Merge tag 'samba-4.8.4' into v4-8-test

samba: tag release samba-4.8.4

28 files changed, 2720 insertions, 94 deletions

diff --git a/WHATSNEW.txt b/WHATSNEW.txt
index 5c2d922cd90..d09297284d2 100644
--- a/WHATSNEW.txt
+++ b/WHATSNEW.txt
@@ -1,4 +1,94 @@
                    =============================
+                   Release Notes for Samba 4.8.4
+                           August 14, 2018
+                   =============================
+
+
+This is a security release in order to address the following defects:
+
+o  CVE-2018-1139  (Weak authentication protocol allowed.)
+o  CVE-2018-1140  (Denial of Service Attack on DNS and LDAP server.)
+o  CVE-2018-10858 (Insufficient input validation on client directory
+		   listing in libsmbclient.)
+o  CVE-2018-10918 (Denial of Service Attack on AD DC DRSUAPI server.)
+o  CVE-2018-10919 (Confidential attribute disclosure from the AD LDAP
+		   server.)
+
+
+=======
+Details
+=======
+
+o  CVE-2018-1139:
+   Vulnerability that allows authentication via NTLMv1 even if disabled.
+
+o  CVE-2018-1140:
+   Missing null pointer checks may crash the Samba AD DC, both over
+   DNS and LDAP.
+
+o  CVE-2018-10858:
+   A malicious server could return a directory entry that could corrupt
+   libsmbclient memory.
+
+o  CVE-2018-10918:
+   Missing null pointer checks may crash the Samba AD DC, over the
+   authenticated DRSUAPI RPC service.
+
+o  CVE-2018-10919:
+   Missing access control checks allow discovery of confidential attribute
+   values via authenticated LDAP search expressions.
+
+
+Changes since 4.8.3:
+--------------------
+
+o  Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
+   * BUG 13453: CVE-2018-10858: libsmb: Harden smbc_readdir_internal() against
+     returns from malicious servers.
+
+o  Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
+   * BUG 13374: CVE-2018-1140: ldbsearch '(distinguishedName=abc)' and DNS query
+     with escapes crashes, ldb: Release LDB 1.3.5 for CVE-2018-1140
+   * BUG 13552: CVE-2018-10918: cracknames: Fix DoS (NULL pointer de-ref) when
+     not servicePrincipalName is set on a user.
+
+o  Tim Beale <timbeale@catalyst.net.nz>
+   * BUG 13434: CVE-2018-10919: acl_read: Fix unauthorized attribute access via
+     searches.
+
+o  Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
+   * BUG 13360: CVE-2018-1139 libcli/auth: Do not allow ntlmv1 over SMB1 when it
+     is disabled via "ntlm auth".
+
+o  Andrej Gessel <Andrej.Gessel@janztec.com>
+   * BUG 13374: CVE-2018-1140 Add NULL check for ldb_dn_get_casefold() in
+     ltdb_index_dn_attr().
+
+
+#######################################
+Reporting bugs & Development Discussion
+#######################################
+
+Please discuss this release on the samba-technical mailing list or by
+joining the #samba-technical IRC channel on irc.freenode.net.
+
+If you do report problems then please try to send high quality
+feedback. If you don't provide vital information to help us track down
+the problem then you will probably be ignored.  All bug reports should
+be filed under the "Samba 4.1 and newer" product in the project's Bugzilla
+database (https://bugzilla.samba.org/).
+
+
+======================================================================
+== Our Code, Our Bugs, Our Responsibility.
+== The Samba Team
+======================================================================
+
+
+Release notes for older releases follow:
+----------------------------------------
+
+                   =============================
                    Release Notes for Samba 4.8.3
                             June 26, 2018
                    =============================
@@ -84,8 +174,8 @@ database (https://bugzilla.samba.org/).
 ======================================================================
 
 
-Release notes for older releases follow:
-----------------------------------------
+----------------------------------------------------------------------
+
 
