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* VERSION: Disable GIT_SNAPSHOT for the 4.7.12 release.samba-4.7.12v4-7-stableKarolin Seeger2018-11-261-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | o CVE-2018-14629 (Unprivileged adding of CNAME record causing loop in AD Internal DNS server) o CVE-2018-16841 (Double-free in Samba AD DC KDC with PKINIT) o CVE-2018-16851 (NULL pointer de-reference in Samba AD DC LDAP server) o CVE-2018-16853 (Samba AD DC S4U2Self crash in experimental MIT Kerberos configuration (unsupported)) Signed-off-by: Karolin Seeger <kseeger@samba.org>
* WHATSNEW: Add release notes for Samba 4.7.12.Karolin Seeger2018-11-261-2/+101
| | | | | | | | | | | o CVE-2018-14629 (Unprivileged adding of CNAME record causing loop in AD Internal DNS server) o CVE-2018-16841 (Double-free in Samba AD DC KDC with PKINIT) o CVE-2018-16851 (NULL pointer de-reference in Samba AD DC LDAP server) o CVE-2018-16853 (Samba AD DC S4U2Self crash in experimental MIT Kerberos configuration (unsupported)) Signed-off-by: Karolin Seeger <kseeger@samba.org>
* CVE-2018-16853 build: The Samba AD DC, when build with MIT Kerberos is ↵Andrew Bartlett2018-11-261-0/+17
| | | | | | | | | | | experimental This matches https://wiki.samba.org/index.php/Running_a_Samba_AD_DC_with_MIT_Kerberos_KDC BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13678 Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
* CVE-2018-16851 ldap_server: Check ret before manipulating blobGarming Sam2018-11-261-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | In the case of hitting the talloc ~256MB limit, this causes a crash in the server. Note that you would actually need to load >256MB of data into the LDAP. Although there is some generated/hidden data which would help you reach that limit (descriptors and RMD blobs). BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13674 Signed-off-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz> Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
* CVE-2018-16841 selftest: Check for mismatching principal in certficate ↵Andrew Bartlett2018-11-261-0/+8
| | | | | | | | compared with principal in AS-REQ BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13628 Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
* CVE-2018-16841 heimdal: Fix segfault on PKINIT with mis-matching principalAndrew Bartlett2018-11-261-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | In Heimdal KRB5_KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH is an enum, so we tried to double-free mem_ctx. This was introduced in 9a0263a7c316112caf0265237bfb2cfb3a3d370d for the MIT KDC effort. BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13628 Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
* CVE-2018-14629 dns: CNAME loop prevention using counterAaron Haslett2018-11-263-0/+36
| | | | | | | | | | | Count number of answers generated by internal DNS query routine and stop at 20 to match Microsoft's loop prevention mechanism. BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13600 Signed-off-by: Aaron Haslett <aaronhaslett@catalyst.net.nz> Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
* VERSION: Bump version up to 4.7.12...Karolin Seeger2018-11-261-2/+2
| | | | | | | and re-enable GIT_SNAPSHOT. Signed-off-by: Karolin Seeger <kseeger@samba.org> (cherry picked from commit 787ab0993889f5ac06691426d7eca3d78bded4a6)
* VERSION: Disable GIT_SNAPSHOT for the 4.7.11 release.samba-4.7.11Karolin Seeger2018-10-221-1/+1
| | | | Signed-off-by: Karolin Seeger <kseeger@samba.org>
* WHATSNEW: Add release notes for Samba 4.7.11.Karolin Seeger2018-10-221-2/+67
| | | | Signed-off-by: Karolin Seeger <kseeger@samba.org>
* s3:winbind: Fix regression introduced with bso #12851Andreas Schneider2018-10-191-18/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12851 Pair-Programmed-With: Guenther Deschner <gd@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Guenther Deschner <gd@samba.org> (cherry picked from commit c1c764925e24788905ab91aa455b415765d6f71f) Autobuild-User(v4-7-test): Karolin Seeger <kseeger@samba.org> Autobuild-Date(v4-7-test): Fri Oct 19 15:17:27 CEST 2018 on sn-devel-144
* smb2_server: set req->do_encryption = true earlierStefan Metzmacher2018-10-102-7/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The STATUS_SESSION_EXPIRED error was returned unencrypted, if the request was encrypted. If clients use SMB3 encryption and the kerberos authenticated session expires, clients disconnect the connection instead of doing a reauthentication. From https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/openspecification/2012/10/05/encryption-in-smb-3-0-a-protocol-perspective/ The sender encrypts the message if any of the following conditions is satisfied: - If the sender is sending a response to an encrypted request. - If Session.EncryptData is TRUE and the request or response being sent is not NEGOTIATE. - If Session.EncryptData is FALSE, the request or response being sent is not NEGOTIATE or SESSION_SETUP or TREE_CONNECT, and <TreeConnect|Share>.EncryptData is TRUE. [MS-SMB2] 3.3.4.1.4 Encrypting the Message If Connection.Dialect