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Diffstat (limited to 'nss/lib/freebl/drbg.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | nss/lib/freebl/drbg.c | 920 |
1 files changed, 920 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/nss/lib/freebl/drbg.c b/nss/lib/freebl/drbg.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..391d456 --- /dev/null +++ b/nss/lib/freebl/drbg.c @@ -0,0 +1,920 @@ +/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#ifdef FREEBL_NO_DEPEND +#include "stubs.h" +#endif + +#include "prerror.h" +#include "secerr.h" + +#include "prtypes.h" +#include "prinit.h" +#include "blapi.h" +#include "blapii.h" +#include "nssilock.h" +#include "secitem.h" +#include "sha_fast.h" +#include "sha256.h" +#include "secrng.h" /* for RNG_SystemRNG() */ +#include "secmpi.h" + +/* PRNG_SEEDLEN defined in NIST SP 800-90 section 10.1 + * for SHA-1, SHA-224, and SHA-256 it's 440 bits. + * for SHA-384 and SHA-512 it's 888 bits */ +#define PRNG_SEEDLEN (440/PR_BITS_PER_BYTE) +#define PRNG_MAX_ADDITIONAL_BYTES PR_INT64(0x100000000) + /* 2^35 bits or 2^32 bytes */ +#define PRNG_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE 0x10000 /* 2^19 bits or 2^16 bytes */ +#define PRNG_ADDITONAL_DATA_CACHE_SIZE (8*1024) /* must be less than + * PRNG_MAX_ADDITIONAL_BYTES + */ + +/* RESEED_COUNT is how many calls to the prng before we need to reseed + * under normal NIST rules, you must return an error. In the NSS case, we + * self-reseed with RNG_SystemRNG(). Count can be a large number. For code + * simplicity, we specify count with 2 components: RESEED_BYTE (which is + * the same as LOG256(RESEED_COUNT)) and RESEED_VALUE (which is the same as + * RESEED_COUNT / (256 ^ RESEED_BYTE)). Another way to look at this is + * RESEED_COUNT = RESEED_VALUE * (256 ^ RESEED_BYTE). For Hash based DRBG + * we use the maximum count value, 2^48, or RESEED_BYTE=6 and RESEED_VALUE=1 + */ +#define RESEED_BYTE 6 +#define RESEED_VALUE 1 + +#define PRNG_RESET_RESEED_COUNT(rng) \ + PORT_Memset((rng)->reseed_counter, 0, sizeof (rng)->reseed_counter); \ + (rng)->reseed_counter[RESEED_BYTE] = 1; + + +/* + * The actual values of this enum are specified in SP 800-90, 10.1.1.* + * The spec does not name the types, it only uses bare values + */ +typedef enum { + prngCGenerateType = 0, /* used when creating a new 'C' */ + prngReseedType = 1, /* used in reseeding */ + prngAdditionalDataType = 2, /* used in mixing additional data */ + prngGenerateByteType = 3 /* used when mixing internal state while + * generating bytes */ +} prngVTypes; + +/* + * Global RNG context + */ +struct RNGContextStr { + PZLock *lock; /* Lock to serialize access to global rng */ + /* + * NOTE, a number of steps in the drbg algorithm need to hash + * V_type || V. The code, therefore, depends on the V array following + * immediately after V_type to avoid extra copies. To accomplish this + * in a way that compiliers can't perturb, we declare V_type and V + * as a V_Data array and reference them by macros */ + PRUint8 V_Data[PRNG_SEEDLEN+1]; /* internal state variables */ +#define V_type V_Data[0] +#define V(rng) (((rng)->V_Data)+1) +#define VSize(rng) ((sizeof (rng)->V_Data) -1) + PRUint8 C[PRNG_SEEDLEN]; /* internal state variables */ + PRUint8 oldV[PRNG_SEEDLEN]; /* for continuous rng checking */ + /* If we get calls for the PRNG to return less than the length of our + * hash, we extend the request for a full hash (since we'll be doing + * the full hash anyway). Future requests for random numbers are fulfilled + * from the remainder of the bytes we generated. Requests for bytes longer + * than the hash size are fulfilled directly from the HashGen function + * of the random number generator. */ + PRUint8 reseed_counter[RESEED_BYTE+1]; /* number of requests since the + * last reseed. Need only be + * big enough to hold the whole + * reseed count */ + PRUint8 data[SHA256_LENGTH]; /* when we request