summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authordjm <djm>2008-05-19 04:50:00 +0000
committerdjm <djm>2008-05-19 04:50:00 +0000
commita1e37c5fac57353ca7637c0dd6d3deaf4ce24452 (patch)
treec86070babcddeb3d6e8dcb696318c7152dd9fc8a
parentf690d624665500312faee3becf0de7f302d77d2d (diff)
downloadopenssh-a1e37c5fac57353ca7637c0dd6d3deaf4ce24452.tar.gz
- (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/04/13 00:22:17 [dh.c sshd.c] Use arc4random_buf() when requesting more than a single word of output Use arc4random_uniform() when the desired random number upper bound is not a power of two ok deraadt@ millert@
-rw-r--r--ChangeLog9
-rw-r--r--dh.c4
-rw-r--r--sshd.c32
3 files changed, 17 insertions, 28 deletions
diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 66145e52..b32f93f0 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -14,6 +14,13 @@
- (djm) [openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.c]
[configure.ac] Implement arc4random_buf(), import implementation of
arc4random_uniform() from OpenBSD
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/04/13 00:22:17
+ [dh.c sshd.c]
+ Use arc4random_buf() when requesting more than a single word of output
+ Use arc4random_uniform() when the desired random number upper bound
+ is not a power of two
+ ok deraadt@ millert@
20080403
- (djm) [openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.c] Include stdlib.h to avoid compile-
@@ -3874,4 +3881,4 @@
OpenServer 6 and add osr5bigcrypt support so when someone migrates
passwords between UnixWare and OpenServer they will still work. OK dtucker@
-$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.4909 2008/05/19 04:47:37 djm Exp $
+$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.4910 2008/05/19 04:50:00 djm Exp $
diff --git a/dh.c b/dh.c
index 66858104..0908fcf1 100644
--- a/dh.c
+++ b/dh.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: dh.c,v 1.45 2007/09/27 00:15:57 ray Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: dh.c,v 1.46 2008/04/13 00:22:17 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
*
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ choose_dh(int min, int wantbits, int max)
}
linenum = 0;
- which = arc4random() % bestcount;
+ which = arc4random_uniform(bestcount);
while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) {
if (!parse_prime(linenum, line, &dhg))
continue;
diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
index 5dfc2b18..796310b0 100644
--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.355 2008/02/14 13:10:31 mbalmer Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.356 2008/04/13 00:22:17 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -368,9 +368,6 @@ grace_alarm_handler(int sig)
static void
generate_ephemeral_server_key(void)
{
- u_int32_t rnd = 0;
- int i;
-
verbose("Generating %s%d bit RSA key.",
sensitive_data.server_key ? "new " : "", options.server_key_bits);
if (sensitive_data.server_key != NULL)
@@ -379,12 +376,7 @@ generate_ephemeral_server_key(void)
options.server_key_bits);
verbose("RSA key generation complete.");
- for (i = 0; i < SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH; i++) {
- if (i % 4 == 0)
- rnd = arc4random();
- sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie[i] = rnd & 0xff;
- rnd >>= 8;
- }
+ arc4random_buf(sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH);
arc4random_stir();
}
@@ -583,16 +575,14 @@ demote_sensitive_data(void)
static void
privsep_preauth_child(void)
{
- u_int32_t rnd[256];
+ u_int32_t rnd[256];
gid_t gidset[1];
- u_int i;
/* Enable challenge-response authentication for privilege separation */
privsep_challenge_enable();
arc4random_stir();
- for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
- rnd[i] = arc4random();
+ arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
@@ -666,7 +656,6 @@ static void
privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
u_int32_t rnd[256];
- u_int i;
#ifdef DISABLE_FD_PASSING
if (1) {
@@ -700,8 +689,7 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
demote_sensitive_data();
arc4random_stir();
- for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
- rnd[i] = arc4random();
+ arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
/* Drop privileges */
@@ -803,7 +791,7 @@ drop_connection(int startups)
p *= startups - options.max_startups_begin;
p /= options.max_startups - options.max_startups_begin;
p += options.max_startups_rate;
- r = arc4random() % 100;
+ r = arc4random_uniform(100);
debug("drop_connection: p %d, r %d", p, r);
return (r < p) ? 1 : 0;
@@ -1956,7 +1944,6 @@ do_ssh1_kex(void)
u_char session_key[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH];
u_char cookie[8];
u_int cipher_type, auth_mask, protocol_flags;
- u_int32_t rnd = 0;
/*
* Generate check bytes that the client must send back in the user
@@ -1967,12 +1954,7 @@ do_ssh1_kex(void)
* cookie. This only affects rhosts authentication, and this is one
* of the reasons why it is inherently insecure.
*/
- for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
- if (i % 4 == 0)
- rnd = arc4random();
- cookie[i] = rnd & 0xff;
- rnd >>= 8;
- }
+ arc4random_buf(cookie, sizeof(cookie));
/*
* Send our public key. We include in the packet 64 bits of random