| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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o CVE-2018-1139 (Weak authentication protocol allowed.)
o CVE-2018-1140 (Denial of Service Attack on DNS and LDAP server.)
o CVE-2018-10858 (Insufficient input validation on client directory
listing in libsmbclient.)
o CVE-2018-10918 (Denial of Service Attack on AD DC DRSUAPI server.)
o CVE-2018-10919 (Confidential attribute disclosure from the AD LDAP
server.)
Signed-off-by: Karolin Seeger <kseeger@samba.org>
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o CVE-2018-1139 (Weak authentication protocol allowed.)
o CVE-2018-1140 (Denial of Service Attack on DNS and LDAP server.)
o CVE-2018-10858 (Insufficient input validation on client directory
listing in libsmbclient.)
o CVE-2018-10918 (Denial of Service Attack on AD DC DRSUAPI server.)
o CVE-2018-10919 (Confidential attribute disclosure from the AD LDAP
server.)
Signed-off-by: Karolin Seeger <kseeger@samba.org>
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invalid chars
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13466
Signed-off-by: Kai Blin <kai@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
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* Security fix for CVE-2018-1140 (NULL pointer de-reference, bug 13374)
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
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Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13374
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This ensures we fail with a good error code before an eventual ldb_dn_get_casefold() which
would otherwise fail.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13374
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ldb_dn_from_ldb_val() does not validate this untrusted input, so a later
call to ldb_dn_get_casefold() can fail if the input is not valid.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13374
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Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13374
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Signed-off-by: Andrej Gessel <Andrej.Gessel@janztec.com>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13374
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via "ntlm auth".
This fixes a regression that came in via 00db3aba6cf9ebaafdf39ee2f9c7ba5ec2281ea0.
Found by Vivek Das <vdas@redhat.com> (Red Hat QE).
In order to demonstrate simply run:
smbclient //server/share -U user%password -mNT1 -c quit \
--option="client ntlmv2 auth"=no \
--option="client use spnego"=no
against a server that uses "ntlm auth = ntlmv2-only" (our default
setting).
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13360
CVE-2018-1139: Weak authentication protocol allowed.
Guenther
Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Guenther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
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is disabled.
Right now, this test will succeed.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13360
CVE-2018-1139: Weak authentication protocol allowed.
Guenther
Signed-off-by: Guenther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
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BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13360
CVE-2018-1139: Weak authentication protocol allowed.
Guenther
Signed-off-by: Guenther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
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BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13360
CVE-2018-1139: Weak authentication protocol allowed.
Guenther
Signed-off-by: Guenther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
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BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13360
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
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We have cmocka in third_party, so we are never without it.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(Backported from commit 33ef0e57a4f08eae5ea06f482374fbc0a1014de6
by Andrew Bartlett)
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The acl_read.c code contains a special case to allow dirsync to
work-around having insufficient access rights. We had a concern that
the dirsync module could leak sensitive information for deleted objects.
This patch adds a test-case to prove whether or not this is happening.
The new test case is similar to the existing dirsync test except:
- We make the confidential attribute also preserve-on-delete, so it
hangs around for deleted objcts. Because the attributes now persist
across test case runs, I've used a different attribute to normal.
(Technically, the dirsync search expressions are now specific enough
that the regular attribute could be used, but it would make things
quite fragile if someone tried to add a new test case).
- To handle searching for deleted objects, the search expressions are
now more complicated. Currently dirsync adds an extra-filter to the
'!' searches to exclude deleted objects, i.e. samaccountname matches
the test-objects AND the object is not deleted. We now extend this to
include deleted objects with lastKnownParent equal to the test OU.
The search expression matches either case so that we can use the same
expression throughout the test (regardless of whether the object is
deleted yet or not).
This test proves that the dirsync corner-case does not actually leak
sensitive information on Samba. This is due to a bug in the dirsync
code - when the buggy line is removed, this new test promptly fails.
Test also passes against Windows.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13434
Signed-off-by: Tim Beale <timbeale@catalyst.net.nz>
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A user that doesn't have access to view an attribute can still guess the
attribute's value via repeated LDAP searches. This affects confidential
attributes, as well as ACLs applied to an object/attribute to deny
access.
Currently the code will hide objects if the attribute filter contains an
attribute they are not authorized to see. However, the code still
returns objects as results if confidential attribute is in the search
expression itself, but not in the attribute filter.
To fix this problem we have to check the access rights on the attributes
in the search-tree, as well as the attributes returned in the message.
Points of note:
- I've preserved the existing dirsync logic (the dirsync module code
suppresses the result as long as the replPropertyMetaData attribute is
removed). However, there doesn't appear to be any test that highlights
that this functionality is required for dirsync.
