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| author | Bram Moolenaar <Bram@vim.org> | 2017-02-26 18:17:10 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Bram Moolenaar <Bram@vim.org> | 2017-02-26 18:17:10 +0100 |
| commit | 0c8485f0e4931463c0f7986e1ea84a7d79f10c75 (patch) | |
| tree | a2150ee7dcde00d58ee21dfb653f45f09f5f9894 | |
| parent | 3eb1637b1bba19519885dd6d377bd5596e91d22c (diff) | |
| download | vim-git-0c8485f0e4931463c0f7986e1ea84a7d79f10c75.tar.gz | |
patch 8.0.0378: possible overflow when reading corrupted undo filev8.0.0378
Problem: Another possible overflow when reading corrupted undo file.
Solution: Check if allocated size is not too big. (King)
| -rw-r--r-- | src/undo.c | 7 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/version.c | 2 |
2 files changed, 5 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/src/undo.c b/src/undo.c index ba7c0b83c..5b953795e 100644 --- a/src/undo.c +++ b/src/undo.c @@ -1385,7 +1385,7 @@ unserialize_uep(bufinfo_T *bi, int *error, char_u *file_name) { int i; u_entry_T *uep; - char_u **array; + char_u **array = NULL; char_u *line; int line_len; @@ -1402,7 +1402,8 @@ unserialize_uep(bufinfo_T *bi, int *error, char_u *file_name) uep->ue_size = undo_read_4c(bi); if (uep->ue_size > 0) { - array = (char_u **)U_ALLOC_LINE(sizeof(char_u *) * uep->ue_size); + if (uep->ue_size < LONG_MAX / (int)sizeof(char_u *)) + array = (char_u **)U_ALLOC_LINE(sizeof(char_u *) * uep->ue_size); if (array == NULL) { *error = TRUE; @@ -1410,8 +1411,6 @@ unserialize_uep(bufinfo_T *bi, int *error, char_u *file_name) } vim_memset(array, 0, sizeof(char_u *) * uep->ue_size); } - else - array = NULL; uep->ue_array = array; for (i = 0; i < uep->ue_size; ++i) diff --git a/src/version.c b/src/version.c index c79020b21..026b82981 100644 --- a/src/version.c +++ b/src/version.c @@ -765,6 +765,8 @@ static char *(features[]) = static int included_patches[] = { /* Add new patch number below this line */ /**/ + 378, +/**/ 377, /**/ 376, |