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author | Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> | 2022-11-11 09:08:18 +0100 |
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committer | Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> | 2022-11-21 10:36:09 +0100 |
commit | 90e9b23a60d5b4c8317f58e01ed05d3bdf063440 (patch) | |
tree | b87f0bd1d2c0ab251fafcbc4aebd5e3c73799397 /mm/slub.c | |
parent | 76537db3b95cbf5d0189ce185c16db9f93017021 (diff) | |
parent | 946fa0dbf2d8923a587f7348adf16563d59f1b3d (diff) | |
download | linux-90e9b23a60d5b4c8317f58e01ed05d3bdf063440.tar.gz |
Merge branch 'slab/for-6.2/kmalloc_redzone' into slab/for-next
kmalloc() redzone improvements by Feng Tang
From cover letter [1]:
kmalloc's API family is critical for mm, and one of its nature is that
it will round up the request size to a fixed one (mostly power of 2).
When user requests memory for '2^n + 1' bytes, actually 2^(n+1) bytes
could be allocated, so there is an extra space than what is originally
requested.
This patchset tries to extend the redzone sanity check to the extra
kmalloced buffer than requested, to better detect un-legitimate access
to it. (depends on SLAB_STORE_USER & SLAB_RED_ZONE)
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20221021032405.1825078-1-feng.tang@intel.com/
Diffstat (limited to 'mm/slub.c')
-rw-r--r-- | mm/slub.c | 64 |
1 files changed, 54 insertions, 10 deletions
diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c index 0a14e7bc278c..a24b71041b26 100644 --- a/mm/slub.c +++ b/mm/slub.c @@ -829,6 +829,17 @@ static inline void set_orig_size(struct kmem_cache *s, if (!slub_debug_orig_size(s)) return; +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC + /* + * KASAN could save its free meta data in object's data area at + * offset 0, if the size is larger than 'orig_size', it will + * overlap the data redzone in [orig_size+1, object_size], and + * the check should be skipped. + */ + if (kasan_metadata_size(s, true) > orig_size) + orig_size = s->object_size; +#endif + p += get_info_end(s); p += sizeof(struct track) * 2; @@ -848,6 +859,11 @@ static inline unsigned int get_orig_size(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object) return *(unsigned int *)p; } +void skip_orig_size_check(struct kmem_cache *s, const void *object) +{ + set_orig_size(s, (void *)object, s->object_size); +} + static void slab_bug(struct kmem_cache *s, char *fmt, ...) { struct va_format vaf; @@ -910,7 +926,7 @@ static void print_trailer(struct kmem_cache *s, struct slab *slab, u8 *p) if (slub_debug_orig_size(s)) off += sizeof(unsigned int); - off += kasan_metadata_size(s); + off += kasan_metadata_size(s, false); if (off != size_from_object(s)) /* Beginning of the filler is the free pointer */ @@ -966,17 +982,28 @@ static __printf(3, 4) void slab_err(struct kmem_cache *s, struct slab *slab, static void init_object(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, u8 val) { u8 *p = kasan_reset_tag(object); + unsigned int poison_size = s->object_size; - if (s->flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE) + if (s->flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE) { memset(p - s->red_left_pad, val, s->red_left_pad); + if (slub_debug_orig_size(s) && val == SLUB_RED_ACTIVE) { + /* + * Redzone the extra allocated space by kmalloc than + * requested, and the poison size will be limited to + * the original request size accordingly. + */ + poison_size = get_orig_size(s, object); + } + } + if (s->flags & __OBJECT_POISON) { - memset(p, POISON_FREE, s->object_size - 1); - p[s->object_size - 1] = POISON_END; + memset(p, POISON_FREE, poison_size - 1); + p[poison_size - 1] = POISON_END; } if (s->flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE) - memset(p + s->object_size, val, s->inuse - s->object_size); + memset(p + poison_size, val, s->inuse - poison_size); } static void restore_bytes(struct kmem_cache *s, char *message, u8 data, @@ -1070,7 +1097,7 @@ static int check_pad_bytes(struct kmem_cache *s, struct slab *slab, u8 *p) off += sizeof(unsigned int); } - off += kasan_metadata_size(s); + off += kasan_metadata_size(s, false); if (size_from_object(s) == off) return 1; @@ -1120,6 +1147,7 @@ static int check_object(struct kmem_cache *s, struct slab *slab, { u8 *p = object; u8 *endobject = object + s->object_size; + unsigned int orig_size; if (s->flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE) { if (!check_bytes_and_report(s, slab, object, "Left Redzone", @@ -1129,6 +1157,17 @@ static int check_object(struct kmem_cache *s, struct slab *slab, if (!check_bytes_and_report(s, slab, object, "Right Redzone", endobject, val, s->inuse - s->object_size)) return 0; + + if (slub_debug_orig_size(s) && val == SLUB_RED_ACTIVE) { + orig_size = get_orig_size(s, object); + + if (s->object_size > orig_size && + !check_bytes_and_report(s, slab, object, + "kmalloc Redzone", p + orig_size, + val, s->object_size - orig_size)) { + return 0; + } + } } else { if ((s->flags & SLAB_POISON) && s->object_size < s->inuse) { check_bytes_and_report(s, slab, p, "Alignment padding", @@ -3387,7 +3426,11 @@ redo: init = slab_want_init_on_alloc(gfpflags, s); out: - slab_post_alloc_hook(s, objcg, gfpflags, 1, &object, init); + /* + * When init equals 'true', like for kzalloc() family, only + * @orig_size bytes might be zeroed instead of s->object_size + */ + slab_post_alloc_hook(s, objcg, gfpflags, 1, &object, init, orig_size); return object; } @@ -3844,11 +3887,11 @@ int kmem_cache_alloc_bulk(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t flags, size_t size, * Done outside of the IRQ disabled fastpath loop. */ slab_post_alloc_hook(s, objcg, flags, size, p, - slab_want_init_on_alloc(flags, s)); + slab_want_init_on_alloc(flags, s), s->object_size); return i; error: slub_put_cpu_ptr(s->cpu_slab); - slab_post_alloc_hook(s, objcg, flags, i, p, false); + slab_post_alloc_hook(s, objcg, flags, i, p, false, s->object_size); kmem_cache_free_bulk(s, i, p); return 0; } @@ -4195,7 +4238,8 @@ static int calculate_sizes(struct kmem_cache *s) */ s->inuse = size; - if ((flags & (SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU | SLAB_POISON)) || + if (slub_debug_orig_size(s) || + (flags & (SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU | SLAB_POISON)) || ((flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE) && s->object_size < sizeof(void *)) || s->ctor) { /* |