- To avoid this fix breaking the acl.py tests, we need to still permit
searches like 'objectClass=*', even though we don't have Read Property
access rights for the objectClass attribute. The logic that Windows
uses does not appear to be clearly documented, so I've made a best
guess that seems to mirror Windows behaviour.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13434
Signed-off-by: Tim Beale <timbeale@catalyst.net.nz>
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This better reflects the special case we're making for dirsync, and gets
rid of a 'if-else' clause.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13434
Signed-off-by: Tim Beale <timbeale@catalyst.net.nz>
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Flip the dirsync check (to avoid a double negative), and use a helper
boolean variable.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13434
Signed-off-by: Tim Beale <timbeale@catalyst.net.nz>
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So we can re-use the same logic laster for checking the search-ops.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13434
Signed-off-by: Tim Beale <timbeale@catalyst.net.nz>
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It is perfectly legal to search LDAP for an attribute that is not part
of the schema. That part of the query should simply not match.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13434
Signed-off-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
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An 'Object Access Allowed' ACE that assigned 'Control Access' (CR)
rights to a specific attribute would not actually grant access.
What was happening was the remaining_access mask for the object_tree
nodes would be Read Property (RP) + Control Access (CR). The ACE mapped
to the schemaIDGUID for a given attribute, which would end up being a
child node in the tree. So the CR bit was cleared for a child node, but
not the rest of the tree. We would then check the user had the RP access
right, which it did. However, the RP right was cleared for another node
in the tree, which still had the CR bit set in its remaining_access
bitmap, so Samba would not grant access.
Generally, the remaining_access only ever has one bit set, which means
this isn't a problem normally. However, in the Control Access case there
are 2 separate bits being checked, i.e. RP + CR.
One option to fix this problem would be to clear the remaining_access
for the tree instead of just the node. However, the Windows spec is
actually pretty clear on this: if the ACE has a CR right present, then
you can stop any further access checks.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13434
Signed-off-by: Tim Beale <timbeale@catalyst.net.nz>
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Currently Samba is a bit disclosive with LDB_OP_PRESENT (i.e.
attribute=*) searches compared to Windows.
All the acl.py tests are based on objectClass=* searches, where Windows
will happily tell a user about objects they have List Contents rights,
but not Read Property rights for. However, if you change the attribute
being searched for, suddenly the objects are no longer visible on
Windows (whereas they are on Samba).
This is a problem, because Samba can tell you about which objects have
confidential attributes, which in itself could be disclosive.
This patch adds a acl.py test-case that highlights this behaviour. The
test passes against Windows but fails against Samba.
Signed-off-by: Tim Beale <timbeale@catalyst.net.nz>
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Adds tests that assert that a confidential attribute cannot be guessed
by an unprivileged user through wildcard DB searches.
The tests basically consist of a set of DB searches/assertions that
get run for:
- basic searches against a confidential attribute
- confidential attributes that get overridden by giving access to the
user via an ACE (run against a variety of ACEs)
- protecting a non-confidential attribute via an ACL that denies read-
access (run against a variety of ACEs)
- querying confidential attributes via the dirsync controls
These tests all pass when run against a Windows Dc and all fail against
a Samba DC.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13434
Signed-off-by: Tim Beale <timbeale@catalyst.net.nz>
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Reading the spec and then reading the code makes sense, but we could
comment the code more so it makes sense on its own.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13434
Signed-off-by: Tim Beale <timbeale@catalyst.net.nz>
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function
Object-specific access checks refer to a specific section of the
MS-ADTS, and the code closely matches the spec. We need to extend this
logic to properly handle the Control-Access Right (CR), so it makes
sense to split the logic out into its own function.
This patch just moves the code, and should not alter the logic (apart
from ading in the boolean grant_access return variable.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13434
Signed-off-by: Tim Beale <timbeale@catalyst.net.nz>
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servicePrincipalName is set on a user
This regression was introduced in Samba 4.7 by bug 12842 and in
master git commit eb2e77970e41c1cb62c041877565e939c78ff52d.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13552
CVE-2018-10918: Denial of Service Attack on AD DC DRSUAPI server.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
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malicious servers.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13453
CVE-2018-10858: Insufficient input validation on client directory
listing in libsmbclient.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
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buffer.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13453
CVE-2018-10858: Insufficient input validation on client directory
listing in libsmbclient.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
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and re-enable GIT_SNAPSHOT.
Signed-off-by: Karolin Seeger <kseeger@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 1df7f93b6ede803ec01424c48d2f1f3526c9818c)
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Signed-off-by: Karolin Seeger <kseeger@samba.org>
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Signed-off-by: Karolin Seeger <kseeger@samba.org>
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* Fix memory leaks and missing error checks (bug 13459, 13471, 13475)
* Fix fallback to full scan (performance regression) on
one-level search (bug 13448)
* Fix read corruption (missing results) during writes, particularly
during a Samba subtree rename (bug 13452)
Autobuild-User(v4-8-test): Karolin Seeger <kseeger@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(v4-8-test): Tue Jun 26 13:31:53 CEST 2018 on sn-devel-144
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Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
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BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13475
Signed-off-by: Andrej Gessel <Andrej.Gessel@janztec.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Fri Jun 15 23:07:25 CEST 2018 on sn-devel-144
(cherry picked from commit 3ca1c09f686fbfa9257cd95710dba4a98c3eeb8f)
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there are also mem leaks in this function
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13475
Signed-off-by: Andrej Gessel <Andrej.Gessel@janztec.com>
Reviewed-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit f75e8f58cd2390c092631803d333adadb475306a)
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BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13475
Signed-off-by: Andrej Gessel <Andrej.Gessel@janztec.com>
Reviewed-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 6b52d21e6040699a72aff12fd6ebb34534dcb457)
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After a duplicated add a small amount of memory can be leaked onto a
long-term context.
