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* Variables: avoid possible buffer overrun with some "$sent_http_*".HEADmasterbranches/defaultSergey Kandaurov2023-05-011-2/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The existing logic to evaluate multi header "$sent_http_*" variables, such as $sent_http_cache_control, as previously introduced in 1.23.0, doesn't take into account that one or more elements can be cleared, yet still present in a linked list, pointed to by the next field. Such elements don't contribute to the resulting variable length, an attempt to append a separator for them ends up in out of bounds write. This is not possible with standard modules, though at least one third party module is known to override multi header values this way, so it makes sense to harden the logic. The fix restores a generic boundary check.
* Fixed segfault if regex studies list allocation fails.Maxim Dounin2023-04-181-3/+3
| | | | | | The rcf->studies list is unconditionally accessed by ngx_regex_cleanup(), and this used to cause NULL pointer dereference if allocation failed. Fix is to set cleanup handler only when allocation succeeds.
* Version bump.Sergey Kandaurov2023-04-171-2/+2
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* Gzip: compatibility with recent zlib-ng versions.Maxim Dounin2023-03-271-6/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | It now uses custom alloc_aligned() wrapper for all allocations, therefore all allocations are larger than expected by (64 + sizeof(void*)). Further, they are seen as allocations of 1 element. Relevant calculations were adjusted to reflect this, and state allocation is now protected with a flag to avoid misinterpreting other allocations as the zlib deflate_state allocation. Further, it no longer forces window bits to 13 on compression level 1, so the comment was adjusted to reflect this.
* SSL: enabled TLSv1.3 by default.Maxim Dounin2023-03-247-14/+21
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* Mail: fixed handling of blocked client read events in proxy.Maxim Dounin2023-03-241-3/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | When establishing a connection to the backend, nginx blocks reading from the client with ngx_mail_proxy_block_read(). Previously, such events were lost, and in some cases this resulted in connection hangs. Notably, this affected mail_imap_ssl.t on Windows, since the test closes connections after requesting authentication, but without waiting for any responses (so the connection close events might be lost). Fix is to post an event to read from the client after connecting to the backend if there were blocked events.
* Syslog: introduced error log handler.Maxim Dounin2023-03-102-9/+41
| | | | | | | This ensures that errors which happen during logging to syslog are logged with proper context, such as "while logging to syslog" and the server name. Prodded by Safar Safarly.
* Syslog: removed usage of ngx_cycle->log and ngx_cycle->hostname.Maxim Dounin2023-03-102-18/+24
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | During initial startup the ngx_cycle->hostname is not available, and previously this resulted in incorrect logging. Instead, hostname from the configuration being parsed is now preserved in the syslog peer structure and then used during logging. Similarly, ngx_cycle->log might not match the configuration where the syslog peer is defined if the configuration is not yet fully applied, and previously this resulted in unexpected logging of syslog errors and debug information. Instead, cf->cycle->new_log is now referenced in the syslog peer structure and used for logging, similarly to how it is done in other modules.
* HTTP/2: finalize request as bad if header validation fails.Maxim Dounin2023-03-101-8/+1
| | | | | Similarly to 7192:d5a535774861, this avoids spurious zero statuses in access.log, and in line with other header-related errors.
* HTTP/2: socket leak with "return 444" in error_page (ticket #2455).Maxim Dounin2023-03-101-0/+4
| | | | | | | | Similarly to ticket #274 (7354:1812f1d79d84), early request finalization without calling ngx_http_run_posted_requests() resulted in a connection hang (a socket leak) if the 400 (Bad Request) error was generated in ngx_http_v2_state_process_header() due to invalid request headers and "return 444" was used in error_page 400.
* SSL: logging levels of errors observed with BoringSSL.Maxim Dounin2023-03-081-0/+21
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | As tested with tlsfuzzer with BoringSSL, the following errors are certainly client-related: SSL_do_handshake() failed (SSL: error:10000066:SSL routines:OPENSSL_internal:BAD_ALERT) SSL_do_handshake() failed (SSL: error:10000089:SSL routines:OPENSSL_internal:DECODE_ERROR) SSL_do_handshake() failed (SSL: error:100000dc:SSL routines:OPENSSL_internal:TOO_MANY_WARNING_ALERTS) SSL_do_handshake() failed (SSL: error:10000100:SSL routines:OPENSSL_internal:INVALID_COMPRESSION_LIST) SSL_do_handshake() failed (SSL: error:10000102:SSL routines:OPENSSL_internal:MISSING_KEY_SHARE) SSL_do_handshake() failed (SSL: error:1000010e:SSL routines:OPENSSL_internal:TOO_MUCH_SKIPPED_EARLY_DATA) SSL_read() failed (SSL: error:100000b6:SSL routines:OPENSSL_internal:NO_RENEGOTIATION) Accordingly, the SSL_R_BAD_ALERT, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARNING_ALERTS, SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_LIST, SSL_R_MISSING_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_TOO_MUCH_SKIPPED_EARLY_DATA, and SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION errors are now logged at the "info" level.
