diff options
author | Ben Laurie <ben@apache.org> | 2003-11-05 11:59:54 +0000 |
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committer | Ben Laurie <ben@apache.org> | 2003-11-05 11:59:54 +0000 |
commit | fc9b2d6f154faa570a06dd33a7121be65b59cbd4 (patch) | |
tree | 3e868237e7a0d70ed76143a278aa5d4e8fa790f7 | |
parent | a1114cc18d8c7df9e4264412d7c4c63ceea0a473 (diff) | |
download | apr-fc9b2d6f154faa570a06dd33a7121be65b59cbd4.tar.gz |
Code style.
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/apr/apr/trunk@64725 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
-rw-r--r-- | include/apr_random.h | 5 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | random/unix/apr_random.c | 229 |
2 files changed, 114 insertions, 120 deletions
diff --git a/include/apr_random.h b/include/apr_random.h index 102d909a0..a6535798a 100644 --- a/include/apr_random.h +++ b/include/apr_random.h @@ -66,14 +66,13 @@ typedef void apr_crypto_hash_finish_t(apr_crypto_hash_t *hash, unsigned char *result); // FIXME: make this opaque -struct apr_crypto_hash_t - { +struct apr_crypto_hash_t { apr_crypto_hash_init_t *init; apr_crypto_hash_add_t *add; apr_crypto_hash_finish_t *finish; apr_size_t size; void *data; - }; +}; apr_crypto_hash_t *apr_crypto_sha256_new(apr_pool_t *p); diff --git a/random/unix/apr_random.c b/random/unix/apr_random.c index 06762804b..167514f7c 100644 --- a/random/unix/apr_random.c +++ b/random/unix/apr_random.c @@ -70,12 +70,11 @@ #define APR_RANDOM_DEFAULT_G_FOR_INSECURE 32 #define APR_RANDOM_DEFAULT_G_FOR_SECURE 320 -typedef struct apr_random_pool_t - { +typedef struct apr_random_pool_t { unsigned char *pool; int bytes; int pool_size; - } apr_random_pool_t; +} apr_random_pool_t; #define hash_init(h) (h)->init(h) #define hash_add(h,b,n) (h)->add(h,b,n) @@ -86,8 +85,7 @@ typedef struct apr_random_pool_t #define crypt_setkey(c,k) (c)->set_key((c)->data,k) #define crypt_crypt(c,out,in) (c)->crypt((c)->date,out,in) -struct apr_random_t - { +struct apr_random_t { apr_pool_t *apr_pool; apr_crypto_hash_t *pool_hash; unsigned int npools; @@ -116,222 +114,219 @@ struct apr_random_t unsigned char secure_started:1; apr_random_t *next; - }; +}; static apr_random_t *all_random; void apr_random_init(apr_random_t *g,apr_pool_t *p, apr_crypto_hash_t *pool_hash,apr_crypto_hash_t *key_hash, apr_crypto_hash_t *prng_hash) - { +{ int n; - g->apr_pool=p; - g->pool_hash=pool_hash; - g->key_hash=key_hash; - g->prng_hash=prng_hash; - g->npools=APR_RANDOM_DEFAULT_POOLS; - g->pools=apr_palloc(p,g->npools*sizeof *g->pools); - for(n=0 ; n < g->npools ; ++n) - { - g->pools[n].bytes=g->pools[n].pool_size=0; - g->pools[n].pool=NULL; - } - g->next_pool=0; - g->generation=0; - g->rehash_size=APR_RANDOM_DEFAULT_REHASH_SIZE; + g->apr_pool = p; + + g->pool_hash = pool_hash; + g->key_hash = key_hash; + g->prng_hash = prng_hash; + + g->npools = APR_RANDOM_DEFAULT_POOLS; + g->pools = apr_palloc(p,g->npools*sizeof *g->pools); + for (n = 0; n < g->npools; ++n) { + g->pools[n].bytes = g->pools[n].pool_size = 0; + g->pools[n].pool = NULL; + } + g->next_pool = 0; + + g->generation = 0; + + g->rehash_size = APR_RANDOM_DEFAULT_REHASH_SIZE; /* Ensure that the rehash size is twice the size of