1230,10 @@ mm_answer_pty(int socket, Buffer *m)
buffer_put_int(m, 1);
buffer_put_cstring(m, s->tty);
- mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
- mm_send_fd(socket, s->ptyfd);
- mm_send_fd(socket, s->ttyfd);
+ mm_send_fd(sock, s->ptyfd);
+ mm_send_fd(sock, s->ttyfd);
/* We need to trick ttyslot */
if (dup2(s->ttyfd, 0) == -1)
@@ -1264,12 +1264,12 @@ mm_answer_pty(int socket, Buffer *m)
if (s != NULL)
mm_session_close(s);
buffer_put_int(m, 0);
- mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
return (0);
}
int
-mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int socket, Buffer *m)
+mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int sock, Buffer *m)
{
Session *s;
char *tty;
@@ -1285,7 +1285,7 @@ mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int socket, Buffer *m)
}
int
-mm_answer_sesskey(int socket, Buffer *m)
+mm_answer_sesskey(int sock, Buffer *m)
{
BIGNUM *p;
int rsafail;
@@ -1306,7 +1306,7 @@ mm_answer_sesskey(int socket, Buffer *m)
BN_clear_free(p);
- mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_SESSKEY, m);
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SESSKEY, m);
/* Turn on permissions for sessid passing */
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, 1);
@@ -1315,7 +1315,7 @@ mm_answer_sesskey(int socket, Buffer *m)
}
int
-mm_answer_sessid(int socket, Buffer *m)
+mm_answer_sessid(int sock, Buffer *m)
{
int i;
@@ -1333,7 +1333,7 @@ mm_answer_sessid(int socket, Buffer *m)
}
int
-mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int socket, Buffer *m)
+mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
{
BIGNUM *client_n;
Key *key = NULL;
@@ -1373,7 +1373,7 @@ mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int socket, Buffer *m)
mm_append_debug(m);
- mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_RSAKEYALLOWED, m);
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSAKEYALLOWED, m);
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, allowed);
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, 0);
@@ -1381,7 +1381,7 @@ mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int socket, Buffer *m)
}
int
-mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int socket, Buffer *m)
+mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int sock, Buffer *m)
{
Key *key = NULL;
u_char *blob;
@@ -1407,7 +1407,7 @@ mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int socket, Buffer *m)
buffer_put_bignum2(m, ssh1_challenge);
debug3("%s sending reply", __func__);
- mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_RSACHALLENGE, m);
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSACHALLENGE, m);
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, 1);
@@ -1417,7 +1417,7 @@ mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int socket, Buffer *m)
}
int
-mm_answer_rsa_response(int socket, Buffer *m)
+mm_answer_rsa_response(int sock, Buffer *m)
{
Key *key = NULL;
u_char *blob, *response;
@@ -1456,13 +1456,13 @@ mm_answer_rsa_response(int socket, Buffer *m)
buffer_clear(m);
buffer_put_int(m, success);
- mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_RSARESPONSE, m);
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSARESPONSE, m);
return (success);
}
int
-mm_answer_term(int socket, Buffer *req)
+mm_answer_term(int sock, Buffer *req)
{
extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
int res, status;
@@ -1740,23 +1740,23 @@ monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon)
#ifdef GSSAPI
int
-mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int socket, Buffer *m)
+mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
{
- gss_OID_desc oid;
+ gss_OID_desc goid;
OM_uint32 major;
u_int len;
- oid.elements = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
- oid.length = len;
+ goid.elements = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+ goid.length = len;
- major = ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&gsscontext, &oid);
+ major = ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&gsscontext, &goid);
- xfree(oid.elements);
+ xfree(goid.elements);
buffer_clear(m);
buffer_put_int(m, major);