* SSL: logging levels of errors observed with tlsfuzzer and LibreSSL.Maxim Dounin2023-03-081-0/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | As tested with tlsfuzzer with LibreSSL 3.7.0, the following errors are certainly client-related: SSL_do_handshake() failed (SSL: error:14026073:SSL routines:ACCEPT_SR_CLNT_HELLO:bad packet length) SSL_do_handshake() failed (SSL: error:1402612C:SSL routines:ACCEPT_SR_CLNT_HELLO:ssl3 session id too long) SSL_do_handshake() failed (SSL: error:140380EA:SSL routines:ACCEPT_SR_KEY_EXCH:tls rsa encrypted value length is wrong) Accordingly, the SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH ("bad packet length"), SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG ("ssl3 session id too long"), SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG ("tls rsa encrypted value length is wrong") errors are now logged at the "info" level.
* SSL: logging levels of various errors reported with tlsfuzzer.Maxim Dounin2023-03-081-0/+41
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | To further differentiate client-related errors and adjust logging levels of various SSL errors, nginx was tested with tlsfuzzer with multiple OpenSSL versions (3.1.0-beta1, 3.0.8, 1.1.1t, 1.1.0l, 1.0.2u, 1.0.1u, 1.0.0s, 0.9.8zh). The following errors were observed during tlsfuzzer runs with OpenSSL 3.0.8, and are clearly client-related: SSL_do_handshake() failed (SSL: error:0A000092:SSL routines::data length too long) SSL_do_handshake() failed (SSL: error:0A0000A0:SSL routines::length too short) SSL_do_handshake() failed (SSL: error:0A000124:SSL routines::bad legacy version) SSL_do_handshake() failed (SSL: error:0A000178:SSL routines::no shared signature algorithms) Accordingly, the SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG ("data length too long"), SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT ("length too short"), SSL_R_BAD_LEGACY_VERSION ("bad legacy version"), and SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS ("no shared signature algorithms", misspelled as "sigature" in OpenSSL 1.0.2) errors are now logged at the "info" level. Additionally, the following errors were observed with OpenSSL 3.0.8 and with TLSv1.3 enabled: SSL_do_handshake() failed (SSL: error:0A00006F:SSL routines::bad digest length) SSL_do_handshake() failed (SSL: error:0A000070:SSL routines::missing sigalgs extension) SSL_do_handshake() failed (SSL: error:0A000096:SSL routines::encrypted length too long) SSL_do_handshake() failed (SSL: error:0A00010F:SSL routines::bad length) SSL_read() failed (SSL: error:0A00007A:SSL routines::bad key update) SSL_read() failed (SSL: error:0A000125:SSL routines::mixed handshake and non handshake data) Accordingly, the SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH ("bad digest length"), SSL_R_MISSING_SIGALGS_EXTENSION ("missing sigalgs extension"), SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG ("encrypted length too long"), SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH ("bad length"), SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE ("bad key update"), and SSL_R_MIXED_HANDSHAKE_AND_NON_HANDSHAKE_DATA ("mixed handshake and non handshake data") errors are now logged at the "info" level. Additionally, the following errors were observed with OpenSSL 1.1.1t: SSL_do_handshake() failed (SSL: error:14094091:SSL routines:ssl3_read_bytes:data between ccs and finished) SSL_do_handshake() failed (SSL: error:14094199:SSL routines:ssl3_read_bytes:too many warn alerts) SSL_read() failed (SSL: error:1408F0C6:SSL routines:ssl3_get_record:packet length too long) SSL_read() failed (SSL: error:14094085:SSL routines:ssl3_read_bytes:ccs received early) Accordingly, the SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY ("ccs received early"), SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED ("data between ccs and finished"), SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG ("packet length too long"), and SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS ("too many warn alerts") errors are now logged at the "info" level. Additionally, the following errors were observed with OpenSSL 1.0.2u: SSL_do_handshake() failed (SSL: error:1407612A:SSL routines:SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO:record too small) SSL_do_handshake() failed (SSL: error:1408C09A:SSL routines:ssl3_get_finished:got a fin before a ccs) Accordingly, the SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL ("record too small") and SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS ("got a fin before a ccs") errors are now logged at the "info" level. No additional client-related errors were observed while testing with OpenSSL 3.1.0-beta1, OpenSSL 1.1.0l, OpenSSL 1.0.1u, OpenSSL 1.0.0s, and OpenSSL 0.9.8zh.
