path: root/source4/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-krb-wg-pkinit-alg-agility-03.txt

Network Working Group                               L. Hornquist Astrand
Internet-Draft                                      Stockholm University
Intended status: Standards Track                                  L. Zhu
Expires: January 10, 2008                          Microsoft Corporation
                                                            July 9, 2007


                       PK-INIT algorithm agility
                draft-ietf-krb-wg-pkinit-alg-agility-03

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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).













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Abstract

   The PK-INIT defined in RFC 4556 is examined and updated to remove
   protocol structures tied to specific cryptographic algorithms.  The
   affinity to SHA-1 as the checksum algorithm in the authentication
   request is analyzed.  The PK-INIT key derivation function is made
   negotiable, the digest algorithms for signing the pre-authentication
   data and the client's X.509 certificates are made discoverable.

   These changes provide protection preemptively against vulnerabilities
   discovered in the future against any specific cryptographic
   algorithm, and allow incremental deployment of newer algorithms.


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Requirements Notation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   3.  paChecksum Agility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   4.  CMS Digest Algorithm Agility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   5.  X.509 Certificate Signer Algorithm Agility . . . . . . . . . .  8
   6.  KDF agility  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   7.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   8.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
   9.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     10.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     10.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
   Appendix A.  PKINIT ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
   Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 21




















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1.  Introduction

   In August 2004, Xiaoyun Wang's research group reported MD4 [RFC1320]
   collisions generated using hand calculation [WANG04] alongside
   attacks on later hash function designs in the MD4, MD5 [RFC1321] and
   SHA [RFC4634] family.  Implementations based on Wang's algorithm can
   find collisions in real time.  These discoveries challenged the
   security for protocols relying on the collision resistance properties
   of these hashes, for example one can forge a digital signature when
   SHA-1 [RFC4634] is the digest algorithm.  A more far reaching side
   effect of these recent events, however, is that it is now generally
   considered flawed or distasteful at least if protocols are designed
   to use only specific algorithms.

   The Internet Engineer Task Force (IETF) called for actions to update
   existing protocols to provide crypto algorithm agility in order to
   untie protocols with specific algorithms.  The idea is that if the
   protocol has crypto algorithm agility, and when a new vulnerability
   specific to an algorithm is discovered, this algorithm can be
   disabled via protocol negotiation quickly, thus we can avoid the wait
   for the multi-year standardization and implementation efforts to
   update the protocols.  In additon, crypto agility allows deployment
   of new crypto algorithms to be done incrementally, rather than
   requring a "flag day" on which the change must be deployed everywhere
   at the same time in order to maintain interoperability.

   This document is to update PK-INIT [RFC4556] to provide crypto
   algorithm agility.  Several protocol structures used in the [RFC4556]
   protocol are either tied to SHA-1, or require the algorithms not
   negotiated but rather based on local policy.  The following concerns
   have been addressed:

   o  The checksum algorithm in the authentication request is hardwired
      to use SHA-1 [RFC4634].

   o  The acceptable digest algorithms for signing the authentication
      data are not discoverable.

   o  The key derivation function in Section 3.2.3 of [RFC4556] is
      hardwired to use SHA-1.

   o  The acceptable digest algorithms for signing the client X.509
      certificates are not discoverable.

   To accomplish these, new key derivation functions (KDFs) identifiable
   by object identifiers are defined.  The PKINIT client provides a list
   of KDFs in the request and the KDC picks one in the response, thus a
   mutually-supported KDF is negotiated.



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   Furthermore, structures are defined to allow the client discover the
   Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC3852] digest algorithms
   supported by the KDC for signing the pre-authentication data and
   signing the client X.509 certificate.















































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2.  Requirements Notation

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].














































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3.  paChecksum Agility

   The paChecksum defined in Section 3.2.1 of [RFC4556] provides a
   cryptographic binding between the client's pre-authentication data
   and the corresponding Kerberos request body.  This also prevents the
   KDC body from being tempered with.  SHA-1 is the only allowed
   checksum algorithm defined in [RFC4556].  This facility relies the
   collision resistance properties of the SHA-1 checksum [RFC4634].

