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authorDaniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>2021-12-14 10:00:34 +0100
committerDaniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>2021-12-14 10:00:34 +0100
commit0e87c373e13aebe4ce1f5970bb0166b34ed5c61e (patch)
tree3c91bae93f6f523ee957805f8f6df9dc7a0ac481
parentf03cc1b7a693b03eddfed2b4c7f8b5fcba9a22e5 (diff)
downloadcurl-bagder/mbedtls-ssl_cert_blob.tar.gz
mbedtls: fix CURLOPT_SSLCERT_BLOBbagder/mbedtls-ssl_cert_blob
The memory passed to mbedTLS for this needs to be null terminated. Reported-by: Florian Van Heghe
-rw-r--r--lib/vtls/mbedtls.c13
1 files changed, 10 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/lib/vtls/mbedtls.c b/lib/vtls/mbedtls.c
index 7f1ff198c..e4d9b802a 100644
--- a/lib/vtls/mbedtls.c
+++ b/lib/vtls/mbedtls.c
@@ -381,10 +381,17 @@ mbed_connect_step1(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn,
}
if(ssl_cert_blob) {
- const unsigned char *blob_data =
- (const unsigned char *)ssl_cert_blob->data;
- ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse(&backend->clicert, blob_data,
+ /* Unfortunately, mbedtls_x509_crt_parse() requires the data to be null
+ terminated even when provided the exact length, forcing us to waste
+ extra memory here. */
+ unsigned char *newblob = malloc(ssl_cert_blob->len + 1);
+ if(!newblob)
+ return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+ memcpy(newblob, ssl_cert_blob->data, ssl_cert_blob->len);
+ newblob[ssl_cert_blob->len] = 0; /* null terminate */
+ ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse(&backend->clicert, newblob,
ssl_cert_blob->len);
+ free(newblob);
if(ret) {
mbedtls_strerror(ret, errorbuf, sizeof(errorbuf));