less than a block + * save the rest of the rng output for + * another partial block */ + PRUint8 dataAvail; /* # bytes of output available in our cache, + * [0...SHA256_LENGTH] */ + /* store additional data that has been shovelled off to us by + * RNG_RandomUpdate. */ + PRUint8 additionalDataCache[PRNG_ADDITONAL_DATA_CACHE_SIZE]; + PRUint32 additionalAvail; + PRBool isValid; /* false if RNG reaches an invalid state */ +}; + +typedef struct RNGContextStr RNGContext; +static RNGContext *globalrng = NULL; +static RNGContext theGlobalRng; + + +/* + * The next several functions are derived from the NIST SP 800-90 + * spec. In these functions, an attempt was made to use names consistent + * with the names in the spec, even if they differ from normal NSS usage. + */ + +/* + * Hash Derive function defined in NISP SP 800-90 Section 10.4.1. + * This function is used in the Instantiate and Reseed functions. + * + * NOTE: requested_bytes cannot overlap with input_string_1 or input_string_2. + * input_string_1 and input_string_2 are logically concatentated. + * input_string_1 must be supplied. + * if input_string_2 is not supplied, NULL should be passed for this parameter. + */ +static SECStatus +prng_Hash_df(PRUint8 *requested_bytes, unsigned int no_of_bytes_to_return, + const PRUint8 *input_string_1, unsigned int input_string_1_len, + const PRUint8 *input_string_2, unsigned int input_string_2_len) +{ + SHA256Context ctx; + PRUint32 tmp; + PRUint8 counter; + + tmp=SHA_HTONL(no_of_bytes_to_return*8); + + for (counter = 1 ; no_of_bytes_to_return > 0; counter++) { + unsigned int hash_return_len; + SHA256_Begin(&ctx); + SHA256_Update(&ctx, &counter, 1); + SHA256_Update(&ctx, (unsigned char *)&tmp, sizeof tmp); + SHA256_Update(&ctx, input_string_1, input_string_1_len); + if (input_string_2) { + SHA256_Update(&ctx, input_string_2, input_string_2_len); + } + SHA256_End(&ctx, requested_bytes, &hash_return_len, + no_of_bytes_to_return); + requested_bytes += hash_return_len; + no_of_bytes_to_return -= hash_return_len; + } + return SECSuccess; +} + + +/* + * Hash_DRBG Instantiate NIST SP 800-80 10.1.1.2 + * + * NOTE: bytes & len are entropy || nonce || personalization_string. In + * normal operation, NSS calculates them all together in a single call. + */ +static SECStatus +prng_instantiate(RNGContext *rng, const PRUint8 *bytes, unsigned int len) +{ + if (len < PRNG_SEEDLEN) { + /* if the seedlen is to small, it's probably because we failed to get + * enough random data */ + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM); + return SECFailure; + } + prng_Hash_df(V(rng), VSize(rng), bytes, len, NULL, 0); + rng->V_type = prngCGenerateType; + prng_Hash_df(rng->C,sizeof rng->C,rng->V_Data,sizeof rng->V_Data,NULL,0); + PRNG_RESET_RESEED_COUNT(rng) + return SECSuccess; +} + + +/* + * Update the global random number generator with more seeding + * material. Use the Hash_DRBG reseed algorithm from NIST SP-800-90 + * section 10.1.1.3 + * + * If entropy is NULL, it is fetched from the noise generator. + */ +static SECStatus +prng_reseed(RNGContext *rng, const PRUint8 *entropy, unsigned int entropy_len, + const PRUint8 *additional_input, unsigned int additional_input_len) +{ + PRUint8 noiseData[(sizeof rng->V_Data)+PRNG_SEEDLEN]; + PRUint8 *noise = &noiseData[0]; + + /* if entropy wasn't supplied, fetch it. (normal operation case) */ + if (entropy == NULL) { + entropy_len = (unsigned int) RNG_SystemRNG( + &noiseData[sizeof rng->V_Data], PRNG_SEEDLEN); + } else { + /* NOTE: this code is only available for testing, not to applications */ + /* if entropy was too big for the stack variable, get it from malloc */ + if (entropy_len > PRNG_SEEDLEN) { + noise = PORT_Alloc(entropy_len + (sizeof rng->V_Data)); + if (noise == NULL) { + return SECFailure; + } + } + PORT_Memcpy(&noise[sizeof rng->V_Data],entropy, entropy_len); + } + + if (entropy_len < 256/PR_BITS_PER_BYTE) { + /* noise == &noiseData[0] at this point, so nothing to free */ + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM); + return SECFailure; + } + + rng->V_type = prngReseedType; + PORT_Memcpy(noise, rng->V_Data, sizeof rng->V_Data); + prng_Hash_df(V(rng), VSize(rng), noise, (sizeof rng->V_Data) + entropy_len, + additional_input, additional_input_len); + /* clear potential CSP */ + PORT_Memset(noise, 0, (sizeof rng->V_Data) + entropy_len); + rng->V_type = prngCGenerateType; + prng_Hash_df(rng->C,sizeof rng->C,rng->V_Data,sizeof rng->V_Data,NULL,0); + PRNG_RESET_RESEED_COUNT(rng) + + if (noise != &noiseData[0]) { + PORT_Free(noise); + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* + * SP 800-90 requires we rerun our health tests on reseed + */ +static SECStatus +prng_reseed_test(RNGContext *rng, const PRUint8 *entropy, + unsigned int entropy_len, const PRUint8 *additional_input, + unsigned int additional_input_len) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + /* do health checks in FIPS mode */ + rv = PRNGTEST_RunHealthTests(); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + /* error set by PRNGTEST_RunHealTests() */ + rng->isValid = PR_FALSE; + return SECFailure; + } + return prng_reseed(rng, entropy, entropy_len, + additional_input, additional_input_len); +} + +/* + * build some fast inline functions for adding. + */ +#define PRNG_ADD_CARRY_ONLY(dest, start, carry) \ + { \ + int k1; \ + for (k1 = start; carry && k1 >= 0; k1--) { \ + carry = !(++dest[k1]); \ + } \ + } + +/* + * NOTE: dest must be an array for the following to work. + */ +#define PRNG_ADD_BITS(dest, dest_len, add, len, carry) \ + carry = 0; \ + PORT_Assert((dest_len) >= (len)); \ + { \ + int k1, k2; \ + for (k1 = dest_len - 1, k2 = len - 1; k2 >= 0; --k1, --k2) { \ + carry += dest[k1] + add[k2]; \ + dest[k1] = (PRUint8) carry; \ + carry >>= 8; \ + } \ + } + +#define PRNG_ADD_BITS_AND_CARRY(dest, dest_len, add, len, carry) \ + PRNG_ADD_BITS(dest, dest_len, add, len, carry) \ + PRNG_ADD_CARRY_ONLY(dest, dest_len - len, carry) + +/* + * This function expands the internal state of the prng to fulfill any number + * of bytes we need for this request. We only use this call if we need more + * than can be supplied by a single call to SHA256_HashBuf. + * + * This function is specified in NIST SP 800-90 section 10.1.1.4, Hashgen + */ +static void +prng_Hashgen(RNGContext *rng, PRUint8 *returned_bytes, + unsigned int no_of_returned_bytes) +{ + PRUint8 data[VSize(rng)]; + + PORT_Memcpy(data, V(rng), VSize(rng)); + while (no_of_returned_bytes) { + SHA256Context ctx; + unsigned int len; + unsigned int carry; + + SHA256_Begin(&ctx); + SHA256_Update(&ctx, data, sizeof data); + SHA256_End(&ctx, returned_bytes, &len, no_of_returned_bytes); + returned_bytes += len; + no_of_returned_bytes -= len; + /* The carry parameter is a bool (increment or not). + * This increments data if no_of_returned_bytes is not zero */ + carry = no_of_returned_bytes; + PRNG_ADD_CARRY_ONLY(data, (sizeof data)- 1, carry); + } + PORT_Memset(data, 0, sizeof data); +} + +/* + * Generates new random bytes and advances the internal prng state. + * additional bytes are only used in algorithm testing. + * + * This function is specified in NIST SP 800-90 section 10.1.1.4 + */ +static SECStatus +prng_generateNewBytes(RNGContext *rng, + PRUint8 *returned_bytes, unsigned int no_of_returned_bytes, + const PRUint8 *additional_input, + unsigned int additional_input_len) +{ + PRUint8 H[SHA256_LENGTH]; /* both H and w since they + * aren't used concurrently */ + unsigned int carry; + + if (!rng->isValid) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + /* This code only triggers during tests, normal + * prng operation does not use additional_input */ + if (additional_input){ + SHA256Context ctx; + /* NIST SP 800-90 defines two temporaries in their calculations, + * w and H. These temporaries are the same lengths, and used + * at different