diff options
| author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2017-09-23 05:33:29 -1000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2017-09-23 05:33:29 -1000 |
| commit | 79444df4e7f03843be78e4b9188d095931648842 (patch) | |
| tree | 8f2663ca2238eb6c32608b538e9ced9505fe1b18 /security | |
| parent | c65da8e22b1d1d8869af69d287fd699c31d2dd58 (diff) | |
| parent | bf81100f63db7ea243d17b9d5008ba3af2fdf6b2 (diff) | |
| download | linux-79444df4e7f03843be78e4b9188d095931648842.tar.gz | |
Merge tag 'apparmor-pr-2017-09-22' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor
Pull apparmor updates from John Johansen:
"This is the apparmor pull request, similar to SELinux and seccomp.
It's the same series that I was sent to James' security tree + one
regression fix that was found after the series was sent to James and
would have been sent for v4.14-rc2.
Features:
- in preparation for secid mapping add support for absolute root view
based labels
- add base infastructure for socket mediation
- add mount mediation
- add signal mediation
minor cleanups and changes:
- be defensive, ensure unconfined profiles have dfas initialized
- add more debug asserts to apparmorfs
- enable policy unpacking to audit different reasons for failure
- cleanup conditional check for label in label_print
- Redundant condition: prev_ns. in [label.c:1498]
Bug Fixes:
- fix regression in apparmorfs DAC access permissions
- fix build failure on sparc caused by undeclared signals
- fix sparse report of incorrect type assignment when freeing label proxies
- fix race condition in null profile creation
- Fix an error code in aafs_create()
- Fix logical error in verify_header()
- Fix shadowed local variable in unpack_trans_table()"
* tag 'apparmor-pr-2017-09-22' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor:
apparmor: fix apparmorfs DAC access permissions
apparmor: fix build failure on sparc caused by undeclared signals
apparmor: fix incorrect type assignment when freeing proxies
apparmor: ensure unconfined profiles have dfas initialized
apparmor: fix race condition in null profile creation
apparmor: move new_null_profile to after profile lookup fns()
apparmor: add base infastructure for socket mediation
apparmor: add more debug asserts to apparmorfs
apparmor: make policy_unpack able to audit different info messages
apparmor: add support for absolute root view based labels
apparmor: cleanup conditional check for label in label_print
apparmor: add mount mediation
apparmor: add the ability to mediate signals
apparmor: Redundant condition: prev_ns. in [label.c:1498]
apparmor: Fix an error code in aafs_create()
apparmor: Fix logical error in verify_header()
apparmor: Fix shadowed local variable in unpack_trans_table()
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
24 files changed, 2088 insertions, 137 deletions
diff --git a/security/apparmor/.gitignore b/security/apparmor/.gitignore index 9cdec70d72b8..d5b291e94264 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/.gitignore +++ b/security/apparmor/.gitignore @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ # # Generated include files # +net_names.h capability_names.h rlim_names.h diff --git a/security/apparmor/Makefile b/security/apparmor/Makefile index a16b195274de..dafdd387d42b 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/Makefile +++ b/security/apparmor/Makefile @@ -4,11 +4,44 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor.o apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o context.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \ path.o domain.o policy.o policy_unpack.o procattr.o lsm.o \ - resource.o secid.o file.o policy_ns.o label.o + resource.o secid.o file.o policy_ns.o label.o mount.o net.o apparmor-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH) += crypto.o -clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h +clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h net_names.h +# Build a lower case string table of address family names +# Transform lines from +# #define AF_LOCAL 1 /* POSIX name for AF_UNIX */ +# #define AF_INET 2 /* Internet IP Protocol */ +# to +# [1] = "local", +# [2] = "inet", +# +# and build the securityfs entries for the mapping. +# Transforms lines from +# #define AF_INET 2 /* Internet IP Protocol */ +# to +# #define AA_SFS_AF_MASK "local inet" +quiet_cmd_make-af = GEN $@ +cmd_make-af = echo "static const char *address_family_names[] = {" > $@ ;\ + sed $< >>$@ -r -n -e "/AF_MAX/d" -e "/AF_LOCAL/d" -e "/AF_ROUTE/d" -e \ + 's/^\#define[ \t]+AF_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\ + echo "};" >> $@ ;\ + printf '%s' '\#define AA_SFS_AF_MASK "' >> $@ ;\ + sed -r -n -e "/AF_MAX/d" -e "/AF_LOCAL/d" -e "/AF_ROUTE/d" -e \ + 's/^\#define[ \t]+AF_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/\L\1/p'\ + $< | tr '\n' ' ' | sed -e 's/ $$/"\n/' >> $@ + +# Build a lower case string table of sock type names +# Transform lines from +# SOCK_STREAM = 1, +# to +# [1] = "stream", +quiet_cmd_make-sock = GEN $@ +cmd_make-sock = echo "static const char *sock_type_names[] = {" >> $@ ;\ + sed $^ >>$@ -r -n \ + -e 's/^\tSOCK_([A-Z0-9_]+)[\t]+=[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\ + echo "};" >> $@ # Build a lower case string table of capability names # Transforms lines from @@ -61,6 +94,7 @@ cmd_make-rlim = echo "static const char *const rlim_names[RLIM_NLIMITS] = {" \ tr '\n' ' ' | sed -e 's/ $$/"\n/' >> $@ $(obj)/capability.o : $(obj)/capability_names.h +$(obj)/net.o : $(obj)/net_names.h $(obj)/resource.o : $(obj)/rlim_names.h $(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/linux/capability.h \ $(src)/Makefile @@ -68,3 +102,8 @@ $(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/linux/capability.h \ $(obj)/rlim_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/asm-generic/resource.h \ $(src)/Makefile $(call cmd,make-rlim) +$(obj)/net_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/socket.h \ + $(srctree)/include/linux/net.h \ + $(src)/Makefile + $(call cmd,make-af) + $(call cmd,make-sock) diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c index 853c2ec8e0c9..518d5928661b 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c +++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ #include "include/audit.h" #include "include/context.h" #include "include/crypto.h" +#include "include/ipc.h" #include "include/policy_ns.h" #include "include/label.h" #include "include/policy.h" @@ -248,8 +249,10 @@ static struct dentry *aafs_create(const char *name, umode_t mode, inode_lock(dir); dentry = lookup_one_len(name, parent, strlen(name)); - if (IS_ERR(dentry)) + if (IS_ERR(dentry)) { + error = PTR_ERR(dentry); goto fail_lock; + } if (d_really_is_positive(dentry)) { error = -EEXIST; @@ -1443,6 +1446,10 @@ void __aafs_profile_migrate_dents(struct aa_profile *old, { int i; + AA_BUG(!old); + AA_BUG(!new); + AA_BUG(!mutex_is_locked(&profiles_ns(old)->lock)); + for (i = 0; i < AAFS_PROF_SIZEOF; i++) { new->dents[i] = old->dents[i]; if (new->dents[i]) @@ -1506,6 +1513,9 @@ int __aafs_profile_mkdir(struct aa_profile *profile, struct dentry *parent) struct dentry *dent = NULL, *dir; int error; + AA_BUG(!profile); + AA_BUG(!mutex_is_locked(&profiles_ns(profile)->lock)); + if (!parent) { struct aa_profile *p; p = aa_deref_parent(profile); @@ -1731,6 +1741,7 @@ void __aafs_ns_rmdir(struct aa_ns *ns) if (!ns) return; + AA_BUG(!mutex_is_locked(&ns->lock)); list_for_each_entry(child, &ns->base.profiles, base.list) __aafs_profile_rmdir(child); @@ -1903,6 +1914,10 @@ static struct aa_ns *__next_ns(struct aa_ns *root, struct aa_ns *ns) { struct aa_ns *parent, *next; + AA_BUG(!root); + AA_BUG(!ns); + AA_BUG(ns != root && !mutex_is_locked(&ns->parent->lock)); + /* is next namespace a child */ if (!list_empty(&ns->sub_ns)) { next = list_first_entry(&ns->sub_ns, typeof(*ns), base.list); @@ -1937,6 +1952,9 @@ static struct aa_ns *__next_ns(struct aa_ns *root, struct aa_ns *ns) static struct aa_profile *__first_profile(struct aa_ns *root, struct aa_ns *ns) { + AA_BUG(!root); + AA_BUG(ns && !mutex_is_locked(&ns->lock)); + for (; ns; ns = __next_ns(root, ns)) { if (!list_empty(&ns->base.profiles)) return list_first_entry(&ns->base.profiles, @@ -1959,6 +1977,8 @@ static struct aa_profile *__next_profile(struct aa_profile *p) struct aa_profile *parent; struct aa_ns *ns = p->ns; + AA_BUG(!mutex_is_locked(&profiles_ns(p)->lock)); + /* is next profile a child */ if (!list_empty(&p->base.profiles)) return list_first_entry(&p->base.profiles, typeof(*p), @@ -2127,6 +2147,11 @@ static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_ptrace[] = { { } }; +static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_signal[] = { + AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("mask", AA_SFS_SIG_MASK), + { } +}; + static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_domain[] = { AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("change_hat", 1), AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("change_hatv", 1), @@ -2151,9 +2176,14 @@ static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_policy[] = { { } }; +static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_mount[] = { + AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("mask", "mount umount pivot_root"), + { } +}; + static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_ns[] = { AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("profile", 1), - AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("pivot_root", 1), + AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("pivot_root", 0), { } }; @@ -2172,22 +2202,25 @@ static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_features[] = { AA_SFS_DIR("policy", aa_sfs_entry_policy), AA_SFS_DIR("domain", aa_sfs_entry_domain), AA_SFS_DIR("file", aa_sfs_entry_file), + AA_SFS_DIR("network", aa_sfs_entry_network), + AA_SFS_DIR("mount", aa_sfs_entry_mount), AA_SFS_DIR("namespaces", aa_sfs_entry_ns), AA_SFS_FILE_U64("capability", VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK), AA_SFS_DIR("rlimit", aa_sfs_entry_rlimit), AA_SFS_DIR("caps", aa_sfs_entry_caps), AA_SFS_DIR("ptrace", aa_sfs_entry_ptrace), + AA_SFS_DIR("signal", aa_sfs_entry_signal), AA_SFS_DIR("query", aa_sfs_entry_query), { } }; static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_apparmor[] = { - AA_SFS_FILE_FOPS(".access", 0640, &aa_sfs_access), + AA_SFS_FILE_FOPS(".access", 0666, &aa_sfs_access), AA_SFS_FILE_FOPS(".stacked", 0444, &seq_ns_stacked_fops), AA_SFS_FILE_FOPS(".ns_stacked", 0444, &seq_ns_nsstacked_fops), - AA_SFS_FILE_FOPS(".ns_level", 0666, &seq_ns_level_fops), - AA_SFS_FILE_FOPS(".ns_name", 0640, &seq_ns_name_fops), - AA_SFS_FILE_FOPS("profiles", 0440, &aa_sfs_profiles_fops), + AA_SFS_FILE_FOPS(".ns_level", 0444, &seq_ns_level_fops), + AA_SFS_FILE_FOPS(".ns_name", 0444, &seq_ns_name_fops), + AA_SFS_FILE_FOPS("profiles", 0444, &aa_sfs_profiles_fops), AA_SFS_DIR("features", aa_sfs_entry_features), { } }; diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c index 17a601c67b62..dd754b7850a8 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/domain.c +++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c @@ -374,8 +374,8 @@ static const char *next_name(int xtype, const char *name) * * Returns: refcounted label, or NULL on failure (MAYBE NULL) */ -static struct aa_label *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex, - const char **name) +struct aa_label *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex, + const char **name) { struct aa_label *label = NULL; u32 xtype = xindex & AA_X_TYPE_MASK; diff --git a/security/apparmor/file.c b/security/apparmor/file.c index 3382518b87fa..db80221891c6 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/file.c +++ b/security/apparmor/file.c @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ #include "include/context.h" #include "include/file.h" #include "include/match.h" +#include "include/net.h" #include "include/path.h" #include "include/policy.h" #include "include/label.h" @@ -566,6 +567,32 @@ static int __file_path_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label, return error; } +static int __file_sock_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label, + struct aa_label *flabel, struct file *file, + u32 request, u32 denied) +{ + struct socket *sock = (struct socket *) file->private_data; + int error; + + AA_BUG(!sock); + + /* revalidation due to label out of date. No revocation at this time */ + if (!denied && aa_label_is_subset(flabel, label)) + return 0; + + /* TODO: improve to skip profiles cached in flabel */ + error = aa_sock_file_perm(label, op, request, sock); + if (denied) { + /* TODO: improve to skip profiles checked above */ + /* check every profile in file label to is cached */ + last_error(error, aa_sock_file_perm(flabel, op, request, sock)); + } + if (!error) + update_file_ctx(file_ctx(file), label, request); + + return error; +} + /** * aa_file_perm - do permission revalidation check & audit for @file * @op: operation being checked @@ -610,6 +637,9 @@ int aa_file_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label, struct file *file, error = __file_path_perm(op, label, flabel, file, request, denied); + else if (S_ISSOCK(file_inode(file)->i_mode)) + error = __file_sock_perm(op, label, flabel, file, request, + denied); done: rcu_read_unlock(); diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h index aaf893f4e4f5..829082c35faa 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h @@ -27,7 +27,9 @@ #define AA_CLASS_NET 4 #define AA_CLASS_RLIMITS 5 #define AA_CLASS_DOMAIN 6 +#define AA_CLASS_MOUNT 7 #define AA_CLASS_PTRACE 9 +#define AA_CLASS_SIGNAL 10 #define AA_CLASS_LABEL 16 #define AA_CLASS_LAST AA_CLASS_LABEL diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h index c68839a44351..ff4316e1068d 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h @@ -71,6 +71,10 @@ enum audit_type { #define OP_FMPROT "file_mprotect" #define OP_INHERIT "file_inherit" +#define OP_PIVOTROOT "pivotroot" +#define OP_MOUNT "mount" +#define OP_UMOUNT "umount" + #define OP_CREATE "create" #define OP_POST_CREATE "post_create" #define OP_BIND "bind" @@ -86,6 +90,7 @@ enum audit_type { #define OP_SHUTDOWN "socket_shutdown" #define OP_PTRACE "ptrace" +#define OP_SIGNAL "signal" #define OP_EXEC "exec" @@ -116,20 +121,36 @@ struct apparmor_audit_data { /* these entries require a custom callback fn */ struct { struct aa_label *peer; - struct { - const char *target; - kuid_t ouid; - } fs; + union { + struct { + kuid_t ouid; + const char *target; + } fs; + struct { + int type, protocol; + struct sock *peer_sk; + void *addr; + int addrlen; + } net; + int signal; + struct { + int rlim; + unsigned long max; + } rlim; + }; }; struct { - const char *name; - long pos; + struct aa_profile *profile; const char *ns; + long pos; } iface; struct { - int rlim; - unsigned long max; - } rlim; + const char *src_name; + const char *type; + const char *trans; + const char *data; + unsigned long flags; + } mnt; }; }; diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/domain.h b/security/apparmor/include/domain.h index 24c5976d6143..ac9862ff7cdf 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/domain.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/domain.h @@ -15,6 +15,8 @@ #include <linux/binfmts.h> #include <linux/types.h> +#include "label.h" + #ifndef __AA_DOMAIN_H #define __AA_DOMAIN_H @@ -29,6 +31,9 @@ struct aa_domain { #define AA_CHANGE_ONEXEC 4 #define AA_CHANGE_STACK 8 +struct aa_label *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex, + const char **name); + int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm); void aa_free_domain_entries(struct aa_domain *domain); diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h b/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h index 656fdb81c8a0..5ffc218d1e74 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h @@ -27,8 +27,14 @@ struct aa_profile; #define AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK (AA_PTRACE_READ | AA_PTRACE_TRACE | \ AA_MAY_BE_READ | AA_MAY_BE_TRACED) +#define AA_SIGNAL_PERM_MASK (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE) + +#define AA_SFS_SIG_MASK "hup int quit ill trap abrt bus fpe kill usr1 " \ + "segv usr2 pipe alrm term stkflt chld cont stop stp ttin ttou urg " \ + "xcpu xfsz vtalrm prof winch io pwr sys emt lost" int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_label *tracer, struct aa_label *tracee, u32 request); +int aa_may_signal(struct aa_label *sender, struct aa_label *target, int sig); #endif /* __AA_IPC_H */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/label.h b/security/apparmor/include/label.h index 9a283b722755..af22dcbbcb8a 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/label.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/label.h @@ -310,6 +310,7 @@ bool aa_update_label_name(struct aa_ns *ns, struct aa_label *label, gfp_t gfp); #define FLAG_SHOW_MODE 1 #define FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS 2 #define FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED 4 +#define FLAG_ABS_ROOT 8 int aa_label_snxprint(char *str, size_t size, struct aa_ns *view, struct aa_label *label, int flags); int aa_label_asxprint(char **strp, struct aa_ns *ns, struct aa_label *label, diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/mount.h b/security/apparmor/include/mount.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..25d6067fa6ef --- /dev/null +++ b/security/apparmor/include/mount.h @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +/* + * AppArmor security module + * + * This file contains AppArmor file mediation function definitions. + * + * Copyright 2017 Canonical Ltd. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the + * License. + */ + +#ifndef __AA_MOUNT_H +#define __AA_MOUNT_H + +#include <linux/fs.h> +#include <linux/path.h> + +#include "domain.h" +#include "policy.h" + +/* mount perms */ +#define AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT 0x01 +#define AA_MAY_MOUNT 0x02 +#define AA_MAY_UMOUNT 0x04 +#define AA_AUDIT_DATA 0x40 +#define AA_MNT_CONT_MATCH 0x40 + +#define AA_MS_IGNORE_MASK (MS_KERNMOUNT | MS_NOSEC | MS_ACTIVE | MS_BORN) + +int aa_remount(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path, + unsigned long flags, void *data); + +int aa_bind_mount(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path, + const char *old_name, unsigned long flags); + + +int aa_mount_change_type(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path, + unsigned long flags); + +int aa_move_mount(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path, + const char *old_name); + +int aa_new_mount(struct aa_label *label, const char *dev_name, + const struct path *path, const char *type, unsigned long flags, + void *data); + +int aa_umount(struct aa_label *label, struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags); + +int aa_pivotroot(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *old_path, + const struct path *new_path); + +#endif /* __AA_MOUNT_H */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/net.h b/security/apparmor/include/net.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..140c8efcf364 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/apparmor/include/net.h @@ -0,0 +1,114 @@ +/* + * AppArmor security module + * + * This file contains AppArmor network mediation definitions. + * + * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE + * Copyright 2009-2017 Canonical Ltd. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the + * License. + */ + +#ifndef __AA_NET_H +#define __AA_NET_H + +#include <net/sock.h> +#include <linux/path.h> + +#include "apparmorfs.h" +#include "label.h" +#include "perms.h" +#include "policy.h" + +#define AA_MAY_SEND AA_MAY_WRITE +#define AA_MAY_RECEIVE AA_MAY_READ + +#define AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN AA_MAY_DELETE + +#define AA_MAY_CONNECT AA_MAY_OPEN +#define AA_MAY_ACCEPT 0x00100000 + +#define AA_MAY_BIND 0x00200000 +#define AA_MAY_LISTEN 0x00400000 + +#define AA_MAY_SETOPT 0x01000000 +#define AA_MAY_GETOPT 0x02000000 + +#define NET_PERMS_MASK (AA_MAY_SEND | AA_MAY_RECEIVE | AA_MAY_CREATE | \ + AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN | AA_MAY_BIND | AA_MAY_LISTEN | \ + AA_MAY_CONNECT | AA_MAY_ACCEPT | AA_MAY_SETATTR | \ + AA_MAY_GETATTR | AA_MAY_SETOPT | AA_MAY_GETOPT) + +#define NET_FS_PERMS (AA_MAY_SEND | AA_MAY_RECEIVE | AA_MAY_CREATE | \ + AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN | AA_MAY_CONNECT | AA_MAY_RENAME |\ + AA_MAY_SETATTR | AA_MAY_GETATTR | AA_MAY_CHMOD | \ + AA_MAY_CHOWN | AA_MAY_CHGRP | AA_MAY_LOCK | \ + AA_MAY_MPROT) + +#define NET_PEER_MASK (AA_MAY_SEND | AA_MAY_RECEIVE | AA_MAY_CONNECT | \ + AA_MAY_ACCEPT) +struct aa_sk_ctx { + struct aa_label *label; + struct aa_label *peer; + struct path path; +}; + +#define SK_CTX(X) ((X)->sk_security) +#define SOCK_ctx(X) SOCK_INODE(X)->i_security +#define DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(NAME, OP, SK, F, T, P) \ + struct lsm_network_audit NAME ## _net = { .sk = (SK), \ + .family = (F)}; \ + DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(NAME, \ + ((SK) && (F) != AF_UNIX) ? LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET : \ + LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, \ + OP); \ + NAME.u.net = &(NAME ## _net); \ + aad(&NAME)->net.type = (T); \ + aad(&NAME)->net.protocol = (P) + +#define DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(NAME, OP, SK) \ + DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(NAME, OP, SK, (SK)->sk_family, (SK)->sk_type, \ + (SK)->sk_protocol) + +/* struct aa_net - network confinement data + * @allow: basic network families permissions + * @audit: which network permissions to force audit + * @quiet: which network permissions to quiet rejects + */ +struct aa_net { + u16 allow[AF_MAX]; + u16 audit[AF_MAX]; + u16 quiet[AF_MAX]; +}; + + +extern struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_network[]; + +void audit_net_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va); +int aa_profile_af_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct common_audit_data *sa, + u32 request, u16 family, int type); +int aa_af_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, u16 family, + int type, int protocol); +static inline int aa_profile_af_sk_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, + struct common_audit_data *sa, + u32 request, + struct sock *sk) +{ + return aa_profile_af_perm(profile, sa, request, sk->sk_family, + sk->sk_type); +} +int aa_sk_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct sock *sk); + +int aa_sock_file_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, + struct socket *sock); + + +static inline void aa_free_net_rules(struct aa_net *new) +{ + /* NOP */ +} + +#endif /* __AA_NET_H */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/perms.h b/security/apparmor/include/perms.h index 2b27bb79aec4..af04d5a7d73d 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/perms.