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authorTomas Mraz <tm@t8m.info>2008-01-04 17:46:45 +0000
committerTomas Mraz <tm@t8m.info>2008-01-04 17:46:45 +0000
commitc8c84e2bf94a4172ad104212e0cd739dbf12eb49 (patch)
tree5c1603c33f36e90308db8d0cb7cb21570774730d /modules/pam_unix/passverify.c
parentc6912ac61ece224b03cf81499cf6d76add564c8a (diff)
downloadlinux-pam-git-pam_unix_ref_branch.tar.gz
Relevant BUGIDs:pam_unix_ref_branch
Purpose of commit: new feature Commit summary: --------------- * modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am: Add unix_update helper. * modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_passwd.c: Move functions i64c(), crypt_md5_wrapper(), save_old_password(), _update_passwd() and _update_shadow() to passverify.c file. Rename _unix_run_shadow_binary() to _unix_run_update_binary(), which also verifies old password and does all writing. (_do_setpass, pam_sm_chauthtok): lckpwdf()->lock_pwdf(), the same for unlock. Call _unix_run_update_binary() appropriately. _update_passwd()->unix_update_passwd(), the same for shadow. * modules/pam_unix/passverify.c: Add new functions moved from pam_unix_passwd.c and unix_chkpwd.c. * modules/pam_unix/passverify.h: Likewise. * modules/pam_unix/unix_chkpwd.c: Remove SELinux checks. Move su_sighandler(), setup_signals(), getuidname() to passverify.c. (main): Remove 'shadow' option. Refactor out read_passwords() and call it. More strict checking how the binary is called. * modules/pam_unix/unix_update.c: New helper binary - non-setuid, called from SELinux confined apps only.
Diffstat (limited to 'modules/pam_unix/passverify.c')
-rw-r--r--modules/pam_unix/passverify.c687
1 files changed, 686 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/passverify.c b/modules/pam_unix/passverify.c
index 9a3d72e6..e379cf62 100644
--- a/modules/pam_unix/passverify.c
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/passverify.c
@@ -13,7 +13,12 @@
#include <shadow.h>
#include <syslog.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <errno.h>
#include <time.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
#include "md5.h"
#include "bigcrypt.h"
@@ -35,6 +40,10 @@
#include <security/pam_ext.h>
#endif
+#if defined(USE_LCKPWDF) && !defined(HAVE_LCKPWDF)
+# include "./lckpwdf.-c"
+#endif
+
int
verify_pwd_hash(const char *p, const char *hash, unsigned int nullok)
{
@@ -256,6 +265,588 @@ check_shadow_expiry(pam_handle_t *pamh, struct spwd *spent, int *daysleft)
}
+/* passwd/salt conversion macros */
+
+#define PW_TMPFILE "/etc/npasswd"
+#define SH_TMPFILE "/etc/nshadow"
+#define OPW_TMPFILE "/etc/security/nopasswd"
+
+/*
+ * i64c - convert an integer to a radix 64 character
+ */
+static int
+i64c(int i)
+{
+ if (i < 0)
+ return ('.');
+ else if (i > 63)
+ return ('z');
+ if (i == 0)
+ return ('.');
+ if (i == 1)
+ return ('/');
+ if (i >= 2 && i <= 11)
+ return ('0' - 2 + i);
+ if (i >= 12 && i <= 37)
+ return ('A' - 12 + i);
+ if (i >= 38 && i <= 63)
+ return ('a' - 38 + i);
+ return ('\0');
+}
+
+char *
+crypt_md5_wrapper(const char *pass_new)
+{
+ /*
+ * Code lifted from Marek Michalkiewicz's shadow suite. (CG)
+ * removed use of static variables (AGM)
+ */
+
+ struct timeval tv;
+ MD5_CTX ctx;
+ unsigned char result[16];
+ char *cp = (char *) result;
+ unsigned char tmp[16];
+ int i;
+ char *x = NULL;
+
+ GoodMD5Init(&ctx);
+ gettimeofday(&tv, (struct timezone *) 0);
+ GoodMD5Update(&ctx, (void *) &tv, sizeof tv);
+ i = getpid();
+ GoodMD5Update(&ctx, (void *) &i, sizeof i);
+ i = clock();
+ GoodMD5Update(&ctx, (void *) &i, sizeof i);
+ GoodMD5Update(&ctx, result, sizeof result);
+ GoodMD5Final(tmp, &ctx);
+ strcpy(cp, "$1$"); /* magic for the MD5 */
+ cp += strlen(cp);
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+ *cp++ = i64c(tmp[i] & 077);
+ *cp = '\0';
+
