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-rw-r--r--cmd/efidebug.c2
-rw-r--r--include/configs/sipeed-maix.h9
-rw-r--r--include/efi_loader.h17
-rw-r--r--lib/efi_loader/Kconfig1
-rw-r--r--lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c33
-rw-r--r--lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c413
-rw-r--r--lib/efi_loader/efi_variable.c42
-rw-r--r--test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/conftest.py131
-rw-r--r--test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/defs.py10
-rw-r--r--test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/openssl.cnf48
-rw-r--r--test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/test_signed.py26
-rw-r--r--test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/test_signed_intca.py135
12 files changed, 554 insertions, 313 deletions
diff --git a/cmd/efidebug.c b/cmd/efidebug.c
index d00d4247dc..9874838b00 100644
--- a/cmd/efidebug.c
+++ b/cmd/efidebug.c
@@ -1126,7 +1126,7 @@ static int do_efi_test_bootmgr(struct cmd_tbl *cmdtp, int flag,
efi_uintn_t exit_data_size = 0;
u16 *exit_data = NULL;
efi_status_t ret;
- void *load_options;
+ void *load_options = NULL;
ret = efi_bootmgr_load(&image, &load_options);
printf("efi_bootmgr_load() returned: %ld\n", ret & ~EFI_ERROR_MASK);
diff --git a/include/configs/sipeed-maix.h b/include/configs/sipeed-maix.h
index a46473fc78..36ff522e4b 100644
--- a/include/configs/sipeed-maix.h
+++ b/include/configs/sipeed-maix.h
@@ -21,4 +21,13 @@
/* For early init */
#define K210_SYSCTL_BASE 0x50440000
+#ifndef CONFIG_EXTRA_ENV_SETTINGS
+#define CONFIG_EXTRA_ENV_SETTINGS \
+ "loadaddr=0x80060000\0" \
+ "fdt_addr_r=0x80028000\0" \
+ "scriptaddr=0x80020000\0" \
+ "kernel_addr_r=0x80060000\0" \
+ "fdtfile=kendryte/" CONFIG_DEFAULT_DEVICE_TREE ".dtb\0"
+#endif
+
#endif /* CONFIGS_SIPEED_MAIX_H */
diff --git a/include/efi_loader.h b/include/efi_loader.h
index 7f0ab1be56..50a17a33ca 100644
--- a/include/efi_loader.h
+++ b/include/efi_loader.h
@@ -773,13 +773,16 @@ struct pkcs7_message;
bool efi_signature_lookup_digest(struct efi_image_regions *regs,
struct efi_signature_store *db);
-bool efi_signature_verify_one(struct efi_image_regions *regs,
- struct pkcs7_message *msg,
- struct efi_signature_store *db);
-bool efi_signature_verify_with_sigdb(struct efi_image_regions *regs,
- struct pkcs7_message *msg,
- struct efi_signature_store *db,
- struct efi_signature_store *dbx);
+bool efi_signature_verify(struct efi_image_regions *regs,
+ struct pkcs7_message *msg,
+ struct efi_signature_store *db,
+ struct efi_signature_store *dbx);
+static inline bool efi_signature_verify_one(struct efi_image_regions *regs,
+ struct pkcs7_message *msg,
+ struct efi_signature_store *db)
+{
+ return efi_signature_verify(regs, msg, db, NULL);
+}
bool efi_signature_check_signers(struct pkcs7_message *msg,
struct efi_signature_store *dbx);
diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig b/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig
index 6017ffe9a6..bad1a29ba8 100644
--- a/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig
+++ b/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig
@@ -205,6 +205,7 @@ config EFI_SECURE_BOOT
select ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE
select X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER
select PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER
+ select PKCS7_VERIFY
default n
help
Select this option to enable EFI secure boot support.
diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c
index fef0bb870c..eea42cc204 100644
--- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c
+++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c
@@ -546,6 +546,11 @@ static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size)
goto err;
}
+ if (efi_signature_lookup_digest(regs, dbx)) {
+ EFI_PRINT("Image's digest was found in \"dbx\"\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
/*
* go through WIN_CERTIFICATE list
* NOTE:
@@ -553,10 +558,9 @@ static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size)
* in PE header, or as pkcs7 SignerInfo's in SignedData.
* So the verification policy here is:
* - Success if, at least, one of signatures is verified
- * - unless
- * any of signatures is rejected explicitly, or
- * none of digest algorithms are supported
+ * - unless signature is rejected explicitly with its digest.
*/
+
for (wincert = wincerts, wincerts_end = (u8 *)wincerts + wincerts_len;
(u8 *)wincert < wincerts_end;
wincert = (WIN_CERTIFICATE *)
@@ -627,32 +631,29 @@ static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size)
/* try black-list first */
if (efi_signature_verify_one(regs, msg, dbx)) {
EFI_PRINT("Signature was rejected by \"dbx\"\n");
- goto err;
+ continue;
}
if (!efi_signature_check_signers(msg, dbx)) {
EFI_PRINT("Signer(s) in \"dbx\"\n");
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (efi_signature_lookup_digest(regs, dbx)) {
- EFI_PRINT("Image's digest was found in \"dbx\"\n");
- goto err;
+ continue;
}
/* try white-list */
- if (efi_signature_verify_with_sigdb(regs, msg, db, dbx))
- continue;
+ if (efi_signature_verify(regs, msg, db, dbx)) {
+ ret = true;
+ break;
+ }
debug("Signature was not verified by \"db\"\n");
- if (efi_signature_lookup_digest(regs, db))
- continue;
+ if (efi_signature_lookup_digest(regs, db)) {
+ ret = true;
+ break;
+ }
debug("Image's digest was not found in \"db\" or \"dbx\"\n");
- goto err;
}
- ret = true;
err:
efi_sigstore_free(db);
diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c
index fc0314e6d4..79dee27421 100644
--- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c
+++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c
@@ -10,7 +10,9 @@
#include <image.h>
#include <hexdump.h>
#include <malloc.h>
+#include <crypto/pkcs7.h>
#include <crypto/pkcs7_parser.h>
+#include <crypto/public_key.h>
#include <linux/compat.h>
#include <linux/oid_registry.h>
#include <u-boot/rsa.h>
@@ -61,143 +63,6 @@ static bool efi_hash_regions(struct image_region *regs, int count,
}
/**
- * efi_hash_msg_content - calculate a hash value of contentInfo
- * @msg: Signature
- * @hash: Pointer to a pointer to buffer holding a hash value
- * @size: Size of buffer to be returned
- *
- * Calculate a sha256 value of contentInfo in @msg and return a value in @hash.