- mm_request_send(socket,MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP, m);
+ mm_request_send(sock,MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP, m);
/* Now we have a context, enable the step */
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 1);
@@ -1765,7 +1765,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int socket, Buffer *m)
}
int
-mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int socket, Buffer *m)
+mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
{
gss_buffer_desc in;
gss_buffer_desc out = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
@@ -1782,7 +1782,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int socket, Buffer *m)
buffer_put_int(m, major);
buffer_put_string(m, out.value, out.length);
buffer_put_int(m, flags);
- mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP, m);
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP, m);
gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out);
@@ -1795,7 +1795,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int socket, Buffer *m)
}
int
-mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int socket, Buffer *m)
+mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int sock, Buffer *m)
{
gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, mic;
OM_uint32 ret;
@@ -1814,7 +1814,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int socket, Buffer *m)
buffer_clear(m);
buffer_put_int(m, ret);
- mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC, m);
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC, m);
if (!GSS_ERROR(ret))
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
@@ -1823,7 +1823,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int socket, Buffer *m)
}
int
-mm_answer_gss_userok(int socket, Buffer *m)
+mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m)
{
int authenticated;
@@ -1833,7 +1833,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(int socket, Buffer *m)
buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
- mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, m);
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, m);
auth_method="gssapi-with-mic";
diff --git a/monitor_fdpass.c b/monitor_fdpass.c
index 22b7882b..f0dd88e7 100644
--- a/monitor_fdpass.c
+++ b/monitor_fdpass.c
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: monitor_fdpass.c,v 1.4 2002/06/26 14:50:04 deraadt Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: monitor_fdpass.c,v 1.5 2004/06/21 17:36:31 avsm Exp $");
#include <sys/uio.h>
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: monitor_fdpass.c,v 1.4 2002/06/26 14:50:04 deraadt Exp $");
#include "monitor_fdpass.h"
void
-mm_send_fd(int socket, int fd)
+mm_send_fd(int sock, int fd)
{
#if defined(HAVE_SENDMSG) && (defined(HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR) || defined(HAVE_CONTROL_IN_MSGHDR))
struct msghdr msg;
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ mm_send_fd(int socket, int fd)
msg.msg_iov = &vec;
msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
- if ((n = sendmsg(socket, &msg, 0)) == -1)
+ if ((n = sendmsg(sock, &msg, 0)) == -1)
fatal("%s: sendmsg(%d): %s", __func__, fd,
strerror(errno));
if (n != 1)
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ mm_send_fd(int socket, int fd)
}
int
-mm_receive_fd(int socket)
+mm_receive_fd(int sock)
{
#if defined(HAVE_RECVMSG) && (defined(HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR) || defined(HAVE_CONTROL_IN_MSGHDR))
struct msghdr msg;
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ mm_receive_fd(int socket)
msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(tmp);
#endif
- if ((n = recvmsg(socket, &msg, 0)) == -1)
+ if ((n = recvmsg(sock, &msg, 0)) == -1)
fatal("%s: recvmsg: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
if (n != 1)
fatal("%s: recvmsg: expected received 1 got %ld",
diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
index ee2dc202..d9cbd9e3 100644
--- a/monitor_wrap.c
+++ b/monitor_wrap.c
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.35 2003/11/17 11:06:07 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.36 2004/06/21 17:36:31 avsm Exp $");
