diff options
| author | Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> | 2020-04-01 21:04:23 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2020-04-02 09:35:26 -0700 |
| commit | 1ad53d9fa3f6168ebcf48a50e08b170432da2257 (patch) | |
| tree | 842e1c32b07b74c175f820c35a495c6de1ebc31d /mm/slub.c | |
| parent | bbd4e305e373a7885bec0dbc285e6dde1b941523 (diff) | |
| download | linux-1ad53d9fa3f6168ebcf48a50e08b170432da2257.tar.gz | |
slub: improve bit diffusion for freelist ptr obfuscation
Under CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED=y, the obfuscation was relatively weak
in that the ptr and ptr address were usually so close that the first XOR
would result in an almost entirely 0-byte value[1], leaving most of the
"secret" number ultimately being stored after the third XOR. A single
blind memory content exposure of the freelist was generally sufficient to
learn the secret.
Add a swab() call to mix bits a little more. This is a cheap way (1
cycle) to make attacks need more than a single exposure to learn the
secret (or to know _where_ the exposure is in memory).
kmalloc-32 freelist walk, before:
ptr ptr_addr stored value secret
ffff90c22e019020@ffff90c22e019000 is 86528eb656b3b5bd (86528eb656b3b59d)
ffff90c22e019040@ffff90c22e019020 is 86528eb656b3b5fd (86528eb656b3b59d)
ffff90c22e019060@ffff90c22e019040 is 86528eb656b3b5bd (86528eb656b3b59d)
ffff90c22e019080@ffff90c22e019060 is 86528eb656b3b57d (86528eb656b3b59d)
ffff90c22e0190a0@ffff90c22e019080 is 86528eb656b3b5bd (86528eb656b3b59d)
...
after:
ptr ptr_addr stored value secret
ffff9eed6e019020@ffff9eed6e019000 is 793d1135d52cda42 (86528eb656b3b59d)
ffff9eed6e019040@ffff9eed6e019020 is 593d1135d52cda22 (86528eb656b3b59d)
ffff9eed6e019060@ffff9eed6e019040 is 393d1135d52cda02 (86528eb656b3b59d)
ffff9eed6e019080@ffff9eed6e019060 is 193d1135d52cdae2 (86528eb656b3b59d)
ffff9eed6e0190a0@ffff9eed6e019080 is f93d1135d52cdac2 (86528eb656b3b59d)
[1] https://blog.infosectcbr.com.au/2020/03/weaknesses-in-linux-kernel-heap.html
Fixes: 2482ddec670f ("mm: add SLUB free list pointer obfuscation")
Reported-by: Silvio Cesare <silvio.cesare@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/202003051623.AF4F8CB@keescook
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'mm/slub.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | mm/slub.c | 2 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c index fc911c222b11..bc949e3428c9 100644 --- a/mm/slub.c +++ b/mm/slub.c @@ -259,7 +259,7 @@ static inline void *freelist_ptr(const struct kmem_cache *s, void *ptr, * freepointer to be restored incorrectly. */ return (void *)((unsigned long)ptr ^ s->random ^ - (unsigned long)kasan_reset_tag((void *)ptr_addr)); + swab((unsigned long)kasan_reset_tag((void *)ptr_addr))); #else return ptr; #endif |