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+Network Working Group                                             L. Zhu
+Request for Comments: 4557                                 K. Jaganathan
+Category: Standards Track                          Microsoft Corporation
+                                                             N. Williams
+                                                        Sun Microsystems
+                                                               June 2006
+
+
+         Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Support for
+                      Public Key Cryptography for
+              Initial Authentication in Kerberos (PKINIT)
+
+Status of This Memo
+
+   This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
+   Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
+   improvements.  Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
+   Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
+   and status of this protocol.  Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
+
+Copyright Notice
+
+   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).
+
+Abstract
+
+   This document defines a mechanism to enable in-band transmission of
+   Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) responses in the Kerberos
+   network authentication protocol.  These responses are used to verify
+   the validity of the certificates used in Public Key Cryptography for
+   Initial Authentication in Kerberos (PKINIT), which is the Kerberos
+   Version 5 extension that provides for the use of public key
+   cryptography.
+
+Table of Contents
+
+   1. Introduction ....................................................2
+   2. Conventions Used in This Document ...............................2
+   3. Message Definition ..............................................2
+   4. Security Considerations .........................................3
+   5. Acknowledgements ................................................4
+   6. References ......................................................4
+      6.1. Normative References .......................................4
+      6.2. Informative References .....................................4
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Zhu, et al.                 Standards Track                     [Page 1]
+
+RFC 4557                OCSP Support for PKINIT                June 2006
+
+
+1.  Introduction
+
+   Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) [RFC2560] enables
+   applications to obtain timely information regarding the revocation
+   status of a certificate.  Because OCSP responses are well bounded and
+   small in size, constrained clients may wish to use OCSP to check the
+   validity of the certificates for Kerberos Key Distribution Center
+   (KDC) in order to avoid transmission of large Certificate Revocation
+   Lists (CRLs) and therefore save bandwidth on constrained networks
+   [OCSP-PROFILE].
+
+   This document defines a pre-authentication type [RFC4120], where the
+   client and the KDC MAY piggyback OCSP responses for certificates used
+   in authentication exchanges, as defined in [RFC4556].
+
+   By using this OPTIONAL extension, PKINIT clients and the KDC can
+   maximize the reuse of cached OCSP responses.
+
+2.  Conventions Used in This Document
+
+   In this document, the key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED",
+   "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY",
+   and "OPTIONAL" are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
+
+3.  Message Definition
+
+   A pre-authentication type identifier is defined for this mechanism:
+
+              PA-PK-OCSP-RESPONSE              18
+
+   The corresponding padata-value field [RFC4120] contains the DER [X60]
+   encoding of the following ASN.1 type:
+
+          PKOcspData ::= SEQUENCE OF OcspResponse
+                         -- If more than one OcspResponse is
+                         -- included, the first OcspResponse
+                         -- MUST contain the OCSP response
+                         -- for the signer's certificate.
+                         -- The signer refers to the client for
+                         -- AS-REQ, and the KDC for the AS-REP,
+                         -- respectively.
+
+          OcspResponse ::= OCTET STRING
+                         -- Contains a complete OCSP response,
+                         -- as defined in [RFC2560].
+
+   The client MAY send OCSP responses for certificates used in PA-PK-
+   AS-REQ [RFC4556] via a PA-PK-OCSP-RESPONSE.
+
+
+
+Zhu, et al.                 Standards Track                     [Page 2]
+
+RFC 4557                OCSP Support for PKINIT                June 2006
+
+
+   The KDC that receives a PA-PK-OCSP-RESPONSE SHOULD send a PA-PK-
+   OCSP-RESPONSE containing OCSP responses for certificates used in the
+   KDC's PA-PK-AS-REP.  The client can request a PA-PK-OCSP-RESPONSE by
+   using a PKOcspData containing an empty sequence.
+
+   The KDC MAY send a PA-PK-OCSP-RESPONSE when it does not receive a
+   PA-PK-OCSP-RESPONSE from the client.
+
+   The PA-PK-OCSP-RESPONSE sent by the KDC contains OCSP responses for
+   certificates used in PA-PK-AS-REP [RFC4556].
+
+   Note the lack of integrity protection for the empty or missing OCSP
+   response; lack of an expected OCSP response from the KDC for the
+   KDC's certificates SHOULD be treated as an error by the client,
+   unless it is configured otherwise.