   When the reply key delivery mechanism is based on public key
   encryption as described in Section 3.2.3. of [RFC4556], the
   asChecksum in the KDC reply provides the binding between the pre-
   authentication and the ticket request and response messages, and
   integrity protection for the unauthenticated clear text in these
   messages.  However, if the reply key delivery mechanism is based on
   the Diffie-Hellman key agreement as described in Section 3.2.3.1 of
   [RFC4556], the security provided by using SHA-1 in the paChecksum is
   weak.  In this case, the new KDF selected by the KDC as described in
   Section 6 provides the cryptographic binding and integrity
   protection.































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4.  CMS Digest Algorithm Agility

   When the KDC_ERR_DIGEST_IN_SIGNED_DATA_NOT_ACCEPTED error is returned
   as described In section 3.2.2 of [RFC4556], implementations
   comforming to this specification can OPTIONALLY send back a list of
   supported CMS types signifying the digest algorithms supported by the
   KDC, in the decreasing preference order.  This is accomplished by
   including a TD_CMS_DATA_DIGEST_ALGORITHMS typed data element in the
   error data.



   TD-CMS-DIGEST-ALGORITHMS ::= INTEGER 111


   The corresponding data for the TD_CMS_DATA_DIGEST_ALGORITHMS contains
   the ASN.1 Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) [X680] [X690] encoded
   TD-CMS-DIGEST-ALGORITHMS-DATA structure defined as follows:



   TD-CMS-DIGEST-ALGORITHMS-DATA ::= SEQUENCE OF
       AlgorithmIdentifier
           -- Contains the list of CMS algorithm [RFC3852]
           -- identifiers that identify the digest algorithms
           -- acceptable by the KDC for signing CMS data in
           -- the order of decreasing preference.


   The algorithm identifiers in the TD-CMS-DIGEST-ALGORITHMS identifiy
   digest algorithms supported by the KDC.

   This information sent by the KDC via TD_CMS_DATA_DIGEST_ALGORITHMS
   can facilitate trouble-shooting when none of the digest algorithms
   supported by the client is supported by the KDC.
















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5.  X.509 Certificate Signer Algorithm Agility

   When the client's X.509 certificate is rejected and the
   KDC_ERR_DIGEST_IN_SIGNED_DATA_NOT_ACCEPTED error is returned as
   described in section 3.2.2 of [RFC4556], conforming implementations
   can OPTIONALLY send a list of digest algorithms acceptable by the KDC
   for use by the CA in signing the client's X.509 certificate, in the
   decreasing preference order.  This is accomplished by including a
   TD_CERT_DIGEST_ALGORITHMS typed data element in the error data.  The
   corresponding data contains the ASN.1 DER encoding of the structure
   TD-CERT-DIGEST-ALGORITHMS-DATA defined as follows:


   TD-CERT-DIGEST-ALGORITHMS ::= INTEGER 112

   TD-CERT-DIGEST-ALGORITHMS-DATA ::= SEQUENCE {
           allowedAlgorithms [0] SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier,
                      -- Contains the list of CMS algorithm [RFC3852]
                      -- identifiers that identify the digest algorithms
                      -- that are used by the CA to sign the client's
                      -- X.509 certificate and acceptable by the KDC in
                      -- the process of validating the client's X.509
                      -- certificate, in the order of decreasing
                      -- preference.
           rejectedAlgorithm [1] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
                      -- This identifies the digest algorithm that was
                      -- used to sign the client's X.509 certificate and
                      -- has been rejected by the KDC in the process of
                      -- validating the client's X.509 certificate
                      -- [RFC3280].
           ...
   }


   The KDC fills in allowedAlgorithm field with the list of algorithm
   [RFC3852] identifiers that identify digest algorithms that are used
   by the CA to sign the client's X.509 certificate and acceptable by
   the KDC in the process of validating the client's X.509 certificate,
   in the order of decreasing preference.  The rejectedAlgorithm field
   identifies the signing algorithm for use in signing the client's
   X.509 certificate that has been rejected by the KDC in the process of
   validating the client's certificate [RFC3280].









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6.  KDF agility

   Based on [RFC3766] and [X9.42], Section 3.2.3.1 of [RFC4556] defines
   a Key Derivation Function (KDF) that derives a Kerberos protocol key
   based on the secret value generated by the Diffie-Hellman key
   exchange.  This KDF requires the use of SHA-1 [RFC4634].