                    =============================
                    Release Notes for Samba 4.8.2
diff --git a/lib/ldb/ABI/ldb-1.3.5.sigs b/lib/ldb/ABI/ldb-1.3.5.sigs
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..a31b84ef4b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/ldb/ABI/ldb-1.3.5.sigs
@@ -0,0 +1,279 @@
+ldb_add: int (struct ldb_context *, const struct ldb_message *)
+ldb_any_comparison: int (struct ldb_context *, void *, ldb_attr_handler_t, const struct ldb_val *, const struct ldb_val *)
+ldb_asprintf_errstring: void (struct ldb_context *, const char *, ...)
+ldb_attr_casefold: char *(TALLOC_CTX *, const char *)
+ldb_attr_dn: int (const char *)
+ldb_attr_in_list: int (const char * const *, const char *)
+ldb_attr_list_copy: const char **(TALLOC_CTX *, const char * const *)
+ldb_attr_list_copy_add: const char **(TALLOC_CTX *, const char * const *, const char *)
+ldb_base64_decode: int (char *)
+ldb_base64_encode: char *(TALLOC_CTX *, const char *, int)
+ldb_binary_decode: struct ldb_val (TALLOC_CTX *, const char *)
+ldb_binary_encode: char *(TALLOC_CTX *, struct ldb_val)
+ldb_binary_encode_string: char *(TALLOC_CTX *, const char *)
+ldb_build_add_req: int (struct ldb_request **, struct ldb_context *, TALLOC_CTX *, const struct ldb_message *, struct ldb_control **, void *, ldb_request_callback_t, struct ldb_request *)
+ldb_build_del_req: int (struct ldb_request **, struct ldb_context *, TALLOC_CTX *, struct ldb_dn *, struct ldb_control **, void *, ldb_request_callback_t, struct ldb_request *)
+ldb_build_extended_req: int (struct ldb_request **, struct ldb_context *, TALLOC_CTX *, const char *, void *, struct ldb_control **, void *, ldb_request_callback_t, struct ldb_request *)
+ldb_build_mod_req: int (struct ldb_request **, struct ldb_context *, TALLOC_CTX *, const struct ldb_message *, struct ldb_control **, void *, ldb_request_callback_t, struct ldb_request *)
+ldb_build_rename_req: int (struct ldb_request **, struct ldb_context *, TALLOC_CTX *, struct ldb_dn *, struct ldb_dn *, struct ldb_control **, void *, ldb_request_callback_t, struct ldb_request *)
+ldb_build_search_req: int (struct ldb_request **, struct ldb_context *, TALLOC_CTX *, struct ldb_dn *, enum ldb_scope, const char *, const char * const *, struct ldb_control **, void *, ldb_request_callback_t, struct ldb_request *)
+ldb_build_search_req_ex: int (struct ldb_request **, struct ldb_context *, TALLOC_CTX *, struct ldb_dn *, enum ldb_scope, struct ldb_parse_tree *, const char * const *, struct ldb_control **, void *, ldb_request_callback_t, struct ldb_request *)
+ldb_casefold: char *(struct ldb_context *, TALLOC_CTX *, const char *, size_t)
+ldb_casefold_default: char *(void *, TALLOC_CTX *, const char *, size_t)
+ldb_check_critical_controls: int (struct ldb_control **)
+ldb_comparison_binary: int (struct ldb_context *, void *, const struct ldb_val *, const struct ldb_val *)
+ldb_comparison_fold: int (struct ldb_context *, void *, const struct ldb_val *, const struct ldb_val *)
+ldb_connect: int (struct ldb_context *, const char *, unsigned int, const char **)
+ldb_control_to_string: char *(TALLOC_CTX *, const struct ldb_control *)
+ldb_controls_except_specified: struct ldb_control **(struct ldb_control **, TALLOC_CTX *, struct ldb_control *)
+ldb_debug: void (struct ldb_context *, enum ldb_debug_level, const char *, ...)
+ldb_debug_add: void (struct ldb_context *, const char *, ...)
+ldb_debug_end: void (struct ldb_context *, enum ldb_debug_level)
+ldb_debug_set: void (struct ldb_context *, enum ldb_debug_level, const char *, ...)
+ldb_delete: int (struct ldb_context *, struct ldb_dn *)
+ldb_dn_add_base: bool (struct ldb_dn *, struct ldb_dn *)
+ldb_dn_add_base_fmt: bool (struct ldb_dn *, const char *, ...)
+ldb_dn_add_child: bool (struct ldb_dn *, struct ldb_dn *)
+ldb_dn_add_child_fmt: bool (struct ldb_dn *, const char *, ...)
+ldb_dn_alloc_casefold: char *(TALLOC_CTX *, struct ldb_dn *)
+ldb_dn_alloc_linearized: char *(TALLOC_CTX *, struct ldb_dn *)
+ldb_dn_canonical_ex_string: char *(TALLOC_CTX *, struct ldb_dn *)
+ldb_dn_canonical_string: char *(TALLOC_CTX *, struct ldb_dn *)
+ldb_dn_check_local: bool (struct ldb_module *, struct ldb_dn *)
+ldb_dn_check_special: bool (struct ldb_dn *, const char *)
+ldb_dn_compare: int (struct ldb_dn *, struct ldb_dn *)
+ldb_dn_compare_base: int (struct ldb_dn *, struct ldb_dn *)
+ldb_dn_copy: struct ldb_dn *(TALLOC_CTX *, struct ldb_dn *)
+ldb_dn_escape_value: char *(TALLOC_CTX *, struct ldb_val)
+ldb_dn_extended_add_syntax: int (struct ldb_context *, unsigned int, const struct ldb_dn_extended_syntax *)
+ldb_dn_extended_filter: void (struct ldb_dn *, const char * const *)
+ldb_dn_extended_syntax_by_name: const struct ldb_dn_extended_syntax *(struct ldb_context *, const char *)
+ldb_dn_from_ldb_val: struct ldb_dn *(TALLOC_CTX *, struct ldb_context *, const struct ldb_val *)
+ldb_dn_get_casefold: const char *(struct ldb_dn *)
+ldb_dn_get_comp_num: int (struct ldb_dn *)
+ldb_dn_get_component_name: const char *(struct ldb_dn *, unsigned int)
+ldb_dn_get_component_val: const struct ldb_val *(struct ldb_dn *, unsigned int)
+ldb_dn_get_extended_comp_num: int (struct ldb_dn *)
+ldb_dn_get_extended_component: const struct ldb_val *(struct ldb_dn *, const char *)
+ldb_dn_get_extended_linearized: char *(TALLOC_CTX *, struct ldb_dn *, int)
+ldb_dn_get_ldb_context: struct ldb_context *(struct ldb_dn *)
+ldb_dn_get_linearized: const char *(struct ldb_dn *)
+ldb_dn_get_parent: struct ldb_dn *(TALLOC_CTX *, struct ldb_dn *)
+ldb_dn_get_rdn_name: const char *(struct ldb_dn *)
+ldb_dn_get_rdn_val: const struct ldb_val *(struct ldb_dn *)
+ldb_dn_has_extended: bool (struct ldb_dn *)
+ldb_dn_is_null: bool (struct ldb_dn *)
+ldb_dn_is_special: bool (struct ldb_dn *)
+ldb_dn_is_valid: bool (struct ldb_dn *)
+ldb_dn_map_local: struct ldb_dn *(struct ldb_module *, void *, struct ldb_dn *)
+ldb_dn_map_rebase_remote: struct ldb_dn *(struct ldb_module *, void *, struct ldb_dn *)
+ldb_dn_map_remote: struct ldb_dn *(struct ldb_module *, void *, struct ldb_dn *)
+ldb_dn_minimise: bool (struct ldb_dn *)
+ldb_dn_new: struct ldb_dn *(TALLOC_CTX *, struct ldb_context *, const char *)
+ldb_dn_new_fmt: struct ldb_dn *(TALLOC_CTX *, struct ldb_context *, const char *, ...)
+ldb_dn_remove_base_components: bool (struct ldb_dn *, unsigned int)
+ldb_dn_remove_child_components: bool (struct ldb_dn *, unsigned int)
+ldb_dn_remove_extended_components: void (struct ldb_dn *)
+ldb_dn_replace_components: bool (struct ldb_dn *, struct ldb_dn *)
+ldb_dn_set_component: int (struct ldb_dn *, int, const char *, const struct ldb_val)
+ldb_dn_set_extended_component: int (struct ldb_dn *, const char *, const struct ldb_val *)
+ldb_dn_update_components: int (struct ldb_dn *, const struct ldb_dn *)
+ldb_dn_validate: bool (struct ldb_dn *)
+ldb_dump_results: void (struct ldb_context *, struct ldb_result *, FILE *)
+ldb_error_at: int (struct ldb_context *, int, const char *, const char *, int)
+ldb_errstring: const char *(struct ldb_context *)
+ldb_extended: int (struct ldb_context *, const char *, void *, struct ldb_result **)
+ldb_extended_default_callback: int (struct ldb_request *, struct ldb_reply *)
+ldb_filter_from_tree: char *(TALLOC_CTX *, const struct ldb_parse_tree *)
+ldb_get_config_basedn: struct ldb_dn *(struct ldb_context *)
+ldb_get_create_perms: unsigned int (struct ldb_context *)
+ldb_get_default_basedn: struct ldb_dn *(struct ldb_context *)
+ldb_get_event_context: struct tevent_context *(struct ldb_context *)
+ldb_get_flags: unsigned int (struct ldb_context *)
+ldb_get_opaque: void *(struct ldb_context *, const char *)
+ldb_get_root_basedn: struct ldb_dn *(struct ldb_context *)
+ldb_get_schema_basedn: struct ldb_dn *(struct ldb_context *)
+ldb_global_init: int (void)
+ldb_handle_get_event_context: struct tevent_context *(struct ldb_handle *)
+ldb_handle_new: struct ldb_handle *(TALLOC_CTX *, struct ldb_context *)
+ldb_handle_use_global_event_context: void (struct ldb_handle *)
+ldb_handler_copy: int (struct ldb_context *, void *, const struct ldb_val *, struct ldb_val *)
+ldb_handler_fold: int (struct ldb_context *, void *, const struct ldb_val *, struct ldb_val *)
+ldb_init: struct ldb_context *(TALLOC_CTX *, struct tevent_context *)
+ldb_ldif_message_redacted_string: char *(struct ldb_context *, TALLOC_CTX *, enum ldb_changetype, const struct ldb_message *)
+ldb_ldif_message_string: char *(struct ldb_context *, TALLOC_CTX *, enum ldb_changetype, const struct ldb_message *)
+ldb_ldif_parse_modrdn: int (struct ldb_context *, const struct ldb_ldif *, TALLOC_CTX *, struct ldb_dn **, struct ldb_dn **, bool *, struct ldb_dn **, struct ldb_dn **)
+ldb_ldif_read: struct ldb_ldif *(struct ldb_context *, int (*)(void *), void *)
+ldb_ldif_read_file: struct ldb_ldif *(struct ldb_context *, FILE *)
+ldb_ldif_read_file_state: struct ldb_ldif *(struct ldb_context *, struct ldif_read_file_state *)
+ldb_ldif_read_free: void (struct ldb_context *, struct ldb_ldif *)
+ldb_ldif_read_string: struct ldb_ldif *(struct ldb_context *, const char **)
+ldb_ldif_write: int (struct ldb_context *, int (*)(void *, const char *, ...), void *, const struct ldb_ldif *)
+ldb_ldif_write_file: int (struct ldb_context *, FILE *, const struct ldb_ldif *)
+ldb_ldif_write_redacted_trace_string: char *(struct ldb_context *, TALLOC_CTX *, const struct ldb_ldif *)
+ldb_ldif_write_string: char *(struct ldb_context *, TALLOC_CTX *, const struct ldb_ldif *)
+ldb_load_modules: int (struct ldb_context *, const char **)
+ldb_map_add: int (struct ldb_module *, struct ldb_request *)
+ldb_map_delete: int (struct ldb_module *, struct ldb_request *)
+ldb_map_init: int (struct ldb_module *, const struct ldb_map_attribute *, const struct ldb_map_objectclass *, const char * const *, const char *, const char *)
+ldb_map_modify: int (struct ldb_module *, struct ldb_request *)
+ldb_map_rename: int (struct ldb_module *, struct ldb_request *)
+ldb_map_search: int (struct ldb_module *, struct ldb_request *)
+ldb_match_message: int (struct ldb_context *, const struct ldb_message *, const struct ldb_parse_tree *, enum ldb_scope, bool *)
+ldb_match_msg: int (struct ldb_context *, const struct ldb_message *, const struct ldb_parse_tree *, struct ldb_dn *, enum ldb_scope)
+ldb_match_msg_error: int (struct ldb_context *, const struct ldb_message *, const struct ldb_parse_tree *, struct ldb_dn *, enum ldb_scope, bool *)
+ldb_match_msg_objectclass: int (const struct ldb_message *, const char *)
+ldb_mod_register_control: int (struct ldb_module *, const char *)
+ldb_modify: int (struct ldb_context *, const struct ldb_message *)
+ldb_modify_default_callback: int (struct ldb_request *, struct ldb_reply *)
+ldb_module_call_chain: char *(struct ldb_request *, TALLOC_CTX *)
+ldb_module_connect_backend: int (struct ldb_context *, const char *, const char **, struct ldb_module **)
+ldb_module_done: int (struct ldb_request *, struct ldb_control **, struct ldb_extended *, int)
+ldb_module_flags: uint32_t (struct ldb_context *)
+ldb_module_get_ctx: struct ldb_context *(struct ldb_module *)
+ldb_module_get_name: const char *(struct ldb_module *)
+ldb_module_get_ops: const struct ldb_module_ops *(struct ldb_module *)
+ldb_module_get_private: void *(struct ldb_module *)
+ldb_module_init_chain: int (struct ldb_context *, struct ldb_module *)
+ldb_module_load_list: int (struct ldb_context *, const char **, struct ldb_module *, struct ldb_module **)
+ldb_module_new: struct ldb_module *(TALLOC_CTX *, struct ldb_context *, const char *, const struct ldb_module_ops *)
+ldb_module_next: struct ldb_module *(struct ldb_module *)
+ldb_module_popt_options: struct poptOption **(struct ldb_context *)
+ldb_module_send_entry: int (struct ldb_request *, struct ldb_message *, struct ldb_control **)
+ldb_module_send_referral: int (struct ldb_request *, char *)
+ldb_module_set_next: void (struct ldb_module *, struct ldb_module *)
+ldb_module_set_private: void (struct ldb_module *, void *)
+ldb_modules_hook: int (struct ldb_context *, enum ldb_module_hook_type)
+ldb_modules_list_from_string: const char **(struct ldb_context *, TALLOC_CTX *, const char *)
+ldb_modules_load: int (const char *, const char *)
+ldb_msg_add: int (struct ldb_message *, const struct ldb_message_element *, int)
+ldb_msg_add_empty: int (struct ldb_message *, const char *, int, struct ldb_message_element **)
+ldb_msg_add_fmt: int (struct ldb_message *, const char *, const char *, ...)
+ldb_msg_add_linearized_dn: int (struct ldb_message *, const char *, struct ldb_dn *)
+ldb_msg_add_steal_string: int (struct ldb_message *, const char *, char *)
+ldb_msg_add_steal_value: int (struct ldb_message *, const char *, struct ldb_val *)
+ldb_msg_add_string: int (struct ldb_message *, const char *, const char *)
+ldb_msg_add_value: int (struct ldb_message *, const char *, const struct ldb_val *, struct ldb_message_element **)
+ldb_msg_canonicalize: struct ldb_message *(struct ldb_context *, const struct ldb_message *)
+ldb_msg_check_string_attribute: int (const struct ldb_message *, const char *, const char *)
+ldb_msg_copy: struct ldb_message *(TALLOC_CTX *, const struct ldb_message *)
+ldb_msg_copy_attr: int (struct ldb_message *, const char *, const char *)
+ldb_msg_copy_shallow: struct ldb_message *(TALLOC_CTX *, const struct ldb_message *)
+ldb_msg_diff: struct ldb_message *(struct ldb_context *, struct ldb_message *, struct ldb_message *)
+ldb_msg_difference: int (struct ldb_context *, TALLOC_CTX *, struct ldb_message *, struct ldb_message *, struct ldb_message **)
+ldb_msg_element_compare: int (struct ldb_message_element *, struct ldb_message_element *)
+ldb_msg_element_compare_name: int (struct ldb_message_element *, struct ldb_message_element *)
+ldb_msg_element_equal_ordered: bool (const struct ldb_message_element *, const struct ldb_message_element *)
+ldb_msg_find_attr_as_bool: int (const struct ldb_message *, const char *, int)
+ldb_msg_find_attr_as_dn: struct ldb_dn *(struct ldb_context *, TALLOC_CTX *, const struct ldb_message *, const char *)
+ldb_msg_find_attr_as_double: double (const struct ldb_message *, const char *, double)
+ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int: int (const struct ldb_message *, const char *, int)
+ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int64: int64_t (const struct ldb_message *, const char *, int64_t)
+ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string: const char *(const struct ldb_message *, const char *, const char *)
+ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint: unsigned int (const struct ldb_message *, const char *, unsigned int)
+ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint64: uint64_t (const struct ldb_message *, const char *, uint64_t)
+ldb_msg_find_common_values: int (struct ldb_context *, TALLOC_CTX *, struct ldb_message_element *, struct ldb_message_element *, uint32_t)
+ldb_msg_find_duplicate_val: int (struct ldb_context *, TALLOC_CTX *, const struct ldb_message_element *, struct ldb_val **, uint32_t)
+ldb_msg_find_element: struct ldb_message_element *(const struct ldb_message *, const char *)
+ldb_msg_find_ldb_val: const struct ldb_val *(const struct ldb_message *, const char *)
+ldb_msg_find_val: struct ldb_val *(const struct ldb_message_element *, struct ldb_val *)
+ldb_msg_new: struct ldb_message *(TALLOC_CTX *)
+ldb_msg_normalize: int (struct ldb_context *, TALLOC_CTX *, const struct ldb_message *, struct ldb_message **)
+ldb_msg_remove_attr: void (struct ldb_message *, const char *)
+ldb_msg_remove_element: void (struct ldb_message *, struct ldb_message_element *)
+ldb_msg_rename_attr: int (struct ldb_message *, const char *, const char *)
+ldb_msg_sanity_check: int (struct ldb_context *, const struct ldb_message *)
+ldb_msg_sort_elements: void (struct ldb_message *)
+ldb_next_del_trans: int (struct ldb_module *)
+ldb_next_end_trans: int (struct ldb_module *)
+ldb_next_init: int (struct ldb_module *)
+ldb_next_prepare_commit: int (struct ldb_module *)
+ldb_next_read_lock: int (struct ldb_module *)
+ldb_next_read_unlock: int (struct ldb_module *)
+ldb_next_remote_request: int (struct ldb_module *, struct ldb_request *)
+ldb_next_request: int (struct ldb_module *, struct ldb_request *)
+ldb_next_start_trans: int (struct ldb_module *)
+ldb_op_default_callback: int (struct ldb_request *, struct ldb_reply *)
+ldb_options_find: const char *(struct ldb_context *, const char **, const char *)
+ldb_pack_data: int (struct ldb_context *, const struct ldb_message *, struct ldb_val *)
+ldb_parse_control_from_string: struct ldb_control *(struct ldb_context *, TALLOC_CTX *, const char *)
+ldb_parse_control_strings: struct ldb_control **(struct ldb_context *, TALLOC_CTX *, const char **)
+ldb_parse_tree: struct ldb_parse_tree *(TALLOC_CTX *, const char *)
+ldb_parse_tree_attr_replace: void (struct ldb_parse_tree *, const char *, const char *)
+ldb_parse_tree_copy_shallow: struct ldb_parse_tree *(TALLOC_CTX *, const struct ldb_parse_tree *)
+ldb_parse_tree_walk: int (struct ldb_parse_tree *, int (*)(struct ldb_parse_tree *, void *), void *)
+ldb_qsort: void (void * const, size_t, size_t, void *, ldb_qsort_cmp_fn_t)
+ldb_register_backend: int (const char *, ldb_connect_fn, bool)
+ldb_register_extended_match_rule: int (struct ldb_context *, const struct ldb_extended_match_rule *)
+ldb_register_hook: int (ldb_hook_fn)
+ldb_register_module: int (const struct ldb_module_ops *)
+ldb_rename: int (struct ldb_context *, struct ldb_dn *, struct ldb_dn *)
+ldb_reply_add_control: int (struct ldb_reply *, const char *, bool, void *)
+ldb_reply_get_control: struct ldb_control *(struct ldb_reply *, const char *)
+ldb_req_get_custom_flags: uint32_t (struct ldb_request *)
+ldb_req_is_untrusted: bool (struct ldb_request *)
+ldb_req_location: const char *(struct ldb_request *)
+ldb_req_mark_trusted: void (struct ldb_request *)
+ldb_req_mark_untrusted: void (struct ldb_request *)
+ldb_req_set_custom_flags: void (struct ldb_request *, uint32_t)
+ldb_req_set_location: void (struct ldb_request *, const char *)
+ldb_request: int (struct ldb_context *, struct ldb_request *)
+ldb_request_add_control: int (struct ldb_request *, const char *, bool, void *)
+ldb_request_done: int (struct ldb_request *, int)
+ldb_request_get_control: struct ldb_control *(struct ldb_request *, const char *)
+ldb_request_get_status: int (struct ldb_request *)
+ldb_request_replace_control: int (struct ldb_request *, const char *, bool, void *)
+ldb_request_set_state: void (struct ldb_request *, int)
+ldb_reset_err_string: void (struct ldb_context *)
+ldb_save_controls: int (struct ldb_control *, struct ldb_request *, struct ldb_control ***)
+ldb_schema_attribute_add: int (struct ldb_context *, const char *, unsigned int, const char *)
+ldb_schema_attribute_add_with_syntax: int (struct ldb_context *, const char *, unsigned int, const struct ldb_schema_syntax *)
+ldb_schema_attribute_by_name: const struct ldb_schema_attribute *(struct ldb_context *, const char *)
+ldb_schema_attribute_fill_with_syntax: int (struct ldb_context *, TALLOC_CTX *, const char *, unsigned int, const struct ldb_schema_syntax *, struct ldb_schema_attribute *)
+ldb_schema_attribute_remove: void (struct ldb_context *, const char *)
+ldb_schema_attribute_remove_flagged: void (struct ldb_context *, unsigned int)
+ldb_schema_attribute_set_override_handler: void (struct ldb_context *, ldb_attribute_handler_override_fn_t, void *)
+ldb_schema_set_override_GUID_index: void (struct ldb_context *, const char *, const char *)
+ldb_schema_set_override_indexlist: void (struct ldb_context *, bool)
+ldb_search: int (struct ldb_context *, TALLOC_CTX *, struct ldb_result **, struct ldb_dn *, enum ldb_scope, const char * const *, const char *, ...)
+ldb_search_default_callback: int (struct ldb_request *, struct ldb_reply *)
+ldb_sequence_number: int (struct ldb_context *, enum ldb_sequence_type, uint64_t *)
+ldb_set_create_perms: void (struct ldb_context *, unsigned int)
+ldb_set_debug: int (struct ldb_context *, void (*)(void *, enum ldb_debug_level, const char *, va_list), void *)
+ldb_set_debug_stderr: int (struct ldb_context *)
+ldb_set_default_dns: void (struct ldb_context *)
+ldb_set_errstring: void (struct ldb_context *, const char *)
+ldb_set_event_context: void (struct ldb_context *, struct tevent_context *)
+ldb_set_flags: void (struct ldb_context *, unsigned int)
+ldb_set_modules_dir: void (struct ldb_context *, const char *)
+ldb_set_opaque: int (struct ldb_context *, const char *, void *)
+ldb_set_require_private_event_context: void (struct ldb_context *)
+ldb_set_timeout: int (struct ldb_context *, struct ldb_request *, int)
+ldb_set_timeout_from_prev_req: int (struct ldb_context *, struct ldb_request *, struct ldb_request *)
+ldb_set_utf8_default: void (struct ldb_context *)
+ldb_set_utf8_fns: void (struct ldb_context *, void *, char *(*)(void *, void *, const char *, size_t))
+ldb_setup_wellknown_attributes: int (struct ldb_context *)
+ldb_should_b64_encode: int (struct ldb_context *, const struct ldb_val *)
+ldb_standard_syntax_by_name: const struct ldb_schema_syntax *(struct ldb_context *, const char *)
+ldb_strerror: const char *(int)
+ldb_string_to_time: time_t (const char *)
+ldb_string_utc_to_time: time_t (const char *)
+ldb_timestring: char *(TALLOC_CTX *, time_t)
+ldb_timestring_utc: char *(TALLOC_CTX *, time_t)
+ldb_transaction_cancel: int (struct ldb_context *)
+ldb_transaction_cancel_noerr: int (struct ldb_context *)
+ldb_transaction_commit: int (struct ldb_context *)
+ldb_transaction_prepare_commit: int (struct ldb_context *)
+ldb_transaction_start: int (struct ldb_context *)
+ldb_unpack_data: int (struct ldb_context *, const struct ldb_val *, struct ldb_message *)
+ldb_unpack_data_only_attr_list: int (struct ldb_context *, const struct ldb_val *, struct ldb_message *, const char * const *, unsigned int, unsigned int *)
+ldb_unpack_data_only_attr_list_flags: int (struct ldb_context *, const struct ldb_val *, struct ldb_message *, const char * const *, unsigned int, unsigned int, unsigned int *)
+ldb_val_dup: struct ldb_val (TALLOC_CTX *, const struct ldb_val *)
+ldb_val_equal_exact: int (const struct ldb_val *, const struct ldb_val *)
+ldb_val_map_local: struct ldb_val (struct ldb_module *, void *, const struct ldb_map_attribute *, const struct ldb_val *)
+ldb_val_map_remote: struct ldb_val (struct ldb_module *, void *, const struct ldb_map_attribute *, const struct ldb_val *)
+ldb_val_string_cmp: int (const struct ldb_val *, const char *)
+ldb_val_to_time: int (const struct ldb_val *, time_t *)
+ldb_valid_attr_name: int (const char *)
+ldb_vdebug: void (struct ldb_context *, enum ldb_debug_level, const char *, va_list)
+ldb_wait: int (struct ldb_handle *, enum ldb_wait_type)
diff --git a/lib/ldb/ABI/pyldb-util-1.3.5.sigs b/lib/ldb/ABI/pyldb-util-1.3.5.sigs
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..74d6719d2bc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/ldb/ABI/pyldb-util-1.3.5.sigs
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+pyldb_Dn_FromDn: PyObject *(struct ldb_dn *)
+pyldb_Object_AsDn: bool (TALLOC_CTX *, PyObject *, struct ldb_context *, struct ldb_dn **)
diff --git a/lib/ldb/ABI/pyldb-util.py3-1.3.5.sigs b/lib/ldb/ABI/pyldb-util.py3-1.3.5.sigs
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..74d6719d2bc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/ldb/ABI/pyldb-util.py3-1.3.5.sigs
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+pyldb_Dn_FromDn: PyObject *(struct ldb_dn *)
+pyldb_Object_AsDn: bool (TALLOC_CTX *, PyObject *, struct ldb_context *, struct ldb_dn **)
diff --git a/lib/ldb/ldb_sqlite3/ldb_sqlite3.c b/lib/ldb/ldb_sqlite3/ldb_sqlite3.c
index f94dc993904..0f5abf87547 100644
--- a/lib/ldb/ldb_sqlite3/ldb_sqlite3.c
+++ b/lib/ldb/ldb_sqlite3/ldb_sqlite3.c
@@ -323,6 +323,9 @@ static char *parsetree_to_sql(struct ldb_module *module,
 		 	const char *cdn = ldb_dn_get_casefold(
 						ldb_dn_new(mem_ctx, ldb,
 							      (const char *)value.data));
+			if (cdn == NULL) {
+				return NULL;
+			}
 
