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authorYang Tse <yangsita@gmail.com>2013-01-04 02:50:28 +0100
committerYang Tse <yangsita@gmail.com>2013-01-06 18:20:27 +0100
commit4a5aa6682daeea7cd7cbbb47ce3e1c310e9261c2 (patch)
tree2e85c371bf30d0a1b166b6e30cc54ebef327967b /lib/hostcheck.c
parente0ba958e2896a1b44f00f00de4981400a47db614 (diff)
downloadcurl-4a5aa6682daeea7cd7cbbb47ce3e1c310e9261c2.tar.gz
Revert changes relative to lib/*.[ch] recent renaming
This reverts renaming and usage of lib/*.h header files done 28-12-2012, reverting 2 commits: f871de0... build: make use of 76 lib/*.h renamed files ffd8e12... build: rename 76 lib/*.h files This also reverts removal of redundant include guard (redundant thanks to changes in above commits) done 2-12-2013, reverting 1 commit: c087374... curl_setup.h: remove redundant include guard This also reverts renaming and usage of lib/*.c source files done 3-12-2013, reverting 3 commits: 13606bb... build: make use of 93 lib/*.c renamed files 5b6e792... build: rename 93 lib/*.c files 7d83dff... build: commit 13606bbfde follow-up 1 Start of related discussion thread: http://curl.haxx.se/mail/lib-2013-01/0012.html Asking for confirmation on pushing this revertion commit: http://curl.haxx.se/mail/lib-2013-01/0048.html Confirmation summary: http://curl.haxx.se/mail/lib-2013-01/0079.html NOTICE: The list of 2 files that have been modified by other intermixed commits, while renamed, and also by at least one of the 6 commits this one reverts follows below. These 2 files will exhibit a hole in history unless git's '--follow' option is used when viewing logs. lib/curl_imap.h lib/curl_smtp.h
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/hostcheck.c')
-rw-r--r--lib/hostcheck.c96
1 files changed, 96 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/lib/hostcheck.c b/lib/hostcheck.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8affce044
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/hostcheck.c
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+/***************************************************************************
+ * _ _ ____ _
+ * Project ___| | | | _ \| |
+ * / __| | | | |_) | |
+ * | (__| |_| | _ <| |___
+ * \___|\___/|_| \_\_____|
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2012, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al.
+ *
+ * This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which
+ * you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms
+ * are also available at http://curl.haxx.se/docs/copyright.html.
+ *
+ * You may opt to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute and/or sell
+ * copies of the Software, and permit persons to whom the Software is
+ * furnished to do so, under the terms of the COPYING file.
+ *
+ * This software is distributed on an "AS IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY
+ * KIND, either express or implied.
+ *
+ ***************************************************************************/
+
+#include "setup.h"
+
+#if defined(USE_SSLEAY) || defined(USE_AXTLS)
+/* these two backends use functions from this file */
+
+#include "hostcheck.h"
+#include "rawstr.h"
+
+/*
+ * Match a hostname against a wildcard pattern.
+ * E.g.
+ * "foo.host.com" matches "*.host.com".
+ *
+ * We use the matching rule described in RFC6125, section 6.4.3.
+ * http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6125#section-6.4.3
+ */
+
+static int hostmatch(const char *hostname, const char *pattern)
+{
+ const char *pattern_label_end, *pattern_wildcard, *hostname_label_end;
+ int wildcard_enabled;
+ size_t prefixlen, suffixlen;
+ pattern_wildcard = strchr(pattern, '*');
+ if(pattern_wildcard == NULL)
+ return Curl_raw_equal(pattern, hostname) ?
+ CURL_HOST_MATCH : CURL_HOST_NOMATCH;
+
+ /* We require at least 2 dots in pattern to avoid too wide wildcard
+ match. */
+ wildcard_enabled = 1;
+ pattern_label_end = strchr(pattern, '.');
+ if(pattern_label_end == NULL || strchr(pattern_label_end+1, '.') == NULL ||
+ pattern_wildcard > pattern_label_end ||
+ Curl_raw_nequal(pattern, "xn--", 4)) {
+ wildcard_enabled = 0;
+ }
+ if(!wildcard_enabled)
+ return Curl_raw_equal(pattern, hostname) ?
+ CURL_HOST_MATCH : CURL_HOST_NOMATCH;
+
+ hostname_label_end = strchr(hostname, '.');
+ if(hostname_label_end == NULL ||
+ !Curl_raw_equal(pattern_label_end, hostname_label_end))
+ return CURL_HOST_NOMATCH;
+
+ /* The wildcard must match at least one character, so the left-most
+ label of the hostname is at least as large as the left-most label
+ of the pattern. */
+ if(hostname_label_end - hostname < pattern_label_end - pattern)
+ return CURL_HOST_NOMATCH;
+
+ prefixlen = pattern_wildcard - pattern;
+ suffixlen = pattern_label_end - (pattern_wildcard+1);
+ return Curl_raw_nequal(pattern, hostname, prefixlen) &&
+ Curl_raw_nequal(pattern_wildcard+1, hostname_label_end - suffixlen,
+ suffixlen) ?
+ CURL_HOST_MATCH : CURL_HOST_NOMATCH;
+}
+
+int Curl_cert_hostcheck(const char *match_pattern, const char *hostname)
+{
+ if(!match_pattern || !*match_pattern ||
+ !hostname || !*hostname) /* sanity check */
+ return 0;
+
+ if(Curl_raw_equal(hostname, match_pattern)) /* trivial case */
+ return 1;
+
+ if(hostmatch(hostname,match_pattern) == CURL_HOST_MATCH)
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#endif /* SSLEAY or AXTLS */