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/dh.h>
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ mm_is_monitor(void)
}
void
-mm_request_send(int socket, enum monitor_reqtype type, Buffer *m)
+mm_request_send(int sock, enum monitor_reqtype type, Buffer *m)
{
u_int mlen = buffer_len(m);
u_char buf[5];
@@ -92,14 +92,14 @@ mm_request_send(int socket, enum monitor_reqtype type, Buffer *m)
PUT_32BIT(buf, mlen + 1);
buf[4] = (u_char) type; /* 1st byte of payload is mesg-type */
- if (atomicio(vwrite, socket, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf))
+ if (atomicio(vwrite, sock, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf))
fatal("%s: write", __func__);
- if (atomicio(vwrite, socket, buffer_ptr(m), mlen) != mlen)
+ if (atomicio(vwrite, sock, buffer_ptr(m), mlen) != mlen)
fatal("%s: write", __func__);
}
void
-mm_request_receive(int socket, Buffer *m)
+mm_request_receive(int sock, Buffer *m)
{
u_char buf[4];
u_int msg_len;
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ mm_request_receive(int socket, Buffer *m)
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
- res = atomicio(read, socket, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ res = atomicio(read, sock, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (res != sizeof(buf)) {
if (res == 0)
cleanup_exit(255);
@@ -118,19 +118,19 @@ mm_request_receive(int socket, Buffer *m)
fatal("%s: read: bad msg_len %d", __func__, msg_len);
buffer_clear(m);
buffer_append_space(m, msg_len);
- res = atomicio(read, socket, buffer_ptr(m), msg_len);
+ res = atomicio(read, sock, buffer_ptr(m), msg_len);
if (res != msg_len)
fatal("%s: read: %ld != msg_len", __func__, (long)res);
}
void
-mm_request_receive_expect(int socket, enum monitor_reqtype type, Buffer *m)
+mm_request_receive_expect(int sock, enum monitor_reqtype type, Buffer *m)
{
u_char rtype;
debug3("%s entering: type %d", __func__, type);
- mm_request_receive(socket, m);
+ mm_request_receive(sock, m);
rtype = buffer_get_char(m);
if (rtype != type)
fatal("%s: read: rtype %d != type %d", __func__,
@@ -544,7 +544,7 @@ mm_send_kex(Buffer *m, Kex *kex)
}
void
-mm_send_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
+mm_send_keystate(struct monitor *monitor)
{
Buffer m;
u_char *blob, *p;
@@ -580,7 +580,7 @@ mm_send_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
goto skip;
} else {
/* Kex for rekeying */
- mm_send_kex(&m, *pmonitor->m_pkex);
+ mm_send_kex(&m, *monitor->m_pkex);
}
debug3("%s: Sending new keys: %p %p",
@@ -632,7 +632,7 @@ mm_send_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
buffer_put_string(&m, buffer_ptr(&input), buffer_len(&input));
buffer_put_string(&m, buffer_ptr(&output), buffer_len(&output));
- mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT, &m);
+ mm_request_send(monitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT, &m);
debug3("%s: Finished sending state", __func__);
buffer_free(&m);
@@ -1093,7 +1093,7 @@ mm_auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNUM *p, u_char response[16])
#ifdef GSSAPI
OM_uint32
-mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid)
+mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID goid)
{
Buffer m;
OM_uint32 major;
@@ -1102,7 +1102,7 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid)
*ctx = NULL;
buffer_init(&m);
- buffer_put_string(&m, oid->elements, oid->length);
+ buffer_put_string(&m, goid->elements, goid->length);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, &m);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP, &m);
diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h
index 2170b132..e5cf5718 100644
--- a/monitor_wrap.h
+++ b/monitor_wrap.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.h,v 1.13 2003/11/17 11:06:07 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.h,v 1.14 2004/06/21 17:36:31 avsm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
@@ -58,9 +58,9 @@ BIGNUM *mm_auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *);
#ifdef GSSAPI
#include "ssh-gss.h"
-OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctxt, gss_OID oid);
-OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *ctxt,