* SSL: switched to detect log level based on the last error.Maxim Dounin2023-03-081-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In some cases there might be multiple errors in the OpenSSL error queue, notably when a libcrypto call fails, and then the SSL layer generates an error itself. For example, the following errors were observed with OpenSSL 3.0.8 with TLSv1.3 enabled: SSL_do_handshake() failed (SSL: error:02800066:Diffie-Hellman routines::invalid public key error:0A000132:SSL routines::bad ecpoint) SSL_do_handshake() failed (SSL: error:08000066:elliptic curve routines::invalid encoding error:0A000132:SSL routines::bad ecpoint) SSL_do_handshake() failed (SSL: error:0800006B:elliptic curve routines::point is not on curve error:0A000132:SSL routines::bad ecpoint) In such cases it seems to be better to determine logging level based on the last error in the error queue (the one added by the SSL layer, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT in all of the above example example errors). To do so, the ngx_ssl_connection_error() function was changed to use ERR_peek_last_error().
* Core: stricter UTF-8 handling in ngx_utf8_decode().Yugo Horie2023-02-231-1/+6
| | | | | | | | | | An UTF-8 octet sequence cannot start with a 11111xxx byte (above 0xf8), see https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc3629#section-3. Previously, such bytes were accepted by ngx_utf8_decode() and misinterpreted as 11110xxx bytes (as in a 4-byte sequence). While unlikely, this can potentially cause issues. Fix is to explicitly reject such bytes in ngx_utf8_decode().
* Win32: non-ASCII names in ngx_fs_bsize(), ngx_fs_available().Maxim Dounin2023-02-231-4/+42
| | | | | This fixes potentially incorrect cache size calculations and non-working "min_free" when using cache in directories with non-ASCII names.
* Win32: removed attempt to use a drive letter in ngx_fs_bsize().Maxim Dounin2023-02-231-6/+0
| | | | | | | | | | Just a drive letter might not correctly represent file system being used, notably when using symlinks (as created by "mklink /d"). As such, instead of trying to call GetDiskFreeSpace() with just a drive letter, we now always use GetDiskFreeSpace() with full path. Further, it looks like the code to use just a drive letter never worked, since it tried to test name[2] instead of name[1] to be ':'.
* Win32: non-ASCII names support in ngx_open_tempfile().Maxim Dounin2023-02-232-10/+37
| | | | | This makes it possible to use temporary directories with non-ASCII characters, either explicitly or via a prefix with non-ASCII characters in it.
* Win32: non-ASCII names support in ngx_rename_file().Maxim Dounin2023-02-232-1/+56
| | | | | This makes it possible to upload files with non-ASCII characters when using the dav module (ticket #1433).
* Win32: non-ASCII names support in ngx_delete_file().Maxim Dounin2023-02-232-1/+37
| | | | | This makes it possible to delete files with non-ASCII characters when using the dav module (ticket #1433).
* Win32: reworked ngx_win32_rename_file() to use nginx wrappers.Maxim Dounin2023-02-231-3/+3
| | | | | | | | This ensures that ngx_win32_rename_file() will support non-ASCII names when supported by the wrappers. Notably, this is used by PUT requests in the dav module when overwriting existing files with non-ASCII names (ticket #1433).
* Win32: reworked ngx_win32_rename_file() to check errors.Maxim Dounin2023-02-231-2/+10
| | | | | | | | Previously, ngx_win32_rename_file() retried on all errors returned by MoveFile() to a temporary name. It only make sense, however, to retry when the destination file already exists, similarly to the condition when ngx_win32_rename_file() is called. Retrying on other errors is meaningless and might result in an infinite loop.
* Win32: non-ASCII directory names support in ngx_delete_dir().Maxim Dounin2023-02-232-1/+37
| | | | | This makes it possible to delete directories with non-ASCII characters when using the dav module (ticket #1433).