+ /* no longer need cleartext */
+ x = Goodcrypt_md5(pass_new, (const char *) result);
+
+ return x;
+}
+
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+int
+unix_selinux_confined(void)
+{
+ static int confined = -1;
+ int fd;
+ char tempfile[]="/etc/.pwdXXXXXX";
+
+ if (confined != -1)
+ return confined;
+
+ /* cannot be confined without SELinux enabled */
+ if (!SELINUX_ENABLED){
+ confined = 0;
+ return confined;
+ }
+
+ /* let's try opening shadow read only */
+ if ((fd=open("/etc/shadow", O_RDONLY)) != -1) {
+ close(fd);
+ confined = 0;
+ return confined;
+ }
+
+ if (errno == EACCES) {
+ confined = 1;
+ return confined;
+ }
+
+ /* shadow opening failed because of other reasons let's try
+ creating a file in /etc */
+ if ((fd=mkstemp(tempfile)) != -1) {
+ unlink(tempfile);
+ close(fd);
+ confined = 0;
+ return confined;
+ }
+
+ confined = 1;
+ return confined;
+}
+
+#else
+int
+unix_selinux_confined(void)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_LCKPWDF
+int
+lock_pwdf(void)
+{
+ int i;
+ int retval;
+
+#ifndef HELPER_COMPILE
+ if (unix_selinux_confined()) {
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+ }
+#endif
+ /* These values for the number of attempts and the sleep time
+ are, of course, completely arbitrary.
+ My reading of the PAM docs is that, once pam_chauthtok() has been
+ called with PAM_UPDATE_AUTHTOK, we are obliged to take any
+ reasonable steps to make sure the token is updated; so retrying
+ for 1/10 sec. isn't overdoing it. */
+ i=0;
+ while((retval = lckpwdf()) != 0 && i < 100) {
+ usleep(1000);
+ i++;
+ }
+ if(retval != 0) {
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_LOCK_BUSY;
+ }
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+void
+unlock_pwdf(void)
+{
+#ifndef HELPER_COMPILE
+ if (unix_selinux_confined()) {
+ return;
+ }
+#endif
+ ulckpwdf();
+}
+#else
+int
+lock_pwdf(void)
+{
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+void
+unlock_pwdf(void)
+{
+ return;
+}
+#endif
+
+int
+save_old_password(const char *forwho, const char *oldpass,
+ int howmany)
+{
+ static char buf[16384];
+ static char nbuf[16384];
+ char *s_luser, *s_uid, *s_npas, *s_pas, *pass;
+ int npas;
+ FILE *pwfile, *opwfile;
+ int err = 0;
+ int oldmask;
+ int found = 0;
+ struct passwd *pwd = NULL;
+ struct stat st;
+ security_context_t prev_context=NULL;
+
+ if (howmany < 0) {
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+ }
+
+ if (oldpass == NULL) {
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+ }
+
+ oldmask = umask(077);
+
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ if (SELINUX_ENABLED) {
+ security_context_t passwd_context=NULL;
+ if (getfilecon("/etc/passwd",&passwd_context)<0) {
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ };
+ if (getfscreatecon(&prev_context)<0) {
+ freecon(passwd_context);
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ }
+ if (setfscreatecon(passwd_context)) {
+ freecon(passwd_context);
+ freecon(prev_context);
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ }
+ freecon(passwd_context);
+ }
+#endif
+ pwfile = fopen(OPW_TMPFILE, "w");
+ umask(oldmask);
+ if (pwfile == NULL) {
+ err = 1;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ opwfile = fopen(OLD_PASSWORDS_FILE, "r");
+ if (opwfile == NULL) {
+ fclose(pwfile);
+ err = 1;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (fstat(fileno(opwfile), &st) == -1) {
+ fclose(opwfile);
+ fclose(pwfile);
+ err = 1;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (fchown(fileno(pwfile), st.st_uid, st.st_gid) == -1) {
+ fclose(opwfile);
+ fclose(pwfile);
+ err = 1;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if (fchmod(fileno(pwfile), st.st_mode) == -1) {
+ fclose(opwfile);
+ fclose(pwfile);
+ err = 1;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ while (fgets(buf, 16380, opwfile)) {
