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authorMouse <mouse008@gmail.com>2016-07-04 13:05:38 -0400
committerMouse <mouse008@gmail.com>2016-07-04 13:05:38 -0400
commit5bdabb7a681b047e2304c693a764cfb6c08a95d5 (patch)
tree8379c9abc1117b40153f659ae8f973e1e784f90f /fhmqv.h
parentbe80fcdbba204b58e96c41b624807460d9eb2d7e (diff)
downloadcryptopp-git-5bdabb7a681b047e2304c693a764cfb6c08a95d5.tar.gz
Add HMQV and merge untracked FHMQV
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+// fhmqv.h - written and placed in the public domain by Jeffrey Walton
+// Shamelessly based upon Wei Dai's MQV source files
+
+#ifndef CRYPTOPP_FHMQV_H
+#define CRYPTOPP_FHMQV_H
+
+/** \file
+*/
+
+#include "gfpcrypt.h"
+#include "algebra.h"
+#include "sha.h"
+
+NAMESPACE_BEGIN(CryptoPP)
+
+//! Fully Hashed Menezes-Qu-Vanstone in GF(p) with key validation,
+/*! <a href="http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/408">A Secure and Efficient Authenticated Diffie–Hellman Protocol</a>
+ Note: this is FHMQV, Protocol 5, from page 11; and not FHMQV-C.
+*/
+template <class GROUP_PARAMETERS, class COFACTOR_OPTION = CPP_TYPENAME GROUP_PARAMETERS::DefaultCofactorOption, class HASH = SHA512>
+class FHMQV_Domain: public AuthenticatedKeyAgreementDomain
+{
+public:
+ typedef GROUP_PARAMETERS GroupParameters;
+ typedef typename GroupParameters::Element Element;
+ typedef FHMQV_Domain<GROUP_PARAMETERS, COFACTOR_OPTION, HASH> Domain;
+
+ FHMQV_Domain(bool clientRole = true): m_role(clientRole ? RoleClient : RoleServer) {}
+
+ FHMQV_Domain(const GroupParameters &params, bool clientRole = true)
+ : m_role(clientRole ? RoleClient : RoleServer), m_groupParameters(params) {}
+
+ FHMQV_Domain(BufferedTransformation &bt, bool clientRole = true)
+ : m_role(clientRole ? RoleClient : RoleServer)
+ {m_groupParameters.BERDecode(bt);}
+
+ template <class T1>
+ FHMQV_Domain(T1 v1, bool clientRole = true)
+ : m_role(clientRole ? RoleClient : RoleServer)
+ {m_groupParameters.Initialize(v1);}
+
+ template <class T1, class T2>
+ FHMQV_Domain(T1 v1, T2 v2, bool clientRole = true)
+ : m_role(clientRole ? RoleClient : RoleServer)
+ {m_groupParameters.Initialize(v1, v2);}
+
+ template <class T1, class T2, class T3>
+ FHMQV_Domain(T1 v1, T2 v2, T3 v3, bool clientRole = true)
+ : m_role(clientRole ? RoleClient : RoleServer)
+ {m_groupParameters.Initialize(v1, v2, v3);}
+
+ template <class T1, class T2, class T3, class T4>
+ FHMQV_Domain(T1 v1, T2 v2, T3 v3, T4 v4, bool clientRole = true)
+ : m_role(clientRole ? RoleClient : RoleServer)
+ {m_groupParameters.Initialize(v1, v2, v3, v4);}
+
+protected:
+
+ inline void Hash(const Element* sigma,
+ const byte* e1, size_t e1len, const byte* e2, size_t e2len,
+ const byte* s1, size_t s1len, const byte* s2, size_t s2len,
+ byte* digest, size_t dlen) const
+ {
+ HASH hash;
+ size_t idx = 0, req = dlen;
+ size_t blk = std::min(dlen, (size_t)HASH::DIGESTSIZE);
+
+ if(sigma)
+ {
+ Integer x = GetAbstractGroupParameters().ConvertElementToInteger(*sigma);
+ SecByteBlock sbb(x.MinEncodedSize());
+ x.Encode(sbb.BytePtr(), sbb.SizeInBytes());
+ hash.Update(sbb.BytePtr(), sbb.SizeInBytes());
+ }
+
+ hash.Update(e1, e1len);
+ hash.Update(e2, e2len);
+ hash.Update(s1, s1len);
+ hash.Update(s2, s2len);
+
+ hash.TruncatedFinal(digest, blk);
+ req -= blk;
+
+ // All this to catch tail bytes for large curves and small hashes
+ while(req != 0)
+ {
+ hash.Update(&digest[idx], (size_t)HASH::DIGESTSIZE);
+
+ idx += (size_t)HASH::DIGESTSIZE;
+ blk = std::min(req, (size_t)HASH::DIGESTSIZE);
