Merge tag 'samba-4.4.16' into v4-4-test

samba: tag release samba-4.4.16

13 files changed, 179 insertions, 8 deletions

diff --git a/VERSION b/VERSION
index 1a6745604d4..c478c33211e 100644
--- a/VERSION
+++ b/VERSION
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
 ########################################################
 SAMBA_VERSION_MAJOR=4
 SAMBA_VERSION_MINOR=4
-SAMBA_VERSION_RELEASE=15
+SAMBA_VERSION_RELEASE=16
 
 ########################################################
 # If a official release has a serious bug              #
diff --git a/WHATSNEW.txt b/WHATSNEW.txt
index 476ea80c509..f97f799b770 100644
--- a/WHATSNEW.txt
+++ b/WHATSNEW.txt
@@ -1,4 +1,84 @@
                    ==============================
+                   Release Notes for Samba 4.4.16
+                          September 20, 2017
+                   ==============================
+
+
+This is a security release in order to address the following defects:
+
+o  CVE-2017-12150 (SMB1/2/3 connections may not require signing where they
+   should)
+o  CVE-2017-12151 (SMB3 connections don't keep encryption across DFS redirects)
+o  CVE-2017-12163 (Server memory information leak over SMB1)
+
+
+=======
+Details
+=======
+
+o  CVE-2017-12150:
+   A man in the middle attack may hijack client connections.
+
+o  CVE-2017-12151:
+   A man in the middle attack can read and may alter confidential
+   documents transferred via a client connection, which are reached
+   via DFS redirect when the original connection used SMB3.
+
+o  CVE-2017-12163:
+   Client with write access to a share can cause server memory contents to be
+   written into a file or printer.
+
+For more details and workarounds, please see the security advisories:
+
+   o https://www.samba.org/samba/security/CVE-2017-12150.html
+   o https://www.samba.org/samba/security/CVE-2017-12151.html
+   o https://www.samba.org/samba/security/CVE-2017-12163.html
+
+
+Changes since 4.4.15:
+---------------------
+
+o  Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
+   * BUG 12836: s3: smbd: Fix a read after free if a chained SMB1 call goes
+     async.
+   * BUG 13020: CVE-2017-12163: s3:smbd: Prevent client short SMB1 write from
+     writing server memory to file.
+
+o  Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
+   * BUG 12885: s3/smbd: Let non_widelink_open() chdir() to directories
+     directly.
+
+o  Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
+   * BUG 12996: CVE-2017-12151: Keep required encryption across SMB3 dfs
+     redirects.
+   * BUG 12997: CVE-2017-12150: Some code path don't enforce smb signing
+     when they should.
+
+
+#######################################
+Reporting bugs & Development Discussion
+#######################################
+
+Please discuss this release on the samba-technical mailing list or by
+joining the #samba-technical IRC channel on irc.freenode.net.
+
+If you do report problems then please try to send high quality
+feedback. If you don't provide vital information to help us track down
+the problem then you will probably be ignored.  All bug reports should
+be filed under the "Samba 4.1 and newer" product in the project's Bugzilla
+database (https://bugzilla.samba.org/).
+
+
+======================================================================
+== Our Code, Our Bugs, Our Responsibility.
+== The Samba Team
+======================================================================
+
+
+Release notes for older releases follow:
+----------------------------------------
+
+                   ==============================
                    Release Notes for Samba 4.4.15
                             July 12, 2017
                    ==============================
@@ -48,8 +128,8 @@ database (https://bugzilla.samba.org/).
 ======================================================================
 
 
-Release notes for older releases follow:
-----------------------------------------
+----------------------------------------------------------------------
+
 
                    ==============================
                    Release Notes for Samba 4.4.14
diff --git a/auth/credentials/credentials.c b/auth/credentials/credentials.c
index 3b7d42a29a5..43e587aa5a0 100644
--- a/auth/credentials/credentials.c
+++ b/auth/credentials/credentials.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
 #include "librpc/gen_ndr/samr.h" /* for struct samrPassword */
 #include "auth/credentials/credentials.h"
 #include "auth/credentials/credentials_internal.h"
+#include "auth/gensec/gensec.h"
 #include "libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h"
 #include "tevent.h"
 #include "param/param.h"
@@ -362,6 +363,8 @@ _PUBLIC_ bool cli_credentials_set_principal_callback(struct cli_credentials *cre
 