times, so we use the following macro to collapse + * them to the same variable, but keeping their unique names for + * easy comparison to the spec */ +#define w H + rng->V_type = prngAdditionalDataType; + SHA256_Begin(&ctx); + SHA256_Update(&ctx, rng->V_Data, sizeof rng->V_Data); + SHA256_Update(&ctx, additional_input, additional_input_len); + SHA256_End(&ctx, w, NULL, sizeof w); + PRNG_ADD_BITS_AND_CARRY(V(rng), VSize(rng), w, sizeof w, carry) + PORT_Memset(w, 0, sizeof w); +#undef w + } + + if (no_of_returned_bytes == SHA256_LENGTH) { + /* short_cut to hashbuf and save a copy and a clear */ + SHA256_HashBuf(returned_bytes, V(rng), VSize(rng) ); + } else { + prng_Hashgen(rng, returned_bytes, no_of_returned_bytes); + } + /* advance our internal state... */ + rng->V_type = prngGenerateByteType; + SHA256_HashBuf(H, rng->V_Data, sizeof rng->V_Data); + PRNG_ADD_BITS_AND_CARRY(V(rng), VSize(rng), H, sizeof H, carry) + PRNG_ADD_BITS(V(rng), VSize(rng), rng->C, sizeof rng->C, carry); + PRNG_ADD_BITS_AND_CARRY(V(rng), VSize(rng), rng->reseed_counter, + sizeof rng->reseed_counter, carry) + carry = 1; + PRNG_ADD_CARRY_ONLY(rng->reseed_counter,(sizeof rng->reseed_counter)-1, carry); + + /* continuous rng check */ + if (memcmp(V(rng), rng->oldV, sizeof rng->oldV) == 0) { + rng->isValid = PR_FALSE; + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + PORT_Memcpy(rng->oldV, V(rng), sizeof rng->oldV); + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Use NSPR to prevent RNG_RNGInit from being called from separate + * threads, creating a race condition. + */ +static const PRCallOnceType pristineCallOnce; +static PRCallOnceType coRNGInit; +static PRStatus rng_init(void) +{ + PRUint8 bytes[PRNG_SEEDLEN*2]; /* entropy + nonce */ + unsigned int numBytes; + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + + if (globalrng == NULL) { + /* bytes needs to have enough space to hold + * a SHA256 hash value. Blow up at compile time if this isn't true */ + PR_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(bytes) >= SHA256_LENGTH); + /* create a new global RNG context */ + globalrng = &theGlobalRng; + PORT_Assert(NULL == globalrng->lock); + /* create a lock for it */ + globalrng->lock = PZ_NewLock(nssILockOther); + if (globalrng->lock == NULL) { + globalrng = NULL; + PORT_SetError(PR_OUT_OF_MEMORY_ERROR); + return PR_FAILURE; + } + + /* Try to get some seed data for the RNG */ + numBytes = (unsigned int) RNG_SystemRNG(bytes, sizeof bytes); + PORT_Assert(numBytes == 0 || numBytes == sizeof bytes); + if (numBytes != 0) { + /* if this is our first call, instantiate, otherwise reseed + * prng_instantiate gets a new clean state, we want to mix + * any previous entropy we may have collected */ + if (V(globalrng)[0] == 0) { + rv = prng_instantiate(globalrng, bytes, numBytes); + } else { + rv = prng_reseed_test(globalrng, bytes, numBytes, NULL, 0); + } + memset(bytes, 0, numBytes); + } else { + PZ_DestroyLock(globalrng->lock); + globalrng->lock = NULL; + globalrng = NULL; + return PR_FAILURE; + } + + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return PR_FAILURE; + } + /* the RNG is in a valid state */ + globalrng->isValid = PR_TRUE; + + /* fetch one random value so that we can populate rng->oldV for our + * continous random number test. */ + prng_generateNewBytes(globalrng, bytes, SHA256_LENGTH, NULL, 0); + + /* Fetch more entropy into the PRNG */ + RNG_SystemInfoForRNG(); + } + return PR_SUCCESS; +} + +/* + * Clean up the global RNG context + */ +static void +prng_freeRNGContext(RNGContext *rng) +{ + PRUint8 inputhash[VSize(rng) + (sizeof rng->C)]; + + /* destroy context lock */ + SKIP_AFTER_FORK(PZ_DestroyLock(globalrng->lock)); + + /* zero global RNG context except for C & V to preserve entropy */ + prng_Hash_df(inputhash, sizeof rng->C, rng->C, sizeof rng->C, NULL, 0); + prng_Hash_df(&inputhash[sizeof rng->C], VSize(rng), V(rng), VSize(rng), + NULL, 0); + memset(rng, 