+ hash.TruncatedFinal(&digest[idx], blk);
+
+ req -= blk;
+ }
+ }
+
+public:
+
+ const GroupParameters & GetGroupParameters() const {return m_groupParameters;}
+ GroupParameters & AccessGroupParameters(){return m_groupParameters;}
+
+ CryptoParameters & AccessCryptoParameters(){return AccessAbstractGroupParameters();}
+
+ //! return length of agreed value produced
+ unsigned int AgreedValueLength() const {return GetAbstractGroupParameters().GetEncodedElementSize(false);}
+ //! return length of static private keys in this domain
+ unsigned int StaticPrivateKeyLength() const {return GetAbstractGroupParameters().GetSubgroupOrder().ByteCount();}
+ //! return length of static public keys in this domain
+ unsigned int StaticPublicKeyLength() const{return GetAbstractGroupParameters().GetEncodedElementSize(true);}
+
+ //! generate static private key
+ /*! \pre size of privateKey == PrivateStaticKeyLength() */
+ void GenerateStaticPrivateKey(RandomNumberGenerator &rng, byte *privateKey) const
+ {
+ Integer x(rng, Integer::One(), GetAbstractGroupParameters().GetMaxExponent());
+ x.Encode(privateKey, StaticPrivateKeyLength());
+ }
+
+ //! generate static public key
+ /*! \pre size of publicKey == PublicStaticKeyLength() */
+ void GenerateStaticPublicKey(RandomNumberGenerator &rng, const byte *privateKey, byte *publicKey) const
+ {
+ const DL_GroupParameters<Element> &params = GetAbstractGroupParameters();
+ Integer x(privateKey, StaticPrivateKeyLength());
+ Element y = params.ExponentiateBase(x);
+ params.EncodeElement(true, y, publicKey);
+ }
+
+ unsigned int EphemeralPrivateKeyLength() const {return StaticPrivateKeyLength() + StaticPublicKeyLength();}
+ unsigned int EphemeralPublicKeyLength() const{return StaticPublicKeyLength();}
+
+ //! return length of ephemeral private keys in this domain
+ void GenerateEphemeralPrivateKey(RandomNumberGenerator &rng, byte *privateKey) const
+ {
+ const DL_GroupParameters<Element> &params = GetAbstractGroupParameters();
+ Integer x(rng, Integer::One(), params.GetMaxExponent());
+ x.Encode(privateKey, StaticPrivateKeyLength());
+ Element y = params.ExponentiateBase(x);
+ params.EncodeElement(true, y, privateKey+StaticPrivateKeyLength());
+ }
+
+ //! return length of ephemeral public keys in this domain
+ void GenerateEphemeralPublicKey(RandomNumberGenerator &rng, const byte *privateKey, byte *publicKey) const
+ {
+ memcpy(publicKey, privateKey+StaticPrivateKeyLength(), EphemeralPublicKeyLength());
+ }
+
+ //! derive agreed value from your private keys and couterparty's public keys, return false in case of failure
+ /*! \note The ephemeral public key will always be validated.
+ If you have previously validated the static public key, use validateStaticOtherPublicKey=false to save time.
+ \pre size of agreedValue == AgreedValueLength()
+ \pre length of staticPrivateKey == StaticPrivateKeyLength()
+ \pre length of ephemeralPrivateKey == EphemeralPrivateKeyLength()
+ \pre length of staticOtherPublicKey == StaticPublicKeyLength()
+ \pre length of ephemeralOtherPublicKey == EphemeralPublicKeyLength()
+ */
+ bool Agree(byte *agreedValue,
+ const byte *staticPrivateKey, const byte *ephemeralPrivateKey,
+ const byte *staticOtherPublicKey, const byte *ephemeralOtherPublicKey,
+ bool validateStaticOtherPublicKey=true) const
+ {
+ byte *XX = NULL, *YY = NULL, *AA = NULL, *BB = NULL;
+ size_t xxs = 0, yys = 0, aas = 0, bbs = 0;
+
+ // Depending on the role, this will hold either A's or B's static
+ // (long term) public key. AA or BB will then point into tt.