- *
- * Return: true on success, false on error
- */
-static bool efi_hash_msg_content(struct pkcs7_message *msg, void **hash,
- size_t *size)
-{
- struct image_region regtmp;
-
- regtmp.data = msg->data;
- regtmp.size = msg->data_len;
-
- return efi_hash_regions(&regtmp, 1, hash, size);
-}
-
-/**
- * efi_signature_verify - verify a signature with a certificate
- * @regs: List of regions to be authenticated
- * @signed_info: Pointer to PKCS7's signed_info
- * @cert: x509 certificate
- *
- * Signature pointed to by @signed_info against image pointed to by @regs
- * is verified by a certificate pointed to by @cert.
- * @signed_info holds a signature, including a message digest which is to be
- * compared with a hash value calculated from @regs.
- *
- * Return: true if signature is verified, false if not
- */
-static bool efi_signature_verify(struct efi_image_regions *regs,
- struct pkcs7_message *msg,
- struct pkcs7_signed_info *ps_info,
- struct x509_certificate *cert)
-{
- struct image_sign_info info;
- struct image_region regtmp[2];
- void *hash;
- size_t size;
- char c;
- bool verified;
-
- EFI_PRINT("%s: Enter, %p, %p, %p(issuer: %s, subject: %s)\n", __func__,
- regs, ps_info, cert, cert->issuer, cert->subject);
-
- verified = false;
-
- memset(&info, '\0', sizeof(info));
- info.padding = image_get_padding_algo("pkcs-1.5");
- /*
- * Note: image_get_[checksum|crypto]_algo takes an string
- * argument like "<checksum>,<crypto>"
- * TODO: support other hash algorithms
- */
- if (!strcmp(ps_info->sig->hash_algo, "sha1")) {
- info.checksum = image_get_checksum_algo("sha1,rsa2048");
- info.name = "sha1,rsa2048";
- } else if (!strcmp(ps_info->sig->hash_algo, "sha256")) {
- info.checksum = image_get_checksum_algo("sha256,rsa2048");
- info.name = "sha256,rsa2048";
- } else {
- EFI_PRINT("unknown msg digest algo: %s\n",
- ps_info->sig->hash_algo);
- goto out;
- }
- info.crypto = image_get_crypto_algo(info.name);
-
- info.key = cert->pub->key;
- info.keylen = cert->pub->keylen;
-
- /* verify signature */
- EFI_PRINT("%s: crypto: %s, signature len:%x\n", __func__,
- info.name, ps_info->sig->s_size);
- if (ps_info->aa_set & (1UL << sinfo_has_message_digest)) {
- EFI_PRINT("%s: RSA verify authentication attribute\n",
- __func__);
- /*
- * NOTE: This path will be executed only for
- * PE image authentication
- */
-
- /* check if hash matches digest first */
- EFI_PRINT("checking msg digest first, len:0x%x\n",
- ps_info->msgdigest_len);
-
-#ifdef DEBUG
- EFI_PRINT("hash in database:\n");
- print_hex_dump(" ", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET, 16, 1,
- ps_info->msgdigest, ps_info->msgdigest_len,
- false);
-#endif
- /* against contentInfo first */
- hash = NULL;
- if ((msg->data && efi_hash_msg_content(msg, &hash, &size)) ||
- /* for signed image */
- efi_hash_regions(regs->reg, regs->num, &hash, &size)) {
- /* for authenticated variable */
- if (ps_info->msgdigest_len != size ||
- memcmp(hash, ps_info->msgdigest, size)) {
- EFI_PRINT("Digest doesn't match\n");
- free(hash);
- goto out;
- }
-
- free(hash);
- } else {
- EFI_PRINT("Digesting image failed\n");
- goto out;
- }
-
- /* against digest */
- c = 0x31;
- regtmp[0].data = &c;
- regtmp[0].size = 1;
- regtmp[1].data = ps_info->authattrs;
- regtmp[1].size = ps_info->authattrs_len;
-
- if (!rsa_verify(&info, regtmp, 2,
- ps_info->sig->s, ps_info->sig->s_size))
- verified = true;
- } else {
- EFI_PRINT("%s: RSA verify content data\n", __func__);
- /* against all data */
- if (!rsa_verify(&info, regs->reg, regs->num,
- ps_info->sig->s, ps_info->sig->s_size))
- verified = true;
- }
-
-out:
- EFI_PRINT("%s: Exit, verified: %d\n", __func__, verified);
- return verified;
-}
-
-/**
* efi_signature_lookup_digest - search for an image's digest in sigdb
* @regs: List of regions to be authenticated
* @db: Signature database for trusted certificates
@@ -260,61 +125,129 @@ out:
}
/**
- * efi_signature_verify_with_list - verify a signature with signature list
- * @regs: List of regions to be authenticated
- * @msg: Signature
- * @signed_info: Pointer to PKCS7's signed_info
- * @siglist: Signature list for certificates
- * @valid_cert: x509 certificate that verifies this signature
+ * efi_lookup_certificate - find a certificate within db
+ * @msg: Signature
+ * @db: Signature database
*
- * Signature pointed to by @signed_info against image pointed to by @regs
- * is verified by signature list pointed to by @siglist.
- * Signature database is a simple concatenation of one or more
- * signature list(s).
+ * Search signature database pointed to by @db and find a certificate
+ * pointed to by @cert.
*
- * Return: true if signature is verified, false if not
+ * Return: true if found, false otherwise.
