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authorDaniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>2022-04-25 13:05:40 +0200
committerDaniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>2022-04-25 13:05:40 +0200
commit6e659993952aa5f90f48864be84a1bbb047fc258 (patch)
tree08dbb67fe7b4a615f640a001ae5850f834d90d18 /lib/http.c
parent8f2079154f80561ccffcaa954268798b658e66b6 (diff)
downloadcurl-6e659993952aa5f90f48864be84a1bbb047fc258.tar.gz
http: avoid auth/cookie on redirects same host diff port
CVE-2022-27776 Reported-by: Harry Sintonen Bug: https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2022-27776.html Closes #8749
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/http.c')
-rw-r--r--lib/http.c34
1 files changed, 22 insertions, 12 deletions
diff --git a/lib/http.c b/lib/http.c
index ce79fc4e3..f0476f3b9 100644
--- a/lib/http.c
+++ b/lib/http.c
@@ -775,6 +775,21 @@ output_auth_headers(struct Curl_easy *data,
return CURLE_OK;
}
+/*
+ * allow_auth_to_host() tells if autentication, cookies or other "sensitive
+ * data" can (still) be sent to this host.
+ */
+static bool allow_auth_to_host(struct Curl_easy *data)
+{
+ struct connectdata *conn = data->conn;
+ return (!data->state.this_is_a_follow ||
+ data->set.allow_auth_to_other_hosts ||
+ (data->state.first_host &&
+ strcasecompare(data->state.first_host, conn->host.name) &&
+ (data->state.first_remote_port == conn->remote_port) &&
+ (data->state.first_remote_protocol == conn->handler->protocol)));
+}
+
/**
* Curl_http_output_auth() setups the authentication headers for the
* host/proxy and the correct authentication
@@ -847,17 +862,14 @@ Curl_http_output_auth(struct Curl_easy *data,
with it */
authproxy->done = TRUE;
- /* To prevent the user+password to get sent to other than the original
- host due to a location-follow, we do some weirdo checks here */
- if(!data->state.this_is_a_follow ||
+ /* To prevent the user+password to get sent to other than the original host
+ due to a location-follow */
+ if(allow_auth_to_host(data)
#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_NETRC
- conn->bits.netrc ||
+ || conn->bits.netrc
#endif
- !data->state.first_host ||
- data->set.allow_auth_to_other_hosts ||
- strcasecompare(data->state.first_host, conn->host.name)) {
+ )
result = output_auth_headers(data, conn, authhost, request, path, FALSE);
- }
else
authhost->done = TRUE;
@@ -1905,10 +1917,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_add_custom_headers(struct Curl_easy *data,
checkprefix("Cookie:", compare)) &&
/* be careful of sending this potentially sensitive header to
other hosts */
- (data->state.this_is_a_follow &&
- data->state.first_host &&
- !data->set.allow_auth_to_other_hosts &&
- !strcasecompare(data->state.first_host, conn->host.name)))
+ !allow_auth_to_host(data))
;
else {
#ifdef USE_HYPER
@@ -2084,6 +2093,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_http_host(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn)
return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
data->state.first_remote_port = conn->remote_port;
+ data->state.first_remote_protocol = conn->handler->protocol;
}
Curl_safefree(data->state.aptr.host);