 			return lsqlite3_tprintf(mem_ctx,
 						"SELECT eid FROM ldb_entry "
diff --git a/lib/ldb/ldb_tdb/ldb_index.c b/lib/ldb/ldb_tdb/ldb_index.c
index 40baeea5c2b..429c8f5aa24 100644
--- a/lib/ldb/ldb_tdb/ldb_index.c
+++ b/lib/ldb/ldb_tdb/ldb_index.c
@@ -970,6 +970,7 @@ static int ltdb_index_dn_leaf(struct ldb_module *module,
 		return LDB_SUCCESS;
 	}
 	if (ldb_attr_dn(tree->u.equality.attr) == 0) {
+		bool valid_dn = false;
 		struct ldb_dn *dn
 			= ldb_dn_from_ldb_val(list,
 					      ldb_module_get_ctx(module),
@@ -981,6 +982,14 @@ static int ltdb_index_dn_leaf(struct ldb_module *module,
 			return LDB_SUCCESS;
 		}
 
+		valid_dn = ldb_dn_validate(dn);
+		if (valid_dn == false) {
+			/* If we can't parse it, no match */
+			list->dn = NULL;
+			list->count = 0;
+			return LDB_SUCCESS;
+		}
+
 		/*
 		 * Re-use the same code we use for a SCOPE_BASE
 		 * search
@@ -1405,6 +1414,15 @@ static int ltdb_index_dn_attr(struct ldb_module *module,
 
 	/* work out the index key from the parent DN */
 	val.data = (uint8_t *)((uintptr_t)ldb_dn_get_casefold(dn));
+	if (val.data == NULL) {
+		const char *dn_str = ldb_dn_get_linearized(dn);
+		ldb_asprintf_errstring(ldb_module_get_ctx(module),
+				       __location__
+				       ": Failed to get casefold DN "
+				       "from: %s",
+				       dn_str);
+		return LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR;
+	}
 	val.length = strlen((char *)val.data);
 	key = ltdb_index_key(ldb, ltdb, attr, &val, NULL);
 	if (!key) {
diff --git a/lib/ldb/ldb_tdb/ldb_search.c b/lib/ldb/ldb_tdb/ldb_search.c
index 02890862cf7..d14be0febd4 100644
--- a/lib/ldb/ldb_tdb/ldb_search.c
+++ b/lib/ldb/ldb_tdb/ldb_search.c
@@ -295,6 +295,14 @@ int ltdb_search_dn1(struct ldb_module *module, struct ldb_dn *dn, struct ldb_mes
 	};
 	TALLOC_CTX *tdb_key_ctx = NULL;
 
+	bool valid_dn = ldb_dn_validate(dn);
+	if (valid_dn == false) {
+		ldb_asprintf_errstring(ldb_module_get_ctx(module),
+				       "Invalid Base DN: %s",
+				       ldb_dn_get_linearized(dn));
+		return LDB_ERR_INVALID_DN_SYNTAX;
+	}
+
 	if (ltdb->cache->GUID_index_attribute == NULL) {
 		tdb_key_ctx = talloc_new(msg);
 		if (!tdb_key_ctx) {
@@ -803,6 +811,14 @@ int ltdb_search(struct ltdb_context *ctx)
 					       ldb_dn_get_linearized(req->op.search.base));
 		}
 			
+	} else if (ldb_dn_validate(req->op.search.base) == false) {
+
+		/* We don't want invalid base DNs here */
+		ldb_asprintf_errstring(ldb,
+				       "Invalid Base DN: %s",
+				       ldb_dn_get_linearized(req->op.search.base));
+		ret = LDB_ERR_INVALID_DN_SYNTAX;
+
 	} else {
 		/* If we are not checking the base DN life is easy */
 		ret = LDB_SUCCESS;
diff --git a/lib/ldb/ldb_tdb/ldb_tdb.c b/lib/ldb/ldb_tdb/ldb_tdb.c
index 701427609e9..c7bf865de58 100644
--- a/lib/ldb/ldb_tdb/ldb_tdb.c
+++ b/lib/ldb/ldb_tdb/ldb_tdb.c
@@ -515,6 +515,16 @@ static int ltdb_add_internal(struct ldb_module *module,
 	struct ldb_context *ldb = ldb_module_get_ctx(module);
 	int ret = LDB_SUCCESS;
 	unsigned int i;
+	bool valid_dn = false;
+
+	/* Check the new DN is reasonable */
+	valid_dn = ldb_dn_validate(msg->dn);
+	if (valid_dn == false) {
+		ldb_asprintf_errstring(ldb_module_get_ctx(module),
+				       "Invalid DN in ADD: %s",
+				       ldb_dn_get_linearized(msg->dn));
+		return LDB_ERR_INVALID_DN_SYNTAX;
+	}
 
 	for (i=0;i<msg->num_elements;i++) {
 		struct ldb_message_element *el = &msg->elements[i];
@@ -1292,6 +1302,7 @@ static int ltdb_rename(struct ltdb_context *ctx)
 	int ret = LDB_SUCCESS;
 	TDB_DATA tdb_key, tdb_key_old;
 	struct ldb_dn *db_dn;
+	bool valid_dn = false;
 
 	ldb_request_set_state(req, LDB_ASYNC_PENDING);
 