*/
-static
-bool efi_signature_verify_with_list(struct efi_image_regions *regs,
- struct pkcs7_message *msg,
- struct pkcs7_signed_info *signed_info,
- struct efi_signature_store *siglist,
- struct x509_certificate **valid_cert)
+static bool efi_lookup_certificate(struct x509_certificate *cert,
+ struct efi_signature_store *db)
{
- struct x509_certificate *cert;
+ struct efi_signature_store *siglist;
struct efi_sig_data *sig_data;
- bool verified = false;
+ struct image_region reg[1];
+ void *hash = NULL, *hash_tmp = NULL;
+ size_t size = 0;
+ bool found = false;
- EFI_PRINT("%s: Enter, %p, %p, %p, %p\n", __func__,
- regs, signed_info, siglist, valid_cert);
+ EFI_PRINT("%s: Enter, %p, %p\n", __func__, cert, db);
- if (guidcmp(&siglist->sig_type, &efi_guid_cert_x509)) {
- EFI_PRINT("Signature type is not supported: %pUl\n",
- &siglist->sig_type);
+ if (!cert || !db || !db->sig_data_list)
goto out;
- }
- /* go through the list */
- for (sig_data = siglist->sig_data_list; sig_data;
- sig_data = sig_data->next) {
- /* TODO: support owner check based on policy */
+ /*
+ * TODO: identify a certificate using sha256 digest
+ * Is there any better way?
+ */
+ /* calculate hash of TBSCertificate */
+ reg[0].data = cert->tbs;
+ reg[0].size = cert->tbs_size;
+ if (!efi_hash_regions(reg, 1, &hash, &size))
+ goto out;
- cert = x509_cert_parse(sig_data->data, sig_data->size);
- if (IS_ERR(cert)) {
- EFI_PRINT("Parsing x509 certificate failed\n");
- goto out;
+ EFI_PRINT("%s: searching for %s\n", __func__, cert->subject);
+ for (siglist = db; siglist; siglist = siglist->next) {
+ /* only with x509 certificate */
+ if (guidcmp(&siglist->sig_type, &efi_guid_cert_x509))
+ continue;
+
+ for (sig_data = siglist->sig_data_list; sig_data;
+ sig_data = sig_data->next) {
+ struct x509_certificate *cert_tmp;
+
+ cert_tmp = x509_cert_parse(sig_data->data,
+ sig_data->size);
+ if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(cert_tmp))
+ continue;
+
+ EFI_PRINT("%s: against %s\n", __func__,
+ cert_tmp->subject);
+ reg[0].data = cert_tmp->tbs;
+ reg[0].size = cert_tmp->tbs_size;
+ if (!efi_hash_regions(reg, 1, &hash_tmp, NULL))
+ goto out;
+
+ x509_free_certificate(cert_tmp);
+
+ if (!memcmp(hash, hash_tmp, size)) {
+ found = true;
+ goto out;
+ }
}
+ }
+out:
+ free(hash);
+ free(hash_tmp);
- verified = efi_signature_verify(regs, msg, signed_info, cert);
+ EFI_PRINT("%s: Exit, found: %d\n", __func__, found);
+ return found;
+}
- if (verified) {
- if (valid_cert)
- *valid_cert = cert;
- else
- x509_free_certificate(cert);
- break;
+/**
+ * efi_verify_certificate - verify certificate's signature with database
+ * @signer: Certificate
+ * @db: Signature database
+ * @root: Certificate to verify @signer
+ *
+ * Determine if certificate pointed to by @signer may be verified
+ * by one of certificates in signature database pointed to by @db.
+ *
+ * Return: true if certificate is verified, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool efi_verify_certificate(struct x509_certificate *signer,
+ struct efi_signature_store *db,
+ struct x509_certificate **root)
+{
+ struct efi_signature_store *siglist;
+ struct efi_sig_data *sig_data;
+ struct x509_certificate *cert;
+ bool verified = false;
+ int ret;
+
+ EFI_PRINT("%s: Enter, %p, %p\n", __func__, signer, db);
+
+ if (!signer || !db || !db->sig_data_list)
+ goto out;
+
+ for (siglist = db; siglist; siglist = siglist->next) {
+ /* only with x509 certificate */
+ if (guidcmp(&siglist->sig_type, &efi_guid_cert_x509))
+ continue;
+
+ for (sig_data = siglist->sig_data_list; sig_data;
+ sig_data = sig_data->next) {
+ cert = x509_cert_parse(sig_data->data, sig_data->size);
+ if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(cert)) {
+ EFI_PRINT("Cannot parse x509 certificate\n");
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ ret = public_key_verify_signature(cert->pub,
+ signer->sig);
+ if (!ret) {
+ verified = true;
+ if (root)
+ *root = cert;
+ else
+ x509_free_certificate(cert);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ x509_free_certificate(cert);
}
- x509_free_certificate(cert);
}
out:
@@ -335,7 +268,7 @@ out:
* protocol at this time and any image will be unconditionally revoked
* when this match occurs.
*
- * Return: true if check passed, false otherwise.
+ * Return: true if check passed (not found), false otherwise.
*/
static bool efi_signature_check_revocation(struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo,
struct x509_certificate *cert,
@@ -405,56 +338,8 @@ out:
return !revoked;
}
-/**
- * efi_signature_verify_one - verify signatures with database
- * @regs: List of regions to be authenticated
- * @msg: Signature
- * @db: Signature database
- *
- * All the signature pointed to by @msg against image pointed to by @regs
- * will be verified by signature database pointed to by @db.
- *
- * Return: true if verification for one of signatures passed, false
- * otherwise
- */
-bool efi_signature_verify_one(struct efi_image_regions *regs,
- struct pkcs7_message *msg,
- struct efi_signature_store *db)
-{
- struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo;
- struct efi_signature_store *siglist;
- struct x509_certificate *cert;
- bool verified = false;
-
- EFI_PRINT("%s: Enter, %p, %p, %p\n", __func__, regs, msg, db);
-
- if (!db)
- goto out;
-
- if (!db->sig_data_list)
- goto out;
-
- EFI_PRINT("%s: Verify signed image with db\n", __func__);
- for (sinfo = msg->signed_infos; sinfo; sinfo = sinfo->next) {
- EFI_PRINT("Signed Info: digest algo: %s, pkey algo: %s\n",
- sinfo->sig->hash_algo, sinfo->sig->pkey_algo);
-
- for (siglist = db; siglist; siglist = siglist->next)
- if (efi_signature_verify_with_list(regs, msg, sinfo,
- siglist, &cert)) {
- verified = true;
- goto out;
- }
- EFI_PRINT("Valid certificate not in \"db\"\n");
- }
-
-out:
- EFI_PRINT("%s: Exit, verified: %d\n", __func__, verified);
- return verified;
-}
-
-/**
- * efi_signature_verify_with_sigdb - verify signatures with db and dbx
+/*
+ * efi_signature_verify - verify signatures with db and dbx
* @regs: List of regions to be authenticated
* @msg: Signature
* @db: Signature database for trusted certificates
@@ -465,43 +350,71 @@ out:
*
* Return: true if verification for all signatures passed, false otherwise
*/
-bool efi_signature_verify_with_sigdb(struct efi_image_regions *regs,
- struct pkcs7_message *msg,
- struct efi_signature_store *db,
- struct efi_signature_store *dbx)
+bool efi_signature_verify(struct efi_image_regions *regs,
+ struct pkcs7_message *msg,
+ struct efi_signature_store *db,
+ struct efi_signature_store *dbx)
{
- struct pkcs7_signed_info *info;
- struct efi_signature_store *siglist;
- struct x509_certificate *cert;
+ struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo;
+ struct x509_certificate *signer, *root;
bool verified = false;
+ int ret;
EFI_PRINT("%s: Enter, %p, %p, %p, %p\n", __func__, regs, msg, db, dbx);
if (!regs || !msg || !db || !db->sig_data_list)
goto out;
- for (info = msg->signed_infos; info; info = info->next) {
+ for (sinfo = msg->signed_infos; sinfo; sinfo = sinfo->next) {
EFI_PRINT("Signed Info: digest algo: %s, pkey algo: %s\n",
- info->sig->hash_algo, info->sig->pkey_algo);
+ sinfo->sig->hash_algo, sinfo->sig->pkey_algo);
- for (siglist = db; siglist; siglist = siglist->next) {
- if (efi_signature_verify_with_list(regs, msg, info,
- siglist, &cert))
- break;
- }
- if (!siglist) {
- EFI_PRINT("Valid certificate not in \"db\"\n");
+ /*
+ * only for authenticated variable.
+ *
+ * If this function is called for image,
+ * hash calculation will be done in
+ * pkcs7_verify_one().
+ */
+ if (!msg->data &&
+ !efi_hash_regions(regs->reg, regs->num,
+ (void **)&sinfo->sig->digest, NULL)) {
+ EFI_PRINT("Digesting an image failed\n");
goto out;
}
- if (!dbx || efi_signature_check_revocation(info, cert, dbx))
+ EFI_PRINT("Verifying certificate chain\n");
+ signer = NULL;
+ ret = pkcs7_verify_one(msg, sinfo, &signer);
+ if (ret == -ENOPKG)
continue;
- EFI_PRINT("Certificate in \"dbx\"\n");
- goto out;
- }
- verified = true;
+ if (ret < 0 || !signer)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (sinfo->blacklisted)
+ goto out;
+ EFI_PRINT("Verifying last certificate in chain\n");
+ if (signer->self_signed) {
+ if (efi_lookup_certificate(signer, db))
+ if (efi_signature_check_revocation(sinfo,
+ signer, dbx))
+ break;
+ } else if (efi_verify_certificate(signer, db, &root)) {
+ bool check;
+
+ check = efi_signature_check_revocation(sinfo, root,
+ dbx);
+ x509_free_certificate(root);
+ if (check)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ EFI_PRINT("Certificate chain didn't reach trusted CA\n");
+ }
+ if (sinfo)
+ verified = true;
out:
EFI_PRINT("%s: Exit, verified: %d\n", __func__, verified);
return verified;
diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_variable.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_variable.c
index e509d6dbf0..a10b9caa8b 100644
--- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_variable.c
+++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_variable.c
@@ -37,16 +37,21 @@ static u8 pkcs7_hdr[] = {
* efi_variable_parse_signature - parse a signature in variable
* @buf: Pointer to variable's value
* @buflen: Length of @buf
+ * @tmpbuf: Pointer to temporary buffer
*
* Parse a signature embedded in variable's value and instantiate
* a pkcs7_message structure. Since pkcs7_parse_message() accepts only
* pkcs7's signedData, some header needed be prepended for correctly
* parsing authentication data, particularly for variable's.
+ * A temporary buffer will be allocated if needed, and it should be
+ * kept valid during the authentication because some data in the buffer
+ * will be referenced by efi_signature_verify().
*
* Return: Pointer to pkcs7_message structure on success, NULL on error
*/
static struct pkcs7_message *efi_variable_parse_signature(const void *buf,
- size_t buflen)
+ size_t buflen,
+ u8 **tmpbuf)
{
u8 *ebuf;
size_t ebuflen, len;
@@ -59,7 +64,9 @@ static struct pkcs7_message *efi_variable_parse_signature(const void *buf,
if (buflen > sizeof(pkcs7_hdr) &&
!memcmp(&((u8 *)buf)[4], &pkcs7_hdr[4], 11)) {
msg = pkcs7_parse_message(buf, buflen);
- goto out;
+ if (IS_ERR(msg))
+ return NULL;
+ return msg;
}
/*
@@ -94,12 +101,12 @@ static struct pkcs7_message *efi_variable_parse_signature(const void *buf,
msg = pkcs7_parse_message(ebuf, ebuflen);
- free(ebuf);
-
-out:
- if (IS_ERR(msg))
+ if (IS_ERR(msg)) {
+ free(ebuf);
return NULL;
+ }
+ *tmpbuf = ebuf;
return msg;
}
@@ -136,6 +143,7 @@ static efi_status_t efi_variable_authenticate(u16 *variable,
struct efi_time timestamp;
struct rtc_time tm;
u64 new_time;
+ u8 *ebuf;
enum efi_auth_var_type var_type;
efi_status_t ret;
@@ -143,6 +151,7 @@ static efi_status_t efi_variable_authenticate(u16 *variable,
truststore = NULL;
truststore2 = NULL;
regs = NULL;
+ ebuf = NULL;
ret = EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
if (*data_size < sizeof(struct efi_variable_authentication_2))
@@ -204,9 +213,12 @@ static efi_status_t efi_variable_authenticate(u16 *variable,
/* variable's signature list */
if (auth->auth_info.hdr.dwLength < sizeof(auth->auth_info))
goto err;
+
+ /* ebuf should be kept valid during the authentication */
var_sig = efi_variable_parse_signature(auth->auth_info.cert_data,
auth->auth_info.hdr.dwLength
- - sizeof(auth->auth_info));
+ - sizeof(auth->auth_info),
+ &ebuf);
if (!var_sig) {
EFI_PRINT("Parsing variable's signature failed\n");
goto err;
@@ -241,12 +253,11 @@ static efi_status_t efi_variable_authenticate(u16 *variable,
}
/* verify signature */
- if (efi_signature_verify_with_sigdb(regs, var_sig, truststore, NULL)) {
+ if (efi_signature_verify(regs, var_sig, truststore, NULL)) {
EFI_PRINT("Verified\n");
} else {
if (truststore2 &&
- efi_signature_verify_with_sigdb(regs, var_sig,
- truststore2, NULL)) {
+ efi_signature_verify(regs, var_sig, truststore2, NULL)) {
EFI_PRINT("Verified\n");
} else {
EFI_PRINT("Verifying variable's signature failed\n");
@@ -262,6 +273,7 @@ err:
efi_sigstore_free(truststore);
efi_sigstore_free(truststore2);
pkcs7_free_message(var_sig);
+ free(ebuf);
free(regs);
return ret;
@@ -496,10 +508,6 @@ efi_status_t efi_init_variables(void)
if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS)
return ret;
- ret = efi_init_secure_state();
- if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS)
- return ret;
-
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_VARIABLES_PRESEED)) {
ret = efi_var_restore((struct efi_var_file *)
__efi_var_file_begin);
@@ -507,5 +515,9 @@ efi_status_t efi_init_variables(void)
log_err("Invalid EFI variable seed\n");
}
- return efi_var_from_file();
+ ret = efi_var_from_file();
+ if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS)
+ return ret;
+
+ return efi_init_secure_state();
}
diff --git a/test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/conftest.py b/test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/conftest.py
index c0943b6250..69a498ca00 100644
--- a/test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/conftest.py
+++ b/test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/conftest.py
@@ -25,13 +25,8 @@ def efi_boot_env(request, u_boot_config):
Return:
A path to disk image to be used for testing
"""
- global HELLO_PATH
-
image_path = u_boot_config.persistent_data_dir
- image_path = image_path + '/' + EFI_SECBOOT_IMAGE_NAME
-
- if HELLO_PATH == '':
- HELLO_PATH = u_boot_config.build_dir + '/lib/efi_loader/helloworld.efi'
+ image_path = image_path + '/test_efi_secboot.img'
try:
mnt_point = u_boot_config.build_dir + '/mnt_efisecure'
@@ -75,9 +70,6 @@ def efi_boot_env(request, u_boot_config):
check_call('cd %s; %scert-to-efi-sig-list -g %s db1.crt db1.esl; %ssign-efi-sig-list -t "2020-04-05" -c KEK.crt -k KEK.key db db1.esl db1.auth'
% (mnt_point, EFITOOLS_PATH, GUID, EFITOOLS_PATH),
shell=True)
- # db1-update
- check_call('cd %s; %ssign-efi-sig-list -t "2020-04-06" -a -c KEK.crt -k KEK.key db db1.esl db1-update.auth'
- % (mnt_point, EFITOOLS_PATH), shell=True)
# dbx (TEST_dbx certificate)
check_call('cd %s; openssl req -x509 -sha256 -newkey rsa:2048 -subj /CN=TEST_dbx/ -keyout dbx.key -out dbx.crt -nodes -days 365'
% mnt_point, shell=True)
@@ -89,7 +81,7 @@ def efi_boot_env(request, u_boot_config):
% (mnt_point, EFITOOLS_PATH, GUID, EFITOOLS_PATH),
shell=True)
# dbx_hash1 (digest of TEST_db1 certificate)
- check_call('cd %s; %scert-to-efi-hash-list -g %s -t 0 -s 256 db1.crt dbx_hash1.crl; %ssign-efi-sig-list -t "2020-04-05" -c KEK.crt -k KEK.key dbx dbx_hash1.crl dbx_hash1.auth'
+ check_call('cd %s; %scert-to-efi-hash-list -g %s -t 0 -s 256 db1.crt dbx_hash1.crl; %ssign-efi-sig-list -t "2020-04-06" -c KEK.crt -k KEK.key dbx dbx_hash1.crl dbx_hash1.auth'
% (mnt_point, EFITOOLS_PATH, GUID, EFITOOLS_PATH),
shell=True)
# dbx_db (with TEST_db certificate)
@@ -98,7 +90,8 @@ def efi_boot_env(request, u_boot_config):
shell=True)
# Copy image
- check_call('cp %s %s' % (HELLO_PATH, mnt_point), shell=True)
+ check_call('cp %s/lib/efi_loader/helloworld.efi %s' %
+ (u_boot_config.build_dir, mnt_point), shell=True)
# Sign image
check_call('cd %s; sbsign --key db.key --cert db.crt helloworld.efi'
@@ -128,3 +121,119 @@ def efi_boot_env(request, u_boot_config):
yield image_path
finally:
call('rm -f %s' % image_path, shell=True)
+
+#
+# Fixture for UEFI secure boot test of intermediate certificates
+#
+
+
+@pytest.fixture(scope='session')
+def efi_boot_env_intca(request, u_boot_config):
+ """Set up a file system to be used in UEFI secure boot test
+ of intermediate certificates.
+
+ Args:
+ request: Pytest request object.
+ u_boot_config: U-boot configuration.
+
+ Return:
+ A path to disk image to be used for testing
+ """
+ image_path = u_boot_config.persistent_data_dir
+ image_path = image_path + '/test_efi_secboot_intca.img'
+
+ try:
+ mnt_point = u_boot_config.persistent_data_dir + '/mnt_efi_secboot_intca'
+ check_call('rm -rf {}'.format(mnt_point), shell=True)
+ check_call('mkdir -p {}'.format(mnt_point), shell=True)
+
+ # Create signature database
+ # PK
+ check_call('cd %s; openssl req -x509 -sha256 -newkey rsa:2048 -subj /CN=TEST_PK/ -keyout PK.key -out PK.crt -nodes -days 365'
+ % mnt_point, shell=True)
+ check_call('cd %s; %scert-to-efi-sig-list -g %s PK.crt PK.esl; %ssign-efi-sig-list -c PK.crt -k PK.key PK PK.esl PK.auth'
+ % (mnt_point, EFITOOLS_PATH, GUID, EFITOOLS_PATH),
+ shell=True)
+ # KEK
+ check_call('cd %s; openssl req -x509 -sha256 -newkey rsa:2048 -subj /CN=TEST_KEK/ -keyout KEK.key -out KEK.crt -nodes -days 365'
+ % mnt_point, shell=True)
+ check_call('cd %s; %scert-to-efi-sig-list -g %s KEK.crt KEK.esl; %ssign-efi-sig-list -c PK.crt -k PK.key KEK KEK.esl KEK.auth'
+ % (mnt_point, EFITOOLS_PATH, GUID, EFITOOLS_PATH),
+ shell=True)
+
+ # We will have three-tier hierarchy of certificates:
+ # TestRoot: Root CA (self-signed)
+ # TestSub: Intermediate CA (signed by Root CA)
+ # TestCert: User certificate (signed by Intermediate CA, and used
+ # for signing an image)
+ #
+ # NOTE:
+ # I consulted the following EDK2 document for certificate options:
+ # BaseTools/Source/Python/Pkcs7Sign/Readme.md
+ # Please not use them as they are in product system. They are
+ # for test purpose only.
+
+ # TestRoot
+ check_call('cp %s/test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/openssl.cnf %s'
+ % (u_boot_config.source_dir, mnt_point), shell=True)
+ check_call('cd %s; export OPENSSL_CONF=./openssl.cnf; openssl genrsa -out TestRoot.key 2048; openssl req -extensions v3_ca -new -x509 -days 365 -key TestRoot.key -out TestRoot.crt -subj "/CN=TEST_root/"; touch index.txt; touch index.txt.attr'
+ % mnt_point, shell=True)
+ # TestSub
+ check_call('cd %s; touch serial.new; export OPENSSL_CONF=./openssl.cnf; openssl genrsa -out TestSub.key 2048; openssl req -new -key TestSub.key -out TestSub.csr -subj "/CN=TEST_sub/"; openssl ca -in TestSub.csr -out TestSub.crt -extensions v3_int_ca -days 365 -batch -rand_serial -cert TestRoot.crt -keyfile TestRoot.key'
+ % mnt_point, shell=True)
+ # TestCert
+ check_call('cd %s; touch serial.new; export OPENSSL_CONF=./openssl.cnf; openssl genrsa -out TestCert.key 2048; openssl req -new -key TestCert.key -out TestCert.csr -subj "/CN=TEST_cert/"; openssl ca -in TestCert.csr -out TestCert.crt -extensions usr_cert -days 365 -batch -rand_serial -cert TestSub.crt -keyfile TestSub.key'
+ % mnt_point, shell=True)
+ # db
+ # for TestCert
+ check_call('cd %s; %scert-to-efi-sig-list -g %s TestCert.crt TestCert.esl; %ssign-efi-sig-list -c KEK.crt -k KEK.key db TestCert.esl db_a.auth'
+ % (mnt_point, EFITOOLS_PATH, GUID, EFITOOLS_PATH),
+ shell=True)
+ # for TestSub
+ check_call('cd %s; %scert-to-efi-sig-list -g %s TestSub.crt TestSub.esl; %ssign-efi-sig-list -t "2020-07-16" -c KEK.crt -k KEK.key db TestSub.esl db_b.auth'
+ % (mnt_point, EFITOOLS_PATH, GUID, EFITOOLS_PATH),
+ shell=True)
+ # for TestRoot
+ check_call('cd %s; %scert-to-efi-sig-list -g %s TestRoot.crt TestRoot.esl; %ssign-efi-sig-list -t "2020-07-17" -c KEK.crt -k KEK.key db TestRoot.esl db_c.auth'
+ % (mnt_point, EFITOOLS_PATH, GUID, EFITOOLS_PATH),
+ shell=True)
+ ## dbx (hash of certificate with revocation time)
+ # for TestCert
+ check_call('cd %s; %scert-to-efi-hash-list -g %s -t "2020-07-20" -s 256 TestCert.crt TestCert.crl; %ssign-efi-sig-list -c KEK.crt -k KEK.key dbx TestCert.crl dbx_a.auth'
+ % (mnt_point, EFITOOLS_PATH, GUID, EFITOOLS_PATH),
+ shell=True)
+ # for TestSub
+ check_call('cd %s; %scert-to-efi-hash-list -g %s -t "2020-07-21" -s 256 TestSub.crt TestSub.crl; %ssign-efi-sig-list -t "2020-07-18" -c KEK.crt -k KEK.key dbx TestSub.crl dbx_b.auth'
+ % (mnt_point, EFITOOLS_PATH, GUID, EFITOOLS_PATH),
+ shell=True)
+ # for TestRoot
+ check_call('cd %s; %scert-to-efi-hash-list -g %s -t "2020-07-22" -s 256 TestRoot.crt TestRoot.crl; %ssign-efi-sig-list -t "2020-07-19" -c KEK.crt -k KEK.key dbx TestRoot.crl dbx_c.auth'
+ % (mnt_point, EFITOOLS_PATH, GUID, EFITOOLS_PATH),
+ shell=True)
+
+ # Sign image
+ # additional intermediate certificates may be included
+ # in SignedData
+
+ check_call('cp %s/lib/efi_loader/helloworld.efi %s' %
+ (u_boot_config.build_dir, mnt_point), shell=True)
+ # signed by TestCert
+ check_call('cd %s; %ssbsign --key TestCert.key --cert TestCert.crt --out helloworld.efi.signed_a helloworld.efi'
+ % (mnt_point, SBSIGN_PATH), shell=True)
+ # signed by TestCert with TestSub in signature
+ check_call('cd %s; %ssbsign --key TestCert.key --cert TestCert.crt --addcert TestSub.crt --out helloworld.efi.signed_ab helloworld.efi'
+ % (mnt_point, SBSIGN_PATH), shell=True)
+ # signed by TestCert with TestSub and TestRoot in signature
+ check_call('cd %s; cat TestSub.crt TestRoot.crt > TestSubRoot.crt; %ssbsign --key TestCert.key --cert TestCert.crt --addcert TestSubRoot.crt --out helloworld.efi.signed_abc helloworld.efi'
+ % (mnt_point, SBSIGN_PATH), shell=True)
+
+ check_call('virt-make-fs --partition=gpt --size=+1M --type=vfat {} {}'.format(mnt_point, image_path), shell=True)
+ check_call('rm -rf {}'.format(mnt_point), shell=True)
+
+ except CalledProcessError as e:
+ pytest.skip('Setup failed: %s' % e.cmd)
+ return
+ else:
+ yield image_path
+ finally:
+ call('rm -f %s' % image_path, shell=True)
diff --git a/test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/defs.py b/test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/defs.py
index ba6b9f391e..b7a2a11851 100644
--- a/test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/defs.py
+++ b/test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/defs.py
@@ -1,14 +1,14 @@