belongs to the SMB 3.x dialect family and Connection.ClientCapabilities includes the SMB2_GLOBAL_CAP_ENCRYPTION bit, the server MUST encrypt the message before sending, if any of the following conditions are satisfied: - If the message being sent is any response to a client request for which Request.IsEncrypted is TRUE. - If Session.EncryptData is TRUE and the response being sent is not SMB2_NEGOTIATE or SMB2 SESSION_SETUP. - If Session.EncryptData is FALSE, the response being sent is not SMB2_NEGOTIATE or SMB2 SESSION_SETUP or SMB2 TREE_CONNECT, and Share.EncryptData for the share associated with the TreeId in the SMB2 header of the response is TRUE. The server MUST encrypt the message as specified in section 3.1.4.3, before sending it to the client. BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13624 Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org> Autobuild-User(master): Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org> Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Oct 2 14:11:30 CEST 2018 on sn-devel-144 (cherry picked from commit 4ef45e5334d5874f5d0fdc69286b745ebcdc612d) Autobuild-User(v4-7-test): Karolin Seeger <kseeger@samba.org> Autobuild-Date(v4-7-test): Wed Oct 10 15:51:31 CEST 2018 on sn-devel-144
* s4:torture: split smb2.session.expire{1,2} to run with signing and encryptpionStefan Metzmacher2018-10-102-4/+48
| | | | | | | | | | This reproduces the problem we have with expired encrypted sessions. BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13624 Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org> (cherry picked from commit 01b868455c9bae309d1ca7ddad54077fc5d7f4b1)
* s3: smbd: Prevent valgrind errors in smbtorture3 POSIX test.Jeremy Allison2018-10-091-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Missing fsp talloc free and linked list delete in error paths in close_directory(). Now matches close_normal_file() and close_fake_file(). BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13633 Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org> Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org> Autobuild-Date(master): Sat Sep 29 05:32:41 CEST 2018 on sn-devel-144 (cherry picked from commit 660dbfaeff493359474ebdb36098ac49b3f7ba0c) Autobuild-User(v4-7-test): Karolin Seeger <kseeger@samba.org> Autobuild-Date(v4-7-test): Tue Oct 9 17:20:22 CEST 2018 on sn-devel-144
* lib: Hold at most 10 outstanding paged result cookiesVolker Lendecke2018-09-281-0/+22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13362 Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org> Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org> Autobuild-Date(master): Tue May 15 09:37:21 CEST 2018 on sn-devel-144 (cherry picked from commit 9fbd4672b06de5333a9c44fc126b8edac0b9d31a) Autobuild-User(v4-7-test): Karolin Seeger <kseeger@samba.org> Autobuild-Date(v4-7-test): Fri Sep 28 13:55:34 CEST 2018 on sn-devel-144
* lib: Put "results_store" into a doubly linked listVolker Lendecke2018-09-281-20/+5
| | | | | | | Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13362 Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org> (cherry picked from commit 8063995a92fffc93aa9d6d1d92a75bf3f3c9592b)
* krb5-samba: interdomain trust uses different salt principalAlexander Bokovoy2018-09-056-26/+63
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Salt principal for the interdomain trust is krbtgt/DOMAIN@REALM where DOMAIN is the sAMAccountName without the dollar sign ($) The salt principal for the BLA$ user object was generated wrong. dn: CN=bla.base,CN=System,DC=w4edom-l4,DC=base securityIdentifier: S-1-5-21-4053568372-2049667917-3384589010 trustDirection: 3 trustPartner: bla.base trustPosixOffset: -2147483648 trustType: 2 trustAttributes: 8 flatName: BLA dn: CN=BLA$,CN=Users,DC=w4edom-l4,DC=base userAccountControl: 2080 primaryGroupID: 513 objectSid: S-1-5-21-278041429-3399921908-1452754838-1597 accountExpires: 9223372036854775807 sAMAccountName: BLA$ sAMAccountType: 805306370 pwdLastSet: 131485652467995000 The salt stored by Windows in the package_PrimaryKerberosBlob (within supplementalCredentials) seems to be 'W4EDOM-L4.BASEkrbtgtBLA' for the above trust and Samba stores 'W4EDOM-L4.BASEBLA$'. While the salt used when building the keys from trustAuthOutgoing/trustAuthIncoming is 'W4EDOM-L4.BASEkrbtgtBLA.BASE', which we handle correct. BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13539 Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <ab@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Sep 5 03:57:22 CEST 2018 on sn-devel-144 (cherry picked from commit f3e349bebc443133fdbe4e14b148ca8db8237060) Autobuild-User(v4-7-test): Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> Autobuild-Date(v4-7-test): Wed Sep 5 18:44:46 CEST 2018 on sn-devel-144
* testprogs/blackbox: let test_trust_user_account.sh check the correct ↵Stefan Metzmacher2018-09-052-0/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | kerberos salt This demonstrates the bug we currently have. BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13539 Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> (cherry picked from commit 1b31fa62567ec549e32c9177b322cfbfb3b6ec1a)
