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Diffstat (limited to 'lib/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_coverage_fuchsia.cpp')
-rw-r--r-- | lib/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_coverage_fuchsia.cpp | 240 |
1 files changed, 240 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/lib/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_coverage_fuchsia.cpp b/lib/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_coverage_fuchsia.cpp new file mode 100644 index 000000000..5451d1e75 --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_coverage_fuchsia.cpp @@ -0,0 +1,240 @@ +//===-- sanitizer_coverage_fuchsia.cpp ------------------------------------===// +// +// Part of the LLVM Project, under the Apache License v2.0 with LLVM Exceptions. +// See https://llvm.org/LICENSE.txt for license information. +// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 WITH LLVM-exception +// +//===----------------------------------------------------------------------===// +// +// Sanitizer Coverage Controller for Trace PC Guard, Fuchsia-specific version. +// +// This Fuchsia-specific implementation uses the same basic scheme and the +// same simple '.sancov' file format as the generic implementation. The +// difference is that we just produce a single blob of output for the whole +// program, not a separate one per DSO. We do not sort the PC table and do +// not prune the zeros, so the resulting file is always as large as it +// would be to report 100% coverage. Implicit tracing information about +// the address ranges of DSOs allows offline tools to split the one big +// blob into separate files that the 'sancov' tool can understand. +// +// Unlike the traditional implementation that uses an atexit hook to write +// out data files at the end, the results on Fuchsia do not go into a file +// per se. The 'coverage_dir' option is ignored. Instead, they are stored +// directly into a shared memory object (a Zircon VMO). At exit, that VMO +// is handed over to a system service that's responsible for getting the +// data out to somewhere that it can be fed into the sancov tool (where and +// how is not our problem). + +#include "sanitizer_platform.h" +#if SANITIZER_FUCHSIA +#include "sanitizer_atomic.h" +#include "sanitizer_common.h" +#include "sanitizer_internal_defs.h" +#include "sanitizer_symbolizer_fuchsia.h" + +#include <zircon/process.h> +#include <zircon/sanitizer.h> +#include <zircon/syscalls.h> + +using namespace __sanitizer; // NOLINT + +namespace __sancov { +namespace { + +// TODO(mcgrathr): Move the constant into a header shared with other impls. +constexpr u64 Magic64 = 0xC0BFFFFFFFFFFF64ULL; +static_assert(SANITIZER_WORDSIZE == 64, "Fuchsia is always LP64"); + +constexpr const char kSancovSinkName[] = "sancov"; + +// Collects trace-pc guard coverage. +// This class relies on zero-initialization. +class TracePcGuardController final { + public: + // For each PC location being tracked, there is a u32 reserved in global + // data called the "guard". At startup, we assign each guard slot a + // unique index into the big results array. Later during runtime, the + // first call to TracePcGuard (below) will store the corresponding PC at + // that index in the array. (Each later call with the same guard slot is + // presumed to be from the same PC.) Then it clears the guard slot back + // to zero, which tells the compiler not to bother calling in again. At + // the end of the run, we have a big array where each element is either + // zero or is a tracked PC location that was hit in the trace. + + // This is called from global constructors. Each translation unit has a + // contiguous array of guard slots, and a constructor that calls here + // with the bounds of its array. Those constructors are allowed to call + // here more than once for the same array. Usually all of these + // constructors run in the initial thread, but it's possible that a + // dlopen call on a secondary thread will run constructors that get here. + void InitTracePcGuard(u32 *start, u32 *end) { + if (end > start && *start == 0 && common_flags()->coverage) { + // Complete the setup before filling in any guards with indices. + // This avoids the possibility of code called from Setup reentering + // TracePcGuard. + u32 idx = Setup(end - start); + for (u32 *p = start; p < end; ++p) { + *p = idx++; + } + } + } + + void TracePcGuard(u32 *guard, uptr pc) { + atomic_uint32_t *guard_ptr = reinterpret_cast<atomic_uint32_t *>(guard); + u32 idx = atomic_exchange(guard_ptr, 0, memory_order_relaxed); + if (idx > 0) array_[idx] = pc; + } + + void Dump() { + BlockingMutexLock locked(&setup_lock_); + if (array_) { + CHECK_NE(vmo_, ZX_HANDLE_INVALID); + + // Publish the VMO to the system, where it can be collected and + // analyzed after this process exits. This always consumes the VMO + // handle. Any failure is just logged and not indicated to us. + __sanitizer_publish_data(kSancovSinkName, vmo_); + vmo_ = ZX_HANDLE_INVALID; + + // This will route to __sanitizer_log_write, which will ensure that + // information about shared libraries is written out. This message + // uses the `dumpfile` symbolizer markup element to highlight the + // dump. See the