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-rw-r--r--lib/efi_loader/Kconfig53
-rw-r--r--lib/efi_loader/Makefile6
-rw-r--r--lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c182
-rw-r--r--lib/efi_loader/efi_var_file.c8
-rw-r--r--lib/efi_loader/efi_var_seed.S17
-rw-r--r--lib/efi_loader/efi_variable.c203
-rw-r--r--lib/efi_loader/efi_variable_tee.c150
7 files changed, 421 insertions, 198 deletions
diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig b/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig
index 4324694d48..6017ffe9a6 100644
--- a/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig
+++ b/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig
@@ -27,13 +27,51 @@ config EFI_LOADER
if EFI_LOADER
+choice
+ prompt "Store for non-volatile UEFI variables"
+ default EFI_VARIABLE_FILE_STORE
+ help
+ Select where non-volatile UEFI variables shall be stored.
+
config EFI_VARIABLE_FILE_STORE
bool "Store non-volatile UEFI variables as file"
depends on FAT_WRITE
- default y
help
- Select tis option if you want non-volatile UEFI variables to be stored
- as file /ubootefi.var on the EFI system partition.
+ Select this option if you want non-volatile UEFI variables to be
+ stored as file /ubootefi.var on the EFI system partition.
+
+config EFI_MM_COMM_TEE
+ bool "UEFI variables storage service via OP-TEE"
+ depends on OPTEE
+ help
+ If OP-TEE is present and running StandAloneMM, dispatch all UEFI
+ variable related operations to that. The application will verify,
+ authenticate and store the variables on an RPMB.
+
+endchoice
+
+config EFI_VARIABLES_PRESEED
+ bool "Initial values for UEFI variables"
+ depends on EFI_VARIABLE_FILE_STORE
+ help
+ Include a file with the initial values for non-volatile UEFI variables
+ into the U-Boot binary. If this configuration option is set, changes
+ to authentication related variables (PK, KEK, db, dbx) are not
+ allowed.
+
+if EFI_VARIABLES_PRESEED
+
+config EFI_VAR_SEED_FILE
+ string "File with initial values of non-volatile UEFI variables"
+ default ubootefi.var
+ help
+ File with initial values of non-volatile UEFI variables. The file must
+ be in the same format as the storage in the EFI system partition. The
+ easiest way to create it is by setting the non-volatile variables in
+ U-Boot. If a relative file path is used, it is relative to the source
+ directory.
+
+endif
config EFI_GET_TIME
bool "GetTime() runtime service"
@@ -174,13 +212,4 @@ config EFI_SECURE_BOOT
it is signed with a trusted key. To do that, you need to install,
at least, PK, KEK and db.
-config EFI_MM_COMM_TEE
- bool "UEFI variables storage service via OP-TEE"
- depends on OPTEE
- default n
- help
- If OP-TEE is present and running StandAloneMM, dispatch all UEFI variable
- related operations to that. The application will verify, authenticate and
- store the variables on an RPMB.
-
endif
diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/Makefile b/lib/efi_loader/Makefile
index f81ec8d277..441ac9432e 100644
--- a/lib/efi_loader/Makefile
+++ b/lib/efi_loader/Makefile
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
# This file only gets included with CONFIG_EFI_LOADER set, so all
# object inclusion implicitly depends on it
-asflags-y += -DHOST_ARCH="$(HOST_ARCH)"
+asflags-y += -DHOST_ARCH="$(HOST_ARCH)" -I.