0, sizeof *rng); + memcpy(rng->C, inputhash, sizeof rng->C); + memcpy(V(rng), &inputhash[sizeof rng->C], VSize(rng)); + + memset(inputhash, 0, sizeof inputhash); +} + +/* + * Public functions + */ + +/* + * Initialize the global RNG context and give it some seed input taken + * from the system. This function is thread-safe and will only allow + * the global context to be initialized once. The seed input is likely + * small, so it is imperative that RNG_RandomUpdate() be called with + * additional seed data before the generator is used. A good way to + * provide the generator with additional entropy is to call + * RNG_SystemInfoForRNG(). Note that C_Initialize() does exactly that. + */ +SECStatus +RNG_RNGInit(void) +{ + /* Allow only one call to initialize the context */ + PR_CallOnce(&coRNGInit, rng_init); + /* Make sure there is a context */ + return (globalrng != NULL) ? SECSuccess : SECFailure; +} + +/* +** Update the global random number generator with more seeding +** material. +*/ +SECStatus +RNG_RandomUpdate(const void *data, size_t bytes) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + /* Make sure our assumption that size_t is unsigned is true */ + PR_STATIC_ASSERT(((size_t)-1) > (size_t)1); + +#if defined(NS_PTR_GT_32) || (defined(NSS_USE_64) && !defined(NS_PTR_LE_32)) + /* + * NIST 800-90 requires us to verify our inputs. This value can + * come from the application, so we need to make sure it's within the + * spec. The spec says it must be less than 2^32 bytes (2^35 bits). + * This can only happen if size_t is greater than 32 bits (i.e. on + * most 64 bit platforms). The 90% case (perhaps 100% case), size_t + * is less than or equal to 32 bits if the platform is not 64 bits, and + * greater than 32 bits if it is a 64 bit platform. The corner + * cases are handled with explicit defines NS_PTR_GT_32 and NS_PTR_LE_32. + * + * In general, neither NS_PTR_GT_32 nor NS_PTR_LE_32 will need to be + * defined. If you trip over the next two size ASSERTS at compile time, + * you will need to define them for your platform. + * + * if 'sizeof(size_t) > 4' is triggered it means that we were expecting + * sizeof(size_t) to be greater than 4, but it wasn't. Setting + * NS_PTR_LE_32 will correct that mistake. + * + * if 'sizeof(size_t) <= 4' is triggered, it means that we were expecting + * sizeof(size_t) to be less than or equal to 4, but it wasn't. Setting + * NS_PTR_GT_32 will correct that mistake. + */ + + PR_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(size_t) > 4); + + if (bytes > (size_t)PRNG_MAX_ADDITIONAL_BYTES) { + bytes = PRNG_MAX_ADDITIONAL_BYTES; + } +#else + PR_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(size_t) <= 4); +#endif + + PZ_Lock(globalrng->lock); + /* if we're passed more than our additionalDataCache, simply + * call reseed with that data */ + if (bytes > sizeof (globalrng->additionalDataCache)) { + rv = prng_reseed_test(globalrng, NULL, 0, data, (unsigned int) bytes); + /* if we aren't going to fill or overflow the buffer, just cache it */ + } else if (bytes < ((sizeof globalrng->additionalDataCache) + - globalrng->additionalAvail)) { + PORT_Memcpy(globalrng->additionalDataCache+globalrng->additionalAvail, + data, bytes); + globalrng->additionalAvail += (PRUint32) bytes; + rv = SECSuccess; + } else { + /* we are going to fill or overflow the buffer. In this case we will + * fill the entropy buffer, reseed with it, start a new buffer with the + * remainder. We know the remainder will fit in the buffer because + * we already handled the case where bytes > the size of the buffer. + */ + size_t bufRemain = (sizeof globalrng->additionalDataCache) + - globalrng->additionalAvail; + /* fill the rest of the buffer */ + if (bufRemain) { + PORT_Memcpy(globalrng->additionalDataCache + +globalrng->additionalAvail, + data, bufRemain); + data = ((unsigned char *)data) + bufRemain; + bytes -= bufRemain; + } + /* reseed from buffer */ + rv = prng_reseed_test(globalrng, NULL, 0, + globalrng->additionalDataCache, + sizeof globalrng->additionalDataCache); + + /* copy the rest into the cache */ + PORT_Memcpy(globalrng->additionalDataCache, data, bytes); + globalrng->additionalAvail = (PRUint32) bytes; + } + + PZ_Unlock(globalrng->lock); + return rv; +} + +/* +** Generate some random bytes, using the global random number generator +** object. +*/ +static SECStatus +prng_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(RNGContext *rng, + void *dest, size_t len) +{ + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + PRUint8 *output = dest; + /* check for a valid global RNG context */ + PORT_Assert(rng != NULL); + if (rng == NULL) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + /* FIPS limits the amount of entropy available in a single request */ + if (len > PRNG_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + /* --- LOCKED --- */ + PZ_Lock(rng->lock); + /* Check the amount of seed data in the generator. If not enough, + * don't produce any data. + */ + if (rng->reseed_counter[0] >= RESEED_VALUE) { + rv = prng_reseed_test(rng, NULL, 0, NULL, 0); + PZ_Unlock(rng->lock); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; + } + RNG_SystemInfoForRNG(); + PZ_Lock(rng->lock); + } + /* + * see if we have enough bytes to fulfill the request. + */ + if (len <= rng->dataAvail) { + memcpy(output, rng->data + ((sizeof rng->data) - rng->dataAvail), len); + memset(rng->data + ((sizeof rng->data) - rng->dataAvail), 0, len); + rng->dataAvail -= len; + rv = SECSuccess; + /* if we are asking for a small number of bytes, cache the rest of + * the bytes */ + } else if (len < sizeof rng->data) { + rv = prng_generateNewBytes(rng, rng->data, sizeof rng->data, + rng->additionalAvail ? rng->additionalDataCache : NULL, + rng->additionalAvail); + rng->additionalAvail = 0; + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + memcpy(output, rng->data, len); + memset(rng->data, 0, len); + rng->dataAvail = (sizeof rng->data) - len; + } + /* we are asking for lots of bytes, just ask the generator to pass them */ + } else { + rv = prng_generateNewBytes(rng, output, len, + rng->additionalAvail ? rng->additionalDataCache : NULL, + rng->additionalAvail); + rng->additionalAvail = 0; + } + PZ_Unlock(rng->lock); + /* --- UNLOCKED --- */ + return rv; +} + +/* +** Generate some random bytes, using the global random number generator +** object. +*/ +SECStatus +RNG_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(void *dest, size_t len) +{ + return prng_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(globalrng, dest, len); +} + +void +RNG_RNGShutdown(void) +{ + /* check for a valid global RNG context */ + PORT_Assert(globalrng != NULL); + if (globalrng == NULL) { + /* Should set a "not initialized" error code. */ + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY); + return; + } + /* clear */ + prng_freeRNGContext(globalrng); + globalrng = NULL; + /* reset the callonce struct to allow a new call to RNG_RNGInit() */ + coRNGInit = pristineCallOnce; +} + +/* + * Test case interface. used by fips testing and power on self test + */ + /* make sure the test context is separate from the global context, This + * allows us to test the internal random number generator without losing + * entropy we may have previously collected. */ +RNGContext testContext; + +/* + * Test vector API. Use NIST SP 800-90 general interface so one of the + * other NIST SP 800-90 algorithms may be used in the future. + */ +SECStatus +PRNGTEST_Instantiate(const PRUint8 *entropy, unsigned int entropy_len, + const PRUint8 *nonce, unsigned int nonce_len, + const PRUint8 *personal_string, unsigned int ps_len) +{ + int bytes_len = entropy_len + nonce_len + ps_len; + PRUint8 *bytes = NULL; + SECStatus rv; + + if (entropy_len < 256/PR_BITS_PER_BYTE) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM); + return SECFailure; + } + + bytes = PORT_Alloc(bytes_len); + if (bytes == NULL) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY); + return SECFailure; + } + /* concatenate the various inputs, internally NSS only instantiates with + * a single long string */ + PORT_Memcpy(bytes, entropy, entropy_len); + if (nonce) { + PORT_Memcpy(&bytes[entropy_len], nonce, nonce_len); + } else { + PORT_Assert(nonce_len == 0); + } + if (personal_string) { + PORT_Memcpy(&bytes[entropy_len+nonce_len], personal_string, ps_len); + } else { + PORT_Assert(ps_len == 0); + } + rv = prng_instantiate(&testContext, bytes, bytes_len); + PORT_ZFree(bytes, bytes_len); + if (rv == SECFailure) { + return SECFailure; + } + testContext.isValid = PR_TRUE; + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +PRNGTEST_Reseed(const PRUint8 *entropy, unsigned int entropy_len, + const PRUint8 *additional, unsigned int additional_len) +{ + if (!testContext.isValid) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + /* This magic input tells us to set the reseed count to it's max count, + * so we can simulate PRNGTEST_Generate reaching max reseed count */ + if ((entropy == NULL) && (entropy_len == 0) && + (additional == NULL) && (additional_len == 0)) { + testContext.reseed_counter[0] = RESEED_VALUE; + return SECSuccess; + } + return prng_reseed(&testContext, entropy, entropy_len, additional, + additional_len); + +} + +SECStatus +PRNGTEST_Generate(PRUint8 *bytes, unsigned int bytes_len, + const PRUint8 *additional, unsigned int additional_len) +{ + SECStatus rv; + if (!testContext.isValid) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + /* replicate reseed test from prng_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes */ + if (testContext.reseed_counter[0] >= RESEED_VALUE) { + rv = prng_reseed(&testContext, NULL, 0, NULL, 0); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; + } + } + return prng_generateNewBytes(&testContext, bytes, bytes_len, + additional, additional_len); + +} + +SECStatus +PRNGTEST_Uninstantiate() +{ + if (!testContext.isValid) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + PORT_Memset(&testContext, 0, sizeof testContext); + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +PRNGTEST_RunHealthTests() +{ + static const PRUint8 entropy[] = { + 0x8e,0x9c,0x0d,0x25,0x75,0x22,0x04,0xf9, + 0xc5,0x79,0x10,0x8b,0x23,0x79,0x37,0x14, + 0x9f,0x2c,0xc7,0x0b,0x39,0xf8,0xee,0xef, + 0x95,0x0c,0x97,0x59,0xfc,0x0a,0x85,0x41, + 0x76,0x9d,0x6d,0x67,0x00,0x4e,0x19,0x12, + 0x02,0x16,0x53,0xea,0xf2,0x73,0xd7,0xd6, + 0x7f,0x7e,0xc8,0xae,0x9c,0x09,0x99,0x7d, + 0xbb,0x9e,0x48,0x7f,0xbb,0x96,0x46,0xb3, + 0x03,0x75,0xf8,0xc8,0x69,0x45,0x3f,0x97, + 0x5e,0x2e,0x48,0xe1,0x5d,0x58,0x97,0x4c }; + static const PRUint8 rng_known_result[] = { + 0x16,0xe1,0x8c,0x57,0x21,0xd8,0xf1,0x7e, + 0x5a,0xa0,0x16,0x0b,0x7e,0xa6,0x25,0xb4, + 0x24,0x19,0xdb,0x54,0xfa,0x35,0x13,0x66, + 0xbb,0xaa,0x2a,0x1b,0x22,0x33,0x2e,0x4a, + 0x14,0x07,0x9d,0x52,0xfc,0x73,0x61,0x48, + 0xac,0xc1,0x22,0xfc,0xa4,0xfc,0xac,0xa4, + 0xdb,0xda,0x5b,0x27,0x33,0xc4,0xb3 }; + static const PRUint8 reseed_entropy[] = { + 0xc6,0x0b,0x0a,0x30,0x67,0x07,0xf4,0xe2, + 0x24,0xa7,0x51,0x6f,0x5f,0x85,0x3e,0x5d, + 0x67,0x97,0xb8,0x3b,0x30,0x9c,0x7a,0xb1, + 0x52,0xc6,0x1b,0xc9,0x46,0xa8,0x62,0x79 }; + static const PRUint8 additional_input[] = { + 0x86,0x82,0x28,0x98,0xe7,0xcb,0x01,0x14, + 0xae,0x87,0x4b,0x1d,0x99,0x1b,0xc7,0x41, + 0x33,0xff,0x33,0x66,0x40,0x95,0x54,0xc6, + 0x67,0x4d,0x40,0x2a,0x1f,0xf9,0xeb,0x65 }; + static const PRUint8 rng_reseed_result[] = { + 0x02,0x0c,0xc6,0x17,0x86,0x49,0xba,0xc4, + 0x7b,0x71,0x35,0x05,0xf0,0xdb,0x4a,0xc2, + 0x2c,0x38,0xc1,0xa4,0x42,0xe5,0x46,0x4a, + 0x7d,0xf0,0xbe,0x47,0x88,0xb8,0x0e,0xc6, + 0x25,0x2b,0x1d,0x13,0xef,0xa6,0x87,0x96, + 0xa3,0x7d,0x5b,0x80,0xc2,0x38,0x76,0x61, + 0xc7,0x80,0x5d,0x0f,0x05,0x76,0x85 }; + static const PRUint8 rng_no_reseed_result[] = { + 0xc4,0x40,0x41,0x8c,0xbf,0x2f,0x70,0x23, + 