+
+   When using OCSP, the response is signed by the OCSP server, which is
+   trusted by the receiver.  Depending on local policy, further
+   verification of the validity of the OCSP servers may be needed
+
+   The client and the KDC SHOULD ignore invalid OCSP responses received
+   via this mechanism, and they MAY implement CRL processing logic as a
+   fall-back position, if the OCSP responses received via this mechanism
+   alone are not sufficient for the verification of certificate
+   validity.  The client and/or the KDC MAY ignore a valid OCSP response
+   and perform its own revocation status verification independently.
+
+4.  Security Considerations
+
+   The pre-authentication data in this document do not actually
+   authenticate any principals, but are designed to be used in
+   conjunction with PKINIT.
+
+   There is no binding between PA-PK-OCSP-RESPONSE pre-authentication
+   data and PKINIT pre-authentication data other than a given OCSP
+   response corresponding to a certificate used in a PKINIT pre-
+   authentication data element.  Attacks involving removal or
+   replacement of PA-PK-OCSP-RESPONSE pre-authentication data elements
+   are, at worst, downgrade attacks, where a PKINIT client or KDC would
+   proceed without use of CRLs or OCSP for certificate validation, or
+   denial-of-service attacks, where a PKINIT client or KDC that cannot
+   validate the other's certificate without an accompanying OCSP
+   response might reject the AS exchange or might have to download very
+   large CRLs in order to continue.  Kerberos V does not protect against
+   denial-of-service attacks; therefore, the denial-of-service aspect of
+   these attacks is acceptable.
+
+
+
+
+
+Zhu, et al.                 Standards Track                     [Page 3]
+
+RFC 4557                OCSP Support for PKINIT                June 2006
+
+
+   If a PKINIT client or KDC cannot validate certificates without the
+   aid of a valid PA-PK-OCSP-RESPONSE, then it SHOULD fail the AS
+   exchange, possibly according to local configuration.
+
+5.  Acknowledgements
+
+   This document was based on conversations among the authors, Jeffrey
+   Altman, Sam Hartman, Martin Rex, and other members of the Kerberos
+   working group.
+
+6.  References
+
+6.1.  Normative References
+
+   [RFC2119]      Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
+                  Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
+
+   [RFC2560]      Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A., Galperin, S., and
+                  C. Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure
+                  Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP", RFC 2560,
+                  June 1999.
+
+   [RFC4120]      Neuman, C., Yu, T., Hartman, S., and K. Raeburn, "The
+                  Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5)", RFC
+                  4120, July 2005.
+
+   [RFC4556]      Zhu, L. and B. Tung, "Public Key Cryptography for
+                  Initial Authentication in Kerberos (PKINIT)", RFC
+                  4556, June 2006.
+
+   [X690]         ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding
+                  Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and
+                  Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER), ITU-T
+                  Recommendation X.690 (1997) | ISO/IEC International
+                  Standard 8825-1:1998.
+
+6.2.  Informative References
+
+   [OCSP-PROFILE] Deacon, A. and R. Hurst, "Lightweight OCSP Profile for
+                  High Volume Environments", Work in Progress, May 2006.
+
+
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+Zhu, et al.                 Standards Track                     [Page 4]
+
+RFC 4557                OCSP Support for PKINIT                June 2006
+
+
+Authors' Addresses
+
+   Larry Zhu
+   Microsoft Corporation
+   One Microsoft Way
+   Redmond, WA  98052
+   US
+
+   EMail: lzhu@microsoft.com
+
+
+   Karthik Jaganathan
+   Microsoft Corporation
+   One Microsoft Way
+   Redmond, WA  98052
+   US
+
+   EMail: karthikj@microsoft.com
+
+
+   Nicolas Williams
+   Sun Microsystems
+   5300 Riata Trace Ct
+   Austin, TX  78727
+   US
+
+   EMail: Nicolas.Williams@sun.com
+
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+Zhu, et al.                 Standards Track                     [Page 5]
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+RFC 4557                OCSP Support for PKINIT                June 2006
+
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+Full Copyright Statement
+
+   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).
+
+   This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
+   contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
+   retain all their rights.
+
+   This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
+   "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
+   OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET
+   ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
+   INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE
+   INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
+   WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
+
+Intellectual Property
+
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+
+Acknowledgement
+
+   Funding for the RFC Editor function is provided by the IETF
+   Administrative Support Activity (IASA).
+
+
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+Zhu, et al.                 Standards Track                     [Page 6]
+