ccflags-y += -DHOST_ARCH="$(HOST_ARCH)"
CFLAGS_efi_boottime.o += \
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ obj-y += efi_variable_tee.o
else
obj-y += efi_variable.o
obj-y += efi_var_file.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_VARIABLES_PRESEED) += efi_var_seed.o
endif
obj-y += efi_watchdog.o
obj-$(CONFIG_LCD) += efi_gop.o
@@ -53,3 +54,6 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_GENERATE_SMBIOS_TABLE) += efi_smbios.o
obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL) += efi_rng.o
obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_LOAD_FILE2_INITRD) += efi_load_initrd.o
obj-y += efi_signature.o
+
+EFI_VAR_SEED_FILE := $(subst $\",,$(CONFIG_EFI_VAR_SEED_FILE))
+$(obj)/efi_var_seed.o: $(srctree)/$(EFI_VAR_SEED_FILE)
diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c
index 1e2be1135b..ee2e67bc8c 100644
--- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c
+++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c
@@ -9,6 +9,33 @@
#include <efi_loader.h>
#include <efi_variable.h>
+enum efi_secure_mode {
+ EFI_MODE_SETUP,
+ EFI_MODE_USER,
+ EFI_MODE_AUDIT,
+ EFI_MODE_DEPLOYED,
+};
+
+struct efi_auth_var_name_type {
+ const u16 *name;
+ const efi_guid_t *guid;
+ const enum efi_auth_var_type type;
+};
+
+static const struct efi_auth_var_name_type name_type[] = {
+ {u"PK", &efi_global_variable_guid, EFI_AUTH_VAR_PK},
+ {u"KEK", &efi_global_variable_guid, EFI_AUTH_VAR_KEK},
+ {u"db", &efi_guid_image_security_database, EFI_AUTH_VAR_DB},
+ {u"dbx", &efi_guid_image_security_database, EFI_AUTH_VAR_DBX},
+ /* not used yet
+ {u"dbt", &efi_guid_image_security_database, EFI_AUTH_VAR_DBT},
+ {u"dbr", &efi_guid_image_security_database, EFI_AUTH_VAR_DBR},
+ */
+};
+
+static bool efi_secure_boot;
+static enum efi_secure_mode efi_secure_mode;
+
/**
* efi_efi_get_variable() - retrieve value of a UEFI variable
*
@@ -138,3 +165,158 @@ efi_status_t EFIAPI efi_query_variable_info(
return EFI_EXIT(ret);
}
+
+/**
+ * efi_set_secure_state - modify secure boot state variables
+ * @secure_boot: value of SecureBoot
+ * @setup_mode: value of SetupMode
+ * @audit_mode: value of AuditMode
+ * @deployed_mode: value of DeployedMode
+ *
+ * Modify secure boot status related variables as indicated.
+ *
+ * Return: status code
+ */
+static efi_status_t efi_set_secure_state(u8 secure_boot, u8 setup_mode,
+ u8 audit_mode, u8 deployed_mode)
+{
+ efi_status_t ret;
+ const u32 attributes_ro = EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS |
+ EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS |
+ EFI_VARIABLE_READ_ONLY;
+ const u32 attributes_rw = EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS |
+ EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS;
+
+ efi_secure_boot = secure_boot;
+
+ ret = efi_set_variable_int(L"SecureBoot", &efi_global_variable_guid,
+ attributes_ro, sizeof(secure_boot),
+ &secure_boot, false);
+ if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS)
+ goto err;
+
+ ret = efi_set_variable_int(L"SetupMode", &efi_global_variable_guid,
+ attributes_ro, sizeof(setup_mode),
+ &setup_mode, false);
+ if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS)
+ goto err;
+
+ ret = efi_set_variable_int(L"AuditMode", &efi_global_variable_guid,
+ audit_mode || setup_mode ?
+ attributes_ro : attributes_rw,
+ sizeof(audit_mode), &audit_mode, false);
+ if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS)
+ goto err;
+
+ ret = efi_set_variable_int(L"DeployedMode",
+ &efi_global_variable_guid,
+ audit_mode || deployed_mode || setup_mode ?
+ attributes_ro : attributes_rw,
+ sizeof(deployed_mode), &deployed_mode,
+ false);
+err:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * efi_transfer_secure_state - handle a secure boot state transition
+ * @mode: new state
+ *
+ * Depending on @mode, secure boot related variables are updated.
+ * Those variables are *read-only* for users, efi_set_variable_int()
+ * is called here.