   New KDFs defined in this document based on [SP80056A] can be used in
   conjunction with any hash functions.  A new KDF is identified by an
   object identifier.  The following KDF object identifiers are defined:



   id-pkinit-kdf OBJECT IDENTIFIER           ::= { id-pkinit 6 }
       -- PKINIT KDFs
   id-pkinit-kdf-ah-sha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER   ::= { id-pkinit-kdf 1 }
       -- SP800 56A ASN.1 structured hash based KDF using SHA-1
   id-pkinit-kdf-ah-sha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkinit-kdf 2 }
       -- SP800 56A ASN.1 structured hash based KDF using SHA-256
   id-pkinit-kdf-ah-sha512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkinit-kdf 3 }
       -- SP800 56A ASN.1 structured hash based KDF using SHA-512


   Where id-pkinit is defined in [RFC4556].  The id-pkinit-kdf-ah-sha1
   KDF is the ASN.1 structured hash based KDF (HKDF) [SP80056A] that
   uses SHA-1 [RFC4634] as the hash function.  Similarly id-pkinit-kdf-
   ah-sha256 and id-pkinit-kdf-ah-sha512 are the ASN.1 structured HKDF
   using SHA-256 [RFC4634] and SHA-512 [RFC4634] respectively.  The
   common input parameters for these KDFs are provided as follows:

   o  The secret value is the shared secret value generated by the
      Diffie-Hellman exchange.  The Diffie-Hellman shared value is first
      padded with leading zeros such that the size of the secret value
      in octets is the same as that of the modulus, then represented as
      a string of octets in big-endian order.

   o  The key data length is K. K is the key-generation seed length in
      bits [RFC3961] for the Authentication Service (AS) reply key.  The
      enctype of the AS reply key is selected according to [RFC4120].

   o  The algorithm identifier input parameter is the identifier of the
      respective KDF.  For example, this is id-pkinit-kdf-ah-sha1 if the
      KDF is the [SP80056A] ASN.1 structured HKDF using SHA-1 as the
      hash.

   o  The initiator identifier is an OCTET STRING that contains the
      ASN.1 DER encoding of the KRB5PrincipalName [RFC4556] that
      identifies the client as specified in the AS-REQ [RFC4120] in the



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      request.

   o  The recipient identifier is an OCTET STRING that contains the
      ASN.1 DER encoding of the KRB5PrincipalName [RFC4556] that
      identifies the TGS as specified in the AS-REQ [RFC4120] in the
      request.

   o  The supplemental private information is absent (not used).

   o  The supplemental public information is an OCTET STRING that
      contains the ASN.1 DER encoding of the structure PkinitSuppPubInfo
      as defined later in this section.

   o  The hash length is 128 for id-pkinit-kdf-ah-sha1, 256 for id-
      pkinit-kdf-ah-sha256, and 512 for id-pkinit-kdf-ah-sha512.

   o  The maximum hash input length is 2^64 in bits.

   The structure PkinitSuppPubInfo is defined as follows:


   PkinitSuppPubInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
          enctype           [0] Int32,
              -- The enctype of the AS reply key.
          as-REQ            [1] OCTET STRING,
              -- This contains the AS-REQ in the request.
          pk-as-rep         [2] OCTET STRING,
              -- Contains the DER encoding of the type
              -- PA-PK-AS-REP [RFC4556] in the KDC reply.
          ticket            [3] Ticket,
              -- This is the ticket in the KDC reply.
          ...
   }


   The PkinitSuppPubInfo structure contains mutually-known public
   information specific to the authentication exchange.  The enctype
   field is the enctype of the AS reply key as selected according to
   [RFC4120].  The as-REQ field contains the DER encoding of the type
   AS-REQ [RFC4120] in the request sent from the client to the KDC.
   Note that the as-REQ field does not include the wrapping 4 octet
   length field when TCP is used.  The pk-as-rep field contains the DER
   encoding of the type PA-PK-AS-REP [RFC4556] in the KDC reply.  The
   ticket field is filled with the ticket in the KDC reply.  The
   PkinitSuppPubInfo provides a cryptographic bindings between the pre-
   authentication data and the corresponding ticket request and
   response, thus addressing the concerns described in Section 3.




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   The above ASN.1 structured [SP80056A] HKDF produces a bit string of
   length K in bits as the keying material, and then the AS reply key is
   the output of random-to-key() [RFC3961] using that returned keying
   material as the input.