@@ -1304,10 +1315,24 @@ static int ltdb_rename(struct ltdb_context *ctx)
 		return LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR;
 	}
 
+	/* Check the new DN is reasonable */
+	valid_dn = ldb_dn_validate(req->op.rename.newdn);
+	if (valid_dn == false) {
+		ldb_asprintf_errstring(ldb_module_get_ctx(module),
+				       "Invalid New DN: %s",
+				       ldb_dn_get_linearized(req->op.rename.newdn));
+		return LDB_ERR_INVALID_DN_SYNTAX;
+	}
+
 	/* we need to fetch the old record to re-add under the new name */
 	ret = ltdb_search_dn1(module, req->op.rename.olddn, msg,
 			      LDB_UNPACK_DATA_FLAG_NO_DATA_ALLOC);
-	if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
+	if (ret == LDB_ERR_INVALID_DN_SYNTAX) {
+		ldb_asprintf_errstring(ldb_module_get_ctx(module),
+				       "Invalid Old DN: %s",
+				       ldb_dn_get_linearized(req->op.rename.newdn));
+		return ret;
+	} else if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
 		/* not finding the old record is an error */
 		return ret;
 	}
diff --git a/lib/ldb/tests/python/api.py b/lib/ldb/tests/python/api.py
index a62b241444b..48fac887f1c 100755
--- a/lib/ldb/tests/python/api.py
+++ b/lib/ldb/tests/python/api.py
@@ -401,6 +401,19 @@ class SimpleLdb(LdbBaseTest):
         finally:
             l.delete(ldb.Dn(l, "dc=bar"))
 
+    def test_rename_bad_string_dns(self):
+        l = ldb.Ldb(self.url(), flags=self.flags())
+        m = ldb.Message()
+        m.dn = ldb.Dn(l, "dc=foo8")
+        m["bla"] = b"bla"
+        m["objectUUID"] = b"0123456789abcdef"
+        self.assertEqual(len(l.search()), 0)
+        l.add(m)
+        self.assertEqual(len(l.search()), 1)
+        self.assertRaises(ldb.LdbError,lambda: l.rename("dcXfoo8", "dc=bar"))
+        self.assertRaises(ldb.LdbError,lambda: l.rename("dc=foo8", "dcXbar"))
+        l.delete(ldb.Dn(l, "dc=foo8"))
+
     def test_empty_dn(self):
         l = ldb.Ldb(self.url(), flags=self.flags())
         self.assertEqual(0, len(l.search()))
@@ -1143,6 +1156,110 @@ class SearchTests(LdbBaseTest):
         # At some point we should fix this, but it isn't trivial
         self.assertEqual(len(res11), 1)
 
+    def test_distinguishedName_filter_one(self):
+        """Testing that a distinguishedName= filter succeeds
+        when the scope is SCOPE_ONELEVEL.
+
+        This should be made more consistent, but for now lock in
+        the behaviour
+
+        """
+
+        res11 = self.l.search(base="DC=SAMBA,DC=ORG",
+                              scope=ldb.SCOPE_ONELEVEL,
+                              expression="(distinguishedName=OU=OU1,DC=SAMBA,DC=ORG)")
+        self.assertEqual(len(res11), 1)
+
+    def test_distinguishedName_filter_subtree(self):
+        """Testing that a distinguishedName= filter succeeds
+        when the scope is SCOPE_SUBTREE"""
+
+        res11 = self.l.search(base="DC=SAMBA,DC=ORG",
+                              scope=ldb.SCOPE_SUBTREE,
+                              expression="(distinguishedName=OU=OU1,DC=SAMBA,DC=ORG)")
+        self.assertEqual(len(res11), 1)
+
+    def test_distinguishedName_filter_base(self):
+        """Testing that (incorrectly) a distinguishedName= filter works
+        when the scope is SCOPE_BASE"""
+
+        res11 = self.l.search(base="OU=OU1,DC=SAMBA,DC=ORG",
+                              scope=ldb.SCOPE_BASE,
+                              expression="(distinguishedName=OU=OU1,DC=SAMBA,DC=ORG)")
+
+        # At some point we should fix this, but it isn't trivial
+        self.assertEqual(len(res11), 1)
+
+    def test_bad_dn_filter_base(self):
+        """Testing that a dn= filter on an invalid DN works
+        when the scope is SCOPE_BASE but
+        returns zero results"""
+
+        res11 = self.l.search(base="OU=OU1,DC=SAMBA,DC=ORG",
+                              scope=ldb.SCOPE_BASE,
+                              expression="(dn=OU=OU1,DC=SAMBA,DCXXXX)")
+
+        # At some point we should fix this, but it isn't trivial
+        self.assertEqual(len(res11), 0)
+
+
+    def test_bad_dn_filter_one(self):
+        """Testing that a dn= filter succeeds but returns zero
+        results when the DN is not valid on a SCOPE_ONELEVEL search
+
+        """
+
+        res11 = self.l.search(base="DC=SAMBA,DC=ORG",
+                              scope=ldb.SCOPE_ONELEVEL,
+                              expression="(dn=OU=OU1,DC=SAMBA,DCXXXX)")
+        self.assertEqual(len(res11), 0)
+
+    def test_bad_dn_filter_subtree(self):
+        """Testing that a dn= filter succeeds but returns zero
+        results when the DN is not valid on a SCOPE_SUBTREE search
+
+        """
+
+        res11 = self.l.search(base="DC=SAMBA,DC=ORG",
+                              scope=ldb.SCOPE_SUBTREE,
+                              expression="(dn=OU=OU1,DC=SAMBA,DCXXXX)")
+        self.assertEqual(len(res11), 0)
+
+    def test_bad_distinguishedName_filter_base(self):
+        """Testing that a distinguishedName= filter on an invalid DN works
+        when the scope is SCOPE_BASE but
+        returns zero results"""
+
+        res11 = self.l.search(base="OU=OU1,DC=SAMBA,DC=ORG",
+                              scope=ldb.SCOPE_BASE,
+                              expression="(distinguishedName=OU=OU1,DC=SAMBA,DCXXXX)")
+
+        # At some point we should fix this, but it isn't trivial
+        self.assertEqual(len(res11), 0)
+
+
+    def test_bad_distinguishedName_filter_one(self):
+        """Testing that a distinguishedName= filter succeeds but returns zero
+        results when the DN is not valid on a SCOPE_ONELEVEL search
+
+        """
+
+        res11 = self.l.search(base="DC=SAMBA,DC=ORG",
+                              scope=ldb.SCOPE_ONELEVEL,
+                              expression="(distinguishedName=OU=OU1,DC=SAMBA,DCXXXX)")
+        self.assertEqual(len(res11), 0)
+
+    def test_bad_distinguishedName_filter_subtree(self):
+        """Testing that a distinguishedName= filter succeeds but returns zero
+        results when the DN is not valid on a SCOPE_SUBTREE search
+
+        """
+
+        res11 = self.l.search(base="DC=SAMBA,DC=ORG",
+                              scope=ldb.SCOPE_SUBTREE,
+                              expression="(distinguishedName=OU=OU1,DC=SAMBA,DCXXXX)")
+        self.assertEqual(len(res11), 0)
+
 
 class IndexedSearchTests(SearchTests):
     """Test searches using the index, to ensure the index doesn't
@@ -1291,6 +1408,17 @@ class AddModifyTests(LdbBaseTest):
             enum = err.args[0]
             self.assertEqual(enum, ldb.ERR_ENTRY_ALREADY_EXISTS)
 
+    def test_add_bad(self):
+        try:
+            self.l.add({"dn": "BAD,DC=SAMBA,DC=ORG",
+                        "name": b"Admins",
+                        "x": "z", "y": "a",
+                        "objectUUID": b"0123456789abcde1"})
+            self.fail("Should have failed adding entry with invalid DN")
+        except ldb.LdbError as err:
+            enum = err.args[0]
+            self.assertEqual(enum, ldb.ERR_INVALID_DN_SYNTAX)
+
     def test_add_del_add(self):
         self.l.add({"dn": "OU=DUP,DC=SAMBA,DC=ORG",
                     "name": b"Admins",
@@ -1372,6 +1500,34 @@ class AddModifyTests(LdbBaseTest):
             enum = err.args[0]
             self.assertEqual(enum, ldb.ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT)
 
+    def test_move_bad(self):
+        self.l.add({"dn": "OU=DUP2,DC=SAMBA,DC=ORG",
+                    "name": b"Admins",
+                    "x": "z", "y": "a",
+                    "objectUUID": b"0123456789abcde2"})
+
+        try:
+            self.l.rename("OUXDUP,DC=SAMBA,DC=ORG",
+                          "OU=DUP2,DC=SAMBA,DC=ORG")
+            self.fail("Should have failed on invalid DN")
+        except ldb.LdbError as err:
+            enum = err.args[0]
+            self.assertEqual(enum, ldb.ERR_INVALID_DN_SYNTAX)
+
+    def test_move_bad2(self):
+        self.l.add({"dn": "OU=DUP2,DC=SAMBA,DC=ORG",
+                    "name": b"Admins",
+                    "x": "z", "y": "a",
+                    "objectUUID": b"0123456789abcde2"})
+
+        try:
+            self.l.rename("OU=DUP,DC=SAMBA,DC=ORG",
+                          "OUXDUP2,DC=SAMBA,DC=ORG")
+            self.fail("Should have failed on missing")
+        except ldb.LdbError as err:
+            enum = err.args[0]
+            self.assertEqual(enum, ldb.ERR_INVALID_DN_SYNTAX)
+
     def test_move_fail_move_add(self):
         self.l.add({"dn": "OU=DUP,DC=SAMBA,DC=ORG",
                     "name": b"Admins",
diff --git a/lib/ldb/wscript b/lib/ldb/wscript
index 15a7caebbf6..27b4df120a0 100644
--- a/lib/ldb/wscript
+++ b/lib/ldb/wscript
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env python
 
 APPNAME = 'ldb'
-VERSION = '1.3.4'
+VERSION = '1.3.5'
 
 blddir = 'bin'
 
diff --git a/libcli/auth/ntlm_check.c b/libcli/auth/ntlm_check.c
index 3b02adc1d48..b68e9c87888 100644
--- a/libcli/auth/ntlm_check.c
+++ b/libcli/auth/ntlm_check.c
@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ NTSTATUS hash_password_check(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
 			     const struct samr_Password *stored_nt)
 {
 	if (stored_nt == NULL) {
-		DEBUG(3,("ntlm_password_check: NO NT password stored for user %s.\n", 
+		DEBUG(3,("hash_password_check: NO NT password stored for user %s.\n",
 			 username));
 	}
 
@@ -232,14 +232,14 @@ NTSTATUS hash_password_check(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
 		if (memcmp(client_nt->hash, stored_nt->hash, sizeof(stored_nt->hash)) == 0) {
 			return NT_STATUS_OK;
 		} else {
-			DEBUG(3,("ntlm_password_check: Interactive logon: NT password check failed for user %s\n",
+			DEBUG(3,("hash_password_check: Interactive logon: NT password check failed for user %s\n",
 				 username));
 			return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
 		}
 