+ if (!strncmp(buf, forwho, strlen(forwho))) {
+ char *sptr = NULL;
+ found = 1;
+ if (howmany == 0)
+ continue;
+ buf[strlen(buf) - 1] = '\0';
+ s_luser = strtok_r(buf, ":", &sptr);
+ s_uid = strtok_r(NULL, ":", &sptr);
+ s_npas = strtok_r(NULL, ":", &sptr);
+ s_pas = strtok_r(NULL, ":", &sptr);
+ npas = strtol(s_npas, NULL, 10) + 1;
+ while (npas > howmany) {
+ s_pas = strpbrk(s_pas, ",");
+ if (s_pas != NULL)
+ s_pas++;
+ npas--;
+ }
+ pass = crypt_md5_wrapper(oldpass);
+ if (s_pas == NULL)
+ snprintf(nbuf, sizeof(nbuf), "%s:%s:%d:%s\n",
+ s_luser, s_uid, npas, pass);
+ else
+ snprintf(nbuf, sizeof(nbuf),"%s:%s:%d:%s,%s\n",
+ s_luser, s_uid, npas, s_pas, pass);
+ _pam_delete(pass);
+ if (fputs(nbuf, pwfile) < 0) {
+ err = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ } else if (fputs(buf, pwfile) < 0) {
+ err = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ fclose(opwfile);
+
+ if (!found) {
+ pwd = getpwnam(forwho);
+ if (pwd == NULL) {
+ err = 1;
+ } else {
+ pass = crypt_md5_wrapper(oldpass);
+ snprintf(nbuf, sizeof(nbuf), "%s:%lu:1:%s\n",
+ forwho, (unsigned long)pwd->pw_uid, pass);
+ _pam_delete(pass);
+ if (fputs(nbuf, pwfile) < 0) {
+ err = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (fclose(pwfile)) {
+ D(("error writing entries to old passwords file: %m"));
+ err = 1;
+ }
+
+done:
+ if (!err) {
+ if (rename(OPW_TMPFILE, OLD_PASSWORDS_FILE))
+ err = 1;
+ }
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ if (SELINUX_ENABLED) {
+ if (setfscreatecon(prev_context)) {
+ err = 1;
+ }
+ if (prev_context)
+ freecon(prev_context);
+ prev_context=NULL;
+ }
+#endif
+ if (!err) {
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+ } else {
+ unlink(OPW_TMPFILE);
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ }
+}
+
+#ifdef HELPER_COMPILE
+int
+unix_update_passwd(const char *forwho, const char *towhat)
+#else
+int
+unix_update_passwd(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *forwho, const char *towhat)
+#endif
+{
+ struct passwd *tmpent = NULL;
+ struct stat st;
+ FILE *pwfile, *opwfile;
+ int err = 1;
+ int oldmask;
+ security_context_t prev_context=NULL;
+
+ oldmask = umask(077);
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ if (SELINUX_ENABLED) {
+ security_context_t passwd_context=NULL;
+ if (getfilecon("/etc/passwd",&passwd_context)<0) {
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ };
+ if (getfscreatecon(&prev_context)<0) {
+ freecon(passwd_context);
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ }
+ if (setfscreatecon(passwd_context)) {
+ freecon(passwd_context);
+ freecon(prev_context);
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ }
+ freecon(passwd_context);
+ }
+#endif
+ pwfile = fopen(PW_TMPFILE, "w");
+ umask(oldmask);
+ if (pwfile == NULL) {
+ err = 1;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ opwfile = fopen("/etc/passwd", "r");
+ if (opwfile == NULL) {
+ fclose(pwfile);
+ err = 1;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (fstat(fileno(opwfile), &st) == -1) {
+ fclose(opwfile);
+ fclose(pwfile);
+ err = 1;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (fchown(fileno(pwfile), st.st_uid, st.st_gid) == -1) {
+ fclose(opwfile);
+ fclose(pwfile);
+ err = 1;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if (fchmod(fileno(pwfile), st.st_mode) == -1) {
+ fclose(opwfile);
+ fclose(pwfile);
+ err = 1;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ tmpent = fgetpwent(opwfile);
+ while (tmpent) {
+ if (!strcmp(tmpent->pw_name, forwho)) {
+ /* To shut gcc up */
+ union {
+ const char *const_charp;
+ char *charp;
+ } assigned_passwd;
+ assigned_passwd.const_charp = towhat;
+
+ tmpent->pw_passwd = assigned_passwd.charp;
+ err = 0;
+ }
+ if (putpwent(tmpent, pwfile)) {
+ D(("error writing entry to password file: %m"));