   The KDF is negotiated between the client and the KDC.  The client
   sends an unordered set of supported KDFs in the request, and the KDC
   picks one from the set in the reply.

   To acomplish this, the AuthPack structure in [RFC4556] is extended as
   follows:


   AuthPack ::= SEQUENCE {
          pkAuthenticator   [0] PKAuthenticator,
          clientPublicValue [1] SubjectPublicKeyInfo OPTIONAL,
          supportedCMSTypes [2] SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier
                   OPTIONAL,
          clientDHNonce     [3] DHNonce OPTIONAL,
          ...,
          supportedKDFs     [4] SEQUENCE OF KDFAlgorithmId OPTIONAL,
              -- Contains an unordered set of KDFs supported by the
              -- client.
          ...
   }

   KDFAlgorithmId ::= SEQUENCE {
          kdf-id            [0] OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
              -- The object identifier of the KDF
          ...
   }


   The new field supportedKDFs contains an unordered set of KDFs
   supported by the client.

   The KDFAlgorithmId structure contains an object identifier that
   identifies a KDF.  The algorithm of the KDF and its parameters are
   defined by the corresponding specification of that KDF.

   The DHRepInfo structure in [RFC4556] is extended as follows:










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   DHRepInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
           dhSignedData         [0] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING,
           serverDHNonce        [1] DHNonce OPTIONAL,
           ...,
           kdf                  [2] KDFAlgorithmId OPTIONAL,
               -- The KDF picked by the KDC.
           ...
   }


   The new field kdf in the extended DHRepInfo structure identifies the
   KDF picked by the KDC.  This kdf field MUST be filled by the
   comforming KDC if the supportedKDFs field is present in the request,
   and it MUST be one of the KDFs supported by the client as indicated
   in the request.  Which KDF is chosen is a matter of the local policy
   on the KDC.

   If the supportedKDFs field is not present in the request, the kdf
   field in the reply MUST be absent.

   If the client fills the supportedKDFs field in the request, but the
   kdf field in the reply is not present, the client can deduce that the
   KDC is not updated to conform with this specification.  In that case,
   it is a matter of local policy on the client whether to reject the
   reply when the kdf field is absent in the reply.

   Implementations comforming to this specification MUST support id-
   pkinit-kdf-ah-sha256.

   If no acceptable KDF is found, the error KDC_ERR_NO_ACCEPTABLE_KDF
   (82).

   PKINIT introduces the following new error code:

   o  KDC_ERR_NO_ACCEPTABLE_KDF 82
















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7.  Security Considerations

   This document describes negotiation of checksum types, key derivation
   functions and other cryptographic functions.  If negotiation is done
   unauthenticated, care MUST be taken to accept only acceptable values.














































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8.  Acknowledgements

   Jeffery Hutzelman and Shawn Emery reviewed the document and provided
   suggestions for improvements.















































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9.  IANA Considerations

   No IANA considerations.
















































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10.  References

10.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC3280]  Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W., and D. Solo, "Internet
              X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and
              Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280,
              April 2002.

   [RFC3766]  Orman, H. and P. Hoffman, "Determining Strengths For
              Public Keys Used For Exchanging Symmetric Keys", BCP 86,
              RFC 3766, April 2004.

   [RFC3852]  Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)",
              RFC 3852, July 2004.

   [RFC3961]  Raeburn, K., "Encryption and Checksum Specifications for
              Kerberos 5", RFC 3961, February 2005.

   [RFC4120]  Neuman, C., Yu, T., Hartman, S., and K. Raeburn, "The
              Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5)", RFC 4120,
              July 2005.

   [RFC4556]  Zhu, L. and B. Tung, "Public Key Cryptography for Initial
              Authentication in Kerberos (PKINIT)", RFC 4556, June 2006.

   [RFC4634]  Eastlake, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms
              (SHA and HMAC-SHA)", July 2006.

   [SP80056A]
              Barker, E., Don, D., and M. Smid, "Recommendation for
              Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete
              Logarithm Cryptography", March 2006.

   [X680]     ITU, "ITU-T Recommendation X.680 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-
              1:2002, Information technology - Abstract Syntax Notation
              One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation".

   [X690]     ITU, "ITU-T Recommendation X.690 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8825-
              1:2002, Information technology - ASN.1 encoding Rules:
              Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical
              Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules
              (DER)".