- gss_buffer_desc *recv, gss_buffer_desc *send, OM_uint32 *flags);
+OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
+OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *,
+ gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *);
int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user);
OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
#endif
diff --git a/nchan.c b/nchan.c
index 3138cdd1..ecf59c5d 100644
--- a/nchan.c
+++ b/nchan.c
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: nchan.c,v 1.49 2003/08/29 10:04:36 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: nchan.c,v 1.50 2004/06/21 17:36:31 avsm Exp $");
#include "ssh1.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
@@ -395,7 +395,7 @@ chan_mark_dead(Channel *c)
}
int
-chan_is_dead(Channel *c, int send)
+chan_is_dead(Channel *c, int do_send)
{
if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE) {
debug2("channel %d: zombie", c->self);
@@ -416,7 +416,7 @@ chan_is_dead(Channel *c, int send)
return 0;
}
if (!(c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_SENT)) {
- if (send) {
+ if (do_send) {
chan_send_close2(c);
} else {
/* channel would be dead if we sent a close */
diff --git a/packet.c b/packet.c
index fca0075e..82a56940 100644
--- a/packet.c
+++ b/packet.c
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.114 2004/06/14 01:44:39 djm Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.115 2004/06/21 17:36:31 avsm Exp $");
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
@@ -507,7 +507,7 @@ packet_send1(void)
u_char buf[8], *cp;
int i, padding, len;
u_int checksum;
- u_int32_t rand = 0;
+ u_int32_t rnd = 0;
/*
* If using packet compression, compress the payload of the outgoing
@@ -533,9 +533,9 @@ packet_send1(void)
cp = buffer_ptr(&outgoing_packet);
for (i = 0; i < padding; i++) {
if (i % 4 == 0)
- rand = arc4random();
- cp[7 - i] = rand & 0xff;
- rand >>= 8;
+ rnd = arc4random();
+ cp[7 - i] = rnd & 0xff;
+ rnd >>= 8;
}
}
buffer_consume(&outgoing_packet, 8 - padding);
@@ -580,18 +580,18 @@ set_newkeys(int mode)
Comp *comp;
CipherContext *cc;
u_int64_t *max_blocks;
- int encrypt;
+ int crypt_type;
debug2("set_newkeys: mode %d", mode);
if (mode == MODE_OUT) {
cc = &send_context;
- encrypt = CIPHER_ENCRYPT;
+ crypt_type = CIPHER_ENCRYPT;
p_send.packets = p_send.blocks = 0;
max_blocks = &max_blocks_out;
} else {
cc = &receive_context;
- encrypt = CIPHER_DECRYPT;
+ crypt_type = CIPHER_DECRYPT;
p_read.packets = p_read.blocks = 0;
max_blocks = &max_blocks_in;
}
@@ -620,7 +620,7 @@ set_newkeys(int mode)
mac->enabled = 1;
DBG(debug("cipher_init_context: %d", mode));
cipher_init(cc, enc->cipher, enc->key, enc->key_len,
- enc->iv, enc->block_size, encrypt);
+ enc->iv, enc->block_size, crypt_type);
/* Deleting the keys does not gain extra security */
/* memset(enc->iv, 0, enc->block_size);
memset(enc->key, 0, enc->key_len); */
@@ -654,7 +654,7 @@ packet_send2_wrapped(void)
u_char padlen, pad;
u_int packet_length = 0;
u_int i, len;
- u_int32_t rand = 0;
+ u_int32_t rnd = 0;
Enc *enc = NULL;
Mac *mac = NULL;
Comp *comp = NULL;
@@ -713,9 +713,9 @@ packet_send2_wrapped(void)
/* random padding */
for (i = 0; i < padlen; i++) {
if (i % 4 == 0)
- rand = arc4random();
- cp[i] = rand & 0xff;
- rand >>= 8;
+ rnd = arc4random();
+ cp[i] = rnd & 0xff;
+ rnd >>= 8;
}
} else {
/* clear padding */
@@ -1489,16 +1489,16 @@ packet_add_padding(u_char pad)
void
packet_send_ignore(int nbytes)
{
- u_int32_t rand = 0;
+ u_int32_t rnd = 0;
int i;
packet_start(compat20 ? SSH2_MSG_IGNORE : SSH_MSG_IGNORE);
packet_put_int(nbytes);
for (i = 0; i < nbytes; i++) {
if (i % 4 == 0)
- rand = arc4random();
- packet_put_char(rand & 0xff);
- rand >>= 8;
+ rnd = arc4random();
+ packet_put_char(rnd & 0xff);
+ rnd >>= 8;
}
}
diff --git a/progressmeter.c b/progressmeter.c
index e74f4785..629a536b 100644
--- a/progressmeter.c
+++ b/progressmeter.c
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: progressmeter.c,v 1.20 2004/05/11 19:01:43 deraadt Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: progressmeter.c,v 1.21 2004/06/21 17:36:31 avsm Exp $");
#include "progressmeter.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ update_progress_meter(int ignore)