+ *
+ * Return: status code
+ */
+static efi_status_t efi_transfer_secure_state(enum efi_secure_mode mode)
+{
+ efi_status_t ret;
+
+ EFI_PRINT("Switching secure state from %d to %d\n", efi_secure_mode,
+ mode);
+
+ if (mode == EFI_MODE_DEPLOYED) {
+ ret = efi_set_secure_state(1, 0, 0, 1);
+ if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS)
+ goto err;
+ } else if (mode == EFI_MODE_AUDIT) {
+ ret = efi_set_variable_int(L"PK", &efi_global_variable_guid,
+ EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS |
+ EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS,
+ 0, NULL, false);
+ if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS)
+ goto err;
+
+ ret = efi_set_secure_state(0, 1, 1, 0);
+ if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS)
+ goto err;
+ } else if (mode == EFI_MODE_USER) {
+ ret = efi_set_secure_state(1, 0, 0, 0);
+ if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS)
+ goto err;
+ } else if (mode == EFI_MODE_SETUP) {
+ ret = efi_set_secure_state(0, 1, 0, 0);
+ if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS)
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ efi_secure_mode = mode;
+
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+
+err:
+ /* TODO: What action should be taken here? */
+ printf("ERROR: Secure state transition failed\n");
+ return ret;
+}
+
+efi_status_t efi_init_secure_state(void)
+{
+ enum efi_secure_mode mode = EFI_MODE_SETUP;
+ u8 efi_vendor_keys = 0;
+ efi_uintn_t size = 0;
+ efi_status_t ret;
+
+ ret = efi_get_variable_int(L"PK", &efi_global_variable_guid,
+ NULL, &size, NULL, NULL);
+ if (ret == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT))
+ mode = EFI_MODE_USER;
+ }
+
+ ret = efi_transfer_secure_state(mode);
+ if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS)
+ return ret;
+
+ /* As we do not provide vendor keys this variable is always 0. */
+ ret = efi_set_variable_int(L"VendorKeys",
+ &efi_global_variable_guid,
+ EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS |
+ EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS |
+ EFI_VARIABLE_READ_ONLY,
+ sizeof(efi_vendor_keys),
+ &efi_vendor_keys, false);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * efi_secure_boot_enabled - return if secure boot is enabled or not
+ *
+ * Return: true if enabled, false if disabled
+ */
+bool efi_secure_boot_enabled(void)
+{
+ return efi_secure_boot;
+}
+
+enum efi_auth_var_type efi_auth_var_get_type(u16 *name, const efi_guid_t *guid)
+{
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(name_type); ++i) {
+ if (!u16_strcmp(name, name_type[i].name) &&
+ !guidcmp(guid, name_type[i].guid))
+ return name_type[i].type;
+ }
+ return EFI_AUTH_VAR_NONE;
+}
diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_file.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_file.c
index 880c279aef..6f9d76f2a2 100644
--- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_file.c
+++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_file.c
@@ -159,13 +159,7 @@ error:
#endif
}
-/**
- * efi_var_restore() - restore EFI variables from buffer
- *
- * @buf: buffer
- * Return: status code
- */
-static efi_status_t __maybe_unused efi_var_restore(struct efi_var_file *buf)
+efi_status_t efi_var_restore(struct efi_var_file *buf)
{
struct efi_var_entry *var, *last_var;
efi_status_t ret;
diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_seed.S b/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_seed.S
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e0a40cf46c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_seed.S
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ */
+/*
+ * Predefined UEFI variables
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2020, Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+
+.section .rodata.efi_seed.init,"a"
+.balign 16
+.global __efi_var_file_begin
+__efi_var_file_begin:
+.incbin CONFIG_EFI_VAR_SEED_FILE
+.global __efi_var_file_end
+__efi_var_file_end:
+.balign 16
diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_variable.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_variable.c
index eab5f005da..39a8482903 100644
--- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_variable.c
+++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_variable.c
@@ -5,12 +5,15 @@
* Copyright (c) 2017 Rob Clark
*/
+#define LOG_CATEGORY LOGC_EFI
+
#include <common.h>
#include <efi_loader.h>
#include <efi_variable.h>
#include <env.h>
#include <env_internal.h>
#include <hexdump.h>
+#include <log.h>
#include <malloc.h>
#include <rtc.h>
#include <search.h>
@@ -18,166 +21,7 @@
#include <crypto/pkcs7_parser.h>
#include <linux/compat.h>
#include <u-boot/crc.h>
-
-enum efi_secure_mode {
- EFI_MODE_SETUP,
- EFI_MODE_USER,
- EFI_MODE_AUDIT,
- EFI_MODE_DEPLOYED,
-};
-
-static bool efi_secure_boot;
-static enum efi_secure_mode efi_secure_mode;
-static u8 efi_vendor_keys;
-
-/**
- * efi_set_secure_state - modify secure boot state variables
- * @secure_boot: value of SecureBoot
- * @setup_mode: value of SetupMode
- * @audit_mode: value of AuditMode
- * @deployed_mode: value of DeployedMode
- *
- * Modify secure boot status related variables as indicated.