0x88,0xf2,0x7b,0x30,0xc3,0xca,0x1e,0xf3, + 0xef,0x53,0x81,0x5d,0x30,0xed,0x4c,0xf1, + 0xff,0x89,0xa5,0xee,0x92,0xf8,0xc0,0x0f, + 0x88,0x53,0xdf,0xb6,0x76,0xf0,0xaa,0xd3, + 0x2e,0x1d,0x64,0x37,0x3e,0xe8,0x4a,0x02, + 0xff,0x0a,0x7f,0xe5,0xe9,0x2b,0x6d }; + + SECStatus rng_status = SECSuccess; + PR_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(rng_known_result) >= sizeof(rng_reseed_result)); + PRUint8 result[sizeof(rng_known_result)]; + + /********************************************/ + /* First test instantiate error path. */ + /* In this case we supply enough entropy, */ + /* but not enough seed. This will trigger */ + /* the code that checks for a entropy */ + /* source failure. */ + /********************************************/ + rng_status = PRNGTEST_Instantiate(entropy, 256/PR_BITS_PER_BYTE, + NULL, 0, NULL, 0); + if (rng_status == SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + if (PORT_GetError() != SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + /* we failed with the proper error code, we can continue */ + + /********************************************/ + /* Generate random bytes with a known seed. */ + /********************************************/ + rng_status = PRNGTEST_Instantiate(entropy, sizeof entropy, + NULL, 0, NULL, 0); + if (rng_status != SECSuccess) { + /* Error set by PRNGTEST_Instantiate */ + return SECFailure; + } + rng_status = PRNGTEST_Generate(result, sizeof rng_known_result, NULL, 0); + if ( ( rng_status != SECSuccess) || + ( PORT_Memcmp( result, rng_known_result, + sizeof rng_known_result ) != 0 ) ) { + PRNGTEST_Uninstantiate(); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + rng_status = PRNGTEST_Reseed(reseed_entropy, sizeof reseed_entropy, + additional_input, sizeof additional_input); + if (rng_status != SECSuccess) { + /* Error set by PRNG_Reseed */ + PRNGTEST_Uninstantiate(); + return SECFailure; + } + rng_status = PRNGTEST_Generate(result, sizeof rng_reseed_result, NULL, 0); + if ( ( rng_status != SECSuccess) || + ( PORT_Memcmp( result, rng_reseed_result, + sizeof rng_reseed_result ) != 0 ) ) { + PRNGTEST_Uninstantiate(); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + /* This magic forces the reseed count to it's max count, so we can see if + * PRNGTEST_Generate will actually when it reaches it's count */ + rng_status = PRNGTEST_Reseed(NULL, 0, NULL, 0); + if (rng_status != SECSuccess) { + PRNGTEST_Uninstantiate(); + /* Error set by PRNG_Reseed */ + return SECFailure; + } + /* This generate should now reseed */ + rng_status = PRNGTEST_Generate(result, sizeof rng_reseed_result, NULL, 0); + if ( ( rng_status != SECSuccess) || + /* NOTE we fail if the result is equal to the no_reseed_result. + * no_reseed_result is the value we would have gotten if we didn't + * do an automatic reseed in PRNGTEST_Generate */ + ( PORT_Memcmp( result, rng_no_reseed_result, + sizeof rng_no_reseed_result ) == 0 ) ) { + PRNGTEST_Uninstantiate(); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + /* make sure reseed fails when we don't supply enough entropy */ + rng_status = PRNGTEST_Reseed(reseed_entropy, 4, NULL, 0); + if (rng_status == SECSuccess) { + PRNGTEST_Uninstantiate(); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + if (PORT_GetError() != SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM) { + PRNGTEST_Uninstantiate(); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + rng_status = PRNGTEST_Uninstantiate(); + if (rng_status != SECSuccess) { + /* Error set by PRNG_Uninstantiate */ + return rng_status; + } + /* make sure uninstantiate fails if the contest is not initiated (also tests + * if the context was cleared in the previous Uninstantiate) */ + rng_status = PRNGTEST_Uninstantiate(); + if (rng_status == SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + if (PORT_GetError() != SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) { + return rng_status; + } + + return SECSuccess; +} |