+ err = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ tmpent = fgetpwent(opwfile);
+ }
+ fclose(opwfile);
+
+ if (fclose(pwfile)) {
+ D(("error writing entries to password file: %m"));
+ err = 1;
+ }
+
+done:
+ if (!err) {
+ if (!rename(PW_TMPFILE, "/etc/passwd"))
+#ifdef HELPER_COMPILE
+ helper_log_err(
+#else
+ pam_syslog(pamh,
+#endif
+ LOG_NOTICE, "password changed for %s", forwho);
+ else
+ err = 1;
+ }
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ if (SELINUX_ENABLED) {
+ if (setfscreatecon(prev_context)) {
+ err = 1;
+ }
+ if (prev_context)
+ freecon(prev_context);
+ prev_context=NULL;
+ }
+#endif
+ if (!err) {
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+ } else {
+ unlink(PW_TMPFILE);
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ }
+}
+
+#ifdef HELPER_COMPILE
+int
+unix_update_shadow(const char *forwho, char *towhat)
+#else
+int
+unix_update_shadow(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *forwho, char *towhat)
+#endif
+{
+ struct spwd *spwdent = NULL, *stmpent = NULL;
+ struct stat st;
+ FILE *pwfile, *opwfile;
+ int err = 1;
+ int oldmask;
+ security_context_t prev_context=NULL;
+
+ spwdent = getspnam(forwho);
+ if (spwdent == NULL) {
+ return PAM_USER_UNKNOWN;
+ }
+ oldmask = umask(077);
+
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ if (SELINUX_ENABLED) {
+ security_context_t shadow_context=NULL;
+ if (getfilecon("/etc/shadow",&shadow_context)<0) {
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ };
+ if (getfscreatecon(&prev_context)<0) {
+ freecon(shadow_context);
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ }
+ if (setfscreatecon(shadow_context)) {
+ freecon(shadow_context);
+ freecon(prev_context);
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ }
+ freecon(shadow_context);
+ }
+#endif
+ pwfile = fopen(SH_TMPFILE, "w");
+ umask(oldmask);
+ if (pwfile == NULL) {
+ err = 1;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ opwfile = fopen("/etc/shadow", "r");
+ if (opwfile == NULL) {
+ fclose(pwfile);
+ err = 1;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (fstat(fileno(opwfile), &st) == -1) {
+ fclose(opwfile);
+ fclose(pwfile);
+ err = 1;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (fchown(fileno(pwfile), st.st_uid, st.st_gid) == -1) {
+ fclose(opwfile);
+ fclose(pwfile);
+ err = 1;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if (fchmod(fileno(pwfile), st.st_mode) == -1) {
+ fclose(opwfile);
+ fclose(pwfile);
+ err = 1;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ stmpent = fgetspent(opwfile);
+ while (stmpent) {
+
+ if (!strcmp(stmpent->sp_namp, forwho)) {
+ stmpent->sp_pwdp = towhat;
+ stmpent->sp_lstchg = time(NULL) / (60 * 60 * 24);
+ err = 0;
+ D(("Set password %s for %s", stmpent->sp_pwdp, forwho));
+ }
+
+ if (putspent(stmpent, pwfile)) {
+ D(("error writing entry to shadow file: %m"));
+ err = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ stmpent = fgetspent(opwfile);
+ }
+ fclose(opwfile);
+
+ if (fclose(pwfile)) {
+ D(("error writing entries to shadow file: %m"));
+ err = 1;
+ }
+
+ done:
+ if (!err) {
+ if (!rename(SH_TMPFILE, "/etc/shadow"))
+#ifdef HELPER_COMPILE
+ helper_log_err(
+#else
+ pam_syslog(pamh,
+#endif
+ LOG_NOTICE, "password changed for %s", forwho);
+ else
+ err = 1;
+ }
+
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ if (SELINUX_ENABLED) {
+ if (setfscreatecon(prev_context)) {
+ err = 1;
+ }
+ if (prev_context)
+ freecon(prev_context);
+ prev_context=NULL;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (!err) {
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+ } else {
+ unlink(SH_TMPFILE);
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ }
+}
+
#ifdef HELPER_COMPILE
int
@@ -296,13 +887,107 @@ helper_log_err(int err, const char *format, ...)