}
void
-start_progress_meter(char *f, off_t filesize, off_t *stat)
+start_progress_meter(char *f, off_t filesize, off_t *ctr)
{
struct winsize winsize;
@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ start_progress_meter(char *f, off_t filesize, off_t *stat)
file = f;
end_pos = filesize;
cur_pos = 0;
- counter = stat;
+ counter = ctr;
stalled = 0;
bytes_per_second = 0;
diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
index 8621a440..3ae17c9a 100644
--- a/scp.c
+++ b/scp.c
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.114 2004/04/01 12:19:57 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.115 2004/06/21 17:36:31 avsm Exp $");
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
@@ -663,7 +663,7 @@ bwlimit(int amount)
{
static struct timeval bwstart, bwend;
static int lamt, thresh = 16384;
- u_int64_t wait;
+ u_int64_t waitlen;
struct timespec ts, rm;
if (!timerisset(&bwstart)) {
@@ -681,10 +681,10 @@ bwlimit(int amount)
return;
lamt *= 8;
- wait = (double)1000000L * lamt / limit_rate;
+ waitlen = (double)1000000L * lamt / limit_rate;
- bwstart.tv_sec = wait / 1000000L;
- bwstart.tv_usec = wait % 1000000L;
+ bwstart.tv_sec = waitlen / 1000000L;
+ bwstart.tv_usec = waitlen % 1000000L;
if (timercmp(&bwstart, &bwend, >)) {
timersub(&bwstart, &bwend, &bwend);
diff --git a/sftp-server.c b/sftp-server.c
index 1d13e97b..8349c176 100644
--- a/sftp-server.c
+++ b/sftp-server.c
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sftp-server.c,v 1.45 2004/02/19 21:15:04 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sftp-server.c,v 1.46 2004/06/21 17:36:31 avsm Exp $");
#include "buffer.h"
#include "bufaux.h"
@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ send_msg(Buffer *m)
}
static void
-send_status(u_int32_t id, u_int32_t error)
+send_status(u_int32_t id, u_int32_t status)
{
Buffer msg;
const char *status_messages[] = {
@@ -276,14 +276,14 @@ send_status(u_int32_t id, u_int32_t error)
"Unknown error" /* Others */
};
- TRACE("sent status id %u error %u", id, error);
+ TRACE("sent status id %u error %u", id, status);
buffer_init(&msg);
buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_STATUS);
buffer_put_int(&msg, id);
- buffer_put_int(&msg, error);
+ buffer_put_int(&msg, status);
if (version >= 3) {
buffer_put_cstring(&msg,
- status_messages[MIN(error,SSH2_FX_MAX)]);
+ status_messages[MIN(status,SSH2_FX_MAX)]);
buffer_put_cstring(&msg, "");
}
send_msg(&msg);
@@ -863,20 +863,20 @@ process_readlink(void)
{
u_int32_t id;
int len;
- char link[MAXPATHLEN];
+ char buf[MAXPATHLEN];
char *path;
id = get_int();
path = get_string(NULL);
TRACE("readlink id %u path %s", id, path);
- if ((len = readlink(path, link, sizeof(link) - 1)) == -1)
+ if ((len = readlink(path, buf, sizeof(buf) - 1)) == -1)
send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno));
else {
Stat s;
- link[len] = '\0';
+ buf[len] = '\0';
attrib_clear(&s.attrib);
- s.name = s.long_name = link;
+ s.name = s.long_name = buf;
send_names(id, 1, &s);
}
xfree(path);
diff --git a/sftp.c b/sftp.c
index df2aff65..d818ef84 100644
--- a/sftp.c
+++ b/sftp.c
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sftp.c,v 1.50 2004/06/20 18:53:39 djm Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sftp.c,v 1.51 2004/06/21 17:36:31 avsm Exp $");
#include "buffer.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
@@ -277,13 +277,13 @@ path_append(char *p1, char *p2)
static char *
make_absolute(char *p, char *pwd)
{
- char *abs;
+ char *abs_str;
/* Derelativise */
if (p && p[0] != '/') {
- abs = path_append(pwd, p);
+ abs_str = path_append(pwd, p);
xfree(p);
- return(abs);
+ return(abs_str);
} else
return(p);
}
diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
index 4f032aa8..52fb49a6 100644
--- a/ssh-gss.h
+++ b/ssh-gss.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.4 2003/11/17 11:06:07 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.5 2004/06/21 17:36:31 avsm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
*
@@ -100,31 +100,31 @@ typedef struct {
extern ssh_gssapi_mech *supported_mechs[];
-int ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *ctx, void *data, size_t len);