 	} else if (client_lanman && stored_lanman) {
 		if (!lanman_auth) {
-			DEBUG(3,("ntlm_password_check: Interactive logon: only LANMAN password supplied for user %s, and LM passwords are disabled!\n",
+			DEBUG(3,("hash_password_check: Interactive logon: only LANMAN password supplied for user %s, and LM passwords are disabled!\n",
 				 username));
 			return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
 		}
@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ NTSTATUS hash_password_check(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
 		if (memcmp(client_lanman->hash, stored_lanman->hash, sizeof(stored_lanman->hash)) == 0) {
 			return NT_STATUS_OK;
 		} else {
-			DEBUG(3,("ntlm_password_check: Interactive logon: LANMAN password check failed for user %s\n",
+			DEBUG(3,("hash_password_check: Interactive logon: LANMAN password check failed for user %s\n",
 				 username));
 			return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
 		}
@@ -572,7 +572,7 @@ NTSTATUS ntlm_password_check(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
 	   - I think this is related to Win9X pass-though authentication
 	*/
 	DEBUG(4,("ntlm_password_check: Checking NT MD4 password in LM field\n"));
-	if (ntlm_auth) {
+	if (ntlm_auth == NTLM_AUTH_ON) {
 		if (smb_pwd_check_ntlmv1(mem_ctx, 
 					 lm_response, 
 					 stored_nt->hash, challenge,
diff --git a/libcli/auth/tests/ntlm_check.c b/libcli/auth/tests/ntlm_check.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..e87a0a276d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/libcli/auth/tests/ntlm_check.c
@@ -0,0 +1,413 @@
+/*
+ * Unit tests for the ntlm_check password hash check library.
+ *
+ *  Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2018
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ *
+ */
+
+/*
+ * from cmocka.c:
+ * These headers or their equivalents should be included prior to
+ * including
+ * this header file.
+ *
+ * #include <stdarg.h>
+ * #include <stddef.h>
+ * #include <setjmp.h>
+ *
+ * This allows test applications to use custom definitions of C standard
+ * library functions and types.
+ *
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Note that the messaging routines (audit_message_send and get_event_server)
+ * are not tested by these unit tests.  Currently they are for integration
+ * test support, and as such are exercised by the integration tests.
+ */
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <setjmp.h>
+#include <cmocka.h>
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include "../lib/crypto/crypto.h"
+#include "librpc/gen_ndr/netlogon.h"
+#include "libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h"
+#include "auth/credentials/credentials.h"
+
+struct ntlm_state {
+	const char *username;
+	const char *domain;
+	DATA_BLOB challenge;
+	DATA_BLOB ntlm;
+	DATA_BLOB lm;
+	DATA_BLOB ntlm_key;
+	DATA_BLOB lm_key;
+	const struct samr_Password *nt_hash;
+};
+
+static int test_ntlm_setup_with_options(void **state,
+					int flags, bool upn)
+{
+	NTSTATUS status;
+	DATA_BLOB challenge = {
+		.data = discard_const_p(uint8_t, "I am a teapot"),
+		.length = 8
+	};
+	struct ntlm_state *ntlm_state = talloc(NULL, struct ntlm_state);
+	DATA_BLOB target_info = NTLMv2_generate_names_blob(ntlm_state,
+							   NULL,
+							   "serverdom");
+	struct cli_credentials *creds = cli_credentials_init(ntlm_state);
+	cli_credentials_set_username(creds,
+				     "testuser",
+				     CRED_SPECIFIED);
+	cli_credentials_set_domain(creds,
+				   "testdom",
+				   CRED_SPECIFIED);
+	cli_credentials_set_workstation(creds,
+					"testwksta",
+					CRED_SPECIFIED);
+	cli_credentials_set_password(creds,
+				     "testpass",
+				     CRED_SPECIFIED);
+
+	if (upn) {
+		cli_credentials_set_principal(creds,
+					      "testuser@samba.org",
+					      CRED_SPECIFIED);
+	}
+
+	cli_credentials_get_ntlm_username_domain(creds,
+						 ntlm_state,
+						 &ntlm_state->username,
+						 &ntlm_state->domain);
+
+	status = cli_credentials_get_ntlm_response(creds,
+						   ntlm_state,
+						   &flags,
+						   challenge,
+						   NULL,
+						   target_info,
+						   &ntlm_state->lm,
+						   &ntlm_state->ntlm,
+						   &ntlm_state->lm_key,
+						   &ntlm_state->ntlm_key);
+	ntlm_state->challenge = challenge;
+
+	ntlm_state->nt_hash = cli_credentials_get_nt_hash(creds,
+							  ntlm_state);
+
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	*state = ntlm_state;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int test_ntlm_setup(void **state) {
+	return test_ntlm_setup_with_options(state, 0, false);
+}
+
+static int test_ntlm_and_lm_setup(void **state) {
+	return test_ntlm_setup_with_options(state,
+					    CLI_CRED_LANMAN_AUTH,
+					    false);
+}
+
+static int test_ntlm2_setup(void **state) {
+	return test_ntlm_setup_with_options(state,
+					    CLI_CRED_NTLM2,
+					    false);
+}
+
+static int test_ntlmv2_setup(void **state) {
+	return test_ntlm_setup_with_options(state,
+					    CLI_CRED_NTLMv2_AUTH,
+					    false);
+}
+
+static int test_ntlm_teardown(void **state)
+{
+	struct ntlm_state *ntlm_state
+		= talloc_get_type_abort(*state,
+					struct ntlm_state);
+	TALLOC_FREE(ntlm_state);
+	*state = NULL;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void test_ntlm_allowed(void **state)
+{
+	DATA_BLOB user_sess_key, lm_sess_key;
+	struct ntlm_state *ntlm_state
+		= talloc_get_type_abort(*state,
+					struct ntlm_state);
+	NTSTATUS status;
+	status = ntlm_password_check(ntlm_state,
+				     false,
+				     NTLM_AUTH_ON,
+				     0,
+				     &ntlm_state->challenge,
+				     &ntlm_state->lm,
+				     &ntlm_state->ntlm,
+				     ntlm_state->username,
+				     ntlm_state->username,
+				     ntlm_state->domain,
+				     NULL,
+				     ntlm_state->nt_hash,
+				     &user_sess_key,
+				     &lm_sess_key);
+
+	assert_int_equal(NT_STATUS_V(status), NT_STATUS_V(NT_STATUS_OK));
+}
+
+static void test_ntlm_allowed_lm_supplied(void **state)
+{
+	return test_ntlm_allowed(state);
+}
+
+static void test_ntlm_disabled(void **state)
+{
+	DATA_BLOB user_sess_key, lm_sess_key;
+	struct ntlm_state *ntlm_state
+		= talloc_get_type_abort(*state,
+					struct ntlm_state);
+	NTSTATUS status;
+	status = ntlm_password_check(ntlm_state,
+				     false,
+				     NTLM_AUTH_DISABLED,
+				     0,
+				     &ntlm_state->challenge,
+				     &ntlm_state->lm,
+				     &ntlm_state->ntlm,
+				     ntlm_state->username,
+				     ntlm_state->username,
+				     ntlm_state->domain,
+				     NULL,
+				     ntlm_state->nt_hash,
+				     &user_sess_key,
+				     &lm_sess_key);
+
+	assert_int_equal(NT_STATUS_V(status), NT_STATUS_V(NT_STATUS_NTLM_BLOCKED));
+}
+
+static void test_ntlm2(void **state)
+{
+	DATA_BLOB user_sess_key, lm_sess_key;
+	struct ntlm_state *ntlm_state
+		= talloc_get_type_abort(*state,
+					struct ntlm_state);
+	NTSTATUS status;
+	status = ntlm_password_check(ntlm_state,
+				     false,
+				     NTLM_AUTH_ON,
+				     0,
+				     &ntlm_state->challenge,
+				     &ntlm_state->lm,
+				     &ntlm_state->ntlm,
+				     ntlm_state->username,
+				     ntlm_state->username,
+				     ntlm_state->domain,
+				     NULL,
+				     ntlm_state->nt_hash,
+				     &user_sess_key,
+				     &lm_sess_key);
+
+	/*
+	 * NTLM2 session security (where the real challenge is the
+	 * MD5(challenge, client-challenge) (in the first 8 bytes of
+	 * the lm) isn't decoded by ntlm_password_check(), it must
+	 * first be converted back into normal NTLM by the NTLMSSP
+	 * layer
+	 */
+	assert_int_equal(NT_STATUS_V(status),
+			 NT_STATUS_V(NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD));
+}
+
+static void test_ntlm_mschapv2_only_allowed(void **state)
+{
+	DATA_BLOB user_sess_key, lm_sess_key;
+	struct ntlm_state *ntlm_state
+		= talloc_get_type_abort(*state,
+					struct ntlm_state);
+	NTSTATUS status;
+	status = ntlm_password_check(ntlm_state,
+				     false,
+				     NTLM_AUTH_MSCHAPv2_NTLMV2_ONLY,
+				     MSV1_0_ALLOW_MSVCHAPV2,
+				     &ntlm_state->challenge,
+				     &ntlm_state->lm,
+				     &ntlm_state->ntlm,
+				     ntlm_state->username,
+				     ntlm_state->username,
+				     ntlm_state->domain,
+				     NULL,
+				     ntlm_state->nt_hash,
+				     &user_sess_key,
+				     &lm_sess_key);
+
+	assert_int_equal(NT_STATUS_V(status), NT_STATUS_V(NT_STATUS_OK));
+}
+
+static void test_ntlm_mschapv2_only_denied(void **state)
+{
+	DATA_BLOB user_sess_key, lm_sess_key;
+	struct ntlm_state *ntlm_state
+		= talloc_get_type_abort(*state,
+					struct ntlm_state);
+	NTSTATUS status;
+	status = ntlm_password_check(ntlm_state,
+				     false,
+				     NTLM_AUTH_MSCHAPv2_NTLMV2_ONLY,
+				     0,
+				     &ntlm_state->challenge,
+				     &ntlm_state->lm,
+				     &ntlm_state->ntlm,
+				     ntlm_state->username,
+				     ntlm_state->username,
+				     ntlm_state->domain,
+				     NULL,
+				     ntlm_state->nt_hash,
+				     &user_sess_key,
+				     &lm_sess_key);
+
+	assert_int_equal(NT_STATUS_V(status),
+			 NT_STATUS_V(NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD));
+}
+
+static void test_ntlmv2_only_ntlmv2(void **state)
+{
+	DATA_BLOB user_sess_key, lm_sess_key;
+	struct ntlm_state *ntlm_state
+		= talloc_get_type_abort(*state,
+					struct ntlm_state);
+	NTSTATUS status;
+	status = ntlm_password_check(ntlm_state,
+				     false,
+				     NTLM_AUTH_NTLMV2_ONLY,
+				     0,
+				     &ntlm_state->challenge,
+				     &ntlm_state->lm,
+				     &ntlm_state->ntlm,
+				     ntlm_state->username,
+				     ntlm_state->username,
+				     ntlm_state->domain,
+				     NULL,
+				     ntlm_state->nt_hash,
+				     &user_sess_key,
+				     &lm_sess_key);
+
+	assert_int_equal(NT_STATUS_V(status), NT_STATUS_V(NT_STATUS_OK));
+}
+
+static void test_ntlmv2_only_ntlm(void **state)
+{
+	DATA_BLOB user_sess_key, lm_sess_key;
+	struct ntlm_state *ntlm_state
+		= talloc_get_type_abort(*state,
+					struct ntlm_state);
+	NTSTATUS status;
+	status = ntlm_password_check(ntlm_state,
+				     false,
+				     NTLM_AUTH_NTLMV2_ONLY,
+				     0,
+				     &ntlm_state->challenge,
+				     &ntlm_state->lm,
+				     &ntlm_state->ntlm,
+				     ntlm_state->username,
+				     ntlm_state->username,
+				     ntlm_state->domain,
+				     NULL,
+				     ntlm_state->nt_hash,
+				     &user_sess_key,
+				     &lm_sess_key);
+
+	assert_int_equal(NT_STATUS_V(status),
+			 NT_STATUS_V(NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD));
+}
+
+static void test_ntlmv2_only_ntlm_and_lanman(void **state)
+{
+	return test_ntlmv2_only_ntlm(state);
+}
+
+static void test_ntlmv2_only_ntlm_once(void **state)
+{
+	DATA_BLOB user_sess_key, lm_sess_key;
+	struct ntlm_state *ntlm_state
+		= talloc_get_type_abort(*state,
+					struct ntlm_state);
+	NTSTATUS status;
+	status = ntlm_password_check(ntlm_state,
+				     false,
+				     NTLM_AUTH_NTLMV2_ONLY,
+				     0,
+				     &ntlm_state->challenge,
+				     &data_blob_null,
+				     &ntlm_state->ntlm,
+				     ntlm_state->username,
+				     ntlm_state->username,
+				     ntlm_state->domain,
+				     NULL,
+				     ntlm_state->nt_hash,
+				     &user_sess_key,
+				     &lm_sess_key);
+
+	assert_int_equal(NT_STATUS_V(status),
+			 NT_STATUS_V(NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD));
+}
+
+int main(int argc, const char **argv)
+{
+	const struct CMUnitTest tests[] = {
+		cmocka_unit_test_setup_teardown(test_ntlm_allowed,
+						test_ntlm_setup,
+						test_ntlm_teardown),
+		cmocka_unit_test_setup_teardown(test_ntlm_allowed_lm_supplied,
+						test_ntlm_and_lm_setup,
+						test_ntlm_teardown),
+		cmocka_unit_test_setup_teardown(test_ntlm_disabled,
+						test_ntlm_setup,
+						test_ntlm_teardown),
+		cmocka_unit_test_setup_teardown(test_ntlm2,
+						test_ntlm2_setup,
+						test_ntlm_teardown),
+		cmocka_unit_test_setup_teardown(test_ntlm_mschapv2_only_allowed,
+						test_ntlm_setup,
+						test_ntlm_teardown),
+		cmocka_unit_test_setup_teardown(test_ntlm_mschapv2_only_denied,
+						test_ntlm_setup,
+						test_ntlm_teardown),
+		cmocka_unit_test_setup_teardown(test_ntlmv2_only_ntlm,
+						test_ntlm_setup,
+						test_ntlm_teardown),
+		cmocka_unit_test_setup_teardown(test_ntlmv2_only_ntlm_and_lanman,
+						test_ntlm_and_lm_setup,
+						test_ntlm_teardown),
+		cmocka_unit_test_setup_teardown(test_ntlmv2_only_ntlm_once,
+						test_ntlm_setup,
+						test_ntlm_teardown),
+		cmocka_unit_test_setup_teardown(test_ntlmv2_only_ntlmv2,
+						test_ntlmv2_setup,
+						test_ntlm_teardown)
+	};
+
+	cmocka_set_message_output(CM_OUTPUT_SUBUNIT);
+	return cmocka_run_group_tests(tests, NULL, NULL);
+}
diff --git a/libcli/auth/wscript_build b/libcli/auth/wscript_build
index 475b7d69406..d319d9b879e 100644
--- a/libcli/auth/wscript_build
+++ b/libcli/auth/wscript_build
@@ -41,3 +41,16 @@ bld.SAMBA_SUBSYSTEM('PAM_ERRORS',
 bld.SAMBA_SUBSYSTEM('SPNEGO_PARSE',
                     source='spnego_parse.c',
                     deps='asn1util')
+
+bld.SAMBA_BINARY(
+        'test_ntlm_check',
+        source='tests/ntlm_check.c',
+        deps='''
+             NTLM_CHECK
+             CREDENTIALS_NTLM
+             samba-credentials
+             cmocka
+             talloc
+        ''',
+        install=False
+    )
diff --git a/libcli/security/access_check.c b/libcli/security/access_check.c
index b4c850b613e..03a7dca4adf 100644
--- a/libcli/security/access_check.c
+++ b/libcli/security/access_check.c
@@ -375,6 +375,81 @@ static const struct GUID *get_ace_object_type(struct security_ace *ace)
 }
 