 _PUBLIC_ bool cli_credentials_authentication_requested(struct cli_credentials *cred) 
 {
+	uint32_t gensec_features = 0;
+
 	if (cred->bind_dn) {
 		return true;
 	}
@@ -389,6 +392,19 @@ _PUBLIC_ bool cli_credentials_authentication_requested(struct cli_credentials *c
 		return true;
 	}
 
+	gensec_features = cli_credentials_get_gensec_features(cred);
+	if (gensec_features & GENSEC_FEATURE_NTLM_CCACHE) {
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	if (gensec_features & GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN) {
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	if (gensec_features & GENSEC_FEATURE_SEAL) {
+		return true;
+	}
+
 	return false;
 }
 
diff --git a/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.c b/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.c
index 691b8ff263e..3c411276025 100644
--- a/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.c
+++ b/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.c
@@ -468,6 +468,11 @@ bool smbXcli_conn_use_unicode(struct smbXcli_conn *conn)
 	return false;
 }
 
+bool smbXcli_conn_signing_mandatory(struct smbXcli_conn *conn)
+{
+	return conn->mandatory_signing;
+}
+
 void smbXcli_conn_set_sockopt(struct smbXcli_conn *conn, const char *options)
 {
 	set_socket_options(conn->sock_fd, options);
diff --git a/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.h b/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.h
index 16c8848dd12..6809807ac76 100644
--- a/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.h
+++ b/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.h
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ bool smbXcli_conn_dfs_supported(struct smbXcli_conn *conn);
 
 enum protocol_types smbXcli_conn_protocol(struct smbXcli_conn *conn);
 bool smbXcli_conn_use_unicode(struct smbXcli_conn *conn);
+bool smbXcli_conn_signing_mandatory(struct smbXcli_conn *conn);
 
 void smbXcli_conn_set_sockopt(struct smbXcli_conn *conn, const char *options);
 const struct sockaddr_storage *smbXcli_conn_local_sockaddr(struct smbXcli_conn *conn);
diff --git a/libgpo/gpo_fetch.c b/libgpo/gpo_fetch.c
index 6b01544faee..cb969ff4270 100644
--- a/libgpo/gpo_fetch.c
+++ b/libgpo/gpo_fetch.c
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ static NTSTATUS gpo_connect_server(ADS_STRUCT *ads,
 			ads->auth.password,
 			CLI_FULL_CONNECTION_USE_KERBEROS |
 			CLI_FULL_CONNECTION_FALLBACK_AFTER_KERBEROS,
-			Undefined);
+			SMB_SIGNING_REQUIRED);
 	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
 		DEBUG(10,("check_refresh_gpo: "
 				"failed to connect: %s\n",
diff --git a/source3/lib/util_cmdline.c b/source3/lib/util_cmdline.c
index 80c3ecdb462..539fa55d3a2 100644
--- a/source3/lib/util_cmdline.c
+++ b/source3/lib/util_cmdline.c
@@ -123,6 +123,9 @@ bool set_cmdline_auth_info_signing_state(struct user_auth_info *auth_info,
 
 int get_cmdline_auth_info_signing_state(const struct user_auth_info *auth_info)
 {
+	if (auth_info->smb_encrypt) {
+		return SMB_SIGNING_REQUIRED;
+	}
 	return auth_info->signing_state;
 }
 
diff --git a/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c b/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c
index d2a4c194f44..074f8ed4dfd 100644
--- a/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c
+++ b/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c
@@ -203,7 +203,9 @@ static NTSTATUS do_connect(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
 		/* If a password was not supplied then
 		 * try again with a null username. */
 		if (password[0] || !username[0] ||
+			force_encrypt || smbXcli_conn_signing_mandatory(c->conn) ||
 			get_cmdline_auth_info_use_kerberos(auth_info) ||
+			get_cmdline_auth_info_use_ccache(auth_info) ||
 			!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status = cli_session_setup(c, "",
 				    		"", 0,
 						"", 0,
@@ -952,7 +954,7 @@ NTSTATUS cli_resolve_path(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
 			     "IPC$",
 			     dfs_auth_info,
 			     false,
-			     smb1cli_conn_encryption_on(rootcli->conn),
+			     cli_state_is_encryption_on(rootcli),
 			     smbXcli_conn_protocol(rootcli->conn),
 			     0,
 			     0x20,
@@ -1010,7 +1012,7 @@ NTSTATUS cli_resolve_path(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
 				dfs_refs[count].share,
 				dfs_auth_info,
 				false,
-				smb1cli_conn_encryption_on(rootcli->conn),
+				cli_state_is_encryption_on(rootcli),
 				smbXcli_conn_protocol(rootcli->conn),
 				0,
 				0x20,
diff --git a/source3/libsmb/clientgen.c b/source3/libsmb/clientgen.c
index cfb3b162358..868ee59245b 100644
--- a/source3/libsmb/clientgen.c
+++ b/source3/libsmb/clientgen.c
@@ -339,6 +339,19 @@ uint16_t cli_getpid(struct cli_state *cli)
 	return cli->smb1.pid;
 }
 