- *
- * Return: status code
- */
-static efi_status_t efi_set_secure_state(u8 secure_boot, u8 setup_mode,
- u8 audit_mode, u8 deployed_mode)
-{
- efi_status_t ret;
- const u32 attributes_ro = EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS |
- EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS |
- EFI_VARIABLE_READ_ONLY;
- const u32 attributes_rw = EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS |
- EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS;
-
- efi_secure_boot = secure_boot;
-
- ret = efi_set_variable_int(L"SecureBoot", &efi_global_variable_guid,
- attributes_ro, sizeof(secure_boot),
- &secure_boot, false);
- if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS)
- goto err;
-
- ret = efi_set_variable_int(L"SetupMode", &efi_global_variable_guid,
- attributes_ro, sizeof(setup_mode),
- &setup_mode, false);
- if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS)
- goto err;
-
- ret = efi_set_variable_int(L"AuditMode", &efi_global_variable_guid,
- audit_mode || setup_mode ?
- attributes_ro : attributes_rw,
- sizeof(audit_mode), &audit_mode, false);
- if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS)
- goto err;
-
- ret = efi_set_variable_int(L"DeployedMode",
- &efi_global_variable_guid,
- audit_mode || deployed_mode || setup_mode ?
- attributes_ro : attributes_rw,
- sizeof(deployed_mode), &deployed_mode,
- false);
-err:
- return ret;
-}
-
-/**
- * efi_transfer_secure_state - handle a secure boot state transition
- * @mode: new state
- *
- * Depending on @mode, secure boot related variables are updated.
- * Those variables are *read-only* for users, efi_set_variable_int()
- * is called here.
- *
- * Return: status code
- */
-static efi_status_t efi_transfer_secure_state(enum efi_secure_mode mode)
-{
- efi_status_t ret;
-
- EFI_PRINT("Switching secure state from %d to %d\n", efi_secure_mode,
- mode);
-
- if (mode == EFI_MODE_DEPLOYED) {
- ret = efi_set_secure_state(1, 0, 0, 1);
- if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS)
- goto err;
- } else if (mode == EFI_MODE_AUDIT) {
- ret = efi_set_variable_int(L"PK", &efi_global_variable_guid,
- EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS |
- EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS,
- 0, NULL, false);
- if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS)
- goto err;
-
- ret = efi_set_secure_state(0, 1, 1, 0);
- if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS)
- goto err;
- } else if (mode == EFI_MODE_USER) {
- ret = efi_set_secure_state(1, 0, 0, 0);
- if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS)
- goto err;
- } else if (mode == EFI_MODE_SETUP) {
- ret = efi_set_secure_state(0, 1, 0, 0);
- if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS)
- goto err;
- } else {
- return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
- }
-
- efi_secure_mode = mode;
-
- return EFI_SUCCESS;
-
-err:
- /* TODO: What action should be taken here? */
- printf("ERROR: Secure state transition failed\n");
- return ret;
-}
-
-/**
- * efi_init_secure_state - initialize secure boot state
- *
- * Return: status code
- */
-static efi_status_t efi_init_secure_state(void)
-{
- enum efi_secure_mode mode = EFI_MODE_SETUP;
- efi_uintn_t size = 0;
- efi_status_t ret;
-
- ret = efi_get_variable_int(L"PK", &efi_global_variable_guid,
- NULL, &size, NULL, NULL);
- if (ret == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT))