* testprogs/blackbox: add testit[_expect_failure]_grep() to subunit.shStefan Metzmacher2018-09-051-0/+50
| | | | | | | | BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13539 Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> (cherry picked from commit 8526feb100e59bc5a15ceb940e6cecce0de59247)
* samba-tool: add virtualKerberosSalt attribute to 'user ↵Stefan Metzmacher2018-09-051-0/+24
| | | | | | | | | | | | | getpassword/syncpasswords' This might be useful for someone, but at least it's very useful for tests. BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13539 Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> (cherry picked from commit 39c281a23673691bab621de1a632d64df2c1c102)
* s4:selftest: test kinit with the interdomain trust user accountAlexander Bokovoy2018-09-052-0/+45
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | To test it, add a blackbox test that ensures we pass a keytab-based authentication with the trust user account for a trusted domain. BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13539 Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <ab@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> (cherry picked from commit 7df505298f71432d5adbcffccde8f97c117a57a6)
* libds: rename UF_MACHINE_ACCOUNT_MASK to UF_TRUST_ACCOUNT_MASKRalph Boehme2018-09-051-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | The name UF_TRUST_ACCOUNT_MASK better reflects the use case and it's not yet used. Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> (cherry picked from commit 8497d2090900b252853278f29a4aaf3bce7515da)
* vfs_fruit: Don't unlink the main fileVolker Lendecke2018-09-052-2/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The original fix for bug 13441 was missing a check that verifies that fruit_ftruncate() is actually called on a stream. Follow-up to Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13441 Pair-Programmed-With: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org> Autobuild-User(master): Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org> Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Aug 23 15:28:48 CEST 2018 on sn-devel-144 (cherry picked from commit 8c14234871820eacde46670d722a676fb5f3a46c)
* torture: Make sure that fruit_ftruncate only unlinks streamsVolker Lendecke2018-09-052-0/+46
| | | | | | | | | | Follow-up to Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13441 Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org> (cherry picked from commit c39ec64231b261fe4ada02f1f1b9aa344cf35bb5)
* s3:smbd: add a comment stating that file_close_user() is redundant for SMB2Ralph Boehme2018-09-051-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13549 Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org> Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org> Autobuild-Date(master): Sat Sep 1 01:26:35 CEST 2018 on sn-devel-144 (cherry picked from commit 5d95f79f604d90c2646225a0f2470f05dd71e19e)
* s3:smbd: let session logoff close files and tcons before deleting the sessionRalph Boehme2018-09-052-24/+23
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This avoids a race in durable handle reconnects if the reconnect comes in while the old session is still in the tear-down phase. The new session is supposed to rendezvous with and wait for destruction of the old session, which is internally implemented with dbwrap_watch_send() on the old session record. If the old session deletes the session record before calling file_close_user() which marks all file handles as disconnected, the durable handle reconnect in the new session will fail as the records are not yet marked as disconnected which is a prerequisite. Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13549 Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org> (cherry picked from commit 8f6edcc1645e0ed35eaec914bd0b672500ce986c)
* s3:smbd: reorder tcon global record deletion and closing files of a tconRalph Boehme2018-09-051-19/+19
| | | | | | | | | | | | | As such, this doesn't change overall behaviour, but in case we ever add semantics acting on tcon record changes via an API like dbwrap_watch_send(), this will make a difference as it enforces ordering. Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13549 Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org> (backported from commit b70b8503faded81b10859131f08486349876d132)
* selftest: add a durable handle test with delayed disconnectRalph Boehme2018-09-057-1/+132
| | | | | | | | Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13549 Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org> (cherry picked from commit 5508024a861e7c85e6c837552ad142aa1d5e8eca)
* s4:selftest: reformat smb2_s3only listRalph Boehme2018-09-051-1/+6
| | | | | | | | | | No change besides reformatting the list to one entry per line. Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13549 Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org> (cherry picked from commit 3255822f75163cb38e53f634a5c6b03d46bfaff1)
* vfs_delay_inject: adding delay to VFS callsRalph Boehme2018-09-053-0/+66
| | | | | | | | Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13549 Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org> (cherry picked from commit 44840ba5b32a2ce7959fd3d7c87822b3159416d3)
* s4:rpc_server/netlogon: don't treet trusted domains as primary in ↵Stefan Metzmacher2018-09-052-58/+82
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | LogonGetDomainInfo() We need to handle trusted domains differently than our primary domain. The most important part is that we don't return NETR_TRUST_FLAG_PRIMARY for them. NETR_TRUST_FLAG_{INBOUND,OUTBOUND,IN_FOREST} are the relavant flags for trusts. This is an example of what Windows returns in a complex trust environment: netr_LogonGetDomainInfo: struct netr_LogonGetDomainInfo out: struct netr_LogonGetDomainInfo return_authenticator : * return_authenticator: struct netr_Authenticator cred: struct netr_Credential data : f48b51ff12ff8c6c timestamp : Tue Aug 28 22:59:03 2018 CEST info : * info : union netr_DomainInfo(case 1) domain_info : * domain_info: struct netr_DomainInformation primary_domain: struct netr_OneDomainInfo domainname: struct lsa_StringLarge length : 0x0014 (20) size : 0x0016 (22) string : * string : 'W2012R2-L4' dns_domainname: struct lsa_StringLarge length : 0x0020 (32) size : 0x0022 (34) string : * string : 'w2012r2-l4.base.' dns_forestname: struct lsa_StringLarge length : 0x0020 (32) size : 0x0022 (34) string : * string : 'w2012r2-l4.base.' domain_guid : 0a133c91-8eac-4df0-96ac-ede69044a38b domain_sid : * domain_sid : S-1-5-21-2930975464-1937418634-1288008815 trust_extension: struct netr_trust_extension_container length : 0x0000 (0) size : 0x0000 (0) info : NULL dummy_string2: struct lsa_StringLarge length : 0x0000 (0) size : 0x0000 (0) string : NULL dummy_string3: struct lsa_StringLarge length : 0x0000 (0) size : 0x0000 (0) string : NULL dummy_string4: struct lsa_StringLarge length : 0x0000 (0) size : 0x0000 (0) string : NULL dummy_long1 : 0x00000000 (0) dummy_long2 : 0x00000000 (0) dummy_long3 : 0x00000000 (0) dummy_long4 : 0x00000000 (0) trusted_domain_count : 0x00000006 (6) trusted_domains : * trusted_domains: ARRAY(6) trusted_domains: struct netr_OneDomainInfo domainname: struct lsa_StringLarge length : 0x000e (14) size : 0x0010 (16) string : * string : 'FREEIPA' dns_domainname: struct lsa_StringLarge length : 0x0018 (24) size : 0x001a (26) string : * string : 'freeipa.base' dns_forestname: struct lsa_StringLarge length : 0x0000 (0) size : 0x0000 (0) string : NULL domain_guid : 00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000 domain_sid : * domain_sid : S-1-5-21-429948374-2562621466-335716826 trust_extension: struct netr_trust_extension_container length : 0x0010 (16) size : 0x0010 (16) info : * info: struct netr_trust_extension length : 0x00000008 (8) dummy : 0x00000000 (0) size : 0x00000008 (8) flags : 0x00000022 (34) 0: NETR_TRUST_FLAG_IN_FOREST 1: NETR_TRUST_FLAG_OUTBOUND 0: NETR_TRUST_FLAG_TREEROOT 0: NETR_TRUST_FLAG_PRIMARY 0: NETR_TRUST_FLAG_NATIVE 1: NETR_TRUST_FLAG_INBOUND 0: NETR_TRUST_FLAG_MIT_KRB5 0: NETR_TRUST_FLAG_AES parent_index : 0x00000000 (0) trust_type : LSA_TRUST_TYPE_UPLEVEL (2) trust_attributes : 0x00000008 (8) 0: LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_NON_TRANSITIVE 0: LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_UPLEVEL_ONLY 0: LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_QUARANTINED_DOMAIN 1: LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_FOREST_TRANSITIVE 0: LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_CROSS_ORGANIZATION 0: LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_WITHIN_FOREST 0: LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_TREAT_AS_EXTERNAL 0: LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_USES_RC4_ENCRYPTION dummy_string2: struct lsa_StringLarge length : 0x0000 (0) size : 0x0000 (0) string : NULL dummy_string3: struct lsa_StringLarge length : 0x0000 (0) size : 0x0000 (0) string : NULL dummy_string4: struct lsa_StringLarge length : 0x0000 (0) size : 0x0000 (0) string : NULL dummy_long1 : 0x00000000 (0) dummy_long2 : 0x00000000 (0) dummy_long3 : 0x00000000 (0) dummy_long4 : 0x00000000 (0) trusted_domains: struct netr_OneDomainInfo domainname: struct lsa_StringLarge length : 0x0016 (22) size : 0x0018 (24) string : * string : 'S1-W2012-L4' dns_domainname: struct lsa_StringLarge length : 0x0036 (54) size : 0x0038 (56) string : * string : 's1-w2012-l4.w2012r2-l4.base' dns_forestname: struct lsa_StringLarge length : 0x0000 (0) size : 0x0000 (0) string : NULL domain_guid : afe7fbde-af82-46cf-88a2-2df6920fc33e domain_sid : * domain_sid : S-1-5-21-1368093395-3821428921-3924672915 trust_extension: struct netr_trust_extension_container length : 0x0010 (16) size : 0x0010 (16) info : * info: struct netr_trust_extension length : 0x00000008 (8) dummy : 0x00000000 (0) size : 0x00000008 (8) flags : 0x00000023 (35) 1: NETR_TRUST_FLAG_IN_FOREST 1: NETR_TRUST_FLAG_OUTBOUND 0: NETR_TRUST_FLAG_TREEROOT 0: NETR_TRUST_FLAG_PRIMARY 0: NETR_TRUST_FLAG_NATIVE 1: NETR_TRUST_FLAG_INBOUND 0: NETR_TRUST_FLAG_MIT_KRB5 0: NETR_TRUST_FLAG_AES parent_index : 0x00000004 (4) trust_type : LSA_TRUST_TYPE_UPLEVEL (2) trust_attributes : 0x00000020 (32) 0: LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_NON_TRANSITIVE 0: LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_UPLEVEL_ONLY 0: LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_QUARANTINED_DOMAIN 0: LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_FOREST_TRANSITIVE 0: LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_CROSS_ORGANIZATION 1: LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_WITHIN_FOREST 0: LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_TREAT_AS_EXTERNAL 0: LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_USES_RC4_ENCRYPTION dummy_string2: struct lsa_StringLarge length : 0x0000 (0) size : 0x0000 (0) string : NULL dummy_string3: struct lsa_StringLarge length : 0x0000 (0) size : 0x0000 (0) string : NULL dummy_string4: struct lsa_StringLarge length : 0x0000 (0) size : 0x0000 (0) string : NULL dummy_long1 : 0x00000000 (0) dummy_long2 : 0x00000000 (0) dummy_long3 : 0x00000000 (0) dummy_long4 : 0x00000000 (0) trusted_domains: struct netr_OneDomainInfo domainname: struct lsa_StringLarge length : 0x0006 (6) size : 0x0008 (8) string : * string : 'BLA' dns_domainname: struct lsa_StringLarge length : 0x0010 (16) size : 0x0012 (18) string : * string : 'bla.base' dns_forestname: struct lsa_StringLarge length : 0x0000 (0) size : 0x0000 (0) string : NULL domain_guid : 00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000 domain_sid : * domain_sid : S-1-5-21-4053568372-2049667917-3384589010 trust_extension: struct netr_trust_extension_container length : 0x0010 (16) size : 0x0010 (16) info : * info: struct netr_trust_extension length : 0x00000008 (8) dummy : 0x00000000 (0) size : 0x00000008 (8) flags : 0x00000022 (34) 0: NETR_TRUST_FLAG_IN_FOREST 1: NETR_TRUST_FLAG_OUTBOUND 0: NETR_TRUST_FLAG_TREEROOT 0: NETR_TRUST_FLAG_PRIMARY 0: NETR_TRUST_FLAG_NATIVE 1: NETR_TRUST_FLAG_INBOUND 0: NETR_TRUST_FLAG_MIT_KRB5 0: NETR_TRUST_FLAG_AES parent_index : 0x00000000 (0) trust_type : LSA_TRUST_TYPE_UPLEVEL (2) trust_attributes : 0x00000008 (8) 0: LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_NON_TRANSITIVE 0: LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_UPLEVEL_ONLY 0: LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_QUARANTINED_DOMAIN 1: LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_FOREST_TRANSITIVE 0: LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_CROSS_ORGANIZATION 0: LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_WITHIN_FOREST 0: LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_TREAT_AS_EXTERNAL 0: LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_USES_RC4_ENCRYPTION dummy_string2: struct lsa_StringLarge length : 0x0000 (0) size : 0x0000 (0) string : NULL dummy_string3: struct lsa_StringLarge length : 0x0000 (0) size : 0x0000 (0) string : NULL dummy_string4: struct lsa_StringLarge length : 0x0000 (0) size : 0x0000 (0) string : NULL dummy_long1 : 0x00000000 (0) dummy_long2 : 0x00000000 (0) dummy_long3 : 0x00000000 (0) dummy_long4 : 0x00000000 (0) trusted_domains: struct netr_OneDomainInfo domainname: struct lsa_StringLarge length : 0x000c (12) size : 0x000e (14) string : * string : 'S4XDOM' dns_domainname: struct lsa_StringLarge length : 0x0016 (22) size : 0x0018 (24) string : * string : 's4xdom.base' dns_forestname: struct lsa_StringLarge length : 0x0000 (0) size : 0x0000 (0) string : NULL domain_guid : 00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000 domain_sid : * domain_sid : S-1-5-21-313966788-4060240134-2249344781 trust_extension: struct netr_trust_extension_container length : 0x0010 (16) size : 0x0010 (16) info : * info: struct netr_trust_extension length : 0x00000008 (8) dummy : 0x00000000 (0) size : 0x00000008 (8) flags : 0x00000022 (34) 0: NETR_TRUST_FLAG_IN_FOREST 1: NETR_TRUST_FLAG_OUTBOUND 0: NETR_TRUST_FLAG_TREEROOT 0: NETR_TRUST_FLAG_PRIMARY 0: NETR_TRUST_FLAG_NATIVE 1: NETR_TRUST_FLAG_INBOUND 0: NETR_TRUST_FLAG_MIT_KRB5 0: NETR_TRUST_FLAG_AES parent_index : 0x00000000 (0) trust_type : LSA_TRUST_TYPE_UPLEVEL (2) trust_attributes : 0x00000008 (8) 0: LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_NON_TRANSITIVE 0: LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_UPLEVEL_ONLY 0: LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_QUARANTINED_DOMAIN 1: LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_FOREST_TRANSITIVE 0: LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_CROSS_ORGANIZATION 0: LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_WITHIN_FOREST 0: LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_TREAT_AS_EXTERNAL 0: LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_USES_RC4_ENCRYPTION dummy_string2: struct lsa_StringLarge length : 0x0000 (0) size : 0x0000 (0) string : NULL dummy_string3: struct lsa_StringLarge length : 0x0000 (0) size : 0x0000 (0) string : NULL dummy_string4: struct lsa_StringLarge length : 0x0000 (0) size : 0x0000 (0) string : NULL dummy_long1 : 0x00000000 (0) dummy_long2 : 0x00000000 (0) dummy_long3 : 0x00000000 (0) dummy_long4 : 0x00000000 (0) trusted_domains: struct netr_OneDomainInfo domainname: struct lsa_StringLarge length : 0x0014 (20) size : 0x0016 (22) string : * string : 'W2012R2-L4' dns_domainname: struct lsa_StringLarge length : 0x001e (30) size : 0x0020 (32) string : * string : 'w2012r2-l4.base' dns_forestname: struct lsa_StringLarge length : 0x0000 (0) size : 0x0000 (0) string : NULL domain_guid : 0a133c91-8eac-4df0-96ac-ede69044a38b domain_sid : * domain_sid : S-1-5-21-2930975464-1937418634-1288008815 trust_extension: struct netr_trust_extension_container length : 0x0010 (16) size : 0x0010 (16) info : * info: struct netr_trust_extension length : 0x00000008 (8) dummy : 0x00000000 (0) size : 0x00000008 (8) flags : 0x0000001d (29) 1: NETR_TRUST_FLAG_IN_FOREST 0: NETR_TRUST_FLAG_OUTBOUND 1: NETR_TRUST_FLAG_TREEROOT 1: NETR_TRUST_FLAG_PRIMARY 1: NETR_TRUST_FLAG_NATIVE 0: NETR_TRUST_FLAG_INBOUND 0: NETR_TRUST_FLAG_MIT_KRB5 0: NETR_TRUST_FLAG_AES parent_index : 0x00000000 (0) trust_type : LSA_TRUST_TYPE_UPLEVEL (2) trust_attributes : 0x00000000 (0) 0: LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_NON_TRANSITIVE 0: LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_UPLEVEL_ONLY 0: LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_QUARANTINED_DOMAIN 0: LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_FOREST_TRANSITIVE 0: LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_CROSS_ORGANIZATION 0: LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_WITHIN_FOREST 0: LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_TREAT_AS_EXTERNAL 0: LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_USES_RC4_ENCRYPTION dummy_string2: struct lsa_StringLarge length : 0x0000 (0) size : 0x0000 (0) string : NULL dummy_string3: struct lsa_StringLarge length : 0x0000 (0) size : 0x0000 (0) string : NULL dummy_string4: struct lsa_StringLarge length : 0x0000 (0) size : 0x0000 (0) string : NULL dummy_long1 : 0x00000000 (0) dummy_long2 : 0x00000000 (0) dummy_long3 : 0x00000000 (0) dummy_long4 : 0x00000000 (0) trusted_domains: struct netr_OneDomainInfo domainname: struct lsa_StringLarge length : 0x0016 (22) size : 0x0018 (24) string : * string : 'S2-W2012-L4' dns_domainname: struct lsa_StringLarge length : 0x004e (78) size : 0x0050 (80) string : * string : 's2-w2012-l4.s1-w2012-l4.w2012r2-l4.base' dns_forestname: struct lsa_StringLarge length : 0x0000 (0) size : 0x0000 (0) string : NULL domain_guid : 29daace6-cded-4ce3-a754-7482a4d9127c domain_sid : * domain_sid : S-1-5-21-167342819-981449877-2130266853 trust_extension: struct netr_trust_extension_container length : 0x0010 (16) size : 0x0010 (16) info : * info: struct netr_trust_extension length : 0x00000008 (8) dummy : 0x00000000 (0) size : 0x00000008 (8) flags : 0x00000001 (1) 1: NETR_TRUST_FLAG_IN_FOREST 0: NETR_TRUST_FLAG_OUTBOUND 0: NETR_TRUST_FLAG_TREEROOT 0: NETR_TRUST_FLAG_PRIMARY 0: NETR_TRUST_FLAG_NATIVE 0: NETR_TRUST_FLAG_INBOUND 0: NETR_TRUST_FLAG_MIT_KRB5 0: NETR_TRUST_FLAG_AES parent_index : 0x00000001 (1) trust_type : LSA_TRUST_TYPE_UPLEVEL (2) trust_attributes : 0x00000000 (0) 0: LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_NON_TRANSITIVE 0: LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_UPLEVEL_ONLY 0: LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_QUARANTINED_DOMAIN 0: LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_FOREST_TRANSITIVE 0: LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_CROSS_ORGANIZATION 0: LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_WITHIN_FOREST 0: LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_TREAT_AS_EXTERNAL 0: LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_USES_RC4_ENCRYPTION dummy_string2: struct lsa_StringLarge length : 0x0000 (0) size : 0x0000 (0) string : NULL dummy_string3: struct lsa_StringLarge length : 0x0000 (0) size : 0x0000 (0) string : NULL dummy_string4: struct lsa_StringLarge length : 0x0000 (0) size : 0x0000 (0) string : NULL dummy_long1 : 0x00000000 (0) dummy_long2 : 0x00000000 (0) dummy_long3 : 0x00000000 (0) dummy_long4 : 0x00000000 (0) lsa_policy: struct netr_LsaPolicyInformation policy_size : 0x00000000 (0) policy : NULL dns_hostname: struct lsa_StringLarge length : 0x0036 (54) size : 0x0038 (56) string : * string : 'torturetest.w2012r2-l4.base' dummy_string2: struct lsa_StringLarge length : 0x0000 (0) size : 0x0000 (0) string : NULL dummy_string3: struct lsa_StringLarge length : 0x0000 (0) size : 0x0000 (0) string : NULL dummy_string4: struct lsa_StringLarge length : 0x0000 (0) size : 0x0000 (0) string : NULL workstation_flags : 0x00000003 (3) 1: NETR_WS_FLAG_HANDLES_INBOUND_TRUSTS 1: NETR_WS_FLAG_HANDLES_SPN_UPDATE supported_enc_types : 0x0000001f (31) 1: KERB_ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC 1: KERB_ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD5 1: KERB_ENCTYPE_RC4_HMAC_MD5 1: KERB_ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96 1: KERB_ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96 0: KERB_ENCTYPE_FAST_SUPPORTED 0: KERB_ENCTYPE_COMPOUND_IDENTITY_SUPPORTED 0: KERB_ENCTYPE_CLAIMS_SUPPORTED 0: KERB_ENCTYPE_RESOURCE_SID_COMPRESSION_DISABLED dummy_long3 : 0x00000000 (0) dummy_long4 : 0x00000000 (0) result : NT_STATUS_OK Best viewed with: git show --histogram -w BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11517 Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> (cherry picked from commit 2099add0657126e4a5427ec2db0fe8025478b355)