+bool cli_state_is_encryption_on(struct cli_state *cli)
+{
+	if (smbXcli_conn_protocol(cli->conn) < PROTOCOL_SMB2_02) {
+		return smb1cli_conn_encryption_on(cli->conn);
+	}
+
+	if (cli->smb2.tcon == NULL) {
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	return smb2cli_tcon_is_encryption_on(cli->smb2.tcon);
+}
+
 bool cli_state_has_tcon(struct cli_state *cli)
 {
 	uint16_t tid = cli_state_get_tid(cli);
diff --git a/source3/libsmb/libsmb_context.c b/source3/libsmb/libsmb_context.c
index 5e31dfbafb1..05133743c56 100644
--- a/source3/libsmb/libsmb_context.c
+++ b/source3/libsmb/libsmb_context.c
@@ -485,7 +485,7 @@ smbc_option_get(SMBCCTX *context,
 
                 for (s = context->internal->servers; s; s = s->next) {
                         num_servers++;
-                        if (!smb1cli_conn_encryption_on(s->cli->conn)) {
+                        if (!cli_state_is_encryption_on(s->cli)) {
                                 return (void *)false;
                         }
                 }
diff --git a/source3/libsmb/proto.h b/source3/libsmb/proto.h
index dc9aa1720b2..e872e3106e7 100644
--- a/source3/libsmb/proto.h
+++ b/source3/libsmb/proto.h
@@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ const char *cli_state_remote_realm(struct cli_state *cli);
 uint16_t cli_state_get_vc_num(struct cli_state *cli);
 uint16_t cli_setpid(struct cli_state *cli, uint16_t pid);
 uint16_t cli_getpid(struct cli_state *cli);
+bool cli_state_is_encryption_on(struct cli_state *cli);
 bool cli_state_has_tcon(struct cli_state *cli);
 uint16_t cli_state_get_tid(struct cli_state *cli);
 uint16_t cli_state_set_tid(struct cli_state *cli, uint16_t tid);
diff --git a/source3/libsmb/pylibsmb.c b/source3/libsmb/pylibsmb.c
index 0c5d7e94841..97aa39ebce9 100644
--- a/source3/libsmb/pylibsmb.c
+++ b/source3/libsmb/pylibsmb.c
@@ -447,7 +447,7 @@ static int py_cli_state_init(struct py_cli_state *self, PyObject *args,
 		cli_credentials_get_username(cli_creds),
 		cli_credentials_get_domain(cli_creds),
 		cli_credentials_get_password(cli_creds),
-		0, 0);
+		0, SMB_SIGNING_DEFAULT);
 	if (!py_tevent_req_wait_exc(self->ev, req)) {
 		return -1;
 	}
diff --git a/source3/smbd/reply.c b/source3/smbd/reply.c
index 3ba61a3b2bc..9896ff8c5fd 100644
--- a/source3/smbd/reply.c
+++ b/source3/smbd/reply.c
@@ -4463,6 +4463,9 @@ void reply_writebraw(struct smb_request *req)
 	}
 
 	/* Ensure we don't write bytes past the end of this packet. */
+	/*
+	 * This already protects us against CVE-2017-12163.
+	 */
 	if (data + numtowrite > smb_base(req->inbuf) + smb_len(req->inbuf)) {
 		reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
 		error_to_writebrawerr(req);
@@ -4563,6 +4566,11 @@ void reply_writebraw(struct smb_request *req)
 			exit_server_cleanly("secondary writebraw failed");
 		}
 