* Win32: non-ASCII directory names support in ngx_create_dir().Maxim Dounin2023-02-232-10/+72
| | | | | | | | | | | | This makes it possible to create directories under prefix with non-ASCII characters, as well as makes it possible to create directories with non-ASCII characters when using the dav module (ticket #1433). To ensure that the dav module operations are restricted similarly to other file operations (in particular, short names are not allowed), the ngx_win32_check_filename() function is used. It improved to support checking of just dirname, and now can be used to check paths when creating files or directories.
* Win32: non-ASCII directory names support in ngx_getcwd().Maxim Dounin2023-02-232-1/+39
| | | | | This makes it possible to start nginx without a prefix explicitly set in a directory with non-ASCII characters in it.
* Win32: non-ASCII names support in "include" with wildcards.Maxim Dounin2023-02-232-34/+64
| | | | | Notably, ngx_open_glob() now supports opening directories with non-ASCII characters, and pathnames returned by ngx_read_glob() are converted to UTF-8.
* Win32: non-ASCII names support in autoindex (ticket #458).Maxim Dounin2023-02-232-21/+244
| | | | | | Notably, ngx_open_dir() now supports opening directories with non-ASCII characters, and directory entries returned by ngx_read_dir() are properly converted to UTF-8.
* Lingering close for connections with pipelined requests.Maxim Dounin2023-02-022-1/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This is expected to help with clients using pipelining with some constant depth, such as apt[1][2]. When downloading many resources, apt uses pipelining with some constant depth, a number of requests in flight. This essentially means that after receiving a response it sends an additional request to the server, and this can result in requests arriving to the server at any time. Further, additional requests are sent one-by-one, and can be easily seen as such (neither as pipelined, nor followed by pipelined requests). The only safe approach to close such connections (for example, when keepalive_requests is reached) is with lingering. To do so, now nginx monitors if pipelining was used on the connection, and if it was, closes the connection with lingering. [1] https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=973861#10 [2] https://mailman.nginx.org/pipermail/nginx-devel/2023-January/ZA2SP5SJU55LHEBCJMFDB2AZVELRLTHI.html
* Fixed "zero size buf" alerts with subrequests.Maxim Dounin2023-01-286-12/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Since 4611:2b6cb7528409 responses from the gzip static, flv, and mp4 modules can be used with subrequests, though empty files were not properly handled. Empty gzipped, flv, and mp4 files thus resulted in "zero size buf in output" alerts. While valid corresponding files are not expected to be empty, such files shouldn't result in alerts. Fix is to set b->sync on such empty subrequest responses, similarly to what ngx_http_send_special() does. Additionally, the static module, the ngx_http_send_response() function, and file cache are modified to do the same instead of not sending the response body at all in such cases, since not sending the response body at all is believed to be at least questionable, and might break various filters which do not expect such behaviour.
* Style.Maxim Dounin2023-01-284-7/+7
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* Added warning about redefinition of listen socket protocol options.Maxim Dounin2023-01-282-1/+66
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The "listen" directive in the http module can be used multiple times in different server blocks. Originally, it was supposed to be specified once with various socket options, and without any parameters in virtual server blocks. For example: server { listen 80 backlog=1024; server_name foo; ... } server { listen 80; server_name bar; ... } server { listen 80; server_name bazz; ... } The address part of the syntax ("address[:port]" / "port" / "unix:path") uniquely identifies the listening socket, and therefore is enough for name-based virtual servers (to let nginx know that the virtual server accepts requests on the listening socket in question). To ensure that listening options do not conflict between virtual servers, they were allowed only once. For example, the following configuration will be rejected ("duplicate listen options for 0.0.0.0:80 in ..."): server { listen 80 backlog=1024; server_name foo; ... } server { listen 80 backlog=512; server_name bar; ... } At some point it was, however, noticed, that it is sometimes convenient to repeat some options for clarity. In nginx 0.8.51 the "ssl" parameter was allowed to be specified multiple times, e.g.: server { listen 443 ssl backlog=1024; server_name foo; ... } server { listen 443 ssl; server_name bar; ... } server { listen 443 ssl; server_name bazz; ... } This approach makes configuration more readable, since SSL sockets are immediately visible in the configuration. If this is not needed, just the address can still be used. Later, additional protocol-specific options similar to "ssl" were introduced, notably "http2" and "proxy_protocol". With these options, one can write: server { listen 443 ssl backlog=1024; server_name foo; ... } server { listen 443 http2; server_name bar; ... } server { listen 443 proxy_protocol; server_name bazz; ... } The resulting socket will use ssl, http2, and proxy_protocol, but this is not really obvious from the configuration. To emphasize such misleading configurations are discouraged, nginx now warns as long as the "listen" directive is used with options different from the options previously used if this is potentially confusing. In particular, the following configurations are allowed: server { listen 8401 ssl backlog=1024; server_name foo; } server { listen 8401 ssl; server_name bar; } server { listen 8401 ssl; server_name bazz; } server { listen 8402 ssl http2 backlog=1024; server_name foo; } server { listen 8402 ssl; server_name bar; } server { listen 8402 ssl; server_name bazz; } server { listen 8403 ssl; server_name bar; } server { listen 8403 ssl; server_name bazz; } server { listen 8403 ssl http2; server_name foo; } server { listen 8404 ssl http2 backlog=1024; server_name foo; } server { listen 8404 http2; server_name bar; } server { listen 8404 http2; server_name bazz; } server { listen 8405 ssl http2 backlog=1024; server_name foo; } server { listen 8405 ssl http2; server_name bar; } server { listen 8405 ssl http2; server_name bazz; } server { listen 8406 ssl; server_name foo; } server { listen 8406; server_name bar; } server { listen 8406; server_name bazz; } And the following configurations will generate warnings: server { listen 8501 ssl http2 backlog=1024; server_name foo; } server { listen 8501 http2; server_name bar; } server { listen 8501 ssl; server_name bazz; } server { listen 8502 backlog=1024; server_name foo; } server { listen 8502 ssl; server_name bar; } server { listen 8503 ssl; server_name foo; } server { listen 8503 http2; server_name bar; } server { listen 8504 ssl; server_name foo; } server { listen 8504 http2; server_name bar; } server { listen 8504 proxy_protocol; server_name bazz; } server { listen 8505 ssl http2 proxy_protocol; server_name foo; } server { listen 8505 ssl http2; server_name bar; } server { listen 8505 ssl; server_name bazz; } server { listen 8506 ssl http2; server_name foo; } server { listen 8506 ssl; server_name bar; } server { listen 8506; server_name bazz; } server { listen 8507 ssl; server_name bar; } server { listen 8507; server_name bazz; } server { listen 8507 ssl http2; server_name foo; } server { listen 8508 ssl; server_name bar; } server { listen 8508; server_name bazz; } server { listen 8508 ssl backlog=1024; server_name foo; } server { listen 8509; server_name bazz; } server { listen 8509 ssl; server_name bar; } server { listen 8509 ssl backlog=1024; server_name foo; } The basic idea is that at most two sets of protocol options are allowed: the main one (with socket options, if any), and a shorter one, with options being a subset of the main options, repeated for clarity. As long as the shorter set of protocol options is used, all listen directives except the main one should use it.
* Fixed handling of very long locations (ticket #2435).Maxim Dounin2023-01-262-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | Previously, location prefix length in ngx_http_location_tree_node_t was stored as "u_char", and therefore location prefixes longer than 255 bytes were handled incorrectly. Fix is to use "u_short" instead. With "u_short", prefixes up to 65535 bytes can be safely used, and this isn't reachable due to NGX_CONF_BUFFER, which is 4096 bytes.
* Gzip static: ranges support (ticket #2349).Maxim Dounin2023-01-241-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | In contrast to on-the-fly gzipping with gzip filter, static gzipped representation as returned by gzip_static is persistent, and therefore the same binary representation is available for future requests, making it possible to use range requests. Further, if a gzipped representation is re-generated with different compression settings, it is expected to result in different ETag and different size reported in the Content-Range header, making it possible to safely use range requests anyway. As such, ranges are now allowed for files returned by gzip_static.
* Updated link to OpenVZ suspend/resume bug.Maxim Dounin2022-12-211-1/+1
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* Fixed port ranges support in the listen directive.Valentin Bartenev2022-12-183-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | Ports difference must be respected when checking addresses for duplicates, otherwise configurations like this are broken: listen 127.0.0.1:6000-6005 It was broken by 4cc2bfeff46c (nginx 1.23.3).
* Style.BullerDu2022-12-163-4/+4
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* Version bump.Sergey Kandaurov2022-12-161-2/+2
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* Win32: event flags handling edge cases in ngx_wsarecv().Maxim Dounin2022-12-012-0/+4
| | | | | | | Fixed event flags handling edge cases in ngx_wsarecv() and ngx_wsarecv_chain(), notably to always reset rev->ready in case of errors (which wasn't the case after ngx_socket_nread() errors), and after EOF (rev->ready was not cleared if due to a misconfiguration a zero-sized buffer was used for reading).