explanation for this in: + // https://fuchsia.googlesource.com/zircon/+/master/docs/symbolizer_markup.md + Printf("SanitizerCoverage: " FORMAT_DUMPFILE " with up to %u PCs\n", + kSancovSinkName, vmo_name_, next_index_ - 1); + } + } + + private: + // We map in the largest possible view into the VMO: one word + // for every possible 32-bit index value. This avoids the need + // to change the mapping when increasing the size of the VMO. + // We can always spare the 32G of address space. + static constexpr size_t MappingSize = sizeof(uptr) << 32; + + BlockingMutex setup_lock_ = BlockingMutex(LINKER_INITIALIZED); + uptr *array_ = nullptr; + u32 next_index_ = 0; + zx_handle_t vmo_ = {}; + char vmo_name_[ZX_MAX_NAME_LEN] = {}; + + size_t DataSize() const { return next_index_ * sizeof(uintptr_t); } + + u32 Setup(u32 num_guards) { + BlockingMutexLock locked(&setup_lock_); + DCHECK(common_flags()->coverage); + + if (next_index_ == 0) { + CHECK_EQ(vmo_, ZX_HANDLE_INVALID); + CHECK_EQ(array_, nullptr); + + // The first sample goes at [1] to reserve [0] for the magic number. + next_index_ = 1 + num_guards; + + zx_status_t status = _zx_vmo_create(DataSize(), ZX_VMO_RESIZABLE, &vmo_); + CHECK_EQ(status, ZX_OK); + + // Give the VMO a name including our process KOID so it's easy to spot. + internal_snprintf(vmo_name_, sizeof(vmo_name_), "%s.%zu", kSancovSinkName, + internal_getpid()); + _zx_object_set_property(vmo_, ZX_PROP_NAME, vmo_name_, + internal_strlen(vmo_name_)); + + // Map the largest possible view we might need into the VMO. Later + // we might need to increase the VMO's size before we can use larger + // indices, but we'll never move the mapping address so we don't have + // any multi-thread synchronization issues with that. + uintptr_t mapping; + status = + _zx_vmar_map(_zx_vmar_root_self(), ZX_VM_PERM_READ | ZX_VM_PERM_WRITE, + 0, vmo_, 0, MappingSize, &mapping); + CHECK_EQ(status, ZX_OK); + + // Hereafter other threads are free to start storing into + // elements [1, next_index_) of the big array. + array_ = reinterpret_cast<uptr *>(mapping); + + // Store the magic number. + // Hereafter, the VMO serves as the contents of the '.sancov' file. + array_[0] = Magic64; + + return 1; + } else { + // The VMO is already mapped in, but it's not big enough to use the + // new indices. So increase the size to cover the new maximum index. + + CHECK_NE(vmo_, ZX_HANDLE_INVALID); + CHECK_NE(array_, nullptr); + + uint32_t first_index = next_index_; + next_index_ += num_guards; + + zx_status_t status = _zx_vmo_set_size(vmo_, DataSize()); + CHECK_EQ(status, ZX_OK); + + return first_index; + } + } +}; + +static TracePcGuardController pc_guard_controller; + +} // namespace +} // namespace __sancov + +namespace __sanitizer { +void InitializeCoverage(bool enabled, const char *dir) { + CHECK_EQ(enabled, common_flags()->coverage); + CHECK_EQ(dir, common_flags()->coverage_dir); + + static bool coverage_enabled = false; + if (!coverage_enabled) { + coverage_enabled = enabled; + Atexit(__sanitizer_cov_dump); + AddDieCallback(__sanitizer_cov_dump); + } +} +} // namespace __sanitizer + +extern "C" { +SANITIZER_INTERFACE_ATTRIBUTE void __sanitizer_dump_coverage( // NOLINT + const uptr *pcs, uptr len) { + UNIMPLEMENTED(); +} + +SANITIZER_INTERFACE_WEAK_DEF(void, __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc_guard, u32 *guard) { + if (!*guard) return; + __sancov::pc_guard_controller.TracePcGuard(guard, GET_CALLER_PC() - 1); +} + +SANITIZER_INTERFACE_WEAK_DEF(void, __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc_guard_init, + u32 *start, u32 *end) { + if (start == end || *start) return; + __sancov::pc_guard_controller.InitTracePcGuard(start, end); +} + +SANITIZER_INTERFACE_ATTRIBUTE void __sanitizer_dump_trace_pc_guard_coverage() { + __sancov::pc_guard_controller.Dump(); +} +SANITIZER_INTERFACE_ATTRIBUTE void __sanitizer_cov_dump() { + __sanitizer_dump_trace_pc_guard_coverage(); +} +// Default empty implementations (weak). Users should redefine them. +SANITIZER_INTERFACE_WEAK_DEF(void, __sanitizer_cov_trace_cmp, void) {} +SANITIZER_INTERFACE_WEAK_DEF(void, __sanitizer_cov_trace_cmp1, void) {} +SANITIZER_INTERFACE_WEAK_DEF(void, __sanitizer_cov_trace_cmp2, void) {} +SANITIZER_INTERFACE_WEAK_DEF(void, __sanitizer_cov_trace_cmp4, void) {} +SANITIZER_INTERFACE_WEAK_DEF(void, __sanitizer_cov_trace_cmp8, void) {} +SANITIZER_INTERFACE_WEAK_DEF(void, __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp1, void) {} +SANITIZER_INTERFACE_WEAK_DEF(void, __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp2, void) {} +SANITIZER_INTERFACE_WEAK_DEF(void, __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp4, void) {} +SANITIZER_INTERFACE_WEAK_DEF(void, __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp8, void) {} +SANITIZER_INTERFACE_WEAK_DEF(void, __sanitizer_cov_trace_switch, void) {} +SANITIZER_INTERFACE_WEAK_DEF(void, __sanitizer_cov_trace_div4, void) {} +SANITIZER_INTERFACE_WEAK_DEF(void, __sanitizer_cov_trace_div8, void) {} +SANITIZER_INTERFACE_WEAK_DEF(void, __sanitizer_cov_trace_gep, void) {} +SANITIZER_INTERFACE_WEAK_DEF(void, __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc_indir, void) {} +} // extern "C" + +#endif // !SANITIZER_FUCHSIA |