- mode = EFI_MODE_USER;
- }
-
- ret = efi_transfer_secure_state(mode);
- if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS)
- return ret;
-
- /* As we do not provide vendor keys this variable is always 0. */
- ret = efi_set_variable_int(L"VendorKeys",
- &efi_global_variable_guid,
- EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS |
- EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS |
- EFI_VARIABLE_READ_ONLY,
- sizeof(efi_vendor_keys),
- &efi_vendor_keys, false);
- return ret;
-}
-
-/**
- * efi_secure_boot_enabled - return if secure boot is enabled or not
- *
- * Return: true if enabled, false if disabled
- */
-bool efi_secure_boot_enabled(void)
-{
- return efi_secure_boot;
-}
+#include <asm/sections.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT
static u8 pkcs7_hdr[] = {
@@ -292,6 +136,7 @@ static efi_status_t efi_variable_authenticate(u16 *variable,
struct efi_time timestamp;
struct rtc_time tm;
u64 new_time;
+ enum efi_auth_var_type var_type;
efi_status_t ret;
var_sig = NULL;
@@ -368,18 +213,20 @@ static efi_status_t efi_variable_authenticate(u16 *variable,
}
/* signature database used for authentication */
- if (u16_strcmp(variable, L"PK") == 0 ||
- u16_strcmp(variable, L"KEK") == 0) {
+ var_type = efi_auth_var_get_type(variable, vendor);
+ switch (var_type) {
+ case EFI_AUTH_VAR_PK:
+ case EFI_AUTH_VAR_KEK:
/* with PK */
truststore = efi_sigstore_parse_sigdb(L"PK");
if (!truststore)
goto err;
- } else if (u16_strcmp(variable, L"db") == 0 ||
- u16_strcmp(variable, L"dbx") == 0) {
+ break;
+ case EFI_AUTH_VAR_DB:
+ case EFI_AUTH_VAR_DBX:
/* with PK and KEK */
truststore = efi_sigstore_parse_sigdb(L"KEK");
truststore2 = efi_sigstore_parse_sigdb(L"PK");
-
if (!truststore) {
if (!truststore2)
goto err;
@@ -387,7 +234,8 @@ static efi_status_t efi_variable_authenticate(u16 *variable,
truststore = truststore2;
truststore2 = NULL;
}
- } else {
+ break;
+ default:
/* TODO: support private authenticated variables */
goto err;
}
@@ -506,6 +354,7 @@ efi_status_t efi_set_variable_int(u16 *variable_name, const efi_guid_t *vendor,
efi_uintn_t ret;
bool append, delete;
u64 time = 0;
+ enum efi_auth_var_type var_type;
if (!variable_name || !*variable_name || !vendor ||
((attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS) &&
@@ -519,10 +368,16 @@ efi_status_t efi_set_variable_int(u16 *variable_name, const efi_guid_t *vendor,
delete = !append && (!data_size || !attributes);
/* check attributes */
+ var_type = efi_auth_var_get_type(variable_name, vendor);
if (var) {
if (ro_check && (var->attr & EFI_VARIABLE_READ_ONLY))
return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED;
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_VARIABLES_PRESEED)) {
+ if (var_type != EFI_AUTH_VAR_NONE)
+ return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED;
+ }
+
/* attributes won't be changed */
if (!delete &&
((ro_check && var->attr != attributes) ||
@@ -540,12 +395,7 @@ efi_status_t efi_set_variable_int(u16 *variable_name, const efi_guid_t *vendor,
return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
}
- if (((!u16_strcmp(variable_name, L"PK") ||
- !u16_strcmp(variable_name, L"KEK")) &&
- !guidcmp(vendor, &efi_global_variable_guid)) ||
- ((!u16_strcmp(variable_name, L"db") ||
- !u16_strcmp(variable_name, L"dbx")) &&
- !guidcmp(vendor, &efi_guid_image_security_database))) {
