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Describe exactly which bytes are hashed and in what order
when signing a configuration.
Signed-off-by: Martin Bonner <martingreybeard@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
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This patch adds the possibility to pass the PIN the OpenSSL Engine
used during signing via the environment variable MKIMAGE_SIGN_PIN.
This follows the approach used during kernel module
signing ("KBUILD_SIGN_PIN") or UBIFS image
signing ("MKIMAGE_SIGN_PIN").
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
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Fix value fields in signature nodes.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Perrot <thomas.perrot@bootlin.com>
Reviewed-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
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After lots of debating, this documents how we'd like mkimage to treat
'keydir' and 'keyfile' arguments. The rest is in the docs.
Signed-off-by: Alexandru Gagniuc <mr.nuke.me@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
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Signed-off-by: Alexandru Gagniuc <mr.nuke.me@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
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Add documentation about 'required-mode' property in /signature node
in U-Boot's control FDT.
Signed-off-by: Thirupathaiah Annapureddy <thiruan@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
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If "object=" is specified in "keydir" when using the pkcs11 engine do
not append another "object=<key-name-hint>". This makes it possible to
use object names other than the key name hint. These two string
identifiers are not necessarily equal.
Signed-off-by: Jan Luebbe <jlu@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Bastian Krause <bst@pengutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
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Describe that a signature node can be added to a binary device tree using
the mkimage tool.
Provide an example device tree node.
Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
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Add missing newline before title and subtitle.
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Tansorier <mickael.tansorier@smile.fr>
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Increment conf id to avoid to have two same conf name
into one configuration description.
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Tansorier <mickael.tansorier@smile.fr>
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There are multiple other openssl engines used by HSMs that can be used to
sign FIT images instead of forcing users to use pkcs11 type of service.
Relax engine selection so that other openssl engines can be specified and
use generic key id definition formula.
Signed-off-by: Vesa Jääskeläinen <vesa.jaaskelainen@vaisala.com>
Cc: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
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The name CONFIG_LEGACY_IMAGE_FORMAT reads slightly better along with
allowing us to avoid a rather nasty Kbuild/Kconfig issue down the line
with CONFIG_IS_ENABLED(IMAGE_FORMAT_LEGACY). In a few places outside of
cmd/ switch to using CONFIG_IS_ENABLED() to test what is set.
Signed-off-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
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Signed-off-by: Philippe Reynes <philippe.reynes@softathome.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
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The DT spec demands a unit-address in a node name to match the "reg"
property in that node. Newer dtc versions will throw warnings if this is
not the case.
Fix all occurences in the FIT image documentation files where this was not
observed, to not give bad examples to the reader.
Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>
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As you see in crypto_algos in common/image-sig.c, the algorithm
should be either "rsa2048" or "rsa4096". "rs2048" is a typo.
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
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Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
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Add support for signing with the pkcs11 engine. This allows FIT images
to be signed with keys securely stored on a smartcard, hardware security
module, etc without exposing the keys.
Support for other engines can be added in the future by modifying
rsa_engine_get_pub_key() and rsa_engine_get_priv_key() to construct
correct key_id strings.
Signed-off-by: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
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Add some basic clarification that the dev.key file generated by OpenSSL
contains both the public and private key, and further highlight that
the certificate generated here contains the public key only.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Dannenberg <dannenberg@ti.com>
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Remove the verified boot limitation that only allows a single
RSA public exponent of 65537 (F4). This change allows use with
existing PKI infrastructure and has been tested with HSM-based
PKI.
Change the configuration OF tree format to store the RSA public
exponent as a 64 bit integer and implement backward compatibility
for verified boot configuration trees without this extra field.
Parameterise vboot_test.sh to test different public exponents.
Mathematics and other hard work by Andrew Bott.
Tested with the following public exponents: 3, 5, 17, 257, 39981,
50457, 65537 and 4294967297.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bott <Andrew.Bott@ipaccess.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Wishart <Andrew.Wishart@ipaccess.com>
Signed-off-by: Neil Piercy <Neil.Piercy@ipaccess.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael van der Westhuizen <michael@smart-africa.com>
Cc: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
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At present this tool only checks the configuration signing. Have it also
look at each of the images in the configuration and confirm that they
verify.
Signed-off-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Heiko Schocher <hs@denx.de> (v1)
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make the use of legacy image format configurable through
the config define CONFIG_IMAGE_FORMAT_LEGACY.
When relying on signed FIT images with required signature check
the legacy image format should be disabled. Therefore introduce
this new define and enable legacy image format if CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE
is not set. If CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE is set disable per default
the legacy image format.
Signed-off-by: Heiko Schocher <hs@denx.de>
Cc: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Cc: Lars Steubesand <lars.steubesand@philips.com>
Cc: Mike Pearce <mike@kaew.be>
Cc: Wolfgang Denk <wd@denx.de>
Cc: Tom Rini <trini@ti.com>
Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu>
Acked-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
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add host tool "fit_check_sign" which verifies, if a fit image is
signed correct.
Signed-off-by: Heiko Schocher <hs@denx.de>
Cc: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
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based on patch from andreas@oetken.name:
http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/294318/
commit message:
I currently need support for rsa-sha256 signatures in u-boot and found out that
the code for signatures is not very generic. Thus adding of different
hash-algorithms for rsa-signatures is not easy to do without copy-pasting the
rsa-code. I attached a patch for how I think it could be better and included
support for rsa-sha256. This is a fast first shot.
aditionally work:
- removed checkpatch warnings
- removed compiler warnings
- rebased against current head
Signed-off-by: Heiko Schocher <hs@denx.de>
Cc: andreas@oetken.name
Cc: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
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While signing images is useful, it does not provide complete protection
against several types of attack. For example, it it possible to create a
FIT with the same signed images, but with the configuration changed such
that a different one is selected (mix and match attack). It is also possible
to substitute a signed image from an older FIT version into a newer FIT
(roll-back attack).
Add support for signing of FIT configurations using the libfdt's region
support.
Please see doc/uImage.FIT/signature.txt for more information.
Signed-off-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
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Add a structure to describe an algorithm which can sign and (later) verify
images.
Signed-off-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
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