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/perms.h @@ -135,9 +135,10 @@ extern struct aa_perms allperms; void aa_perm_mask_to_str(char *str, const char *chrs, u32 mask); -void aa_audit_perm_names(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char **names, u32 mask); +void aa_audit_perm_names(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char * const *names, + u32 mask); void aa_audit_perm_mask(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 mask, const char *chrs, - u32 chrsmask, const char **names, u32 namesmask); + u32 chrsmask, const char * const *names, u32 namesmask); void aa_apply_modes_to_perms(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_perms *perms); void aa_compute_perms(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state, diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h index 17fe41a9cac3..4364088a0b9e 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ #include "file.h" #include "lib.h" #include "label.h" +#include "net.h" #include "perms.h" #include "resource.h" @@ -111,6 +112,7 @@ struct aa_data { * @policy: general match rules governing policy * @file: The set of rules governing basic file access and domain transitions * @caps: capabilities for the profile + * @net: network controls for the profile * @rlimits: rlimits for the profile * * @dents: dentries for the profiles file entries in apparmorfs @@ -148,6 +150,7 @@ struct aa_profile { struct aa_policydb policy; struct aa_file_rules file; struct aa_caps caps; + struct aa_net net; struct aa_rlimit rlimits; struct aa_loaddata *rawdata; @@ -220,6 +223,16 @@ static inline unsigned int PROFILE_MEDIATES_SAFE(struct aa_profile *profile, return 0; } +static inline unsigned int PROFILE_MEDIATES_AF(struct aa_profile *profile, + u16 AF) { + unsigned int state = PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_NET); + u16 be_af = cpu_to_be16(AF); + + if (!state) + return 0; + return aa_dfa_match_len(profile->policy.dfa, state, (char *) &be_af, 2); +} + /** * aa_get_profile - increment refcount on profile @p * @p: profile (MAYBE NULL) diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/sig_names.h b/security/apparmor/include/sig_names.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..92e62fe95292 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/apparmor/include/sig_names.h @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +#include <linux/signal.h> + +#define SIGUNKNOWN 0 +#define MAXMAPPED_SIG 35 +/* provide a mapping of arch signal to internal signal # for mediation + * those that are always an alias SIGCLD for SIGCLHD and SIGPOLL for SIGIO + * map to the same entry those that may/or may not get a separate entry + */ +static const int sig_map[MAXMAPPED_SIG] = { + [0] = MAXMAPPED_SIG, /* existence test */ + [SIGHUP] = 1, + [SIGINT] = 2, + [SIGQUIT] = 3, + [SIGILL] = 4, + [SIGTRAP] = 5, /* -, 5, - */ + [SIGABRT] = 6, /* SIGIOT: -, 6, - */ + [SIGBUS] = 7, /* 10, 7, 10 */ + [SIGFPE] = 8, + [SIGKILL] = 9, + [SIGUSR1] = 10, /* 30, 10, 16 */ + [SIGSEGV] = 11, + [SIGUSR2] = 12, /* 31, 12, 17 */ + [SIGPIPE] = 13, + [SIGALRM] = 14, + [SIGTERM] = 15, +#ifdef SIGSTKFLT + [SIGSTKFLT] = 16, /* -, 16, - */ +#endif + [SIGCHLD] = 17, /* 20, 17, 18. SIGCHLD -, -, 18 */ + [SIGCONT] = 18, /* 19, 18, 25 */ + [SIGSTOP] = 19, /* 17, 19, 23 */ + [SIGTSTP] = 20, /* 18, 20, 24 */ + [SIGTTIN] = 21, /* 21, 21, 26 */ + [SIGTTOU] = 22, /* 22, 22, 27 */ + [SIGURG] = 23, /* 16, 23, 21 */ + [SIGXCPU] = 24, /* 24, 24, 30 */ + [SIGXFSZ] = 25, /* 25, 25, 31 */ + [SIGVTALRM] = 26, /* 26, 26, 28 */ + [SIGPROF] = 27, /* 27, 27, 29 */ + [SIGWINCH] = 28, /* 28, 28, 20 */ + [SIGIO] = 29, /* SIGPOLL: 23, 29, 22 */ + [SIGPWR] = 30, /* 29, 30, 19. SIGINFO 29, -, - */ +#ifdef SIGSYS + [SIGSYS] = 31, /* 12, 31, 12. often SIG LOST/UNUSED */ +#endif +#ifdef SIGEMT + [SIGEMT] = 32, /* 7, - , 7 */ +#endif +#if defined(SIGLOST) && SIGPWR != SIGLOST /* sparc */ + [SIGLOST] = 33, /* unused on Linux */ +#endif +#if defined(SIGUNUSED) && \ + defined(SIGLOST) && defined(SIGSYS) && SIGLOST != SIGSYS + [SIGUNUSED] = 34, /* -, 31, - */ +#endif +}; + +/* this table is ordered post sig_map[sig] mapping */ +static const char *const sig_names[MAXMAPPED_SIG + 1] = { + "unknown", + "hup", + "int", + "quit", + "ill", + "trap", + "abrt", + "bus", + "fpe", + "kill", + "usr1", + "segv", + "usr2", + "pipe", + "alrm", + "term", + "stkflt", + "chld", + "cont", + "stop", + "stp", + "ttin", + "ttou", + "urg", + "xcpu", + "xfsz", + "vtalrm", + "prof", + "winch", + "io", + "pwr", + "sys", + "emt", + "lost", + "unused", + + "exists", /* always last existence test mapped to MAXMAPPED_SIG */ +}; + diff --git a/security/apparmor/ipc.c b/security/apparmor/ipc.c index 11e66b5bbc42..66fb9ede9447 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/ipc.c +++ b/security/apparmor/ipc.c @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ #include "include/context.h" #include "include/policy.h" #include "include/ipc.h" +#include "include/sig_names.h" /** * audit_ptrace_mask - convert mask to permission string @@ -121,3 +122,101 @@ int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_label *tracer, struct aa_label *tracee, } +static inline int map_signal_num(int sig) +{ + if (sig > SIGRTMAX) + return SIGUNKNOWN; + else if (sig >= SIGRTMIN) + return sig - SIGRTMIN + 128; /* rt sigs mapped to 128 */ + else if (sig <= MAXMAPPED_SIG) + return sig_map[sig]; + return SIGUNKNOWN; +} + +/** + * audit_file_mask - convert mask to permission string + * @buffer: buffer to write string to (NOT NULL) + * @mask: permission mask to convert + */ +static void audit_signal_mask(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 mask) +{ + if (mask & MAY_READ) + audit_log_string(ab, "receive"); + if (mask & MAY_WRITE) + audit_log_string(ab, "send"); +} + +/** + * audit_cb - call back for signal specific audit fields + * @ab: audit_buffer (NOT NULL) + * @va: audit struct to audit values of (NOT NULL) + */ +static void audit_signal_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) +{ + struct common_audit_data *sa = va; + + if (aad(sa)->request & AA_SIGNAL_PERM_MASK) { + audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask="); + audit_signal_mask(ab, aad(sa)->request); + if (aad(sa)->denied & AA_SIGNAL_PERM_MASK) { + audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask="); + audit_signal_mask(ab, aad(sa)->denied); + } + } + if (aad(sa)->signal <= MAXMAPPED_SIG) + audit_log_format(ab, " signal=%s", sig_names[aad(sa)->signal]); + else + audit_log_format(ab, " signal=rtmin+%d", + aad(sa)->signal - 128); + audit_log_format(ab, " peer="); + aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer, + FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC); +} + +/* TODO: update to handle compound name&name2, conditionals */ +static void profile_match_signal(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *label, + int signal, struct aa_perms *perms) +{ + unsigned int state; + + /* TODO: secondary cache check <profile, profile, perm> */ + state = aa_dfa_next(profile->policy.dfa, + profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_SIGNAL], + signal); + state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa, state, label); + aa_compute_perms(profile->policy.dfa, state, perms); +} + +static int profile_signal_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, + struct aa_profile *peer, u32 request, + struct common_audit_data *sa) +{ + struct aa_perms perms; + + if (profile_unconfined(profile) || + !PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_SIGNAL)) + return 0; + + aad(sa)->peer = &peer->label; + profile_match_signal(profile, peer->base.hname, aad(sa)->signal, + &perms); + aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms); + return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_signal_cb); +} + +static int aa_signal_cross_perm(struct aa_profile *sender, + struct aa_profile *target, + struct common_audit_data *sa) +{ + return xcheck(profile_signal_perm(sender, target, MAY_WRITE, sa), + profile_signal_perm(target, sender, MAY_READ, sa)); +} + +int aa_may_signal(struct aa_label *sender, struct aa_label *target, int sig) +{ + DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, OP_SIGNAL); + + aad(&sa)->signal = map_signal_num(sig); + return xcheck_labels_profiles(sender, target, aa_signal_cross_perm, + &sa); +} diff --git a/security/apparmor/label.c b/security/apparmor/label.c index e052eaba1cf6..c5b99b954580 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/label.c +++ b/security/apparmor/label.c @@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ static void free_proxy(struct aa_proxy *proxy) /* p->label will not updated any more as p is dead */ aa_put_label(rcu_dereference_protected(proxy->label, true)); memset(proxy, 0, sizeof(*proxy)); - proxy->label = (struct aa_label *) PROXY_POISON; + RCU_INIT_POINTER(proxy->label, (struct aa_label *)PROXY_POISON); kfree(proxy); } } @@ -1450,9 +1450,11 @@ bool aa_update_label_name(struct aa_ns *ns, struct aa_label *label, gfp_t gfp) * cached label name is present and visible * @label->hname only exists if label is namespace hierachical */ -static inline bool use_label_hname(struct aa_ns *ns, struct aa_label *label) +static inline bool use_label_hname(struct aa_ns *ns, struct aa_label *label, + int flags) { - if (label->hname && labels_ns(label) == ns) + if (label->hname && (!ns || labels_ns(label) == ns) && + !