+ if (var_type != EFI_AUTH_VAR_NONE) {
/* authentication is mandatory */
if (!(attributes &
EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS)) {
@@ -604,7 +454,7 @@ efi_status_t efi_set_variable_int(u16 *variable_name, const efi_guid_t *vendor,
if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS)
return ret;
- if (!u16_strcmp(variable_name, L"PK"))
+ if (var_type == EFI_AUTH_VAR_PK)
ret = efi_init_secure_state();
else
ret = EFI_SUCCESS;
@@ -747,5 +597,12 @@ efi_status_t efi_init_variables(void)
if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS)
return ret;
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_VARIABLES_PRESEED)) {
+ ret = efi_var_restore((struct efi_var_file *)
+ __efi_var_file_begin);
+ if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS)
+ log_err("Invalid EFI variable seed\n");
+ }
+
return efi_var_from_file();
}
diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_variable_tee.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_variable_tee.c
index ff90aa8e81..c042348938 100644
--- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_variable_tee.c
+++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_variable_tee.c
@@ -244,10 +244,92 @@ out:
return ret;
}
+/*
+ * StMM can store internal attributes and properties for variables, i.e enabling
+ * R/O variables
+ */
+static efi_status_t set_property_int(u16 *variable_name, efi_uintn_t name_size,
+ const efi_guid_t *vendor,
+ struct var_check_property *var_property)
+{
+ struct smm_variable_var_check_property *smm_property;
+ efi_uintn_t payload_size;
+ u8 *comm_buf = NULL;
+ efi_status_t ret;
+
+ payload_size = sizeof(*smm_property) + name_size;
+ if (payload_size > max_payload_size) {
+ ret = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ comm_buf = setup_mm_hdr((void **)&smm_property, payload_size,
+ SMM_VARIABLE_FUNCTION_VAR_CHECK_VARIABLE_PROPERTY_SET,
+ &ret);
+ if (!comm_buf)
+ goto out;
+
+ guidcpy(&smm_property->guid, vendor);
+ smm_property->name_size = name_size;
+ memcpy(&smm_property->property, var_property,
+ sizeof(smm_property->property));
+ memcpy(smm_property->name, variable_name, name_size);
+
+ ret = mm_communicate(comm_buf, payload_size);
+
+out:
+ free(comm_buf);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static efi_status_t get_property_int(u16 *variable_name, efi_uintn_t name_size,
+ const efi_guid_t *vendor,
+ struct var_check_property *var_property)
+{
+ struct smm_variable_var_check_property *smm_property;
+ efi_uintn_t payload_size;
+ u8 *comm_buf = NULL;
+ efi_status_t ret;
+
+ memset(var_property, 0, sizeof(*var_property));
+ payload_size = sizeof(*smm_property) + name_size;
+ if (payload_size > max_payload_size) {
+ ret = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ comm_buf = setup_mm_hdr((void **)&smm_property, payload_size,
+ SMM_VARIABLE_FUNCTION_VAR_CHECK_VARIABLE_PROPERTY_GET,
+ &ret);
+ if (!comm_buf)
+ goto out;
+
+ guidcpy(&smm_property->guid, vendor);
+ smm_property->name_size = name_size;
+ memcpy(smm_property->name, variable_name, name_size);
+
+ ret = mm_communicate(comm_buf, payload_size);
+ /*
+ * Currently only R/O property is supported in StMM.
+ * Variables that are not set to R/O will not set the property in StMM
+ * and the call will return EFI_NOT_FOUND. We are setting the
+ * properties to 0x0 so checking against that is enough for the
+ * EFI_NOT_FOUND case.