Found by Andrej Gessel https://github.com/andiges
https://github.com/samba-team/samba/commit/e8fb45125e6a279b918694668e0d4fbddac10aee#commitcomment-29334102
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13471
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Fri Jun 15 04:39:41 CEST 2018 on sn-devel-144
(cherry picked from commit f4f3abfa0e18bb4968b37b1cac40cd8c185c8d7b)
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Introduced in e8cdacc509016d9273d63faf334d9f827585c3eb
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13459
Signed-off-by: Lukas Slebodnik <lslebodn@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Fri Jun 1 11:10:24 CEST 2018 on sn-devel-144
(cherry picked from commit d161aa3522576545d269208426bb0014ee2ab35f)
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BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13448
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
(cherry picked from commit e99c199d811e607e7867e7b40d82a1642226c647)
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When no search filter is specified, the code falls back to using
'(|(objectClass=*)(distinguishedName=*)'. ltdb_index_dn() then failed
because matching against '*' is not indexed. The error return then
caused the code to fallback to a full-scan of the DB, which could have a
considerable performance hit.
Instead, we want to continue on and do the ltdb_index_filter() over the
indexed results that were returned.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13448
Signed-off-by: Tim Beale <timbeale@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
(cherry picked from commit 88ae60ed186c9c479722ad62d65a07d0c2e71469)
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Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
(cherry picked from commit 9e143ee9b9f7be53c193cee3153f64c4dedc07e9)
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Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
(cherry picked from commit 3632775d7ad31e06437ed76b8731d9895930caa1)
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Otherwise Samba modules like subtree_rename can fail as they modify the
index during the callback.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13452
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
(cherry picked from commit d02cd236dcbd8a44ecc85d1f7e95a48c95c0a479)
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../source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/samldb.c: In function ‘samldb_add’:
../source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/samldb.c:424:6: error: ‘found’ may be used uninitialized in this function [-Werror=maybe-uninitialized]
if (found) {
^
../source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/samldb.c:348:11: note: ‘found’ was declared here
bool ok, found;
^~~~~
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13437
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Guenther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 76828876faa3cd463023e323983df0be597c7361)
Autobuild-User(v4-8-test): Karolin Seeger <kseeger@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(v4-8-test): Tue Jun 26 02:26:15 CEST 2018 on sn-devel-144
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BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12851
Pair-Programmed-With: Guenther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Guenther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit c1c764925e24788905ab91aa455b415765d6f71f)
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../source3/utils/smbget.c: In function ‘smb_download_file’:
../source3/utils/smbget.c:97:27: error: ‘b’ directive output may be truncated writing 1 byte into a region of size between 0 and 19 [-Werror=format-truncation=]
snprintf(buffer, l, "%jdb", (intmax_t)s);
^
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13437
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Guenther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4a3164e0beea35c1f4ce44fbe43547f7104587d1)
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../source3/registry/reg_perfcount.c: In function ‘reg_perfcount_get_hkpd’:
../source3/registry/reg_perfcount.c:337:29: error: ‘snprintf’ output may be truncated before the last format character [-Werror=format-truncation=]
snprintf(buf, buflen,"%d%s", key_part1, key_part2);
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13437
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Guenther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 29f6842ee86b768f3677b38c5640655e312c398e)
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Follow Apple's lead and do not fail krb5_set_config_files() simply
because one of the files in the profile list fails to parse correctly.
Doing so can lead to hard to find failures and could lead to an end
user shooting themselves in the foot and no longer be able to login
to their system to fix it.
Parse as many of the files as we can. Only fail krb5_set_config_files()
if init_context_from_config_file() fails.
Change-Id: I122664c6d707a5f926643808ba414bf4f681f8b8
Cherry-pick of Heimdal commit b7cf5e7caf9b270f4d4151d2690177b11a7a1bdf
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11573
Signed-off-by: Björn Baumbach <bb@sernet.de>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Bokovoy <ab@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit f05a1554b770c6a2c905170347bfb41157f4aa78)
Autobuild-User(v4-8-test): Karolin Seeger <kseeger@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(v4-8-test): Mon Jun 25 17:30:14 CEST 2018 on sn-devel-144
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Applications (like OpenSSH) don't know about users and and
their relationship to Kerberos principals. This plugin allows that
Kerberos principals can be validated against local user accounts.
Administrator@WURST.WORLD -> WURST\Administrator
https://web.mit.edu/kerberos/krb5-latest/doc/plugindev/localauth.html
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13480
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Bokovoy <ab@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5e89a23ffaceccdc83d70a4ab2798ae25c10d580)
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