| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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We pass the stack variable 'req' to dcerpc_winbind_SendToSam_r_send(),
so we need to make sure the runtime of the subreq in not longer
than the stack variable.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15253
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
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authsam_logon_success_accounting()
This fixes a use after free problem introduced by
commit 7b8e32efc336fb728e0c7e3dd6fbe2ed54122124,
which has msg = current; which means the lifetime
of the 'msg' memory is no longer in the scope of th
caller.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14611
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15253
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
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If the account has been locked out in the meantime (indicated by
NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_LOCKED_OUT), we should return the appropriate error
code.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14611
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
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If we find that the user has been locked out sometime during the request
(due to a race), we will now return an error code.
Note that we cannot avoid the MIT KDC aspect of the issue by checking
the return status of mit_samba_zero_bad_password_count(), because
kdb_vftabl::audit_as_req() returning void means we cannot pass on the
result.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14611
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
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This simplifies the code for the following commit.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14611
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
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Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Mon Sep 12 03:27:55 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
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This plugin is now only used by the kpasswd service. Thus, ensuring we
only look up the kadmin/changepw principal means we can't be fooled into
accepting tickets for other service principals. We make sure not to
specify a specific kvno, to ensure that we do not accept RODC-issued
tickets.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15074
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
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Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
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Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
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Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
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sdb_entry_ex will be removed shortly.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
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sdb_entry_ex will be removed shortly.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
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We should avoid sdb_entry_ex, as it will be removed soon.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
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Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
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This prepares the removal of sdb_entry_ex.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
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kdc_entry can be hdb_entry or krb5_db_entry.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
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Accounts in the Protected Users group acting as clients lack support for
the RC4 encryption type. TGTs issued to such accounts have a lifetime
restricted to four hours, and are unable to be proxied or forwarded.
To determine at lookup time whether a client account is a member of
Protected Users, we now also create an auth_user_info_dc structure when
creating the database entry for an AS-REQ, rather than only when
creating a PAC for a TGT, or when recreating the PAC from an RODC-issued
TGT.
This means that the user's groups are now expanded even for AS-REQs that
result in an error (such as a PREAUTH_REQUIRED error), but this is
required to be able to correctly determine the account's available
encryption types, which are needed soon after fetching the user account.
Currently, the TGT lifetime may exceed four hours (for Heimdal
specifically). This may happen if PKINIT is used, and either the
pkinit_max_life_from_cert_extension option is TRUE and
pkinit_max_life_bound is greater than four hours, or
pkinit_max_life_from_cert is greater than four hours.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
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Otherwise useful information gets lost while converting
from NTSTATUS to krb5_error and back to NTSTATUS again.
E.g. NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_DISABLED would be audited as
NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_LOCKED_OUT.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15015
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
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Cases to handle KDC_AUTH_EVENT_VALIDATED_LONG_TERM_KEY and
KDC_AUTH_EVENT_PREAUTH_SUCCEEDED were removed in:
commit 791be84c3eecb95e03611458e2305bae272ba267
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Wed Mar 2 10:10:08 2022 +1300
s4:kdc: hdb_samba4_audit() is only called once per request
Normally these auth event types are overwritten with the
KDC_AUTH_EVENT_CLIENT_AUTHORIZED event type, but if a client passes the
pre-authentication check, and happens to fail the client access check
(e.g. because the account is disabled), we get error messages of the
form:
hdb_samba4_audit: Unhandled hdb_auth_status=9 => INTERNAL_ERROR
To avoid such errors, use the error code provided in the request
structure to obtain a relevant status code in cases not handled
explicitly.
For unexpected values we return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC
in order to hopefully prevent success. And within make test
we panic in order let a ci run fail.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15015
Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
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The call to sdb_free_entry() was forgotten.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15000
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Fri Mar 11 11:05:55 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
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mapped_state is completely irrelevant for audit logging and
will also be removed in the next commits.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13879
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
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The most important case is that we still have a previous
password cached at the RODC and the inbound replication
hasn't wiped the cache yet and we also haven't triggered
a new replication yet.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14865
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
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So we need to restructure the logic a bit.
NOTE: This commit finally works again!
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14995
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Joseph Sutton <jsutton@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Mar 1 23:28:22 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
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This is to adapt to:
commit 6530021f09a5cab631be19a1b5898a0ba6b32f16
Author: Luke Howard <lukeh@padl.com>
Date: Thu Jan 13 14:37:29 2022 +1100
kdc: move auth event definitions into KDC header
Move KDC auth event macro definitions out of hdb.h and into a new KDC header,
kdc-audit.h.
NOTE: THIS COMMIT WON'T COMPILE/WORK ON ITS OWN!