closelog();
}
+static void
+su_sighandler(int sig)
+{
+#ifndef SA_RESETHAND
+ /* emulate the behaviour of the SA_RESETHAND flag */
+ if ( sig == SIGILL || sig == SIGTRAP || sig == SIGBUS || sig = SIGSERV )
+ signal(sig, SIG_DFL);
+#endif
+ if (sig > 0) {
+ _exit(sig);
+ }
+}
+
+void
+setup_signals(void)
+{
+ struct sigaction action; /* posix signal structure */
+
+ /*
+ * Setup signal handlers
+ */
+ (void) memset((void *) &action, 0, sizeof(action));
+ action.sa_handler = su_sighandler;
+#ifdef SA_RESETHAND
+ action.sa_flags = SA_RESETHAND;
+#endif
+ (void) sigaction(SIGILL, &action, NULL);
+ (void) sigaction(SIGTRAP, &action, NULL);
+ (void) sigaction(SIGBUS, &action, NULL);
+ (void) sigaction(SIGSEGV, &action, NULL);
+ action.sa_handler = SIG_IGN;
+ action.sa_flags = 0;
+ (void) sigaction(SIGTERM, &action, NULL);
+ (void) sigaction(SIGHUP, &action, NULL);
+ (void) sigaction(SIGINT, &action, NULL);
+ (void) sigaction(SIGQUIT, &action, NULL);
+}
+
+char *
+getuidname(uid_t uid)
+{
+ struct passwd *pw;
+ static char username[256];
+
+ pw = getpwuid(uid);
+ if (pw == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ strncpy(username, pw->pw_name, sizeof(username));
+ username[sizeof(username) - 1] = '\0';
+
+ return username;
+}
+
+int
+read_passwords(int fd, int npass, char **passwords)
+{
+ int rbytes = 0;
+ int offset = 0;
+ int i = 0;
+ char *pptr;
+ while (npass > 0) {
+ rbytes = read(fd, passwords[i]+offset, MAXPASS-offset);
+
+ if (rbytes < 0) {
+ if (errno == EINTR) continue;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (rbytes == 0)
+ break;
+
+ while (npass > 0 && (pptr=memchr(passwords[i]+offset, '\0', rbytes))
+ != NULL) {
+ rbytes -= pptr - (passwords[i]+offset) + 1;
+ i++;
+ offset = 0;
+ npass--;
+ if (rbytes > 0) {
+ if (npass > 0)
+ memcpy(passwords[i], pptr+1, rbytes);
+ memset(pptr+1, '\0', rbytes);
+ }
+ }
+ offset += rbytes;
+ }
+
+ /* clear up */
+ if (offset > 0 && npass > 0) {
+ memset(passwords[i], '\0', offset);
+ }
+
+ return i;
+}
+
#endif
/* ****************************************************************** *
* Copyright (c) Jan Rêkorajski 1999.
* Copyright (c) Andrew G. Morgan 1996-8.
* Copyright (c) Alex O. Yuriev, 1996.
* Copyright (c) Cristian Gafton 1996.
- * Copyright (c) Red Hat, Inc. 2007.
+ * Copyright (c) Red Hat, Inc. 1996, 2007, 2008.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions