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authorLennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>2018-04-30 12:22:41 +0200
committerLennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>2018-05-03 17:45:42 +0200
commitd4b653c589fc103325a22680227fea6f35b2a781 (patch)
treeed33c06e6a25cf8913d67b27faf6e8553f6f0220 /src/nspawn/nspawn-mount.c
parent10af01a5ff5a6ede9cc684def71508b88f6b93eb (diff)
downloadsystemd-d4b653c589fc103325a22680227fea6f35b2a781.tar.gz
nspawn: lock down a few things in /proc by default
This tightens security on /proc: a couple of files exposed there are now made inaccessible. These files might potentially leak kernel internals or expose non-virtualized concepts, hence lock them down by default. Moreover, a couple of dirs in /proc that expose stuff also exposed in /sys are now marked read-only, similar to how we handle /sys. The list is taken from what docker/runc based container managers generally apply, but slightly extended.
Diffstat (limited to 'src/nspawn/nspawn-mount.c')
-rw-r--r--src/nspawn/nspawn-mount.c111
1 files changed, 88 insertions, 23 deletions
diff --git a/src/nspawn/nspawn-mount.c b/src/nspawn/nspawn-mount.c
index 461c2707cf..8a4634f53e 100644
--- a/src/nspawn/nspawn-mount.c
+++ b/src/nspawn/nspawn-mount.c
@@ -508,6 +508,18 @@ int mount_all(const char *dest,
uid_t uid_shift, uid_t uid_range,
const char *selinux_apifs_context) {
+#define PROC_INACCESSIBLE(path) \
+ { NULL, (path), NULL, NULL, MS_BIND, \
+ MOUNT_IN_USERNS|MOUNT_APPLY_APIVFS_RO|MOUNT_INACCESSIBLE_REG }, /* Bind mount first ... */ \
+ { NULL, (path), NULL, NULL, MS_BIND|MS_RDONLY|MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV|MS_REMOUNT, \
+ MOUNT_IN_USERNS|MOUNT_APPLY_APIVFS_RO } /* Then, make it r/o */
+
+#define PROC_READ_ONLY(path) \
+ { (path), (path), NULL, NULL, MS_BIND, \
+ MOUNT_IN_USERNS|MOUNT_APPLY_APIVFS_RO }, /* Bind mount first ... */ \
+ { NULL, (path), NULL, NULL, MS_BIND|MS_RDONLY|MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV|MS_REMOUNT, \
+ MOUNT_IN_USERNS|MOUNT_APPLY_APIVFS_RO } /* Then, make it r/o */
+
typedef struct MountPoint {
const char *what;
const char *where;
@@ -518,39 +530,72 @@ int mount_all(const char *dest,
} MountPoint;
static const MountPoint mount_table[] = {
- /* inner child mounts */
- { "proc", "/proc", "proc", NULL, MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV, MOUNT_FATAL|MOUNT_IN_USERNS },
- { "/proc/sys", "/proc/sys", NULL, NULL, MS_BIND, MOUNT_FATAL|MOUNT_IN_USERNS|MOUNT_APPLY_APIVFS_RO }, /* Bind mount first ... */
- { "/proc/sys/net", "/proc/sys/net", NULL, NULL, MS_BIND, MOUNT_FATAL|MOUNT_IN_USERNS|MOUNT_APPLY_APIVFS_RO|MOUNT_APPLY_APIVFS_NETNS }, /* (except for this) */
- { NULL, "/proc/sys", NULL, NULL, MS_BIND|MS_RDONLY|MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV|MS_REMOUNT, MOUNT_FATAL|MOUNT_IN_USERNS|MOUNT_APPLY_APIVFS_RO }, /* ... then, make it r/o */
- { "/proc/sysrq-trigger", "/proc/sysrq-trigger", NULL, NULL, MS_BIND, MOUNT_IN_USERNS|MOUNT_APPLY_APIVFS_RO }, /* Bind mount first ... */
- { NULL, "/proc/sysrq-trigger", NULL, NULL, MS_BIND|MS_RDONLY|MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV|MS_REMOUNT, MOUNT_IN_USERNS|MOUNT_APPLY_APIVFS_RO }, /* ... then, make it r/o */
-
- /* outer child mounts */
- { "tmpfs", "/tmp", "tmpfs", "mode=1777", MS_NOSUID|MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME, MOUNT_FATAL },
- { "tmpfs", "/sys", "tmpfs", "mode=755", MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV, MOUNT_FATAL|MOUNT_APPLY_APIVFS_NETNS },
- { "sysfs", "/sys", "sysfs", NULL, MS_RDONLY|MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV, MOUNT_FATAL|MOUNT_APPLY_APIVFS_RO }, /* skipped if above was mounted */
- { "sysfs", "/sys", "sysfs", NULL, MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV, MOUNT_FATAL }, /* skipped if above was mounted */
-
- { "tmpfs", "/dev", "tmpfs", "mode=755", MS_NOSUID|MS_STRICTATIME, MOUNT_FATAL },
- { "tmpfs", "/dev/shm", "tmpfs", "mode=1777", MS_NOSUID|MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME, MOUNT_FATAL },
- { "tmpfs", "/run", "tmpfs", "mode=755", MS_NOSUID|MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME, MOUNT_FATAL },
+ /* First we list inner child mounts (i.e. mounts applied *after* entering user namespacing) */
+ { "proc", "/proc", "proc", NULL, MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV,
+ MOUNT_FATAL|MOUNT_IN_USERNS },
+
+ { "/proc/sys", "/proc/sys", NULL, NULL, MS_BIND,
+ MOUNT_FATAL|MOUNT_IN_USERNS|MOUNT_APPLY_APIVFS_RO }, /* Bind mount first ... */
+
+ { "/proc/sys/net", "/proc/sys/net", NULL, NULL, MS_BIND,
+ MOUNT_FATAL|MOUNT_IN_USERNS|MOUNT_APPLY_APIVFS_RO|MOUNT_APPLY_APIVFS_NETNS }, /* (except for this) */
+
+ { NULL, "/proc/sys", NULL, NULL, MS_BIND|MS_RDONLY|MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV|MS_REMOUNT,
+ MOUNT_FATAL|MOUNT_IN_USERNS|MOUNT_APPLY_APIVFS_RO }, /* ... then, make it r/o */
+
+ /* Make these files inaccessible to container payloads: they potentially leak information about kernel
+ * internals or the host's execution environment to the container */
+ PROC_INACCESSIBLE("/proc/kallsyms"),
+ PROC_INACCESSIBLE("/proc/kcore"),
+ PROC_INACCESSIBLE("/proc/keys"),
+ PROC_INACCESSIBLE("/proc/sysrq-trigger"),
+ PROC_INACCESSIBLE("/proc/timer_list"),
+
+ /* Make these directories read-only to container payloads: they show hardware information, and in some
+ * cases contain tunables the container really shouldn't have access to. */
+ PROC_READ_ONLY("/proc/acpi"),
+ PROC_READ_ONLY("/proc/apm"),
+ PROC_READ_ONLY("/proc/asound"),
+ PROC_READ_ONLY("/proc/bus"),
+ PROC_READ_ONLY("/proc/fs"),
+ PROC_READ_ONLY("/proc/irq"),
+ PROC_READ_ONLY("/proc/scsi"),
+
+ /* Then we list outer child mounts (i.e. mounts applied *before* entering user namespacing) */
+ { "tmpfs", "/tmp", "tmpfs", "mode=1777", MS_NOSUID|MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME,
+ MOUNT_FATAL },
+ { "tmpfs", "/sys", "tmpfs", "mode=755", MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV,
+ MOUNT_FATAL|MOUNT_APPLY_APIVFS_NETNS },
+ { "sysfs", "/sys", "sysfs", NULL, MS_RDONLY|MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV,
+ MOUNT_FATAL|MOUNT_APPLY_APIVFS_RO }, /* skipped if above was mounted */
+ { "sysfs", "/sys", "sysfs", NULL, MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV,
+ MOUNT_FATAL }, /* skipped if above was mounted */
+ { "tmpfs", "/dev", "tmpfs", "mode=755", MS_NOSUID|MS_STRICTATIME,
+ MOUNT_FATAL },
+ { "tmpfs", "/dev/shm", "tmpfs", "mode=1777", MS_NOSUID|MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME,
+ MOUNT_FATAL },
+ { "tmpfs", "/run", "tmpfs", "mode=755", MS_NOSUID|MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME,
+ MOUNT_FATAL },
+
#if HAVE_SELINUX
- { "/sys/fs/selinux", "/sys/fs/selinux", NULL, NULL, MS_BIND, 0 }, /* Bind mount first */
- { NULL, "/sys/fs/selinux", NULL, NULL, MS_BIND|MS_RDONLY|MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV|MS_REMOUNT, 0 }, /* Then, make it r/o */
+ { "/sys/fs/selinux", "/sys/fs/selinux", NULL, NULL, MS_BIND,
+ 0 }, /* Bind mount first */
+ { NULL, "/sys/fs/selinux", NULL, NULL, MS_BIND|MS_RDONLY|MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV|MS_REMOUNT,
+ 0 }, /* Then, make it r/o */
#endif
};
- size_t k;
+ _cleanup_(unlink_and_freep) char *inaccessible = NULL;
bool use_userns = (mount_settings & MOUNT_USE_USERNS);
bool netns = (mount_settings & MOUNT_APPLY_APIVFS_NETNS);
bool ro = (mount_settings & MOUNT_APPLY_APIVFS_RO);
bool in_userns = (mount_settings & MOUNT_IN_USERNS);
+ size_t k;
int r;
for (k = 0; k < ELEMENTSOF(mount_table); k++) {
_cleanup_free_ char *where = NULL, *options = NULL;
- const char *o;
+ const char *o, *what;
bool fatal = (mount_table[k].mount_settings & MOUNT_FATAL);
if (in_userns != (bool)(mount_table[k].mount_settings & MOUNT_IN_USERNS))
@@ -566,12 +611,32 @@ int mount_all(const char *dest,
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to resolve %s/%s: %m", dest, mount_table[k].where);
+ if (mount_table[k].mount_settings & MOUNT_INACCESSIBLE_REG) {
+
+ if (!inaccessible) {
+ _cleanup_free_ char *np = NULL;
+
+ r = tempfn_random_child(NULL, "inaccessible", &np);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to generate inaccessible file node path: %m");
+
+ r = touch_file(np, false, USEC_INFINITY, UID_INVALID, GID_INVALID, 0000);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to create inaccessible file node '%s': %m", np);
+
+ inaccessible = TAKE_PTR(np);
+ }
+
+ what = inaccessible;
+ } else
+ what = mount_table[k].what;
+
r = path_is_mount_point(where, NULL, 0);
if (r < 0 && r != -ENOENT)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to detect whether %s is a mount point: %m", where);
/* Skip this entry if it is not a remount. */
- if (mount_table[k].what && r > 0)
+ if (what && r > 0)
continue;
r = mkdir_userns_p(dest, where, 0755, mount_settings, uid_shift);
@@ -600,7 +665,7 @@ int mount_all(const char *dest,
}
r = mount_verbose(fatal ? LOG_ERR : LOG_DEBUG,
- mount_table[k].what,
+ what,
where,
mount_table[k].type,
mount_table[k].flags,