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authorDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>2021-05-04 08:58:25 +0000
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2021-05-28 13:10:26 +0200
commit3173c7c807854a580c85f04193a6a25aeff3dd96 (patch)
tree2c305015be00b8732d3367a1b41a3384804919b1
parent2b3cc41d500a74bb48358faf40b4a4ec6f03e25e (diff)
downloadlinux-stable-3173c7c807854a580c85f04193a6a25aeff3dd96.tar.gz
bpf: No need to simulate speculative domain for immediates
commit a7036191277f9fa68d92f2071ddc38c09b1e5ee5 upstream. In 801c6058d14a ("bpf: Fix leakage of uninitialized bpf stack under speculation") we replaced masking logic with direct loads of immediates if the register is a known constant. Given in this case we do not apply any masking, there is also no reason for the operation to be truncated under the speculative domain. Therefore, there is also zero reason for the verifier to branch-off and simulate this case, it only needs to do it for unknown but bounded scalars. As a side-effect, this also enables few test cases that were previously rejected due to simulation under zero truncation. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
-rw-r--r--kernel/bpf/verifier.c6
1 files changed, 5 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index fe0aca9d1cf4..aefd94794796 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -4408,8 +4408,12 @@ do_sim:
/* If we're in commit phase, we're done here given we already
* pushed the truncated dst_reg into the speculative verification
* stack.
+ *
+ * Also, when register is a known constant, we rewrite register-based
+ * operation to immediate-based, and thus do not need masking (and as
+ * a consequence, do not need to simulate the zero-truncation either).
*/
- if (commit_window)
+ if (commit_window || off_is_imm)
return 0;
/* Simulate and find potential out-of-bounds access under