(flags & ~FLAG_SHOW_MODE)) return true; return false; @@ -1495,7 +1497,7 @@ static int aa_profile_snxprint(char *str, size_t size, struct aa_ns *view, view = profiles_ns(profile); if (view != profile->ns && - (!prev_ns || (prev_ns && *prev_ns != profile->ns))) { + (!prev_ns || (*prev_ns != profile->ns))) { if (prev_ns) *prev_ns = profile->ns; ns_name = aa_ns_name(view, profile->ns, @@ -1605,8 +1607,13 @@ int aa_label_snxprint(char *str, size_t size, struct aa_ns *ns, AA_BUG(!str && size != 0); AA_BUG(!label); - if (!ns) + if (flags & FLAG_ABS_ROOT) { + ns = root_ns; + len = snprintf(str, size, "="); + update_for_len(total, len, size, str); + } else if (!ns) { ns = labels_ns(label); + } label_for_each(i, label, profile) { if (aa_ns_visible(ns, profile->ns, flags & FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS)) { @@ -1710,10 +1717,8 @@ void aa_label_xaudit(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct aa_ns *ns, AA_BUG(!ab); AA_BUG(!label); - if (!ns) - ns = labels_ns(label); - - if (!use_label_hname(ns, label) || display_mode(ns, label, flags)) { + if (!use_label_hname(ns, label, flags) || + display_mode(ns, label, flags)) { len = aa_label_asxprint(&name, ns, label, flags, gfp); if (len == -1) { AA_DEBUG("label print error"); @@ -1738,10 +1743,7 @@ void aa_label_seq_xprint(struct seq_file *f, struct aa_ns *ns, AA_BUG(!f); AA_BUG(!label); - if (!ns) - ns = labels_ns(label); - - if (!use_label_hname(ns, label)) { + if (!use_label_hname(ns, label, flags)) { char *str; int len; @@ -1764,10 +1766,7 @@ void aa_label_xprintk(struct aa_ns *ns, struct aa_label *label, int flags, { AA_BUG(!label); - if (!ns) - ns = labels_ns(label); - - if (!use_label_hname(ns, label)) { + if (!use_label_hname(ns, label, flags)) { char *str; int len; @@ -1874,6 +1873,9 @@ struct aa_label *aa_label_parse(struct aa_label *base, const char *str, if (*str == '&') str++; } + if (*str == '=') + base = &root_ns->unconfined->label; + error = vec_setup(profile, vec, len, gfp); if (error) return ERR_PTR(error); diff --git a/security/apparmor/lib.c b/security/apparmor/lib.c index 08ca26bcca77..8818621b5d95 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lib.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lib.c @@ -211,7 +211,8 @@ void aa_perm_mask_to_str(char *str, const char *chrs, u32 mask) *str = '\0'; } -void aa_audit_perm_names(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char **names, u32 mask) +void aa_audit_perm_names(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char * const *names, + u32 mask) { const char *fmt = "%s"; unsigned int i, perm = 1; @@ -229,7 +230,7 @@ void aa_audit_perm_names(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char **names, u32 mask) } void aa_audit_perm_mask(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 mask, const char *chrs, - u32 chrsmask, const char **names, u32 namesmask) + u32 chrsmask, const char * const *names, u32 namesmask) { char str[33]; diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c index 7a82c0f61452..72b915dfcaf7 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c @@ -33,11 +33,13 @@ #include "include/context.h" #include "include/file.h" #include "include/ipc.h" +#include "include/net.h" #include "include/path.h" #include "include/label.h" #include "include/policy.h" #include "include/policy_ns.h" #include "include/procattr.h" +#include "include/mount.h" /* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */ int apparmor_initialized; @@ -511,6 +513,65 @@ static int apparmor_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) ? MAP_PRIVATE : 0); } +static int apparmor_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path, + const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data) +{ + struct aa_label *label; + int error = 0; + + /* Discard magic */ + if ((flags & MS_MGC_MSK) == MS_MGC_VAL) + flags &= ~MS_MGC_MSK; + + flags &= ~AA_MS_IGNORE_MASK; + + label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); + if (!unconfined(label)) { + if (flags & MS_REMOUNT) + error = aa_remount(label, path, flags, data); + else if (flags & MS_BIND) + error = aa_bind_mount(label, path, dev_name, flags); + else if (flags & (MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE | + MS_UNBINDABLE)) + error = aa_mount_change_type(label, path, flags); + else if (flags & MS_MOVE) + error = aa_move_mount(label, path, dev_name); + else + error = aa_new_mount(label, dev_name, path, type, + flags, data); + } + __end_current_label_crit_section(label); + + return error; +} + +static int apparmor_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) +{ + struct aa_label *label; + int error = 0; + + label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); + if (!unconfined(label)) + error = aa_umount(label, mnt, flags); + __end_current_label_crit_section(label); + + return error; +} + +static int apparmor_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *old_path, + const struct path *new_path) +{ + struct aa_label *label; + int error = 0; + + label = aa_get_current_label(); + if (!unconfined(label)) + error = aa_pivotroot(label, old_path, new_path); + aa_put_label(label); + + return error; +} + static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name, char **value) { @@ -656,12 +717,398 @@ static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task, return error; } +static int apparmor_task_kill(struct task_struct *target, struct siginfo *info, + int sig, u32 secid) +{ + struct aa_label *cl, *tl; + int error; + + if (secid) + /* TODO: after secid to label mapping is done. + * Dealing with USB IO specific behavior + */ + return 0; + cl = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); + tl = aa_get_task_label(target); + error = aa_may_signal(cl, tl, sig); + aa_put_label(tl); + __end_current_label_crit_section(cl); + + return error; +} + +/** + * apparmor_sk_alloc_security - allocate and attach the sk_security field + */ +static int apparmor_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t flags) +{ + struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx; + + ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), flags); + if (!ctx) + return -ENOMEM; + + SK_CTX(sk) = ctx; + + return 0; +} + +/** + * apparmor_sk_free_security - free the sk_security field + */ +static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk) +{ + struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk); + + SK_CTX(sk) = NULL; + aa_put_label(ctx->label); + aa_put_label(ctx->peer); + path_put(&ctx->path); + kfree(ctx); +} + +/** + * apparmor_clone_security - clone the sk_security field + */ +static void apparmor_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, + struct sock *newsk) +{ + struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk); + struct aa_sk_ctx *new = SK_CTX(newsk); + + new->label = aa_get_label(ctx->label); + new->peer = aa_get_label(ctx->peer); + new->path = ctx->path; + path_get(&new->path); +} + +static int aa_sock_create_perm(struct aa_label *label, int family, int type, + int protocol) +{ + AA_BUG(!label); + AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); + + return aa_af_perm(label, OP_CREATE, AA_MAY_CREATE, family, type, + protocol); +} + + +/** + * apparmor_socket_create - check perms before creating a new socket + */ +static int apparmor_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern) +{ + struct aa_label *label; + int error = 0; + + label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); + if (!(kern || unconfined(label))) + error = aa_sock_create_perm(label, family, type, protocol); + end_current_label_crit_section(label); + + return error; +} + +/** + * apparmor_socket_post_create - setup the per-socket security struct + * + * Note: + * - kernel sockets currently labeled unconfined but we may want to + * move to a special kernel label + * - socket may not have sk here if created with sock_create_lite or + * sock_alloc. These should be accept cases which will be handled in + * sock_graft. + */ +static int apparmor_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, + int type, int protocol, int kern) +{ + struct aa_label *label; + + if (kern) { + struct aa_ns *ns = aa_get_current_ns(); + + label = aa_get_label(ns_unconfined(ns)); + aa_put_ns(ns); + } else + label = aa_get_current_label(); + + if (sock->sk) { + struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sock->sk); + + aa_put_label(ctx->label); + ctx->label = aa_get_label(label); + } + aa_put_label(label); + + return 0; +} + +/** + * apparmor_socket_bind - check perms before bind addr to socket + */ +static int apparmor_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, + struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) +{ + AA_BUG(!sock); + AA_BUG(!sock->sk); + AA_BUG(!address); + AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); + + return aa_sk_perm(OP_BIND, AA_MAY_BIND, sock->sk); +} + +/** + * apparmor_socket_connect - check perms before connecting @sock to @address + */ +static int apparmor_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, + struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) +{ + AA_BUG(!sock); + AA_BUG(!sock->sk); + AA_BUG(!address); + AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); + + return aa_sk_perm(OP_CONNECT, AA_MAY_CONNECT, sock->sk); +} + +/** + * apparmor_socket_list - check perms before allowing listen + */ +static int apparmor_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog) +{ + AA_BUG(!sock); + AA_BUG(!sock->sk); + AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); + + return aa_sk_perm(OP_LISTEN, AA_MAY_LISTEN, sock->sk); +} + +/** + * apparmor_socket_accept - check perms before accepting a new connection. + * + * Note: while @newsock is created and has some information, the accept + * has not been done. + */ +static int apparmor_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock) +{ + AA_BUG(!sock); + AA_BUG(!sock->sk); + AA_BUG(!newsock); + AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); + + return aa_sk_perm(OP_ACCEPT, AA_MAY_ACCEPT, sock->sk); +} + +static int aa_sock_msg_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock, + struct msghdr *msg, int size) +{ + AA_BUG(!sock); + AA_BUG(!sock->sk); + AA_BUG(!msg); + AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); + + return aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk); +} + +/** + * apparmor_socket_sendmsg - check perms before sending msg to another socket + */ +static int apparmor_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, + struct msghdr *msg, int size) +{ + return aa_sock_msg_perm(OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND, sock, msg, size); +} + +/** + * apparmor_socket_recvmsg - check perms before receiving a message + */ +static int apparmor_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, + struct msghdr *msg, int size, int flags) +{ + return aa_sock_msg_perm(OP_RECVMSG, AA_MAY_RECEIVE, sock, msg, size); +} + +/* revaliation, get/set attr, shutdown */ +static int aa_sock_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock) +{ + AA_BUG(!sock); + AA_BUG(!sock->sk); + AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); + + return aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk); +} + +/** + * apparmor_socket_getsockname - check perms before getting the local address + */ +static int apparmor_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock) +{ + return aa_sock_perm(OP_GETSOCKNAME, AA_MAY_GETATTR, sock); +} + +/** + * apparmor_socket_getpeername - check perms before getting remote address + */ +static int apparmor_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock) +{ + return aa_sock_perm(OP_GETPEERNAME, AA_MAY_GETATTR, sock); +} + +/* revaliation, get/set attr, opt */ +static int aa_sock_opt_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock, + int level, int optname) +{ + AA_BUG(!sock); + AA_BUG(!sock->sk); + AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); + + return aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk); +} + +/** + * apparmor_getsockopt - check perms before getting socket options + */ +static int apparmor_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, + int