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
-# Disk image name
-EFI_SECBOOT_IMAGE_NAME = 'test_efi_secboot.img'
-
# Owner guid
GUID = '11111111-2222-3333-4444-123456789abc'
# v1.5.1 or earlier of efitools has a bug in sha256 calculation, and
# you need build a newer version on your own.
+# The path must terminate with '/'.
EFITOOLS_PATH = ''
-# Hello World application for sandbox
-HELLO_PATH = ''
+# "--addcert" option of sbsign must be available, otherwise
+# you need build a newer version on your own.
+# The path must terminate with '/'.
+SBSIGN_PATH = ''
diff --git a/test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/openssl.cnf b/test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/openssl.cnf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f684f1df7e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/openssl.cnf
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+[ ca ]
+default_ca = CA_default
+
+[ CA_default ]
+new_certs_dir = .
+database = ./index.txt
+serial = ./serial
+default_md = sha256
+policy = policy_min
+
+[ req ]
+distinguished_name = def_distinguished_name
+
+[def_distinguished_name]
+
+# Extensions
+# -addext " ... = ..."
+#
+[ v3_ca ]
+ # Extensions for a typical Root CA.
+ basicConstraints = critical,CA:TRUE
+ keyUsage = critical, digitalSignature, cRLSign, keyCertSign
+ subjectKeyIdentifier = hash
+ authorityKeyIdentifier = keyid:always,issuer
+
+[ v3_int_ca ]
+ # Extensions for a typical intermediate CA.
+ basicConstraints = critical, CA:TRUE
+ keyUsage = critical, digitalSignature, cRLSign, keyCertSign
+ subjectKeyIdentifier = hash
+ authorityKeyIdentifier = keyid:always,issuer
+
+[ usr_cert ]
+ # Extensions for user end certificates.
+ basicConstraints = CA:FALSE
+ keyUsage = critical, nonRepudiation, digitalSignature, keyEncipherment
+ extendedKeyUsage = clientAuth, emailProtection
+ subjectKeyIdentifier = hash
+ authorityKeyIdentifier = keyid,issuer
+
+[ policy_min ]
+ countryName = optional
+ stateOrProvinceName = optional
+ localityName = optional
+ organizationName = optional
+ organizationalUnitName = optional
+ commonName = supplied
+ emailAddress = optional
diff --git a/test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/test_signed.py b/test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/test_signed.py
index 7531bbac6a..1443ba7b62 100644
--- a/test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/test_signed.py
+++ b/test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/test_signed.py
@@ -157,7 +157,8 @@ class TestEfiSignedImage(object):
u_boot_console.restart_uboot()
disk_img = efi_boot_env
with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 5a'):
- # Test Case 5a, rejected if any of signatures is not verified
+ # Test Case 5a, authenticated even if only one of signatures
+ # is verified
output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([
'host bind 0 %s' % disk_img,
'fatload host 0:1 4000000 db.auth',
@@ -171,8 +172,7 @@ class TestEfiSignedImage(object):
'efidebug boot add 1 HELLO host 0:1 /helloworld.efi.signed_2sigs ""',
'efidebug boot next 1',
'efidebug test bootmgr'])
- assert '\'HELLO\' failed' in ''.join(output)
- assert 'efi_start_image() returned: 26' in ''.join(output)
+ assert 'Hello, world!' in ''.join(output)
with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 5b'):
# Test Case 5b, authenticated if both signatures are verified
@@ -181,19 +181,29 @@ class TestEfiSignedImage(object):
'setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -at -a -i 4000000,$filesize db'])
assert 'Failed to set EFI variable' not in ''.join(output)
output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([
- 'efidebug boot add 1 HELLO host 0:1 /helloworld.efi.signed_2sigs ""',
'efidebug boot next 1',
- 'bootefi bootmgr'])
+ 'efidebug test bootmgr'])
assert 'Hello, world!' in ''.join(output)
with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 5c'):
- # Test Case 5c, rejected if any of signatures is revoked
+ # Test Case 5c, not rejected if one of signatures (digest of
+ # certificate) is revoked
output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([
- 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 dbx_hash1.auth',
+ 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 dbx_hash.auth',
'setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -at -i 4000000,$filesize dbx'])
assert 'Failed to set EFI variable' not in ''.join(output)
output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([
- 'efidebug boot add 1 HELLO host 0:1 /helloworld.efi.signed_2sigs ""',
+ 'efidebug boot next 1',
+ 'efidebug test bootmgr'])
+ assert 'Hello, world!' in ''.join(output)
+
+ with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 5d'):
+ # Test Case 5d, rejected if both of signatures are revoked
+ output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([
+ 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 dbx_hash1.auth',
+ 'setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -at -a -i 4000000,$filesize dbx'])
+ assert 'Failed to set EFI variable' not in ''.join(output)
+ output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([
'efidebug boot next 1',
'efidebug test bootmgr'])
assert '\'HELLO\' failed' in ''.join(output)
diff --git a/test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/test_signed_intca.py b/test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/test_signed_intca.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1e5f4d04b3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/test_signed_intca.py
@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+# Copyright (c) 2020, Linaro Limited
+# Author: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
+#
+# U-Boot UEFI: Image Authentication Test (signature with certificates chain)
+
+"""
+This test verifies image authentication for a signed image which is signed
+by user certificate and contains additional intermediate certificates in its
+signature.