+		/*
+		 * We are not vulnerable to CVE-2017-12163
+		 * here as we are guarenteed to have numtowrite
+		 * bytes available - we just read from the client.
+		 */
 		nwritten = write_file(req,fsp,buf+4,startpos+nwritten,numtowrite);
 		if (nwritten == -1) {
 			TALLOC_FREE(buf);
@@ -4644,6 +4652,7 @@ void reply_writeunlock(struct smb_request *req)
 	connection_struct *conn = req->conn;
 	ssize_t nwritten = -1;
 	size_t numtowrite;
+	size_t remaining;
 	off_t startpos;
 	const char *data;
 	NTSTATUS status = NT_STATUS_OK;
@@ -4676,6 +4685,17 @@ void reply_writeunlock(struct smb_request *req)
 	startpos = IVAL_TO_SMB_OFF_T(req->vwv+2, 0);
 	data = (const char *)req->buf + 3;
 
+	/*
+	 * Ensure client isn't asking us to write more than
+	 * they sent. CVE-2017-12163.
+	 */
+	remaining = smbreq_bufrem(req, data);
+	if (numtowrite > remaining) {
+		reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
+		END_PROFILE(SMBwriteunlock);
+		return;
+	}
+
 	if (!fsp->print_file && numtowrite > 0) {
 		init_strict_lock_struct(fsp, (uint64_t)req->smbpid,
 		    (uint64_t)startpos, (uint64_t)numtowrite, WRITE_LOCK,
@@ -4757,6 +4777,7 @@ void reply_write(struct smb_request *req)
 {
 	connection_struct *conn = req->conn;
 	size_t numtowrite;
+	size_t remaining;
 	ssize_t nwritten = -1;
 	off_t startpos;
 	const char *data;
@@ -4797,6 +4818,17 @@ void reply_write(struct smb_request *req)
 	startpos = IVAL_TO_SMB_OFF_T(req->vwv+2, 0);
 	data = (const char *)req->buf + 3;
 
+	/*
+	 * Ensure client isn't asking us to write more than
+	 * they sent. CVE-2017-12163.
+	 */
+	remaining = smbreq_bufrem(req, data);
+	if (numtowrite > remaining) {
+		reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
+		END_PROFILE(SMBwrite);
+		return;
+	}
+
 	if (!fsp->print_file) {
 		init_strict_lock_struct(fsp, (uint64_t)req->smbpid,
 			(uint64_t)startpos, (uint64_t)numtowrite, WRITE_LOCK,
@@ -5023,6 +5055,9 @@ void reply_write_and_X(struct smb_request *req)
 			goto out;
 		}
 	} else {
+		/*
+		 * This already protects us against CVE-2017-12163.
+		 */
 		if (smb_doff > smblen || smb_doff + numtowrite < numtowrite ||
 				smb_doff + numtowrite > smblen) {
 			reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
@@ -5451,6 +5486,7 @@ void reply_writeclose(struct smb_request *req)
 {
 	connection_struct *conn = req->conn;
 	size_t numtowrite;
+	size_t remaining;
 	ssize_t nwritten = -1;
 	NTSTATUS close_status = NT_STATUS_OK;
 	off_t startpos;
@@ -5484,6 +5520,17 @@ void reply_writeclose(struct smb_request *req)
 	mtime = convert_time_t_to_timespec(srv_make_unix_date3(req->vwv+4));
 	data = (const char *)req->buf + 1;
 
+	/*
+	 * Ensure client isn't asking us to write more than
+	 * they sent. CVE-2017-12163.
+	 */
+	remaining = smbreq_bufrem(req, data);
+	if (numtowrite > remaining) {
+		reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
+		END_PROFILE(SMBwriteclose);
+		return;
+	}
+
 	if (fsp->print_file == NULL) {
 		init_strict_lock_struct(fsp, (uint64_t)req->smbpid,
 		    (uint64_t)startpos, (uint64_t)numtowrite, WRITE_LOCK,
@@ -6079,6 +6126,9 @@ void reply_printwrite(struct smb_request *req)
 
 	numtowrite = SVAL(req->buf, 1);
 
+	/*
+	 * This already protects us against CVE-2017-12163.
+	 */
 	if (req->buflen < numtowrite + 3) {
 		reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
 		END_PROFILE(SMBsplwr);