+ SecByteBlock tt(StaticPublicKeyLength());
+
+ try
+ {
+ const DL_GroupParameters<Element> &params = GetAbstractGroupParameters();
+
+ if(m_role == RoleServer)
+ {
+ Integer b(staticPrivateKey, StaticPrivateKeyLength());
+ Element B = params.ExponentiateBase(b);
+ params.EncodeElement(true, B, tt);
+
+ XX = const_cast<byte*>(ephemeralOtherPublicKey);
+ xxs = EphemeralPublicKeyLength();
+ YY = const_cast<byte*>(ephemeralPrivateKey) + StaticPrivateKeyLength();
+ yys = EphemeralPublicKeyLength();
+ AA = const_cast<byte*>(staticOtherPublicKey);
+ aas = StaticPublicKeyLength();
+ BB = tt.BytePtr();
+ bbs = tt.SizeInBytes();
+ }
+ else if(m_role == RoleClient)
+ {
+ Integer a(staticPrivateKey, StaticPrivateKeyLength());
+ Element A = params.ExponentiateBase(a);
+ params.EncodeElement(true, A, tt);
+
+ XX = const_cast<byte*>(ephemeralPrivateKey) + StaticPrivateKeyLength();
+ xxs = EphemeralPublicKeyLength();
+ YY = const_cast<byte*>(ephemeralOtherPublicKey);
+ yys = EphemeralPublicKeyLength();
+ AA = tt.BytePtr();
+ aas = tt.SizeInBytes();
+ BB = const_cast<byte*>(staticOtherPublicKey);
+ bbs = StaticPublicKeyLength();
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ assert(0);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ // DecodeElement calls ValidateElement at level 1. Level 1 only calls
+ // VerifyPoint to ensure the element is in G*. If the other's PublicKey is
+ // requested to be validated, we manually call ValidateElement at level 3.
+ Element VV1 = params.DecodeElement(staticOtherPublicKey, false);
+ if(!params.ValidateElement(validateStaticOtherPublicKey ? 3 : 1, VV1, NULL))
+ return false;
+
+ // DecodeElement calls ValidateElement at level 1. Level 1 only calls
+ // VerifyPoint to ensure the element is in G*. Crank it up.
+ Element VV2 = params.DecodeElement(ephemeralOtherPublicKey, false);
+ if(!params.ValidateElement(3, VV2, NULL))
+ return false;
+
+ const Integer& p = params.GetGroupOrder();
+ const Integer& q = params.GetSubgroupOrder();
+ const unsigned int len /*bytes*/ = (((q.BitCount()+1)/2 +7)/8);
+
+ Integer d, e;
+ SecByteBlock dd(len), ee(len);
+
+ Hash(NULL, XX, xxs, YY, yys, AA, aas, BB, bbs, dd.BytePtr(), dd.SizeInBytes());
+ d.Decode(dd.BytePtr(), dd.SizeInBytes());
+
+ Hash(NULL, YY, yys, XX, xxs, AA, aas, BB, bbs, ee.BytePtr(), ee.SizeInBytes());
+ e.Decode(ee.BytePtr(), ee.SizeInBytes());
+
+ Element sigma;
+ if(m_role == RoleServer)
+ {
+ Integer y(ephemeralPrivateKey, StaticPrivateKeyLength());
+ Integer b(staticPrivateKey, StaticPrivateKeyLength());
+ Integer s_B = (y + e * b) % q;
+
+ Element A = params.DecodeElement(AA, false);
+ Element X = params.DecodeElement(XX, false);
+
+ Element t1 = params.ExponentiateElement(A, d);
+ Element t2 = m_groupParameters.MultiplyElements(X, t1);
+
+ sigma = params.ExponentiateElement(t2, s_B);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ Integer x(ephemeralPrivateKey, StaticPrivateKeyLength());
+ Integer a(staticPrivateKey, StaticPrivateKeyLength());
+ Integer s_A = (x + d * a) % q;
+
+ Element B = params.DecodeElement(BB, false);
+ Element Y = params.DecodeElement(YY, false);
+
+ Element t1 = params.ExponentiateElement(B, e);
+ Element t2 = m_groupParameters.MultiplyElements(Y, t1);
+
+ sigma = params.ExponentiateElement(t2, s_A);
+ }
+
+ Hash(&sigma, XX, xxs, YY, yys, AA, aas, BB, bbs, agreedValue, AgreedValueLength());
+ }
+ catch (DL_BadElement &)
+ {
+ return false;
+ }
+ return true;
+ }
+
+private:
+
+ // The paper uses Initiator and Recipient - make it classical.
+ enum KeyAgreementRole{ RoleServer = 1, RoleClient };
+
+ DL_GroupParameters<Element> & AccessAbstractGroupParameters() {return m_groupParameters;}
+ const DL_GroupParameters<Element> & GetAbstractGroupParameters() const{return m_groupParameters;}
+
+ KeyAgreementRole m_role;
+ GroupParameters m_groupParameters;
+};
+
+//! Fully Hashed Menezes-Qu-Vanstone in GF(p) with key validation,
+/*! <a href="http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/408">A Secure and Efficient Authenticated Diffie–Hellman Protocol</a>
+ Note: this is FHMQV, Protocol 5, from page 11; and not FHMQV-C.
+*/
+typedef FHMQV_Domain<DL_GroupParameters_GFP_DefaultSafePrime> FullyHashedMQV;
+
+NAMESPACE_END
+
+#endif