summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/contrib/credential/wincred/git-credential-wincred.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorTaylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>2023-05-01 11:54:06 -0400
committerJunio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>2023-05-01 09:27:02 -0700
commit0a3a972c163b2c5ed81a8e2c12fbf0c53eeb210c (patch)
tree924338f51518ebfc62c87a9af5c52602ccbc1b00 /contrib/credential/wincred/git-credential-wincred.c
parent64f1e658e935bea6c9afdc4fa8be1d3ad6740355 (diff)
downloadgit-0a3a972c163b2c5ed81a8e2c12fbf0c53eeb210c.tar.gz
contrib/credential: embiggen fixed-size buffer in wincred
As in previous commits, harden the wincred credential helper against the aforementioned protocol injection attack. Unlike the approached used for osxkeychain and libsecret, where a fixed-size buffer was replaced with `getline()`, we must take a different approach here. There is no `getline()` equivalent in Windows, and the function is not available to us with ordinary compiler settings. Instead, allocate a larger (still fixed-size) buffer in which to process each line. The value of 100 KiB is chosen to match the maximum-length header that curl will allow, CURL_MAX_HTTP_HEADER. To ensure that we are reading complete lines at a time, and that we aren't susceptible to a similar injection attack (albeit with more padding), ensure that each read terminates at a newline (i.e., that no line is more than 100 KiB long). Note that it isn't sufficient to turn the old loop into something like: while (len && strchr("\r\n", buf[len - 1])) { buf[--len] = 0; ends_in_newline = 1; } because if an attacker sends something like: [aaaaa.....]\r host=example.com\r\n the credential helper would fill its buffer after reading up through the first '\r', call fgets() again, and then see "host=example.com\r\n" on its line. Note that the original code was written in a way that would trim an arbitrary number of "\r" and "\n" from the end of the string. We should get only a single "\n" (since the point of `fgets()` is to return the buffer to us when it sees one), and likewise would not expect to see more than one associated "\r". The new code trims a single "\r\n", which matches the original intent. [1]: https://curl.se/libcurl/c/CURLOPT_HEADERFUNCTION.html Tested-by: Matthew John Cheetham <mjcheetham@outlook.com> Helped-by: Matthew John Cheetham <mjcheetham@outlook.com> Co-authored-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'contrib/credential/wincred/git-credential-wincred.c')
-rw-r--r--contrib/credential/wincred/git-credential-wincred.c21
1 files changed, 17 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/contrib/credential/wincred/git-credential-wincred.c b/contrib/credential/wincred/git-credential-wincred.c
index ead6e267c7..32ebef7f65 100644
--- a/contrib/credential/wincred/git-credential-wincred.c
+++ b/contrib/credential/wincred/git-credential-wincred.c
@@ -249,17 +249,28 @@ static WCHAR *utf8_to_utf16_dup(const char *str)
return wstr;
}
+#define KB (1024)
+
static void read_credential(void)
{
- char buf[1024];
+ size_t alloc = 100 * KB;
+ char *buf = calloc(alloc, sizeof(*buf));
- while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin)) {
+ while (fgets(buf, alloc, stdin)) {
char *v;
- int len = strlen(buf);
+ size_t len = strlen(buf);
+ int ends_in_newline = 0;
/* strip trailing CR / LF */
- while (len && strchr("\r\n", buf[len - 1]))
+ if (len && buf[len - 1] == '\n') {
+ buf[--len] = 0;
+ ends_in_newline = 1;
+ }
+ if (len && buf[len - 1] == '\r')
buf[--len] = 0;
+ if (!ends_in_newline)
+ die("bad input: %s", buf);
+
if (!*buf)
break;
@@ -284,6 +295,8 @@ static void read_credential(void)
* learn new lines, and the helpers are updated to match.
*/
}
+
+ free(buf);
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[])