-void ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(Gssctxt *ctx, void *data, size_t len);
-void ssh_gssapi_set_oid(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_OID oid);
-void ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset);
-ssh_gssapi_mech *ssh_gssapi_get_ctype(Gssctxt *ctxt);
-
-OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *host);
-OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(Gssctxt *ctx);
-OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, int deleg_creds,
- gss_buffer_desc *recv_tok, gss_buffer_desc *send_tok, OM_uint32 *flags);
-OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx,
- gss_buffer_desc *recv_tok, gss_buffer_desc *send_tok, OM_uint32 *flags);
-OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *);
-void ssh_gssapi_error(Gssctxt *ctx);
-char *ssh_gssapi_last_error(Gssctxt *ctxt, OM_uint32 *maj, OM_uint32 *min);
-void ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx);
-void ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx);
+int ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
+void ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
+void ssh_gssapi_set_oid(Gssctxt *, gss_OID);
+void ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *);
+ssh_gssapi_mech *ssh_gssapi_get_ctype(Gssctxt *);
+
+OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *, const char *);
+OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(Gssctxt *);
+OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *, int,
+ gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *);
+OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *,
+ gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *);
+OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *, ssh_gssapi_client *);
+void ssh_gssapi_error(Gssctxt *);
+char *ssh_gssapi_last_error(Gssctxt *, OM_uint32 *, OM_uint32 *);
+void ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(Gssctxt **);
+void ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **);
OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
-OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid);
+OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
void ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
/* In the server */
int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name);
OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
-void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep);
+void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c
index 5539fe17..d4d19d3a 100644
--- a/ssh-keygen.c
+++ b/ssh-keygen.c
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.115 2004/05/09 00:06:47 djm Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.116 2004/06/21 17:36:31 avsm Exp $");
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/pem.h>
@@ -192,8 +192,8 @@ do_convert_to_ssh2(struct passwd *pw)
static void
buffer_get_bignum_bits(Buffer *b, BIGNUM *value)
{
- u_int bits = buffer_get_int(b);
- u_int bytes = (bits + 7) / 8;
+ u_int bignum_bits = buffer_get_int(b);
+ u_int bytes = (bignum_bits + 7) / 8;
if (buffer_len(b) < bytes)
fatal("buffer_get_bignum_bits: input buffer too small: "
@@ -630,7 +630,7 @@ do_change_passphrase(struct passwd *pw)
* Print the SSHFP RR.
*/
static void
-do_print_resource_record(struct passwd *pw, char *hostname)
+do_print_resource_record(struct passwd *pw, char *hname)
{
Key *public;
char *comment = NULL;
@@ -644,7 +644,7 @@ do_print_resource_record(struct passwd *pw, char *hostname)
}
public = key_load_public(identity_file, &comment);
if (public != NULL) {
- export_dns_rr(hostname, public, stdout, print_generic);
+ export_dns_rr(hname, public, stdout, print_generic);
key_free(public);
xfree(comment);
exit(0);
diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
index b9bd8c0d..9e3f7355 100644
--- a/ssh.c
+++ b/ssh.c
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.220 2004/06/20 17:36:59 djm Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.221 2004/06/21 17:36:31 avsm Exp $");
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
@@ -807,17 +807,17 @@ x11_get_proto(char **_proto, char **_data)
* for the local connection.
*/
if (!got_data) {
- u_int32_t rand = 0;
+ u_int32_t rnd = 0;
logit("Warning: No xauth data; "
"using fake authentication data for X11 forwarding.");
strlcpy(proto, SSH_X11_PROTO, sizeof proto);
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
if (i % 4 == 0)
- rand = arc4random();
+ rnd = arc4random();
snprintf(data + 2 * i, sizeof data - 2 * i, "%02x",
- rand & 0xff);
- rand >>= 8;
+ rnd & 0xff);
+ rnd >>= 8;
}
}
}
diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c
index 95bb527b..11008e54 100644
--- a/sshconnect.c
+++ b/sshconnect.c
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.157 2004/05/08 00:21:31 djm Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.158 2004/06/21 17:36:31 avsm Exp $");
#include <openssl/bn.h>
@@ -767,19 +767,19 @@ check_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key,
break;
case HOST_CHANGED:
if (options.check_host_ip && host_ip_differ) {
- char *msg;
+ char *key_msg;
if (ip_status == HOST_NEW)
- msg = "is unknown";
+ key_msg = "is unknown";
else if (ip_status == HOST_OK)
- msg = "is unchanged";
+ key_msg = "is unchanged";
else
- msg = "has a different value";
+ key_msg = "has a different value";
error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
error("@ WARNING: POSSIBLE DNS SPOOFING DETECTED! @");
error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
error("The %s host key for %s has changed,", type, host);
error("and the key for the according IP address %s", ip);
- error("%s. This could either mean that", msg);
+ error("%s. This could either mean that", key_msg);
error("DNS SPOOFING is happening or the IP address for the host");
error("and its host key have changed at the same time.");
if (ip_status != HOST_NEW)
diff --git a/sshconnect1.c b/sshconnect1.c
index ae33ab39..61fecab1 100644
--- a/sshconnect1.c
+++ b/sshconnect1.c
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect1.c,v 1.58 2004/05/09 01:19:28 djm Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect1.c,v 1.59 2004/06/21 17:36:31 avsm Exp $");
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/md5.h>
@@ -476,7 +476,7 @@ ssh_kex(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr)
u_char cookie[8];
u_int supported_ciphers;
u_int server_flags, client_flags;
- u_int32_t rand = 0;
+ u_int32_t rnd = 0;
debug("Waiting for server public key.");
@@ -540,9 +540,9 @@ ssh_kex(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr)
*/
for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
if (i % 4 == 0)
- rand = arc4random();
- session_key[i] = rand & 0xff;
- rand >>= 8;
+ rnd = arc4random();
+ session_key[i] = rnd & 0xff;
+ rnd >>= 8;
}
/*
diff --git a/sshlogin.c b/sshlogin.c
index e1cc4cc8..22cfd344 100644
--- a/sshlogin.c
+++ b/sshlogin.c
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshlogin.c,v 1.7 2003/06/12 07:57:38 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshlogin.c,v 1.8 2004/06/21 17:36:31 avsm Exp $");
#include "loginrec.h"
@@ -64,12 +64,12 @@ get_last_login_time(uid_t uid, const char *logname,
* systems were more standardized.
*/
void
-record_login(pid_t pid, const char *ttyname, const char *user, uid_t uid,
+record_login(pid_t pid, const char *tty, const char *user, uid_t uid,
const char *host, struct sockaddr * addr, socklen_t addrlen)
{
struct logininfo *li;
- li = login_alloc_entry(pid, user, host, ttyname);
+ li = login_alloc_entry(pid, user, host, tty);
login_set_addr(li, addr, addrlen);
login_login(li);
login_free_entry(li);
@@ -91,11 +91,11 @@ record_utmp_only(pid_t pid, const char *ttyname, const char *user,
/* Records that the user has logged out. */
void
-record_logout(pid_t pid, const char *ttyname, const char *user)
+record_logout(pid_t pid, const char *tty, const char *user)
{
struct logininfo *li;
- li = login_alloc_entry(pid, user, NULL, ttyname);
+ li = login_alloc_entry(pid, user, NULL, tty);
login_logout(li);
login_free_entry(li);
}
diff --git a/sshpty.c b/sshpty.c
index 0fe3891b..efd1dfef 100644
--- a/sshpty.c
+++ b/sshpty.c
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshpty.c,v 1.11 2004/01/11 21:55:06 deraadt Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshpty.c,v 1.12 2004/06/21 17:36:31 avsm Exp $");
#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
# include <util.h>
@@ -60,18 +60,18 @@ pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd, char *namebuf, int namebuflen)
/* Releases the tty. Its ownership is returned to root, and permissions to 0666. */
void
-pty_release(const char *ttyname)
+pty_release(const char *tty)
{
- if (chown(ttyname, (uid_t) 0, (gid_t) 0) < 0)
- error("chown %.100s 0 0 failed: %.100s", ttyname, strerror(errno));
- if (chmod(ttyname, (mode_t) 0666) < 0)
- error("chmod %.100s 0666 failed: %.100s", ttyname, strerror(errno));
+ if (chown(tty, (uid_t) 0, (gid_t) 0) < 0)
+ error("chown %.100s 0 0 failed: %.100s", tty, strerror(errno));
+ if (chmod(tty, (mode_t) 0666) < 0)
+ error("chmod %.100s 0666 failed: %.100s", tty, strerror(errno));
}
/* Makes the tty the process's controlling tty and sets it to sane modes. */
void
-pty_make_controlling_tty(int *ttyfd, const char *ttyname)
+pty_make_controlling_tty(int *ttyfd, const char *tty)
{
int fd;
#ifdef USE_VHANGUP
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ pty_make_controlling_tty(int *ttyfd, const char *ttyname)
if (setsid() < 0)
error("setsid: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- fd = open(ttyname, O_RDWR|O_NOCTTY);
+ fd = open(tty, O_RDWR|O_NOCTTY);
if (fd != -1) {
signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN);
ioctl(fd, TCVHUP, (char *)NULL);
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ pty_make_controlling_tty(int *ttyfd, const char *ttyname)
ioctl(*ttyfd, TCSETCTTY, NULL);
fd = open("/dev/tty", O_RDWR);
if (fd < 0)
- error("%.100s: %.100s", ttyname, strerror(errno));
+ error("%.100s: %.100s", tty, strerror(errno));
close(*ttyfd);
*ttyfd = fd;
#else /* _UNICOS */
@@ -137,9 +137,9 @@ pty_make_controlling_tty(int *ttyfd, const char *ttyname)
vhangup();
signal(SIGHUP, old);
#endif /* USE_VHANGUP */
- fd = open(ttyname, O_RDWR);
+ fd = open(tty, O_RDWR);
if (fd < 0) {
- error("%.100s: %.100s", ttyname, strerror(errno));
+ error("%.100s: %.100s", tty, strerror(errno));
} else {
#ifdef USE_VHANGUP
close(*ttyfd);
@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ pty_change_window_size(int ptyfd, int row, int col,
}
void
-pty_setowner(struct passwd *pw, const char *ttyname)
+pty_setowner(struct passwd *pw, const char *tty)
{
struct group *grp;
gid_t gid;
@@ -196,33 +196,33 @@ pty_setowner(struct passwd *pw, const char *ttyname)
* Warn but continue if filesystem is read-only and the uids match/
* tty is owned by root.
*/
- if (stat(ttyname, &st))
- fatal("stat(%.100s) failed: %.100s", ttyname,
+ if (stat(tty, &st))
+ fatal("stat(%.100s) failed: %.100s", tty,
strerror(errno));
if (st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid || st.st_gid != gid) {
- if (chown(ttyname, pw->pw_uid, gid) < 0) {
+ if (chown(tty, pw->pw_uid, gid) < 0) {
if (errno == EROFS &&
(st.st_uid == pw->pw_uid || st.st_uid == 0))
debug("chown(%.100s, %u, %u) failed: %.100s",
- ttyname, (u_int)pw->pw_uid, (u_int)gid,
+ tty, (u_int)pw->pw_uid, (u_int)gid,
strerror(errno));
else
fatal("chown(%.100s, %u, %u) failed: %.100s",
- ttyname, (u_int)pw->pw_uid, (u_int)gid,
+ tty, (u_int)pw->pw_uid, (u_int)gid,
strerror(errno));
}
}
if ((st.st_mode & (S_IRWXU|S_IRWXG|S_IRWXO)) != mode) {
- if (chmod(ttyname, mode) < 0) {
+ if (chmod(tty, mode) < 0) {
if (errno == EROFS &&
(st.st_mode & (S_IRGRP | S_IROTH)) == 0)
debug("chmod(%.100s, 0%o) failed: %.100s",
- ttyname, (u_int)mode, strerror(errno));
+ tty, (u_int)mode, strerror(errno));
else
fatal("chmod(%.100s, 0%o) failed: %.100s",
- ttyname, (u_int)mode, strerror(errno));
+ tty, (u_int)mode, strerror(errno));
}
}
}