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14995
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
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Rather than having a 'free_entry' member that can be called to free an
hdb_entry, we now implement the free function in HDB. We perform the
free only if the context pointer is non-NULL.
We also remove the ZERO_STRUCTP() in sdb_entry_to_hdb_entry(), as the
context pointer is now part of the 'hdb_entry' structure itself, and
this would undesirably zero it out.
This is an adaptation to Heimdal commits:
commit c5551775e204d00c7ee8055ab6ddbba7e0590584
Author: Luke Howard <lukeh@padl.com>
Date: Fri Jan 7 12:15:55 2022 +1100
hdb: decorate HDB_entry with context member
Decorate HDB_entry with context and move free_entry callback into HDB structure
itself. Requires updating hdb_free_entry() signature to include HDB parameter.
A follow-up commit will consolidate hdb_entry_ex (which has a single hdb_entry
member) into hdb_entry.
commit 0e8c4ccc6ee0123ea39e53e8917fc3f6bb74e8c8
Author: Luke Howard <lukeh@padl.com>
Date: Fri Jan 7 12:54:40 2022 +1100
hdb: eliminate hdb_entry_ex
Remove hdb_entry_ex and revert to the original design of hdb_entry (except with
an additional context member in hdb_entry which is managed by the free_entry
method in HDB).
NOTE: THIS COMMIT WON'T COMPILE/WORK ON ITS OWN!
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14995
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
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This is an adaptation to Heimdal:
commit 06f8985c55fcd23e3efe0017ed2480c5b3c4524f
Author: Luke Howard <lukeh@padl.com>
Date: Wed Jan 5 09:42:03 2022 +1100
hdb: consolidate preauth audit event types
Instead of having distinct preauth success/failure events for different
mechanisms, have a single event; the mechanism can be disambiguated by querying
the HDB_REQUEST_KV_PA_NAME key.
Note: there is still an explicit event for long-term key-based success/failure
in order to help the backend implement lockout.
Audit failure (HDB_AUTH_EVENT_PREAUTH_FAILED) in the main preauth loop, rather
than in each mechanism. Success is still audited in the mechanism to allow
client pre-authentication success to be noted even if something subsequent
(e.g. encoding a reply, memory allocation) fails. The generic catch-all for
success remains.
NOTE: THIS COMMIT WON'T COMPILE/WORK ON ITS OWN!
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14995
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
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This is an adaptation to Heimdal:
commit d683780b1d728bf8c5b794a1f66842e5a25bd360
Author: Luke Howard <lukeh@padl.com>
Date: Sat Jan 1 23:44:05 2022 +1100
kdc: separate PKINIT/GSS authorization failure
Create a new audit event for PKINIT/GSS authorization (impersonation) failure
NOTE: THIS COMMIT WON'T COMPILE/WORK ON ITS OWN!
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14995
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
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This is an adaptation to Heimdal:
commit e15e711b13e2fb33f4480a054cba60b6c4c0183b
Author: Luke Howard <lukeh@padl.com>
Date: Sat Jan 1 18:05:51 2022 +1100
kdc: remove auth_event_details audit key
The auth event details audit key (formerly, parameter to auth_status)
contained, variously, an encryption type name; a PKINIT client certificate
name; or, a GSS initiator name. Audit these instead using individual keys that
reflect the values' contents.
NOTE: THIS COMMIT WON'T COMPILE/WORK ON ITS OWN!
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14995
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
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This is an adaptation to Heimdal:
commit b1dcc1a47485165ada778ef3c3463cfc0779d183
Author: Luke Howard <lukeh@padl.com>
Date: Fri Dec 31 17:24:58 2021 +1100
kdc: refactor Samba-specific auditing API in terms of existing API
Make Samba-specific HDB auth status API a wrapper on the existing auditing API,
with a view towards unifying the two APIs in a future commit.
The term "auth status" is replaced with "auth event", and the HDB auth_status
method is replaced with a more general purpose audit method which has access to
the entire request structure.
NOTE: THIS COMMIT WON'T COMPILE/WORK ON ITS OWN!
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14995
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
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We used to have a 1 to 1 mapping, but now we have
a conflict with these:
#define SDB_F_FORCE_CANON 16384
#define HDB_F_PRECHECK 16384
We currently don't really care about HDB_F_PRECHECK,
so we can just filter it out.
In the long run we may change the SDB flags space to uint64...
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14960
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Fri Jan 28 13:33:22 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
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BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14960
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
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Note Windows uses the string "MICROSOFT" as cookie,
so it's wrong to have a per DC cookie, but we need to
adjust the Heimdal logic to support that.
NOTE: THIS COMMIT WON'T COMPILE/WORK ON ITS OWN!
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
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Including updates to hook into the improved hdb_auth_status
by Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> from his Heimdal
upgrade branch.