optname) +{ + return aa_sock_opt_perm(OP_GETSOCKOPT, AA_MAY_GETOPT, sock, + level, optname); +} + +/** + * apparmor_setsockopt - check perms before setting socket options + */ +static int apparmor_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, + int optname) +{ + return aa_sock_opt_perm(OP_SETSOCKOPT, AA_MAY_SETOPT, sock, + level, optname); +} + +/** + * apparmor_socket_shutdown - check perms before shutting down @sock conn + */ +static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how) +{ + return aa_sock_perm(OP_SHUTDOWN, AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN, sock); +} + +/** + * apparmor_socket_sock_recv_skb - check perms before associating skb to sk + * + * Note: can not sleep may be called with locks held + * + * dont want protocol specific in __skb_recv_datagram() + * to deny an incoming connection socket_sock_rcv_skb() + */ +static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + return 0; +} + + +static struct aa_label *sk_peer_label(struct sock *sk) +{ + struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk); + + if (ctx->peer) + return ctx->peer; + + return ERR_PTR(-ENOPROTOOPT); +} + +/** + * apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream - get security context of peer + * + * Note: for tcp only valid if using ipsec or cipso on lan + */ +static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, + char __user *optval, + int __user *optlen, + unsigned int len) +{ + char *name; + int slen, error = 0; + struct aa_label *label; + struct aa_label *peer; + + label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); + peer = sk_peer_label(sock->sk); + if (IS_ERR(peer)) { + error = PTR_ERR(peer); + goto done; + } + slen = aa_label_asxprint(&name, labels_ns(label), peer, + FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS | + FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED, GFP_KERNEL); + /* don't include terminating \0 in slen, it breaks some apps */ + if (slen < 0) { + error = -ENOMEM; + } else { + if (slen > len) { + error = -ERANGE; + } else if (copy_to_user(optval, name, slen)) { + error = -EFAULT; + goto out; + } + if (put_user(slen, optlen)) + error = -EFAULT; +out: + kfree(name); + + } + +done: + end_current_label_crit_section(label); + + return error; +} + +/** + * apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram - get security label of packet + * @sock: the peer socket + * @skb: packet data + * @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet + * + * Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent + */ +static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, + struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid) + +{ + /* TODO: requires secid support */ + return -ENOPROTOOPT; +} + +/** + * apparmor_sock_graft - Initialize newly created socket + * @sk: child sock + * @parent: parent socket + * + * Note: could set off of SOCK_CTX(parent) but need to track inode and we can + * just set sk security information off of current creating process label + * Labeling of sk for accept case - probably should be sock based + * instead of task, because of the case where an implicitly labeled + * socket is shared by different tasks. + */ +static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent) +{ + struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk); + + if (!ctx->label) + ctx->label = aa_get_current_label(); +} + static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check), LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme), LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, apparmor_capget), LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, apparmor_capable), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, apparmor_sb_mount), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, apparmor_sb_umount), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_pivotroot, apparmor_sb_pivotroot), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_link, apparmor_path_link), LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_unlink, apparmor_path_unlink), LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_symlink, apparmor_path_symlink), @@ -686,6 +1133,30 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, apparmor_sk_alloc_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, apparmor_sk_free_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, apparmor_sk_clone_security), + + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, apparmor_socket_create), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, apparmor_socket_post_create), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, apparmor_socket_bind), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, apparmor_socket_connect), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, apparmor_socket_listen), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, apparmor_socket_accept), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, apparmor_socket_sendmsg), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, apparmor_socket_recvmsg), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, apparmor_socket_getsockname), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, apparmor_socket_getpeername), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, apparmor_socket_getsockopt), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, apparmor_socket_setsockopt), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, apparmor_socket_shutdown), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream, + apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, + apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, apparmor_sock_graft), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, apparmor_cred_alloc_blank), LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, apparmor_cred_free), LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, apparmor_cred_prepare), @@ -696,6 +1167,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, apparmor_bprm_committed_creds), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, apparmor_task_setrlimit), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, apparmor_task_kill), }; /* diff --git a/security/apparmor/mount.c b/security/apparmor/mount.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..82a64b58041d --- /dev/null +++ b/security/apparmor/mount.c @@ -0,0 +1,696 @@ +/* + * AppArmor security module + * + * This file contains AppArmor mediation of files + * + * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE + * Copyright 2009-2017 Canonical Ltd. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the + * License. + */ + +#include <linux/fs.h> +#include <linux/mount.h> +#include <linux/namei.h> + +#include "include/apparmor.h" +#include "include/audit.h" +#include "include/context.h" +#include "include/domain.h" +#include "include/file.h" +#include "include/match.h" +#include "include/mount.h" +#include "include/path.h" +#include "include/policy.h" + + +static void audit_mnt_flags(struct audit_buffer *ab, unsigned long flags) +{ + if (flags & MS_RDONLY) + audit_log_format(ab, "ro"); + else + audit_log_format(ab, "rw"); + if (flags & MS_NOSUID) + audit_log_format(ab, ", nosuid"); + if (flags & MS_NODEV) + audit_log_format(ab, ", nodev"); + if (flags & MS_NOEXEC) + audit_log_format(ab, ", noexec"); + if (flags & MS_SYNCHRONOUS) + audit_log_format(ab, ", sync"); + if (flags & MS_REMOUNT) + audit_log_format(ab, ", remount"); + if (flags & MS_MANDLOCK) + audit_log_format(ab, ", mand"); + if (flags & MS_DIRSYNC) + audit_log_format(ab, ", dirsync"); + if (flags & MS_NOATIME) + audit_log_format(ab, ", noatime"); + if (flags & MS_NODIRATIME) + audit_log_format(ab, ", nodiratime"); + if (flags & MS_BIND) + audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rbind" : ", bind"); + if (flags & MS_MOVE) + audit_log_format(ab, ", move"); + if (flags & MS_SILENT) + audit_log_format(ab, ", silent"); + if (flags & MS_POSIXACL) + audit_log_format(ab, ", acl"); + if (flags & MS_UNBINDABLE) + audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", runbindable" : + ", unbindable"); + if (flags & MS_PRIVATE) + audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rprivate" : + ", private"); + if (flags & MS_SLAVE) + audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rslave" : + ", slave"); + if (flags & MS_SHARED) + audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rshared" : + ", shared"); + if (flags & MS_RELATIME) + audit_log_format(ab, ", relatime"); + if (flags & MS_I_VERSION) + audit_log_format(ab, ", iversion"); + if (flags & MS_STRICTATIME) + audit_log_format(ab, ", strictatime"); + if (flags & MS_NOUSER) + audit_log_format(ab, ", nouser"); +} + +/** + * audit_cb - call back for mount specific audit fields + * @ab: audit_buffer (NOT NULL) + * @va: audit struct to audit values of (NOT NULL) + */ +static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) +{ + struct common_audit_data *sa = va; + + if (aad(sa)->mnt.type) { + audit_log_format(ab, " fstype="); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, aad(sa)->mnt.type); + } + if (aad(sa)->mnt.src_name) { + audit_log_format(ab, " srcname="); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, aad(sa)->mnt.src_name); + } + if (aad(sa)->mnt.trans) { + audit_log_format(ab, " trans="); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, aad(sa)->mnt.trans); + } + if (aad(sa)->mnt.flags) { + audit_log_format(ab, " flags=\""); + audit_mnt_flags(ab, aad(sa)->mnt.flags); + audit_log_format(ab, "\""); + } + if (aad(sa)->mnt.data) { + audit_log_format(ab, " options="); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, aad(sa)->mnt.data); + } +} + +/** + * audit_mount - handle the auditing of mount operations + * @profile: the profile being enforced (NOT NULL) + * @op: operation being mediated (NOT NULL) + * @name: name of object being mediated (MAYBE NULL) + * @src_name: src_name of object being mediated (MAYBE_NULL) + * @type: type of filesystem (MAYBE_NULL) + * @trans: name of trans (MAYBE NULL) + * @flags: filesystem idependent mount flags + * @data: filesystem mount flags + * @request: permissions requested + * @perms: the permissions computed for the request (NOT NULL) + * @info: extra information message (MAYBE NULL) + * @error: 0 if operation allowed else failure error code + * + * Returns: %0 or error on failure + */ +static int audit_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *op, + const char *name, const char *src_name, + const char *type, const char *trans, + unsigned long flags, const void *data, u32 request, + struct aa_perms *perms, const char *info, int error) +{ + int audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO; + DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, op); + + if (likely(!error)) { + u32 mask = perms->audit; + + if (unlikely(AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_ALL)) + mask = 0xffff; + + /* mask off perms that are not being force audited */ + request &= mask; + + if (likely(!request)) + return 0; + audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT; + } else { + /* only report permissions that were denied */ + request = request & ~perms->allow; + + if (request & perms->kill) + audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL; + + /* quiet known rejects, assumes quiet and kill do not overlap */ + if ((request & perms->quiet) && + AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_NOQUIET && + AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL) + request &= ~perms->quiet; + + if (!request) + return error; + } + + aad(&sa)->name = name; + aad(&sa)->mnt.src_name = src_name; + aad(&sa)->mnt.type = type; + aad(&sa)->mnt.trans = trans; + aad(&sa)->mnt.flags = flags; + if (data && (perms->audit & AA_AUDIT_DATA)) + aad(&sa)->mnt.data = data; + aad(&sa)->info = info; + aad(&sa)->error = error; + + return aa_audit(audit_type, profile, &sa, audit_cb); +} + +/** + * match_mnt_flags - Do an ordered match on mount flags + * @dfa: dfa to match against + * @state: state to start in + * @flags: mount flags to match against + * + * Mount flags are encoded as an ordered match. This is done instead of + * checking against a simple bitmask, to allow for logical operations + * on the flags. + * + * Returns: next state after flags match + */ +static unsigned int match_mnt_flags(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state, + unsigned long flags) +{ + unsigned int i; + + for (i = 0; i <= 31 ; ++i) { + if ((1 << i) & flags) + state = aa_dfa_next(dfa, state, i + 1); + } + + return state; +} + +/** + * compute_mnt_perms - compute mount permission associated with @state + * @dfa: dfa to match against (NOT NULL) + * @state: state match finished in + * + * Returns: mount permissions + */ +static struct aa_perms compute_mnt_perms(struct aa_dfa *dfa, + unsigned int state) +{ + struct aa_perms perms; + + perms.kill = 0; + perms.allow = dfa_user_allow(dfa, state); + perms.audit = dfa_user_audit(dfa, state); + perms.quiet = dfa_user_quiet(dfa, state); + perms.xindex = dfa_user_xindex(dfa, state); + + return perms; +} + +static const char * const mnt_info_table[] = { + "match succeeded", + "failed mntpnt match", + "failed srcname match", + "failed type match", + "failed flags match", + "failed data match" +}; + +/* + * Returns 0 on success else element that match failed in, this is the + * index into the mnt_info_table above + */ +static int do_match_mnt(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start, + const char *mntpnt, const char *devname, + const char *type, unsigned long flags, + void *data, bool binary, struct aa_perms *perms) +{ + unsigned int state; + + AA_BUG(!dfa); + AA_BUG(!perms); + + state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, start, mntpnt); + state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state); + if (!state) + return 1; + + if (devname) + state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, state, devname); + state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state); + if (!state) + return 2; + + if (type) + state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, state, type); + state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state); + if (!state) + return 3; + + state = match_mnt_flags(dfa, state, flags); + if (!state) + return 4; + *perms = compute_mnt_perms(dfa, state); + if (perms->allow & AA_MAY_MOUNT) + return 0; + + /* only match data if not binary and the DFA flags data is expected */ + if (data && !binary && (perms->allow & AA_MNT_CONT_MATCH)) { + state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state); + if (!state) + return 4; + + state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, state, data); + if (!state) + return 5; + *perms = compute_mnt_perms(dfa, state); + if (perms->allow & AA_MAY_MOUNT) + return 0; + } + + /* failed at end of flags match */ + return 4; +} + + +static int path_flags(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path) +{ + AA_BUG(!profile); + AA_BUG(!path); + + return profile->path_flags | + (S_ISDIR(path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode) ? PATH_IS_DIR : 0); +} + +/** + * match_mnt_path_str - handle path matching for mount + * @profile: the confining profile + * @mntpath: for the mntpnt (NOT NULL) + * @buffer: buffer to be used to lookup mntpath + * @devnme: string for the devname/src_name (MAY BE NULL OR ERRPTR) + * @type: string for the dev type (MAYBE NULL) + * @flags: mount flags to match + * @data: fs mount data (MAYBE NULL) + * @binary: whether @data is binary + * @devinfo: error str if (IS_ERR(@devname)) + * + * Returns: 0 on success else error + */ +static int match_mnt_path_str(struct aa_profile *profile, + const struct path *mntpath, char *buffer, + const char *devname, const char *type, + unsigned long flags, void *data, bool binary, + const char *devinfo) +{ + struct aa_perms perms = { }; + const char *mntpnt = NULL, *info = NULL; + int pos, error; + + AA_BUG(!profile); + AA_BUG(!mntpath); + AA_BUG(!buffer); + + error = aa_path_name(mntpath, path_flags(profile, mntpath), buffer, + &mntpnt, &info, profile->disconnected); + if (error) + goto audit; + if (IS_ERR(devname)) { + error = PTR_ERR(devname); + devname = NULL; + info = devinfo; + goto audit; + } + + error = -EACCES; + pos = do_match_mnt(profile->policy.dfa, + profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT], + mntpnt, devname, type, flags, data, binary, &perms); + if (pos) { + info = mnt_info_table[pos]; + goto audit; + } + error = 0; + +audit: + return audit_mount(profile, OP_MOUNT, mntpnt, devname, type, NULL, + flags, data, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms, info, error); +} + +/** + * match_mnt - handle path matching for mount + * @profile: the confining profile + * @mntpath: for the mntpnt (NOT NULL) + * @buffer: buffer to be used to lookup mntpath + * @devpath: path devname/src_name (MAYBE NULL) + * @devbuffer: buffer to be used to lookup devname/src_name + * @type: string for the dev type (MAYBE NULL) + * @flags: mount flags to match + * @data: fs mount data (MAYBE NULL) + * @binary: whether @data is binary + * + * Returns: 0 on success else error + */ +static int match_mnt(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path, + char *buffer, struct path *devpath, char *devbuffer, + const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data, + bool binary) +{ + const char *devname = NULL, *info = NULL; + int error = -EACCES; + + AA_BUG(!profile); + AA_BUG(devpath && !devbuffer); + + if (devpath) { + error = aa_path_name(devpath, path_flags(profile, devpath), + devbuffer, &devname, &info, + profile->disconnected); + if (error) + devname = ERR_PTR(error); + } + + return match_mnt_path_str(profile, path, buffer, devname, type, flags, + data, binary, info); +} + +int aa_remount(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path, + unsigned long flags, void *data) +{ + struct aa_profile *profile; + char *buffer = NULL; + bool binary; + int error; + + AA_BUG(!label); + AA_BUG(!path); + + binary = path->dentry->d_sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA; + + get_buffers(buffer); + error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile, + match_mnt(profile, path, buffer, NULL, NULL, NULL, + flags, data, binary)); + put_buffers(buffer); + + return error; +} + +int aa_bind_mount(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path, + const char *dev_name, unsigned long flags) +{ + struct aa_profile *profile; + char *buffer = NULL, *old_buffer = NULL; + struct path old_path; + int error; + + AA_BUG(!label); + AA_BUG(!path); + + if (!dev_name || !*dev_name) + return -EINVAL; + + flags &= MS_REC | MS_BIND; + + error = kern_path(dev_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW|LOOKUP_AUTOMOUNT, &old_path); + if (error) + return error; + + get_buffers(buffer, old_buffer); + error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile, + match_mnt(profile, path, buffer, &old_path, old_buffer, + NULL, flags, NULL, false)); + put_buffers(buffer, old_buffer); + path_put(&old_path); + + return error; +} + +int aa_mount_change_type(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path, + unsigned long flags) +{ + struct aa_profile *profile; + char *buffer = NULL; + int error; + + AA_BUG(!label); + AA_BUG(!path); + + /* These are the flags allowed by do_change_type() */ + flags &= (MS_REC | MS_SILENT | MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE | + MS_UNBINDABLE); + + get_buffers(buffer); + error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile, + match_mnt(profile, path, buffer, NULL, NULL, NULL, + flags, NULL, false)); + put_buffers(buffer); + + return error; +} + +int aa_move_mount(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path, + const char *orig_name) +{ + struct aa_profile *profile; + char *buffer = NULL, *old_buffer = NULL; + struct path old_path; + int error; + + AA_BUG(!label); + AA_BUG(!path); + + if (!orig_name || !*orig_name) + return -EINVAL; + + error = kern_path(orig_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &old_path); + if (error) + return error; + + get_buffers(buffer, old_buffer); + error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile, + match_mnt(profile, path, buffer, &old_path, old_buffer, + NULL, MS_MOVE, NULL, false)); + put_buffers(buffer, old_buffer); + path_put(&old_path); + + return error; +} + +int aa_new_mount(struct aa_label *label, const char *dev_name, + const struct path *path, const char *type, unsigned long flags, + void *data) +{ + struct aa_profile *profile; + char *buffer = NULL, *dev_buffer = NULL; + bool binary = true; + int error; + int requires_dev = 0; + struct path tmp_path, *dev_path = NULL; + + AA_BUG(!label); + AA_BUG(!path); + + if (type) { + struct file_system_type *fstype; + + fstype = get_fs_type(type); + if (!fstype) + return -ENODEV; + binary = fstype->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA; + requires_dev = fstype->fs_flags & FS_REQUIRES_DEV; + put_filesystem(fstype); + + if (requires_dev) { + if (!dev_name || !