the pool hasher */ - g->rehash_size=((g->rehash_size+2*g->pool_hash->size-1)/g->pool_hash->size + g->rehash_size = ((g->rehash_size+2*g->pool_hash->size-1)/g->pool_hash->size /2)*g->pool_hash->size*2; - g->reseed_size=APR_RANDOM_DEFAULT_RESEED_SIZE; - g->prng_hash=prng_hash; - g->H=apr_palloc(p,H_size(g)); - g->H_waiting=apr_palloc(p,H_size(g)); - g->randomness=apr_palloc(p,B_size(g)); - g->random_bytes=0; - - g->g_for_insecure=APR_RANDOM_DEFAULT_G_FOR_INSECURE; - g->secure_base=0; - g->g_for_secure=APR_RANDOM_DEFAULT_G_FOR_SECURE; - g->secure_started=g->insecure_started=0; - - g->next=all_random; - all_random=g; - } + g->reseed_size = APR_RANDOM_DEFAULT_RESEED_SIZE; + + g->H = apr_palloc(p,H_size(g)); + g->H_waiting = apr_palloc(p,H_size(g)); + + g->randomness = apr_palloc(p,B_size(g)); + g->random_bytes = 0; + + g->g_for_insecure = APR_RANDOM_DEFAULT_G_FOR_INSECURE; + g->secure_base = 0; + g->g_for_secure = APR_RANDOM_DEFAULT_G_FOR_SECURE; + g->secure_started = g->insecure_started = 0; + + g->next = all_random; + all_random = g; +} static void mix_pid(apr_random_t *g,unsigned char *H,pid_t pid) - { +{ hash_init(g->key_hash); hash_add(g->key_hash,H,H_size(g)); hash_add(g->key_hash,&pid,sizeof pid); hash_finish(g->key_hash,H); - } +} static void mixer(apr_random_t *g,pid_t pid) - { - unsigned char *H=H_current(g); +{ + unsigned char *H = H_current(g); /* mix the PID into the current H */ mix_pid(g,H,pid); /* if we are in waiting, then also mix into main H */ - if(H != g->H) + if (H != g->H) mix_pid(g,g->H,pid); /* change order of pool mixing for good measure - note that going backwards is much better than going forwards */ --g->generation; /* blow away any lingering randomness */ - g->random_bytes=0; - } + g->random_bytes = 0; +} void apr_random_after_fork(apr_proc_t *proc) - { +{ apr_random_t *r; - for(r=all_random ; r ; r=r->next) + for (r = all_random; r; r = r->next) mixer(r,proc->pid); - } +} apr_random_t *apr_random_standard_new(apr_pool_t *p) - { - apr_random_t *r=apr_palloc(p,sizeof *r); +{ + apr_random_t *r = apr_palloc(p,sizeof *r); apr_random_init(r,p,apr_crypto_sha256_new(p),apr_crypto_sha256_new(p), apr_crypto_sha256_new(p)); return r; - } +} static void rekey(apr_random_t *g) - { +{ int n; - unsigned char *H=H_current(g); + unsigned char *H = H_current(g); hash_init(g->key_hash); hash_add(g->key_hash,H,H_size(g)); - for(n=0 ; n < g->npools && (n == 0 || g->generation&(1 << (n-1))) - ; ++n) - { + for (n = 0 ; n < g->npools && (n == 0 || g->generation&(1 << (n-1))) + ; ++n) { hash_add(g->key_hash,g->pools[n].pool,g->pools[n].bytes); - g->pools[n].bytes=0; - } + g->pools[n].bytes = 0; + } hash_finish(g->key_hash,H+B_size(g)); + ++g->generation; - if(!g->insecure_started && g->generation > g->g_for_insecure) - { - g->insecure_started=1; - if(!g->secure_started) - { + if (!g->insecure_started && g->generation > g->g_for_insecure) { + g->insecure_started = 1; + if (!g->secure_started) { memcpy(g->H_waiting,g->H,H_size(g)); - g->secure_base=g->generation; - } + g->secure_base = g->generation; } - if(!g->secure_started && g->generation > g->secure_base+g->g_for_secure) - { - g->secure_started=1; + } + + if (!g->secure_started && g->generation > g->secure_base+g->g_for_secure) { + g->secure_started = 1; memcpy(g->H,g->H_waiting,H_size(g)); - } } +} void apr_random_add_entropy(apr_random_t *g,const void *entropy_, apr_size_t bytes) - { +{ int n; - const unsigned char *entropy=entropy_; + const unsigned char *entropy = entropy_; - for(n=0 ; n < bytes ; ++n) - { - apr_random_pool_t *p=&g->pools[g->next_pool]; + for (n = 0; n < bytes; ++n) { + apr_random_pool_t *p = &g->pools[g->next_pool]; - if(++g->next_pool == g->npools) - g->next_pool=0; + if (++g->next_pool == g->npools) + g->next_pool = 0; - if(p->pool_size < p->bytes+1) - { - unsigned char *np=apr_palloc(g->apr_pool,(p->bytes+1)*2); + if (p->pool_size < p->bytes+1) { + unsigned char *np = apr_palloc(g->apr_pool,(p->bytes+1)*2); memcpy(np,p->pool,p->bytes); - p->pool=np; - p->pool_size=(p->bytes+1)*2; - } - p->pool[p->bytes++]=entropy[n]; + p->pool = np; + p->pool_size = (p->bytes+1)*2; + } + p->pool[p->bytes++] = entropy[n]; - if(p->bytes == g->rehash_size) - { + if (p->bytes == g->rehash_size) { int r; - for(r=0 ; r < p->bytes/2 ; r+=g->pool_hash->size) + for (r = 0; r < p->bytes/2; r+=g->pool_hash->size) hash(g->pool_hash,p->pool+r,p->pool+r*2,g->pool_hash->size*2); p->bytes/=2; - } - assert(p->bytes < g->rehash_size); } + assert(p->bytes < g->rehash_size); + } - if(g->pools[0].bytes >= g->reseed_size) + if (g->pools[0].bytes >= g->reseed_size) rekey(g); - } +} // This will give g->B_size bytes of randomness static void apr_random_block(apr_random_t *g,unsigned char *random) - { - // FIXME: in principle, these are different hashes +{ + /* FIXME: in principle, these are different hashes */ hash(g->prng_hash,g->H,g->H,H_size(g)); hash(g->prng_hash,random,g->H,B_size(g)); - } +} static void apr_random_bytes(apr_random_t *g,unsigned char *random, apr_size_t bytes) - { +{ apr_size_t n; - for(n=0 ; n < bytes ; ) - { + for (n = 0; n < bytes; ) { int l; - if(g->random_bytes == 0) - { + if (g->random_bytes == 0) { apr_random_block(g,g->randomness); - g->random_bytes=B_size(g); - } - l=min(bytes-n,g->random_bytes); + g->random_bytes = B_size(g); + } + l = min(bytes-n,g->random_bytes); memcpy(&random[n],g->randomness+B_size(g)-g->random_bytes,l); g->random_bytes-=l; n+=l; - } } +} apr_status_t apr_random_secure_bytes(apr_random_t *g,void *random, apr_size_t bytes) - { - if(!g->secure_started) +{ + if (!g->secure_started) return APR_ENOTENOUGHENTROPY; apr_random_bytes(g,random,bytes); return APR_SUCCESS; - } +} apr_status_t apr_random_insecure_bytes(apr_random_t *g,void *random, apr_size_t bytes) - { - if(!g->insecure_started) +{ + if (!g->insecure_started) return APR_ENOTENOUGHENTROPY; apr_random_bytes(g,random,bytes); return APR_SUCCESS; - } +} void apr_random_barrier(apr_random_t *g) - { - g->secure_started=0; - g->secure_base=g->generation; - } +{ + g->secure_started = 0; + g->secure_base = g->generation; +} apr_status_t apr_random_secure_ready(apr_random_t *r) - { - if(!r->secure_started) +{ + if (!r->secure_started) return APR_ENOTENOUGHENTROPY; return APR_SUCCESS; - } +} apr_status_t apr_random_insecure_ready(apr_random_t *r) - { - if(!r->insecure_started) +{ + if (!r->insecure_started) return APR_ENOTENOUGHENTROPY; return APR_SUCCESS; - } +} |