* s4:rpc_server/netlogon: make use of talloc_zero_array() for the ↵Stefan Metzmacher2018-09-051-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | netr_OneDomainInfo array It's much safer than having uninitialized memory when we hit an error case. BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11517 Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> (cherry picked from commit ef0b489ad0d93199e08415dd895da5cfe2d1c11a)
* s4:rpc_server/netlogon: use samdb_domain_guid()/dsdb_trust_local_tdo_info() ↵Stefan Metzmacher2018-09-051-18/+91
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | to build our netr_OneDomainInfo values The logic for constructing the values for our own primary domain differs from the values of trusted domains. In order to make the code easier to understand we have a new fill_our_one_domain_info() helper that only takes care of our primary domain. The cleanup for the trust case will follow in a separate commit. BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11517 Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> (cherry picked from commit 61333f7787d78e3ec5c7bd2874d5a0f1f536275a)
* s4:dsdb/common: add samdb_domain_guid() helper functionStefan Metzmacher2018-09-051-0/+55
| | | | | | | | BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11517 Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> (cherry picked from commit 0e442e094240abbf79aaca00a9d1a053a200a7e8)
* dsdb:util_trusts: add dsdb_trust_local_tdo_info() helper functionStefan Metzmacher2018-09-051-0/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | This is similar to dsdb_trust_xref_tdo_info(), but will also work if we ever support more than one domain in our forest. BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11517 Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> (cherry picked from commit c1b0ac95db5c6112d90356c7ada8c3d445e9b668)
* dsdb/util_trusts: domain_dn is an input parameter of ↵Stefan Metzmacher2018-09-051-6/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | dsdb_trust_crossref_tdo_info() We should not overwrite it within the function. Currently it doesn't matter as we don't have multiple domains within our forest, but that will change in future. BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11517 Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> (cherry picked from commit f5f96f558b499770cdeb3d38998167a387e058b9)
* s4:torture/rpc/netlogon: verify the trusted domains output of ↵Stefan Metzmacher2018-09-052-1/+130
| | | | | | | | | | | | | LogonGetDomainInfo() This makes sure we don't treat trusted domains in the same way we treat our primary domain. BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11517 Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> (cherry picked from commit d5dd8fdc647d6a202c5da0451d395116c2cd92b9)
* s4:torture/rpc/netlogon: assert that ↵Stefan Metzmacher2018-09-051-0/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | cli_credentials_get_{workstation,password} don't return NULL This is better that generating a segfault while dereferencing a NULL pointer later. BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11517 Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> (cherry picked from commit dffc182c6943d21513d8db9f6cf66bdc09206b17)
* smbd: Fix a memleak in async search ask sharemodeVolker Lendecke2018-09-051-8/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | fetch_share_mode_unlocked_parser() takes a "struct fetch_share_mode_unlocked_state *" as "private_data". fetch_share_mode_send() used a talloc_zero'ed "struct share_mode_lock". This lead to the parser putting a "struct share_mode_lock on the NULL talloc_context where nobody really picked it up. Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13602 Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org> (cherry picked from commit 0bd109b733fbce774feae2142d25f7e828b56bcb)
* s3: util: Do not take over stderr when there is no log filePaulo Alcantara2018-09-051-2/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In case we don't have either a /var/log/samba directory, or pass a non-existent log directory through '-l' option, all commands that are daemonized with '-D' option hang when executed within a subshell. An example on how to trigger that: # rm -r /var/log/samba # s=$(nmbd -D -s /etc/samba/smb.conf -l /foo123) (never returns) So, when the above command is executed within a subshell the following happens: (a) Parent shell creates a pipe, sets write side of it to fd 1 (stdout), call read() on read-side fd, forks off a new child process and then executes nmbd in it. (b) nmbd sets up initial logging to go through fd 1 (stdout) by calling setup_logging(..., DEBUG_DEFAULT_STDOUT). 