+ */
+ if (ret == EFI_NOT_FOUND)
+ ret = EFI_SUCCESS;
+ if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS)
+ goto out;
+ memcpy(var_property, &smm_property->property, sizeof(*var_property));
+
+out:
+ free(comm_buf);
+ return ret;
+}
+
efi_status_t efi_get_variable_int(u16 *variable_name, const efi_guid_t *vendor,
u32 *attributes, efi_uintn_t *data_size,
void *data, u64 *timep)
{
+ struct var_check_property var_property;
struct smm_variable_access *var_acc;
efi_uintn_t payload_size;
efi_uintn_t name_size;
@@ -299,8 +381,16 @@ efi_status_t efi_get_variable_int(u16 *variable_name, const efi_guid_t *vendor,
if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS)
goto out;
- if (attributes)
+ ret = get_property_int(variable_name, name_size, vendor, &var_property);
+ if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (attributes) {
*attributes = var_acc->attr;
+ if (var_property.property & VAR_CHECK_VARIABLE_PROPERTY_READ_ONLY)
+ *attributes |= EFI_VARIABLE_READ_ONLY;
+ }
+
if (data)
memcpy(data, (u8 *)var_acc->name + var_acc->name_size,
var_acc->data_size);
@@ -387,11 +477,13 @@ efi_status_t efi_set_variable_int(u16 *variable_name, const efi_guid_t *vendor,
u32 attributes, efi_uintn_t data_size,
const void *data, bool ro_check)
{
+ efi_status_t ret, alt_ret = EFI_SUCCESS;
+ struct var_check_property var_property;
struct smm_variable_access *var_acc;
efi_uintn_t payload_size;
efi_uintn_t name_size;
u8 *comm_buf = NULL;
- efi_status_t ret;
+ bool ro;
if (!variable_name || variable_name[0] == 0 || !vendor) {
ret = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
@@ -401,7 +493,6 @@ efi_status_t efi_set_variable_int(u16 *variable_name, const efi_guid_t *vendor,
ret = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
goto out;
}
-
/* Check payload size */
name_size = u16_strsize(variable_name);
payload_size = MM_VARIABLE_ACCESS_HEADER_SIZE + name_size + data_size;
@@ -410,12 +501,41 @@ efi_status_t efi_set_variable_int(u16 *variable_name, const efi_guid_t *vendor,
goto out;
}
- /* Get communication buffer and initialize header */
+ /*
+ * Allocate the buffer early, before switching to RW (if needed)
+ * so we won't need to account for any failures in reading/setting
+ * the properties, if the allocation fails
+ */
comm_buf = setup_mm_hdr((void **)&var_acc, payload_size,
SMM_VARIABLE_FUNCTION_SET_VARIABLE, &ret);
if (!comm_buf)
goto out;
+ ro = !!(attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_READ_ONLY);
+ attributes &= EFI_VARIABLE_MASK;
+
+ /*
+ * The API has the ability to override RO flags. If no RO check was
+ * requested switch the variable to RW for the duration of this call
+ */
+ ret = get_property_int(variable_name, name_size, vendor,
+ &var_property);
+ if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (var_property.property & VAR_CHECK_VARIABLE_PROPERTY_READ_ONLY) {
+ /* Bypass r/o check */
+ if (!ro_check) {
+ var_property.property &= ~VAR_CHECK_VARIABLE_PROPERTY_READ_ONLY;
+ ret = set_property_int(variable_name, name_size, vendor, &var_property);
+ if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS)
+ goto out;
+ } else {
+ ret = EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
/* Fill in contents */
guidcpy(&var_acc->guid, vendor);
var_acc->data_size = data_size;
@@ -426,10 +546,26 @@ efi_status_t efi_set_variable_int(u16 *variable_name, const efi_guid_t *vendor,
/* Communicate */
ret = mm_communicate(comm_buf, payload_size);
+ if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS)
+ alt_ret = ret;
+
+ if (ro && !(var_property.property & VAR_CHECK_VARIABLE_PROPERTY_READ_ONLY)) {
+ var_property.revision = VAR_CHECK_VARIABLE_PROPERTY_REVISION;
+ var_property.property |= VAR_CHECK_VARIABLE_PROPERTY_READ_ONLY;
+ var_property.attributes = attributes;
+ var_property.minsize = 1;
+ var_property.maxsize = var_acc->data_size;
+ ret = set_property_int(variable_name, name_size, vendor, &var_property);
+ }
+
+ if (alt_ret != EFI_SUCCESS)
+ goto out;
+ if (!u16_strcmp(variable_name, L"PK"))
+ alt_ret = efi_init_secure_state();
out:
free(comm_buf);
- return ret;
+ return alt_ret == EFI_SUCCESS ? ret : alt_ret;
}
efi_status_t efi_query_variable_info_int(u32 attributes,
@@ -586,5 +722,9 @@ efi_status_t efi_init_variables(void)
MM_VARIABLE_COMMUNICATE_SIZE +
max_payload_size;
+ ret = efi_init_secure_state();
+ if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS)
+ return ret;
+
return EFI_SUCCESS;
}