+"""
+
+import pytest
+
+
+@pytest.mark.boardspec('sandbox')
+@pytest.mark.buildconfigspec('efi_secure_boot')
+@pytest.mark.buildconfigspec('cmd_efidebug')
+@pytest.mark.buildconfigspec('cmd_fat')
+@pytest.mark.buildconfigspec('cmd_nvedit_efi')
+@pytest.mark.slow
+class TestEfiSignedImageIntca(object):
+ def test_efi_signed_image_intca1(self, u_boot_console, efi_boot_env_intca):
+ """
+ Test Case 1 - authenticated by root CA in db
+ """
+ u_boot_console.restart_uboot()
+ disk_img = efi_boot_env_intca
+ with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 1a'):
+ # Test Case 1a, with no Int CA and not authenticated by root CA
+ output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([
+ 'host bind 0 %s' % disk_img,
+ 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 db_c.auth',
+ 'setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -at -i 4000000,$filesize db',
+ 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 KEK.auth',
+ 'setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -at -i 4000000,$filesize KEK',
+ 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 PK.auth',
+ 'setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -at -i 4000000,$filesize PK'])
+ assert 'Failed to set EFI variable' not in ''.join(output)
+
+ output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([
+ 'efidebug boot add 1 HELLO_a host 0:1 /helloworld.efi.signed_a ""',
+ 'efidebug boot next 1',
+ 'efidebug test bootmgr'])
+ assert '\'HELLO_a\' failed' in ''.join(output)
+ assert 'efi_start_image() returned: 26' in ''.join(output)
+
+ with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 1b'):
+ # Test Case 1b, signed and authenticated by root CA
+ output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([
+ 'efidebug boot add 2 HELLO_ab host 0:1 /helloworld.efi.signed_ab ""',
+ 'efidebug boot next 2',
+ 'bootefi bootmgr'])
+ assert 'Hello, world!' in ''.join(output)
+
+ def test_efi_signed_image_intca2(self, u_boot_console, efi_boot_env_intca):
+ """
+ Test Case 2 - authenticated by root CA in db
+ """
+ u_boot_console.restart_uboot()
+ disk_img = efi_boot_env_intca
+ with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 2a'):
+ # Test Case 2a, unsigned and not authenticated by root CA
+ output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([
+ 'host bind 0 %s' % disk_img,
+ 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 KEK.auth',
+ 'setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -at -i 4000000,$filesize KEK',
+ 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 PK.auth',
+ 'setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -at -i 4000000,$filesize PK'])
+ assert 'Failed to set EFI variable' not in ''.join(output)
+
+ output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([
+ 'efidebug boot add 1 HELLO_abc host 0:1 /helloworld.efi.signed_abc ""',
+ 'efidebug boot next 1',
+ 'efidebug test bootmgr'])
+ assert '\'HELLO_abc\' failed' in ''.join(output)
+ assert 'efi_start_image() returned: 26' in ''.join(output)
+
+ with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 2b'):
+ # Test Case 2b, signed and authenticated by root CA
+ output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([
+ 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 db_b.auth',
+ 'setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -at -i 4000000,$filesize db',
+ 'efidebug boot next 1',
+ 'efidebug test bootmgr'])
+ assert '\'HELLO_abc\' failed' in ''.join(output)
+ assert 'efi_start_image() returned: 26' in ''.join(output)
+
+ with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 2c'):
+ # Test Case 2c, signed and authenticated by root CA
+ output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([
+ 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 db_c.auth',
+ 'setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -at -i 4000000,$filesize db',
+ 'efidebug boot next 1',
+ 'efidebug test bootmgr'])
+ assert 'Hello, world!' in ''.join(output)
+
+ def test_efi_signed_image_intca3(self, u_boot_console, efi_boot_env_intca):
+ """
+ Test Case 3 - revoked by dbx
+ """
+ u_boot_console.restart_uboot()
+ disk_img = efi_boot_env_intca
+ with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 3a'):
+ # Test Case 3a, revoked by int CA in dbx
+ output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([
+ 'host bind 0 %s' % disk_img,
+ 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 dbx_b.auth',
+ 'setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -at -i 4000000,$filesize dbx',
+ 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 db_c.auth',
+ 'setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -at -i 4000000,$filesize db',
+ 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 KEK.auth',
+ 'setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -at -i 4000000,$filesize KEK',
+ 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 PK.auth',
+ 'setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -at -i 4000000,$filesize PK'])
+ assert 'Failed to set EFI variable' not in ''.join(output)
+
+ output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([
+ 'efidebug boot add 1 HELLO_abc host 0:1 /helloworld.efi.signed_abc ""',
+ 'efidebug boot next 1',
+ 'efidebug test bootmgr'])
+ assert 'Hello, world!' in ''.join(output)
+ # Or,
+ # assert '\'HELLO_abc\' failed' in ''.join(output)
+ # assert 'efi_start_image() returned: 26' in ''.join(output)
+
+ with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 3b'):
+ # Test Case 3b, revoked by root CA in dbx
+ output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([
+ 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 dbx_c.auth',
+ 'setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -at -i 4000000,$filesize dbx',
+ 'efidebug boot next 1',
+ 'efidebug test bootmgr'])
+ assert '\'HELLO_abc\' failed' in ''.join(output)
+ assert 'efi_start_image() returned: 26' in ''.join(output)
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