*dev_name) + return -ENOENT; + + error = kern_path(dev_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &tmp_path); + if (error) + return error; + dev_path = &tmp_path; + } + } + + get_buffers(buffer, dev_buffer); + if (dev_path) { + error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile, + match_mnt(profile, path, buffer, dev_path, dev_buffer, + type, flags, data, binary)); + } else { + error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile, + match_mnt_path_str(profile, path, buffer, dev_name, + type, flags, data, binary, NULL)); + } + put_buffers(buffer, dev_buffer); + if (dev_path) + path_put(dev_path); + + return error; +} + +static int profile_umount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path, + char *buffer) +{ + struct aa_perms perms = { }; + const char *name = NULL, *info = NULL; + unsigned int state; + int error; + + AA_BUG(!profile); + AA_BUG(!path); + + error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), buffer, &name, + &info, profile->disconnected); + if (error) + goto audit; + + state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa, + profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT], + name); + perms = compute_mnt_perms(profile->policy.dfa, state); + if (AA_MAY_UMOUNT & ~perms.allow) + error = -EACCES; + +audit: + return audit_mount(profile, OP_UMOUNT, name, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, + AA_MAY_UMOUNT, &perms, info, error); +} + +int aa_umount(struct aa_label *label, struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) +{ + struct aa_profile *profile; + char *buffer = NULL; + int error; + struct path path = { .mnt = mnt, .dentry = mnt->mnt_root }; + + AA_BUG(!label); + AA_BUG(!mnt); + + get_buffers(buffer); + error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile, + profile_umount(profile, &path, buffer)); + put_buffers(buffer); + + return error; +} + +/* helper fn for transition on pivotroot + * + * Returns: label for transition or ERR_PTR. Does not return NULL + */ +static struct aa_label *build_pivotroot(struct aa_profile *profile, + const struct path *new_path, + char *new_buffer, + const struct path *old_path, + char *old_buffer) +{ + const char *old_name, *new_name = NULL, *info = NULL; + const char *trans_name = NULL; + struct aa_perms perms = { }; + unsigned int state; + int error; + + AA_BUG(!profile); + AA_BUG(!new_path); + AA_BUG(!old_path); + + if (profile_unconfined(profile)) + return aa_get_newest_label(&profile->label); + + error = aa_path_name(old_path, path_flags(profile, old_path), + old_buffer, &old_name, &info, + profile->disconnected); + if (error) + goto audit; + error = aa_path_name(new_path, path_flags(profile, new_path), + new_buffer, &new_name, &info, + profile->disconnected); + if (error) + goto audit; + + error = -EACCES; + state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa, + profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT], + new_name); + state = aa_dfa_null_transition(profile->policy.dfa, state); + state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa, state, old_name); + perms = compute_mnt_perms(profile->policy.dfa, state); + + if (AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT & perms.allow) + error = 0; + +audit: + error = audit_mount(profile, OP_PIVOTROOT, new_name, old_name, + NULL, trans_name, 0, NULL, AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT, + &perms, info, error); + if (error) + return ERR_PTR(error); + + return aa_get_newest_label(&profile->label); +} + +int aa_pivotroot(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *old_path, + const struct path *new_path) +{ + struct aa_profile *profile; + struct aa_label *target = NULL; + char *old_buffer = NULL, *new_buffer = NULL, *info = NULL; + int error; + + AA_BUG(!label); + AA_BUG(!old_path); + AA_BUG(!new_path); + + get_buffers(old_buffer, new_buffer); + target = fn_label_build(label, profile, GFP_ATOMIC, + build_pivotroot(profile, new_path, new_buffer, + old_path, old_buffer)); + if (!target) { + info = "label build failed"; + error = -ENOMEM; + goto fail; + } else if (!IS_ERR(target)) { + error = aa_replace_current_label(target); + if (error) { + /* TODO: audit target */ + aa_put_label(target); + goto out; + } + } else + /* already audited error */ + error = PTR_ERR(target); +out: + put_buffers(old_buffer, new_buffer); + + return error; + +fail: + /* TODO: add back in auditing of new_name and old_name */ + error = fn_for_each(label, profile, + audit_mount(profile, OP_PIVOTROOT, NULL /*new_name */, + NULL /* old_name */, + NULL, NULL, + 0, NULL, AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT, &nullperms, info, + error)); + goto out; +} diff --git a/security/apparmor/net.c b/security/apparmor/net.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..33d54435f8d6 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/apparmor/net.c @@ -0,0 +1,184 @@ +/* + * AppArmor security module + * + * This file contains AppArmor network mediation + * + * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE + * Copyright 2009-2017 Canonical Ltd. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the + * License. + */ + +#include "include/apparmor.h" +#include "include/audit.h" +#include "include/context.h" +#include "include/label.h" +#include "include/net.h" +#include "include/policy.h" + +#include "net_names.h" + + +struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_network[] = { + AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("af_mask", AA_SFS_AF_MASK), + { } +}; + +static const char * const net_mask_names[] = { + "unknown", + "send", + "receive", + "unknown", + + "create", + "shutdown", + "connect", + "unknown", + + "setattr", + "getattr", + "setcred", + "getcred", + + "chmod", + "chown", + "chgrp", + "lock", + + "mmap", + "mprot", + "unknown", + "unknown", + + "accept", + "bind", + "listen", + "unknown", + + "setopt", + "getopt", + "unknown", + "unknown", + + "unknown", + "unknown", + "unknown", + "unknown", +}; + + +/* audit callback for net specific fields */ +void audit_net_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) +{ + struct common_audit_data *sa = va; + + audit_log_format(ab, " family="); + if (address_family_names[sa->u.net->family]) + audit_log_string(ab, address_family_names[sa->u.net->family]); + else + audit_log_format(ab, "\"unknown(%d)\"", sa->u.net->family); + audit_log_format(ab, " sock_type="); + if (sock_type_names[aad(sa)->net.type]) + audit_log_string(ab, sock_type_names[aad(sa)->net.type]); + else + audit_log_format(ab, "\"unknown(%d)\"", aad(sa)->net.type); + audit_log_format(ab, " protocol=%d", aad(sa)->net.protocol); + + if (aad(sa)->request & NET_PERMS_MASK) { + audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask="); + aa_audit_perm_mask(ab, aad(sa)->request, NULL, 0, + net_mask_names, NET_PERMS_MASK); + + if (aad(sa)->denied & NET_PERMS_MASK) { + audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask="); + aa_audit_perm_mask(ab, aad(sa)->denied, NULL, 0, + net_mask_names, NET_PERMS_MASK); + } + } + if (aad(sa)->peer) { + audit_log_format(ab, " peer="); + aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer, + FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC); + } +} + + +/* Generic af perm */ +int aa_profile_af_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct common_audit_data *sa, + u32 request, u16 family, int type) +{ + struct aa_perms perms = { }; + + AA_BUG(family >= AF_MAX); + AA_BUG(type < 0 || type >= SOCK_MAX); + + if (profile_unconfined(profile)) + return 0; + + perms.allow = (profile->net.allow[family] & (1 << type)) ? + ALL_PERMS_MASK : 0; + perms.audit = (profile->net.audit[family] & (1 << type)) ? + ALL_PERMS_MASK : 0; + perms.quiet = (profile->net.quiet[family] & (1 << type)) ? + ALL_PERMS_MASK : 0; + aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms); + + return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_net_cb); +} + +int aa_af_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, u16 family, + int type, int protocol) +{ + struct aa_profile *profile; + DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(sa, op, NULL, family, type, protocol); + + return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile, + aa_profile_af_perm(profile, &sa, request, family, + type)); +} + +static int aa_label_sk_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, + struct sock *sk) +{ + struct aa_profile *profile; + DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(sa, op, sk); + + AA_BUG(!label); + AA_BUG(!sk); + + if (unconfined(label)) + return 0; + + return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile, + aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, &sa, request, sk)); +} + +int aa_sk_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct sock *sk) +{ + struct aa_label *label; + int error; + + AA_BUG(!sk); + AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); + + /* TODO: switch to begin_current_label ???? */ + label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); + error = aa_label_sk_perm(label, op, request, sk); + end_current_label_crit_section(label); + + return error; +} + + +int aa_sock_file_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, + struct socket *sock) +{ + AA_BUG(!label); + AA_BUG(!sock); + AA_BUG(!sock->sk); + + return aa_label_sk_perm(label, op, request, sock->sk); +} diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c index 244ea4a4a8f0..4243b0c3f0e4 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/policy.c +++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c @@ -289,85 +289,6 @@ fail: return NULL; } -/** - * aa_new_null_profile - create or find a null-X learning profile - * @parent: profile that caused this profile to be created (NOT NULL) - * @hat: true if the null- learning profile is a hat - * @base: name to base the null profile off of - * @gfp: type of allocation - * - * Find/Create a null- complain mode profile used in learning mode. The - * name of the profile is unique and follows the format of parent//null-XXX. - * where XXX is based on the @name or if that fails or is not supplied - * a unique number - * - * null profiles are added to the profile list but the list does not - * hold a count on them so that they are automatically released when - * not in use. - * - * Returns: new refcounted profile else NULL on failure - */ -struct aa_profile *aa_new_null_profile(struct aa_profile *parent, bool hat, - const char *base, gfp_t gfp) -{ - struct aa_profile *profile; - char *name; - - AA_BUG(!parent); - - if (base) { - name = kmalloc(strlen(parent->base.hname) + 8 + strlen(base), - gfp); - if (name) { - sprintf(name, "%s//null-%s", parent->base.hname, base); - goto name; - } - /* fall through to try shorter uniq */ - } - - name = kmalloc(strlen(parent->base.hname) + 2 + 7 + 8, gfp); - if (!name) - return NULL; - sprintf(name, "%s//null-%x", parent->base.hname, - atomic_inc_return(&parent->ns->uniq_null)); - -name: - /* lookup to see if this is a dup creation */ - profile = aa_find_child(parent, basename(name)); - if (profile) - goto out; - - profile = aa_alloc_profile(name, NULL, gfp); - if (!profile) - goto fail; - - profile->mode = APPARMOR_COMPLAIN; - profile->label.flags |= FLAG_NULL; - if (hat) - profile->label.flags |= FLAG_HAT; - profile->path_flags = parent->path_flags; - - /* released on free_profile */ - rcu_assign_pointer(profile->parent, aa_get_profile(parent)); - profile->ns = aa_get_ns(parent->ns); - profile->file.dfa = aa_get_dfa(nulldfa); - profile->policy.dfa = aa_get_dfa(nulldfa); - - mutex_lock(&profile->ns->lock); - __add_profile(&parent->base.profiles, profile); - mutex_unlock(&profile->ns->lock); - - /* refcount released by caller */ -out: - kfree(name); - - return profile; - -fail: - aa_free_profile(profile); - return NULL; -} - /* TODO: profile accounting - setup in remove */ /** @@ -559,6 +480,93 @@ struct aa_profile *aa_fqlookupn_profile(struct aa_label *base, } /** + * aa_new_null_profile - create or find a null-X learning profile + * @parent: profile that caused this profile to be created (NOT NULL) + * @hat: true if the null- learning profile is a hat + * @base: name to base the null profile off of + * @gfp: type of allocation + * + * Find/Create a null- complain mode profile used in learning mode. The + * name of the profile is unique and follows the format of parent//null-XXX. + * where XXX is based on the @name or if that fails or is not supplied + * a unique number + * + * null profiles are added to the profile list but the list does not + * hold a count on them so that they are automatically released when + * not in use. + * + * Returns: new refcounted profile else NULL on failure + */ +struct aa_profile *aa_new_null_profile(struct aa_profile *parent, bool hat, + const char *base, gfp_t gfp) +{ + struct aa_profile *p, *profile; + const char *bname; + char *name; + + AA_BUG(!parent); + + if (base) { + name = kmalloc(strlen(parent->base.hname) + 8 + strlen(base), + gfp); + if (name) { + sprintf(name, "%s//null-%s", parent->base.hname, base); + goto name; + } + /* fall through to try shorter uniq */ + } + + name = kmalloc(strlen(parent->base.hname) + 2 + 7 + 8, gfp); + if (!name) + return NULL; + sprintf(name, "%s//null-%x", parent->base.hname, + atomic_inc_return(&parent->ns->uniq_null)); + +name: + /* lookup to see if this is a dup creation */ + bname = basename(name); + profile = aa_find_child(parent, bname); + if (profile) + goto out; + + profile = aa_alloc_profile(name, NULL, gfp); + if (!profile) + goto fail; + + profile->mode = APPARMOR_COMPLAIN; + profile->label.flags |= FLAG_NULL; + if (hat) + profile->label.flags |= FLAG_HAT; + profile->path_flags = parent->path_flags; + + /* released on free_profile */ + rcu_assign_pointer(profile->parent, aa_get_profile(parent)); + profile->ns = aa_get_ns(parent->ns); + profile->file.dfa = aa_get_dfa(nulldfa); + profile->policy.dfa = aa_get_dfa(nulldfa); + + mutex_lock(&profile->ns->lock); + p = __find_child(&parent->base.profiles, bname); + if (p) { + aa_free_profile(profile); + profile = aa_get_profile(p); + } else { + __add_profile(&parent->base.profiles, profile); + } + mutex_unlock(&profile->ns->lock); + + /* refcount released by caller */ +out: + kfree(name); + + return profile; + +fail: + aa_free_profile(profile); + return NULL; +} + +/** * replacement_allowed - test to see if replacement is allowed * @profile: profile to test if it can be replaced (MAYBE NULL) * @noreplace: true if replacement shouldn't be allowed but addition is okay diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c b/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c index 351d3bab3a3d..62a3589c62ab 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c +++ b/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c @@ -112,6 +112,8 @@ static struct aa_ns *alloc_ns(const char *prefix, const char *name) ns->unconfined->label.flags |= FLAG_IX_ON_NAME_ERROR | FLAG_IMMUTIBLE | FLAG_NS_COUNT | FLAG_UNCONFINED; ns->unconfined->mode = APPARMOR_UNCONFINED; + ns->unconfined->file.dfa = aa_get_dfa(nulldfa); + ns->unconfined->policy.dfa = aa_get_dfa(nulldfa); /* ns and ns->unconfined share ns->unconfined refcount */ ns->unconfined->ns = ns; diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c index c600f4dd1783..5a2aec358322 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c +++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c @@ -85,9 +85,9 @@ static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) audit_log_format(ab, " ns="); audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, aad(sa)->iface.ns); } - if (aad(sa)->iface.name) { + if (aad(sa)->name) { audit_log_format(ab, " name="); - audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, aad(sa)->iface.name); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, aad(sa)->name); } if (aad(sa)->iface.pos) audit_log_format(ab, " offset=%ld", aad(sa)->iface.pos); @@ -114,9 +114,9 @@ static int audit_iface(struct aa_profile *new, const char *ns_name, aad(&sa)->iface.pos = e->pos - e->start; aad(&sa)->iface.ns = ns_name; if (new) - aad(&sa)->iface.name = new->base.hname; + aad(&sa)->name = new->base.hname; else - aad(&sa)->iface.name = name; + aad(&sa)->name = name; aad(&sa)->info = info; aad(&sa)->error = error; @@ -275,6 +275,19 @@ fail: return 0; } +static bool unpack_u16(struct aa_ext *e, u16 *data, const char *name) +{ + if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_U16, name)) { + if (!inbounds(e, sizeof(u16))) + return 0; + if (data) + *data = le16_to_cpu(get_unaligned((__le16 *) e->pos)); + e->pos += sizeof(u16); + return 1; + } + return 0; +} + static bool unpack_u32(struct aa_ext *e, u32 *data, const char *name) { if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_U32, name)) { @@ -448,7 +461,7 @@ fail: */ static bool unpack_trans_table(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_profile *profile) { - void *pos = e->pos; + void *saved_pos = e->pos; /* exec table is optional */ if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "xtable")) { @@ -511,7 +524,7 @@ static bool unpack_trans_table(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_profile *profile) fail: aa_free_domain_entries(&profile->file.trans); - e->pos = pos; + e->pos = saved_pos; return 0; } @@ -583,7 +596,8 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name) { struct aa_profile *profile = NULL; const char *tmpname, *tmpns = NULL, *name = NULL; - size_t ns_len; + const char *info = "failed to unpack profile"; + size_t size = 0, ns_len; struct rhashtable_params params = { 0 }; char *key = NULL; struct aa_data *data; @@ -604,8 +618,10 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name) tmpname = aa_splitn_fqname(name, strlen(name), &tmpns, &ns_len); if (tmpns) { *ns_name = kstrndup(tmpns, ns_len, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!*ns_name) + if (!*ns_name) { + info = "out of memory"; goto fail; + } name = tmpname; } @@ -624,12 +640,15 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name) if (IS_ERR(profile->xmatch)) { error = PTR_ERR(profile->xmatch); profile->xmatch = NULL; + info = "bad xmatch"; goto fail; } /* xmatch_len is not optional if xmatch is set */ if (profile->xmatch) { - if (!unpack_u32(e, &tmp, NULL)) + if (!unpack_u32(e, &tmp, NULL)) { + info = "missing xmatch len"; goto fail; + } profile->xmatch_len = tmp; } @@ -637,8 +656,11 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name) (void) unpack_str(e, &profile->disconnected, "disconnected"); /* per profile debug flags (complain, audit) */ - if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "flags")) + if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "flags")) { + info = "profile missing flags"; goto fail; + } + info = "failed to unpack profile flags"; if (!unpack_u32(e, &tmp, NULL)) goto fail; if (tmp & PACKED_FLAG_HAT) @@ -667,6 +689,7 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name) /* set a default value if path_flags field is not present */ profile->path_flags = PATH_MEDIATE_DELETED; + info = "failed to unpack profile capabilities"; if (!unpack_u32(e, &(profile->caps.allow.cap[0]), NULL)) goto fail; if (!unpack_u32(e, &(profile->caps.audit.cap[0]), NULL)) @@ -676,6 +699,7 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name) if (!unpack_u32(e, &tmpcap.cap[0], NULL)) goto fail; + info = "failed to unpack upper profile capabilities"; if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "caps64")) { /* optional upper half of 64 bit caps */ if (!unpack_u32(e, &(profile->caps.allow.cap[1]), NULL)) @@ -690,6 +714,7 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name) goto fail; } + info = "failed to unpack extended profile capabilities"; if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "capsx")) { /* optional extended caps mediation mask */ if (!unpack_u32(e, &(profile->caps.extended.cap[0]), NULL)) @@ -700,11 +725,46 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name) goto fail; } - if (!unpack_rlimits(e, profile)) + if (!unpack_rlimits(e, profile)) { + info = "failed to unpack profile rlimits"; goto fail; + } + + size = unpack_array(e, "net_allowed_af"); + if (size) { + + for (i = 0; i < size; i++) { + /* discard extraneous rules that this kernel will + * never request + */ + if (i >= AF_MAX) { + u16 tmp; + + if (!unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL) || + !unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL) || + !unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL)) + goto fail; + continue; + } + if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.allow[i], NULL)) + goto fail; + if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.audit[i], NULL)) + goto fail; + if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.quiet[i], NULL)) + goto fail; + } + if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_ARRAYEND, NULL)) + goto fail; + } + if (VERSION_LT(e->version, v7)) { + /* pre v7 policy always allowed these */ + profile->net.allow[AF_UNIX] = 0xffff; + profile->net.allow[AF_NETLINK] = 0xffff; + } if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "policydb")) { /* generic policy dfa - optional and may be NULL */ + info = "failed to unpack policydb"; profile->policy.dfa = unpack_dfa(e); if (IS_ERR(profile->policy.dfa)) { error = PTR_ERR(profile->policy.dfa); @@ -734,6 +794,7 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name) if (IS_ERR(profile->file.dfa)) { error = PTR_ERR(profile->file.dfa); profile->file.dfa = NULL; + info = "failed to unpack profile file rules"; goto fail; } else if (profile->file.dfa) { if (!unpack_u32(e, &profile->file.start, "dfa_start")) @@ -746,10 +807,13 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name) } else profile->file.dfa = aa_get_dfa(nulldfa); - if (!unpack_trans_table(e, profile)) + if (!unpack_trans_table(e, profile)) { + info = "failed to unpack profile transition table"; goto fail; + } if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "data")) { + info = "out of memory"; profile->data = kzalloc(sizeof(*profile->data), GFP_KERNEL); if (!profile->data) goto fail; @@ -761,8 +825,10 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name) params.hashfn = strhash; params.obj_cmpfn = datacmp; - if (rhashtable_init(profile->data, ¶ms)) + if (rhashtable_init(profile->data, ¶ms)) { + info = "failed to init key, value hash table"; goto fail; + } while (unpack_strdup(e, &key, NULL)) { data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL); @@ -784,12 +850,16 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name) profile->data->p); } - if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL)) + if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL)) { + info = "failed to unpack end of key, value data table"; goto fail; + } } - if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL)) + if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL)) { + info = "failed to unpack end of profile"; goto fail; + } return profile; @@ -798,8 +868,7 @@ fail: name = NULL; else if (!name) name = "unknown"; - audit_iface(profile, NULL, name, "failed to unpack profile", e, - error); + audit_iface(profile, NULL, name, info, e, error); aa_free_profile(profile); return ERR_PTR(error); @@ -832,7 +901,7 @@ static int verify_header(struct aa_ext *e, int required, const char **ns) * if not specified use previous version * Mask off everything that is not kernel abi version */ - if (VERSION_LT(e->version, v5) && VERSION_GT(e->version, v7)) { + if (VERSION_LT(e->version, v5) || VERSION_GT(e->version, v7)) { audit_iface(NULL, NULL, NULL, "unsupported interface version", e, error); return error; |