 /**
+ * Evaluates access rights specified in a object-specific ACE for an AD object.
+ * This logic corresponds to MS-ADTS 5.1.3.3.3 Checking Object-Specific Access.
+ * @param[in] ace - the ACE being processed
+ * @param[in/out] tree - remaining_access gets updated for the tree
+ * @param[out] grant_access - set to true if the ACE grants sufficient access
+ *                            rights to the object/attribute
+ * @returns NT_STATUS_OK, unless access was denied
+ */
+static NTSTATUS check_object_specific_access(struct security_ace *ace,
+					     struct object_tree *tree,
+					     bool *grant_access)
+{
+	struct object_tree *node = NULL;
+	const struct GUID *type = NULL;
+
+	*grant_access = false;
+
+	/* if no tree was supplied, we can't do object-specific access checks */
+	if (!tree) {
+		return NT_STATUS_OK;
+	}
+
+	/* Get the ObjectType GUID this ACE applies to */
+	type = get_ace_object_type(ace);
+
+	/*
+	 * If the ACE doesn't have a type, then apply it to the whole tree, i.e.
+	 * treat 'OA' ACEs as 'A' and 'OD' as 'D'
+	 */
+	if (!type) {
+		node = tree;
+	} else {
+
+		/* skip it if the ACE's ObjectType GUID is not in the tree */
+		node = get_object_tree_by_GUID(tree, type);
+		if (!node) {
+			return NT_STATUS_OK;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (ace->type == SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT) {
+
+		/* apply the access rights to this node, and any children */
+		object_tree_modify_access(node, ace->access_mask);
+
+		/*
+		 * Currently all nodes in the tree request the same access mask,
+		 * so we can use any node to check if processing this ACE now
+		 * means the requested access has been granted
+		 */
+		if (node->remaining_access == 0) {
+			*grant_access = true;
+			return NT_STATUS_OK;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * As per 5.1.3.3.4 Checking Control Access Right-Based Access,
+		 * if the CONTROL_ACCESS right is present, then we can grant
+		 * access and stop any further access checks
+		 */
+		if (ace->access_mask & SEC_ADS_CONTROL_ACCESS) {
+			*grant_access = true;
+			return NT_STATUS_OK;
+		}
+	} else {
+
+		/* this ACE denies access to the requested object/attribute */
+		if (node->remaining_access & ace->access_mask){
+			return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
+		}
+	}
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+/**
  * @brief Perform directoryservice (DS) related access checks for a given user
  *
  * Perform DS access checks for the user represented by its security_token, on
@@ -405,8 +480,6 @@ NTSTATUS sec_access_check_ds(const struct security_descriptor *sd,
 {
 	uint32_t i;
 	uint32_t bits_remaining;
-	struct object_tree *node;
-	const struct GUID *type;
 	struct dom_sid self_sid;
 
 	dom_sid_parse(SID_NT_SELF, &self_sid);
@@ -456,6 +529,8 @@ NTSTATUS sec_access_check_ds(const struct security_descriptor *sd,
 	for (i=0; bits_remaining && i < sd->dacl->num_aces; i++) {
 		struct dom_sid *trustee;
 		struct security_ace *ace = &sd->dacl->aces[i];
+		NTSTATUS status;
+		bool grant_access = false;
 
 		if (ace->flags & SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERIT_ONLY) {
 			continue;
@@ -486,34 +561,15 @@ NTSTATUS sec_access_check_ds(const struct security_descriptor *sd,
 			break;
 		case SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_DENIED_OBJECT:
 		case SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT:
-			/*
-			 * check only in case we have provided a tree,
-			 * the ACE has an object type and that type
-			 * is in the tree
-			 */
-			type = get_ace_object_type(ace);
-
-			if (!tree) {
-				continue;
-			}
+			status = check_object_specific_access(ace, tree,
+							      &grant_access);
 
-			if (!type) {
-				node = tree;
-			} else {
-				if (!(node = get_object_tree_by_GUID(tree, type))) {
-					continue;
-				}
+			if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+				return status;
 			}
 
-			if (ace->type == SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT) {
-				object_tree_modify_access(node, ace->access_mask);
-				if (node->remaining_access == 0) {
-					return NT_STATUS_OK;
-				}
-			} else {
-				if (node->remaining_access & ace->access_mask){
-					return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
-				}
+			if (grant_access) {
+				return NT_STATUS_OK;
 			}
 			break;
 		default:	/* Other ACE types not handled/supported */
diff --git a/python/samba/tests/dns_invalid.py b/python/samba/tests/dns_invalid.py
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..9f87cd56084
--- /dev/null
+++ b/python/samba/tests/dns_invalid.py
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+# Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
+# Copyright (C) Kai Blin  <kai@samba.org> 2018
+#
+# This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+# the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+# (at your option) any later version.
+#
+# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+# GNU General Public License for more details.
+#
+# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+# along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+#
+
+import os
+import sys
+import struct
+import random
+import socket
+import samba.ndr as ndr
+from samba import credentials, param
+from samba.dcerpc import dns, dnsp, dnsserver
+from samba.netcmd.dns import TXTRecord, dns_record_match, data_to_dns_record
+from samba.tests.subunitrun import SubunitOptions, TestProgram
+from samba import werror, WERRORError
+from samba.tests.dns_base import DNSTest
+import samba.getopt as options
+import optparse
+
+parser = optparse.OptionParser("dns_invalid.py <server ip> [options]")
+sambaopts = options.SambaOptions(parser)
+parser.add_option_group(sambaopts)
+
+# This timeout only has relevance when testing against Windows
+# Format errors tend to return patchy responses, so a timeout is needed.
+parser.add_option("--timeout", type="int", dest="timeout",
+                  help="Specify timeout for DNS requests")
+
+# use command line creds if available
+credopts = options.CredentialsOptions(parser)
+parser.add_option_group(credopts)
+subunitopts = SubunitOptions(parser)
+parser.add_option_group(subunitopts)
+
+opts, args = parser.parse_args()
+
+lp = sambaopts.get_loadparm()
+creds = credopts.get_credentials(lp)
+
+timeout = opts.timeout
+
+if len(args) < 1:
+    parser.print_usage()
+    sys.exit(1)
+
+server_ip = args[0]
+creds.set_krb_forwardable(credentials.NO_KRB_FORWARDABLE)
+
+
+class TestBrokenQueries(DNSTest):
+    def setUp(self):
+        super(TestBrokenQueries, self).setUp()
+        global server, server_ip, lp, creds, timeout
+        self.server_ip = server_ip
+        self.lp = lp
+        self.creds = creds
+        self.timeout = timeout
+
+    def test_invalid_chars_in_name(self):
+        """Check the server refuses invalid characters in the query name"""
+        p = self.make_name_packet(dns.DNS_OPCODE_QUERY)
+        questions = []
+
+        name = "\x10\x11\x05\xa8.%s" % self.get_dns_domain()
+        q = self.make_name_question(name, dns.DNS_QTYPE_A, dns.DNS_QCLASS_IN)
+        print "asking for ", q.name
+        questions.append(q)
+
+        self.finish_name_packet(p, questions)
+        (response, response_packet) = self.dns_transaction_udp(p, host=server_ip)
+        self.assert_dns_rcode_equals(response, dns.DNS_RCODE_NXDOMAIN)
+
+
+TestProgram(module=__name__, opts=subunitopts)
diff --git a/selftest/knownfail b/selftest/knownfail
index ba16fd72290..84776d4f35d 100644
--- a/selftest/knownfail
+++ b/selftest/knownfail
@@ -303,8 +303,9 @@
 ^samba4.smb.signing.*disabled.*signing=off.*\(ad_dc\)
 # fl2000dc doesn't support AES
 ^samba4.krb5.kdc.*as-req-aes.*fl2000dc
-# nt4_member and ad_member don't support ntlmv1
+# nt4_member and ad_member don't support ntlmv1 (not even over SMB1)
 ^samba3.blackbox.smbclient_auth.plain.*_member.*option=clientntlmv2auth=no.member.creds.*as.user
+^samba3.blackbox.smbclient_auth.plain.*_member.*option=clientntlmv2auth=no.*mNT1.member.creds.*as.user
 #nt-vfs server blocks read with execute access
 ^samba4.smb2.read.access
 #ntvfs server blocks copychunk with execute access on read handle
diff --git a/selftest/tests.py b/selftest/tests.py
index 126e1184230..dc6486c13f8 100644
--- a/selftest/tests.py
+++ b/selftest/tests.py
@@ -38,7 +38,6 @@ finally:
     f.close()
 
 have_man_pages_support = ("XSLTPROC_MANPAGES" in config_hash)
-with_cmocka = ("HAVE_CMOCKA" in config_hash)
 with_pam = ("WITH_PAM" in config_hash)
 pam_wrapper_so_path=config_hash["LIBPAM_WRAPPER_SO_PATH"]
 