* SSL: fixed ngx_ssl_recv() to reset c->read->ready after errors.Maxim Dounin2022-12-012-3/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | With this change, behaviour of ngx_ssl_recv() now matches ngx_unix_recv(), which used to always reset c->read->ready to 0 when returning errors. This fixes an infinite loop in unbuffered SSL proxying if writing to the client is blocked and an SSL error happens (ticket #2418). With this change, the fix for a similar issue in the stream module (6868:ee3645078759), which used a different approach of explicitly testing c->read->error instead, is no longer needed and was reverted.
* Removed casts from ngx_memcmp() macro.Maxim Dounin2022-11-301-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Casts are believed to be not needed, since memcmp() has "const void *" arguments since introduction of the "void" type in C89. And on pre-C89 platforms nginx is unlikely to compile without warnings anyway, as there are no casts in memcpy() and memmove() calls. These casts were added in 1648:89a47f19b9ec without any details on why they were added, and Igor does not remember details either. The most plausible explanation is that they were copied from ngx_strcmp() and were not really needed even at that time. Prodded by Alejandro Colomar.
* Fixed alignment of ngx_memmove()/ngx_movemem() macro definitions.Maxim Dounin2022-11-301-2/+2
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* SSL: fixed debug logging of SSL_sendfile() return value.Sergey Kandaurov2022-11-241-1/+1
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* Fixed segfault when switching off master process during upgrade.Maxim Dounin2022-11-232-11/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Binary upgrades are not supported without master process, but it is, however, possible, that nginx running with master process is asked to upgrade binary, and the configuration file as available on disk at this time includes "master_process off;". If this happens, listening sockets inherited from the previous binary will have ls[i].previous set. But the old cycle on initial process startup, including startup after binary upgrade, is destroyed by ngx_init_cycle() once configuration parsing is complete. As a result, an attempt to dereference ls[i].previous in ngx_event_process_init() accesses already freed memory. Fix is to avoid looking into ls[i].previous if the old cycle is already freed. With this change it is also no longer needed to clear ls[i].previous in worker processes, so the relevant code was removed.
* Disabled cloning of sockets without master process (ticket #2403).Maxim Dounin2022-11-231-1/+4
| | | | | | | | Cloning of listening sockets for each worker process does not make sense when working without master process, and causes some of the connections not to be accepted if worker_processes is set to more than one and there are listening sockets configured with the reuseport flag. Fix is to disable cloning when master process is disabled.
* Filtering duplicate addresses in listen (ticket #2400).Maxim Dounin2022-11-233-26/+85
| | | | | | | | | | | | Due to the glibc bug[1], getaddrinfo("localhost") with AI_ADDRCONFIG on a typical host with glibc and without IPv6 returns two 127.0.0.1 addresses, and therefore "listen localhost:80;" used to result in "duplicate ... address and port pair" after 4f9b72a229c1. Fix is to explicitly filter out duplicate addresses returned during resolution of a name. [1] https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=14969
* Process events posted by ngx_close_idle_connections() immediately.Roman Arutyunyan2022-11-182-0/+2
| | | | | | Previously, if an event was posted by a read event handler, called by ngx_close_idle_connections(), that event was not processed until the next event loop iteration, which could happen after a timeout.
* SSI: handling of subrequests from other modules (ticket #1263).Ciel Zhao2022-11-212-1/+29
| | | | | | | | | | | | As the SSI parser always uses the context from the main request for storing variables and blocks, that context should always exist for subrequests using SSI, even though the main request does not necessarily have SSI enabled. However, `ngx_http_get_module_ctx(r->main, ...)` is getting NULL in such cases, resulting in the worker crashing SIGSEGV when accessing its attributes. This patch links the first initialized context to the main request, and upgrades it only when main context is initialized.
* Fixed PROXY protocol to use ngx_memcpy()/ngx_memcmp().Maxim Dounin2022-11-081-5/+5
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* Added logging to PROXY protocol write buffer check.Maxim Dounin2022-11-081-0/+2
| | | | | | The check is not expected to fail unless there is a bug in the calling code. But given the check is here, it should log an alert if it fails instead of silently closing the connection.
* Increased maximum read PROXY protocol header size.Roman Arutyunyan2022-11-024-8/+11
| | | | | | | | Maximum size for reading the PROXY protocol header is increased to 4096 to accommodate a bigger number of TLVs, which are supported since cca4c8a715de. Maximum size for writing the PROXY protocol header is not changed since only version 1 is currently supported.