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10.2.  Informative References

   [RFC1320]  Rivest, R., "The MD4 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC 1320,
              April 1992.

   [RFC1321]  Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC 1321,
              April 1992.

   [WANG04]   Wang, X., Lai, X., Fheg, D., Chen, H., and X. Yu,
              "Cryptanalysis of Hash functions MD4 and RIPEMD",
              August 2004.

   [X9.42]    ANSI, "Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services
              Industry: Agreement of Symmetric Keys Using Discrete
              Logarithm Cryptography", 2003.




































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Appendix A.  PKINIT ASN.1 Module



   KerberosV5-PK-INIT-Agility-SPEC {
          iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
          security(5) kerberosV5(2) modules(4) pkinit(5) agility (1)
   } DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN

   IMPORTS
      AlgorithmIdentifier, SubjectPublicKeyInfo
          FROM PKIX1Explicit88 { iso (1)
            identified-organization (3) dod (6) internet (1)
            security (5) mechanisms (5) pkix (7) id-mod (0)
            id-pkix1-explicit (18) }
            -- As defined in RFC 3280.

      Ticket, Int32, Realm, EncryptionKey, Checksum
          FROM KerberosV5Spec2 { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
            dod(6) internet(1) security(5) kerberosV5(2)
            modules(4) krb5spec2(2) }
            -- as defined in RFC 4120.

      PKAuthenticator, DHNonce
          FROM KerberosV5-PK-INIT-SPEC {
            iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
            security(5) kerberosV5(2) modules(4) pkinit(5) };
            -- as defined in RFC 4556.

   TD-CMS-DIGEST-ALGORITHMS-DATA ::= SEQUENCE OF
       AlgorithmIdentifier
           -- Contains the list of CMS algorithm [RFC3852]
           -- identifiers that identify the digest algorithms
           -- acceptable by the KDC for signing CMS data in
           -- the order of decreasing preference.

   TD-CERT-DIGEST-ALGORITHMS-DATA ::= SEQUENCE {
          allowedAlgorithms [0] SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier,
              -- Contains the list of CMS algorithm [RFC3852]
              -- identifiers that identify the digest algorithms
              -- that are used by the CA to sign the client's
              -- X.509 certificate and acceptable by the KDC in
              -- the process of validating the client's X.509
              -- certificate, in the order of decreasing
              -- preference.
          rejectedAlgorithm [1] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
              -- This identifies the digest algorithm that was
              -- used to sign the client's X.509 certificate and



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              -- has been rejected by the KDC in the process of
              -- validating the client's X.509 certificate
              -- [RFC3280].
          ...
   }

   PkinitSuppPubInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
          enctype           [0] Int32,
              -- The enctype of the AS reply key.
          as-REQ            [1] OCTET STRING,
              -- This contains the AS-REQ in the request.
          pk-as-rep         [2] OCTET STRING,
              -- Contains the DER encoding of the type
              -- PA-PK-AS-REP [RFC4556] in the KDC reply.
          ticket            [3] Ticket,
              -- This is the ticket in the KDC reply.
          ...
   }

   AuthPack ::= SEQUENCE {
          pkAuthenticator   [0] PKAuthenticator,
          clientPublicValue [1] SubjectPublicKeyInfo OPTIONAL,
          supportedCMSTypes [2] SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier
                   OPTIONAL,
          clientDHNonce     [3] DHNonce OPTIONAL,
          ...,
          supportedKDFs     [4] SEQUENCE OF KDFAlgorithmId OPTIONAL,
              -- Contains an unordered set of KDFs supported by the
              -- client.
          ...
   }

   KDFAlgorithmId ::= SEQUENCE {
          kdf-id            [0] OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
              -- The object identifier of the KDF
          ...
   }

   DHRepInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
          dhSignedData      [0] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING,
          serverDHNonce     [1] DHNonce OPTIONAL,
          ...,
          kdf               [2] KDFAlgorithmId OPTIONAL,
              -- The KDF picked by the KDC.
          ...
   }
   END




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Authors' Addresses

   Love Hornquist Astrand
   Stockholm University
   SE-106 91 Stockholm
   Sweden

   Email: lha@it.su.se


   Larry Zhu
   Microsoft Corporation
   One Microsoft Way
   Redmond, WA  98052
   US

   Email: lzhu@microsoft.com


































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