@@ -168,13 +167,14 @@ if with_pam:
                    valgrindify(python), pam_wrapper_so_path,
                    "$DOMAIN", "alice", "Secret007"])
 
-if with_cmocka:
-    plantestsuite("samba.unittests.krb5samba", "none",
-                  [os.path.join(bindir(), "default/testsuite/unittests/test_krb5samba")])
-    plantestsuite("samba.unittests.sambafs_srv_pipe", "none",
-                  [os.path.join(bindir(), "default/testsuite/unittests/test_sambafs_srv_pipe")])
-    plantestsuite("samba.unittests.lib_util_modules", "none",
-                  [os.path.join(bindir(), "default/testsuite/unittests/test_lib_util_modules")])
+plantestsuite("samba.unittests.krb5samba", "none",
+              [os.path.join(bindir(), "default/testsuite/unittests/test_krb5samba")])
+plantestsuite("samba.unittests.sambafs_srv_pipe", "none",
+              [os.path.join(bindir(), "default/testsuite/unittests/test_sambafs_srv_pipe")])
+plantestsuite("samba.unittests.lib_util_modules", "none",
+              [os.path.join(bindir(), "default/testsuite/unittests/test_lib_util_modules")])
 
-    plantestsuite("samba.unittests.smb1cli_session", "none",
-                  [os.path.join(bindir(), "default/libcli/smb/test_smb1cli_session")])
+plantestsuite("samba.unittests.smb1cli_session", "none",
+              [os.path.join(bindir(), "default/libcli/smb/test_smb1cli_session")])
+plantestsuite("samba.unittests.ntlm_check", "none",
+              [os.path.join(bindir(), "default/libcli/auth/test_ntlm_check")])
diff --git a/source3/libsmb/libsmb_dir.c b/source3/libsmb/libsmb_dir.c
index 72441c46736..54c2bcb3c73 100644
--- a/source3/libsmb/libsmb_dir.c
+++ b/source3/libsmb/libsmb_dir.c
@@ -943,27 +943,47 @@ SMBC_closedir_ctx(SMBCCTX *context,
 
 }
 
-static void
+static int
 smbc_readdir_internal(SMBCCTX * context,
                       struct smbc_dirent *dest,
                       struct smbc_dirent *src,
                       int max_namebuf_len)
 {
         if (smbc_getOptionUrlEncodeReaddirEntries(context)) {
+		int remaining_len;
 
                 /* url-encode the name.  get back remaining buffer space */
-                max_namebuf_len =
+                remaining_len =
                         smbc_urlencode(dest->name, src->name, max_namebuf_len);
 
+		/* -1 means no null termination. */
+		if (remaining_len < 0) {
+			return -1;
+		}
+
                 /* We now know the name length */
                 dest->namelen = strlen(dest->name);
 
+		if (dest->namelen + 1 < 1) {
+			/* Integer wrap. */
+			return -1;
+		}
+
+		if (dest->namelen + 1 >= max_namebuf_len) {
+			/* Out of space for comment. */
+			return -1;
+		}
+
                 /* Save the pointer to the beginning of the comment */
                 dest->comment = dest->name + dest->namelen + 1;
 
+		if (remaining_len < 1) {
+			/* No room for comment null termination. */
+			return -1;
+		}
+
                 /* Copy the comment */
-                strncpy(dest->comment, src->comment, max_namebuf_len - 1);
-                dest->comment[max_namebuf_len - 1] = '\0';
+                strlcpy(dest->comment, src->comment, remaining_len);
 
                 /* Save other fields */
                 dest->smbc_type = src->smbc_type;
@@ -973,10 +993,21 @@ smbc_readdir_internal(SMBCCTX * context,
         } else {
 
                 /* No encoding.  Just copy the entry as is. */
+		if (src->dirlen > max_namebuf_len) {
+			return -1;
+		}
                 memcpy(dest, src, src->dirlen);
+		if (src->namelen + 1 < 1) {
+			/* Integer wrap */
+			return -1;
+		}
+		if (src->namelen + 1 >= max_namebuf_len) {
+			/* Comment off the end. */
+			return -1;
+		}
                 dest->comment = (char *)(&dest->name + src->namelen + 1);
         }
-
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -988,6 +1019,7 @@ SMBC_readdir_ctx(SMBCCTX *context,
                  SMBCFILE *dir)
 {
         int maxlen;
+	int ret;
 	struct smbc_dirent *dirp, *dirent;
 	TALLOC_CTX *frame = talloc_stackframe();
 
@@ -1037,7 +1069,12 @@ SMBC_readdir_ctx(SMBCCTX *context,
         dirp = &context->internal->dirent;
         maxlen = sizeof(context->internal->_dirent_name);
 
-        smbc_readdir_internal(context, dirp, dirent, maxlen);
+        ret = smbc_readdir_internal(context, dirp, dirent, maxlen);
+	if (ret == -1) {
+		errno = EINVAL;
+		TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+                return NULL;
+	}
 
         dir->dir_next = dir->dir_next->next;
 
@@ -1095,6 +1132,7 @@ SMBC_getdents_ctx(SMBCCTX *context,
 	 */
 
 	while ((dirlist = dir->dir_next)) {
+		int ret;
 		struct smbc_dirent *dirent;
 		struct smbc_dirent *currentEntry = (struct smbc_dirent *)ndir;
 
@@ -1109,8 +1147,13 @@ SMBC_getdents_ctx(SMBCCTX *context,
                 /* Do urlencoding of next entry, if so selected */
                 dirent = &context->internal->dirent;
                 maxlen = sizeof(context->internal->_dirent_name);
-                smbc_readdir_internal(context, dirent,
+		ret = smbc_readdir_internal(context, dirent,
                                       dirlist->dirent, maxlen);
+		if (ret == -1) {
+			errno = EINVAL;
+			TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+			return -1;
+		}
 
                 reqd = dirent->dirlen;
 
diff --git a/source3/libsmb/libsmb_path.c b/source3/libsmb/libsmb_path.c
index 01b0a61e483..5b53b386a67 100644
--- a/source3/libsmb/libsmb_path.c
+++ b/source3/libsmb/libsmb_path.c
@@ -173,8 +173,13 @@ smbc_urlencode(char *dest,
                 }
         }
 
-        *dest++ = '\0';
-        max_dest_len--;
+	if (max_dest_len <= 0) {
+		/* Ensure we return -1 if no null termination. */
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	*dest++ = '\0';
+	max_dest_len--;
 
         return max_dest_len;
 }
diff --git a/source3/selftest/tests.py b/source3/selftest/tests.py
index cdcb1ddbca4..68212e17258 100755
--- a/source3/selftest/tests.py
+++ b/source3/selftest/tests.py
@@ -190,7 +190,7 @@ for env in ["nt4_dc", "nt4_member", "ad_member", "ad_dc", "ad_dc_ntvfs", "s4memb
     plantestsuite("samba3.blackbox.smbclient_machine_auth.plain (%s:local)" % env, "%s:local" % env, [os.path.join(samba3srcdir, "script/tests/test_smbclient_machine_auth.sh"), '$SERVER', smbclient3, configuration])
     plantestsuite("samba3.blackbox.smbclient_ntlm.plain (%s)" % env, env, [os.path.join(samba3srcdir, "script/tests/test_smbclient_ntlm.sh"), '$SERVER', '$DC_USERNAME', '$DC_PASSWORD', "never", smbclient3, configuration])
 
-for options in ["--option=clientntlmv2auth=no", "--option=clientusespnego=no --option=clientntlmv2auth=no", ""]:
+for options in ["--option=clientntlmv2auth=no", "--option=clientusespnego=no --option=clientntlmv2auth=no", "--option=clientusespnego=no --option=clientntlmv2auth=no -mNT1", ""]:
     for env in ["nt4_member", "ad_member"]:
         plantestsuite("samba3.blackbox.smbclient_auth.plain (%s) %s" % (env, options), env, [os.path.join(samba3srcdir, "script/tests/test_smbclient_auth.sh"), '$SERVER', '$SERVER_IP', '$DC_USERNAME', '$DC_PASSWORD', smbclient3, configuration, options])
         plantestsuite("samba3.blackbox.smbclient_auth.plain (%s) %s member creds" % (env, options), env, [os.path.join(samba3srcdir, "script/tests/test_smbclient_auth.sh"), '$SERVER', '$SERVER_IP', '$SERVER/$USERNAME', '$PASSWORD', smbclient3, configuration, options])
diff --git a/source3/utils/ntlm_auth.c b/source3/utils/ntlm_auth.c
index 3f544902a24..8f77680416f 100644
--- a/source3/utils/ntlm_auth.c
+++ b/source3/utils/ntlm_auth.c
@@ -1010,7 +1010,7 @@ static NTSTATUS local_pw_check(struct auth4_context *auth4_context,
 	*pauthoritative = 1;
 
 	nt_status = ntlm_password_check(mem_ctx,
-					true, true, 0,
+					true, NTLM_AUTH_ON, 0,
 					&auth4_context->challenge.data,
 					&user_info->password.response.lanman,
 					&user_info->password.response.nt,
@@ -1719,7 +1719,9 @@ static void manage_ntlm_server_1_request(enum stdio_helper_mode stdio_helper_mod
 
 				nt_lm_owf_gen (opt_password, nt_pw.hash, lm_pw.hash);
 				nt_status = ntlm_password_check(mem_ctx,
-								true, true, 0,
+								true,
+								NTLM_AUTH_ON,
+								0,
 								&challenge,
 								&lm_response,
 								&nt_response,
diff --git a/source4/dsdb/samdb/cracknames.c b/source4/dsdb/samdb/cracknames.c
index d43f510b949..3b215ac0ec9 100644
--- a/source4/dsdb/samdb/cracknames.c
+++ b/source4/dsdb/samdb/cracknames.c
@@ -1253,7 +1253,13 @@ static WERROR DsCrackNameOneFilter(struct ldb_context *sam_ctx, TALLOC_CTX *mem_
 		return WERR_OK;
 	}
 	case DRSUAPI_DS_NAME_FORMAT_SERVICE_PRINCIPAL: {
-		if (result->elements[0].num_values > 1) {
+		struct ldb_message_element *el
+			= ldb_msg_find_element(result,
+					       "servicePrincipalName");
+		if (el == NULL) {
+			info1->status = DRSUAPI_DS_NAME_STATUS_NOT_FOUND;
+			return WERR_OK;
+		} else if (el->num_values > 1) {
 			info1->status = DRSUAPI_DS_NAME_STATUS_NOT_UNIQUE;
 			return WERR_OK;
 		}
diff --git a/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/acl_read.c b/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/acl_read.c
index 3c9cf7c0672..280845a47a5 100644
--- a/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/acl_read.c
+++ b/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/acl_read.c
@@ -38,6 +38,8 @@
 #include "param/param.h"
 #include "dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/util.h"
 