'state.fd' is now set to 1. (c) reopen_logs() is called by the first time which then calls reopen_logs_internal() (d) in reopen_logs_internal(), it attempts to create log.nmbd file in /foo123 directory and fails because directory doesn't exist. (e) Regardless whether the log file was created or not, it calls dup2(state.fd, 2) which dups fd 1 into fd 2. (f) At some point, fd 0 and 1 are closed and set to /dev/null The problem with that is because parent shell in (a) is still blocked in read() call and the new write side of the pipe is now fd 2 -- after dup2() in (e) -- and remains unclosed. BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13578 Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara <palcantara@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Jim McDonough <jmcd@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org> Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org> Autobuild-Date(master): Sat Aug 18 01:32:25 CEST 2018 on sn-devel-144 (cherry picked from commit 41aa55f49233ea7682cf14e5a7062617274434ce)
* s3: smbd: Ensure get_real_filename() copes with empty pathnames.Jeremy Allison2018-08-291-0/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Needed for vfs_glusterfs, as Gluster requires "." not '\0'. Based on a fix from Anoop C S <anoopcs@redhat.com> BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13585 Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Ira Cooper <ira@samba.org> Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org> Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Aug 22 21:50:41 CEST 2018 on sn-devel-144 (cherry picked from commit 9c71f61ed8a31d287d343d4f2e68cb40c57a2b89) Autobuild-User(v4-7-test): Karolin Seeger <kseeger@samba.org> Autobuild-Date(v4-7-test): Wed Aug 29 14:00:12 CEST 2018 on sn-devel-144
* VERSION: Bump version up to 4.7.9...Karolin Seeger2018-08-271-2/+2
| | | | | | and re-enable GIT_SNAPSHOT. Signed-off-by: Karolin Seeger <kseeger@samba.org>
* VERSION: Disable GIT_SNAPSHOT for the 4.7.10 release.samba-4.7.10Karolin Seeger2018-08-271-1/+1
| | | | Signed-off-by: Karolin Seeger <kseeger@samba.org>
* WHATSNEW: Add release notes for Samba 4.7.10.Karolin Seeger2018-08-271-2/+107
| | | | Signed-off-by: Karolin Seeger <kseeger@samba.org>
* torture: Demonstrate the invalid lock order panicVolker Lendecke2018-08-231-0/+89
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13584 Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org> Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org> Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Aug 21 02:33:05 CEST 2018 on sn-devel-144 (cherry picked from commit ec3c37ee53f21d8c0e80b1d3b3d7e95a4ac8e0bc) Autobuild-User(v4-7-test): Karolin Seeger <kseeger@samba.org> Autobuild-Date(v4-7-test): Thu Aug 23 15:48:56 CEST 2018 on sn-devel-144
* vfs_fruit: Fix a leak of "br_lck"Volker Lendecke2018-08-231-8/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fix a panic if fruit_access_check detects a locking conflict. do_lock() returns a valid br_lck even in case of a locking conflict. Not free'ing it leads to a invalid lock order panic later, because "br_lck" corresponds to a dbwrap lock on brlock.tdb. BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13584 Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org> (cherry picked from commit 51d57073798f76ec4f1261945e0ba779b2530009)
* selftest: Load time_audit and full_audit modules for all testsChristof Schmitt2018-08-231-6/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Previously the only test was to load these modules to trigger the smb_vfs_assert_all_fns check. As these modules just pass through the calls, they can be loaded for all tests to ensure that the codepaths are exercised. This would have found the problem in smb_time_audit_offload_read_recv. BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13568 Signed-off-by: Christof Schmitt <cs@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org> Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org> Autobuild-Date(master): Mon Aug 13 22:35:20 CEST 2018 on sn-devel-144 (cherry picked from commit a98f09a09db2fc7be85f9171b586e65344a39e92)
* s3: vfs: time_audit: fix handling of token_blob in ↵Ralph Wuerthner2018-08-231-9/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | smb_time_audit_offload_read_recv() BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13568 Signed-off-by: Ralph Wuerthner <ralph.wuerthner@de.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Christof Schmitt <cs@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org> (cherry picked from commit 4909b966050c921b0a6a32285fee55f5f14dc3ff)
* g_lock: Fix lock upgradesVolker Lendecke2018-08-232-1/+4
| | | | | | | | | | Master has changed significantly, this is a minimum fix for 4.7 without cleaning up the code BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13195 Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
* torture3: Extend the g_lock6 test to also cover upgradesVolker Lendecke2018-08-232-0/+17
| | | | | | | | | | The fixes for #13195 were incomplete and did not cover upgrades properly. It's all gone in master with the new code. BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13195 Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
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