NOTE: THIS COMMIT WON'T COMPILE/WORK ON ITS OWN!
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
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Additional fields may be added to this structure without us explicitly
initialising them. This could cause Heimdal to crash upon reading
garbage data, so we should zero-initialise the structure.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Dec 9 02:47:27 UTC 2021 on sn-devel-184
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Looking up the DB twice is subject to a race and is a poor
use of resources, so instead just pass in the record we
already got when trying to confirm that the server in
S4U2Self is the same as the requesting client.
The client record has already been bound to the the
original client by the SID check in the PAC.
Likewise by looking up server only once we ensure
that the keys looked up originally are in the record
we confirm the SID for here.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14686
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
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Fixes csbuild errors
Error: COMPILER_WARNING:
auth/auth_log.c: scope_hint: In function ‘log_authentication_event_json’
auth/auth_log.c:146:14: warning: unused parameter ‘unix_username’
[-Wunused-parameter]
Error: COMPILER_WARNING:
auth/auth_log.c: scope_hint: In function
‘log_authentication_event_human_readable’
auth/auth_log.c:586:14: warning: unused parameter ‘unix_username’
[-Wunused-parameter]
Signed-off-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
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Generate and pass the logon_id in SamLogon calls
Signed-off-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
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Fold the two 32 bit values logon_id_high and logon_id_low into a single
64 bit logon_id in netr_identity_info. This will be used to tie
together winbind and SamLogon requests in audit logging.
Summary of the of the Query and Response from Microsoft on it's usage.
[REG:119013019612095] [MS-NRPC]: NETLOGON_LOGON_IDENTITY_INFO: Does
the Reserved field have LogonId meaning?
Questions:
In NetrLogonSamLogonEx does the Reserved field
(of NETLOGON_LOGON_IDENTITY_INFO) have LogonId meaning?
What is a valid LogonID, and does have any audit usage?
Samba is sending a constant "deadbeef" in hex and would like to
understand any usage of this field.
Response:
The NRPC spec is accurate in defining the field as Reserved, and without
protocol significance. In the header file in our source code, it is
defined as LogonId and commented as such, but it’s effectively not used.
This is probably why the API structure has that field name. It may have
been intended as such but it’s not used.
Samba will send a random value in this field.
Signed-off-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
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This is not a general purpose profiling solution, but these JSON logs are already being
generated and stored, so this is worth adding.
Some administrators are very keen to know how long authentication
takes, particularly due to long replication transactions in other
processes.
This complements a similar patch set to log the transaction duration.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
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Signed-off-by: Mathieu Parent <math.parent@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
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HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE indicated a very specific error on an RODC.
We should not map any error to HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE,
we should just pass errors along unmapped.
Otherwise we'll hit the logic bug in:
if (ret == KDC_PROXY_REQUEST) {
uint16_t port;
if (!sock->kdc_socket->kdc->am_rodc) {
DEBUG(0,("kdc_udp_call_loop: proxying requested when not RODC"));
talloc_free(call);
goto done;
}
And just don't send an error message to the client.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13132
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Dec 6 23:16:54 CET 2017 on sn-devel-144
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This allows you to forward bad password count resets to 0. Currently,
there is a missing access check for the RODC to ensure it only applies
to cached users (msDS-Allowed-Password-Replication-Group).
(further patches still need to address forcing a RWDC contact)
Signed-off-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
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This means that a RWDC will be collecting the badPwdCount to ensure
domain wide lockout.
TODO The parameters should be better constructed.
Signed-off-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
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We now pass on the original client name and the client address to allow
consistent audit logging in Samba across multiple protocols.
We use config->db[0] to find the first database to record incorrect
users.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
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lastLogon is supposed to be updated for every interactive or kerberos
login, and (according to testing against Windows2012r2) when the bad
password count is non-zero but the lockout time is zero. It is not
replicated.
lastLogonTimestamp is updated if the old value is more than 14 -
random.choice([0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5]) days old, and it is replicated. The
14 in this calculation is the default, stored as
"msDS-LogonTimeSyncInterval", which we offer no interface for
changing.
The authsam_zero_bad_pwd_count() function is a convenient place to
update these values, as it is called upon a successful logon however
that logon is performed. That makes the function's name inaccurate, so
we rename it authsam_logon_success_accounting(). It also needs to be
told whet5her the login is interactive.
The password_lockout tests are extended to test lastLogon and
lasLogonTimestamp.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
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Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
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Guenther
Pair-Programmed-With: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Guenther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Bokovoy <ab@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Jul 30 13:29:27 CEST 2015 on sn-devel-104
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Guenther
Signed-off-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
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samba_kdc_check_pkinit_ms_upn_match().
Guenther
Signed-off-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
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Guenther
Signed-off-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
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