+/* The attributeSecurityGuid for the Public Information Property-Set */
+#define PUBLIC_INFO_PROPERTY_SET "e48d0154-bcf8-11d1-8702-00c04fb96050"
 
 struct aclread_context {
 	struct ldb_module *module;
@@ -227,6 +229,253 @@ static int aclread_get_sd_from_ldb_message(struct aclread_context *ac,
 	return LDB_SUCCESS;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Returns the access mask required to read a given attribute
+ */
+static uint32_t get_attr_access_mask(const struct dsdb_attribute *attr,
+				     uint32_t sd_flags)
+{
+
+	uint32_t access_mask = 0;
+	bool is_sd;
+
+	/* nTSecurityDescriptor is a special case */
+	is_sd = (ldb_attr_cmp("nTSecurityDescriptor",
+			      attr->lDAPDisplayName) == 0);
+
+	if (is_sd) {
+		if (sd_flags & (SECINFO_OWNER|SECINFO_GROUP)) {
+			access_mask |= SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL;
+		}
+		if (sd_flags & SECINFO_DACL) {
+			access_mask |= SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL;
+		}
+		if (sd_flags & SECINFO_SACL) {
+			access_mask |= SEC_FLAG_SYSTEM_SECURITY;
+		}
+	} else {
+		access_mask = SEC_ADS_READ_PROP;
+	}
+
+	if (attr->searchFlags & SEARCH_FLAG_CONFIDENTIAL) {
+		access_mask |= SEC_ADS_CONTROL_ACCESS;
+	}
+
+	return access_mask;
+}
+
+/* helper struct for traversing the attributes in the search-tree */
+struct parse_tree_aclread_ctx {
+	struct aclread_context *ac;
+	TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
+	struct dom_sid *sid;
+	struct ldb_dn *dn;
+	struct security_descriptor *sd;
+	const struct dsdb_class *objectclass;
+	bool suppress_result;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Checks that the user has sufficient access rights to view an attribute
+ */
+static int check_attr_access_rights(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, const char *attr_name,
+				    struct aclread_context *ac,
+				    struct security_descriptor *sd,
+				    const struct dsdb_class *objectclass,
+				    struct dom_sid *sid, struct ldb_dn *dn,
+				    bool *is_public_info)
+{
+	int ret;
+	const struct dsdb_attribute *attr = NULL;
+	uint32_t access_mask;
+	struct ldb_context *ldb = ldb_module_get_ctx(ac->module);
+
+	*is_public_info = false;
+
+	attr = dsdb_attribute_by_lDAPDisplayName(ac->schema, attr_name);
+	if (!attr) {
+		ldb_debug_set(ldb,
+			      LDB_DEBUG_TRACE,
+			      "acl_read: %s cannot find attr[%s] in schema,"
+			      "ignoring\n",
+			      ldb_dn_get_linearized(dn), attr_name);
+		return LDB_SUCCESS;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If we have no Read Property (RP) rights for a child object, it should
+	 * still appear as a visible object in 'objectClass=*' searches,
+	 * as long as we have List Contents (LC) rights for it.
+	 * This is needed for the acl.py tests (e.g. test_search1()).
+	 * I couldn't find the Windows behaviour documented in the specs, so
+	 * this is a guess, but it seems to only apply to attributes in the
+	 * Public Information Property Set that have the systemOnly flag set to
+	 * TRUE. (This makes sense in a way, as it's not disclosive to find out
+	 * that a child object has a 'objectClass' or 'name' attribute, as every
+	 * object has these attributes).
+	 */
+	if (attr->systemOnly) {
+		struct GUID public_info_guid;
+		NTSTATUS status;
+
+		status = GUID_from_string(PUBLIC_INFO_PROPERTY_SET,
+					  &public_info_guid);
+		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+			ldb_set_errstring(ldb, "Public Info GUID parse error");
+			return LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR;
+		}
+
+		if (GUID_compare(&attr->attributeSecurityGUID,
+				 &public_info_guid) == 0) {
+			*is_public_info = true;
+		}
+	}
+
+	access_mask = get_attr_access_mask(attr, ac->sd_flags);
+
+	/* the access-mask should be non-zero. Skip attribute otherwise */
+	if (access_mask == 0) {
+		DBG_ERR("Could not determine access mask for attribute %s\n",
+			attr_name);
+		return LDB_SUCCESS;
+	}
+
+	ret = acl_check_access_on_attribute(ac->module, mem_ctx, sd, sid,
+					    access_mask, attr, objectclass);
+
+	if (ret == LDB_ERR_INSUFFICIENT_ACCESS_RIGHTS) {
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
+		ldb_debug_set(ldb, LDB_DEBUG_FATAL,
+			      "acl_read: %s check attr[%s] gives %s - %s\n",
+			      ldb_dn_get_linearized(dn), attr_name,
+			      ldb_strerror(ret), ldb_errstring(ldb));
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	return LDB_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the attribute name for this particular level of a search operation
+ * parse-tree.
+ */
+static const char * parse_tree_get_attr(struct ldb_parse_tree *tree)
+{
+	const char *attr = NULL;
+
+	switch (tree->operation) {
+	case LDB_OP_EQUALITY:
+	case LDB_OP_GREATER:
+	case LDB_OP_LESS:
+	case LDB_OP_APPROX:
+		attr = tree->u.equality.attr;
+		break;
+	case LDB_OP_SUBSTRING:
+		attr = tree->u.substring.attr;
+		break;
+	case LDB_OP_PRESENT:
+		attr = tree->u.present.attr;
+		break;
+	case LDB_OP_EXTENDED:
+		attr = tree->u.extended.attr;
+		break;
+
+	/* we'll check LDB_OP_AND/_OR/_NOT children later on in the walk */
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+	return attr;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Checks a single attribute in the search parse-tree to make sure the user has
+ * sufficient rights to view it.
+ */
+static int parse_tree_check_attr_access(struct ldb_parse_tree *tree,
+					void *private_context)
+{
+	struct parse_tree_aclread_ctx *ctx = NULL;
+	const char *attr_name = NULL;
+	bool is_public_info = false;
+	int ret;
+
+	ctx = (struct parse_tree_aclread_ctx *)private_context;
+
+	/*
+	 * we can skip any further checking if we already know that this object
+	 * shouldn't be visible in this user's search
+	 */
+	if (ctx->suppress_result) {
+		return LDB_SUCCESS;
+	}
+
+	/* skip this level of the search-tree if it has no attribute to check */
+	attr_name = parse_tree_get_attr(tree);
+	if (attr_name == NULL) {
+		return LDB_SUCCESS;
+	}
+
+	ret = check_attr_access_rights(ctx->mem_ctx, attr_name, ctx->ac,
+				       ctx->sd, ctx->objectclass, ctx->sid,
+				       ctx->dn, &is_public_info);
+
+	/*
+	 * if the user does not have the rights to view this attribute, then we
+	 * should not return the object as a search result, i.e. act as if the
+	 * object doesn't exist (for this particular user, at least)
+	 */
+	if (ret == LDB_ERR_INSUFFICIENT_ACCESS_RIGHTS) {
+
+		/*
+		 * We make an exception for attribute=* searches involving the
+		 * Public Information property-set. This allows searches like
+		 * objectClass=* to return visible objects, even if the user
+		 * doesn't have Read Property rights on the attribute
+		 */
+		if (tree->operation == LDB_OP_PRESENT && is_public_info) {
+			return LDB_SUCCESS;
+		}
+
+		ctx->suppress_result = true;
+		return LDB_SUCCESS;
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Traverse the search-tree to check that the user has sufficient access rights
+ * to view all the attributes.
+ */
+static int check_search_ops_access(struct aclread_context *ac,
+				   TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+				   struct security_descriptor *sd,
+				   const struct dsdb_class *objectclass,
+				   struct dom_sid *sid, struct ldb_dn *dn,
+				   bool *suppress_result)
+{
+	int ret;
+	struct parse_tree_aclread_ctx ctx = { 0 };
+	struct ldb_parse_tree *tree = ac->req->op.search.tree;
+
+	ctx.ac = ac;
+	ctx.mem_ctx = mem_ctx;
+	ctx.suppress_result = false;
+	ctx.sid = sid;
+	ctx.dn = dn;
+	ctx.sd = sd;
+	ctx.objectclass = objectclass;
+
+	/* walk the search tree, checking each attribute as we go */
+	ret = ldb_parse_tree_walk(tree, parse_tree_check_attr_access, &ctx);
+
+	/* return whether this search result should be hidden to this user */
+	*suppress_result = ctx.suppress_result;
+	return ret;
+}
 
 static int aclread_callback(struct ldb_request *req, struct ldb_reply *ares)
 {
@@ -241,6 +490,7 @@ static int aclread_callback(struct ldb_request *req, struct ldb_reply *ares)
 	TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx;
 	uint32_t instanceType;
 	const struct dsdb_class *objectclass;
+	bool suppress_result = false;
 
 	ac = talloc_get_type(req->context, struct aclread_context);
 	ldb = ldb_module_get_ctx(ac->module);
@@ -342,26 +592,8 @@ static int aclread_callback(struct ldb_request *req, struct ldb_reply *ares)
 				aclread_mark_inaccesslible(&msg->elements[i]);
 				continue;
 			}
-			/* nTSecurityDescriptor is a special case */
-			if (is_sd) {
-				access_mask = 0;
-
-				if (ac->sd_flags & (SECINFO_OWNER|SECINFO_GROUP)) {
-					access_mask |= SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL;
-				}
-				if (ac->sd_flags & SECINFO_DACL) {
-					access_mask |= SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL;
-				}
-				if (ac->sd_flags & SECINFO_SACL) {
-					access_mask |= SEC_FLAG_SYSTEM_SECURITY;
-				}
-			} else {
-				access_mask = SEC_ADS_READ_PROP;
-			}
 
-			if (attr->searchFlags & SEARCH_FLAG_CONFIDENTIAL) {
-				access_mask |= SEC_ADS_CONTROL_ACCESS;
-			}
+			access_mask = get_attr_access_mask(attr, ac->sd_flags);
 
 			if (access_mask == 0) {
 				aclread_mark_inaccesslible(&msg->elements[i]);
@@ -382,18 +614,14 @@ static int aclread_callback(struct ldb_request *req, struct ldb_reply *ares)
 			 * in anycase.
 			 */
 			if (ret == LDB_ERR_INSUFFICIENT_ACCESS_RIGHTS) {
-				if (!ac->indirsync) {
-					/*
-					 * do not return this entry if attribute is
-					 * part of the search filter
-					 */
-					if (dsdb_attr_in_parse_tree(ac->req->op.search.tree,
-								msg->elements[i].name)) {
-						talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
-						return LDB_SUCCESS;
-					}
-					aclread_mark_inaccesslible(&msg->elements[i]);
-				} else {
+				bool in_search_filter;
+
+				/* check if attr is part of the search filter */
+				in_search_filter = dsdb_attr_in_parse_tree(ac->req->op.search.tree,
+								msg->elements[i].name);
+
+				if (in_search_filter) {
+
 					/*
 					 * We are doing dirysnc answers
 					 * and the object shouldn't be returned (normally)
@@ -402,13 +630,17 @@ static int aclread_callback(struct ldb_request *req, struct ldb_reply *ares)
 					 * (remove the object if it is not deleted, or return
 					 * just the objectGUID if it's deleted).
 					 */
-					if (dsdb_attr_in_parse_tree(ac->req->op.search.tree,
-								msg->elements[i].name)) {
+					if (ac->indirsync) {
 						ldb_msg_remove_attr(msg, "replPropertyMetaData");
 						break;
 					} else {
-						aclread_mark_inaccesslible(&msg->elements[i]);
+
+						/* do not return this entry */
+						talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+						return LDB_SUCCESS;
 					}
+				} else {
+					aclread_mark_inaccesslible(&msg->elements[i]);
 				}
 			} else if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
 				ldb_debug_set(ldb, LDB_DEBUG_FATAL,
@@ -420,6 +652,37 @@ static int aclread_callback(struct ldb_request *req, struct ldb_reply *ares)
 				goto fail;
 			}
 		}
+
+		/*
+		 * check access rights for the search attributes, as well as the
+		 * attribute values actually being returned
+		 */
+		ret = check_search_ops_access(ac, tmp_ctx, sd, objectclass, sid,
+					      msg->dn, &suppress_result);
+		if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
+			ldb_debug_set(ldb, LDB_DEBUG_FATAL,
+				      "acl_read: %s check search ops %s - %s\n",
+				      ldb_dn_get_linearized(msg->dn),
+				      ldb_strerror(ret), ldb_errstring(ldb));
+			goto fail;
+		}
+
+		if (suppress_result) {
+
+			/*
+			 * As per the above logic, we strip replPropertyMetaData
+			 * out of the msg so that the dirysync module will do
+			 * what is needed (return just the objectGUID if it's,
+			 * deleted, or remove the object if it is not).
+			 */
+			if (ac->indirsync) {
+				ldb_msg_remove_attr(msg, "replPropertyMetaData");
+			} else {
+				talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+				return LDB_SUCCESS;
+			}
+		}
+
 		for (i=0; i < msg->num_elements; i++) {
 			if (!aclread_is_inaccessible(&msg->elements[i])) {
 				num_of_attrs++;
diff --git a/source4/dsdb/tests/python/acl.py b/source4/dsdb/tests/python/acl.py
index d5d069e3e6b..51e4dec8a94 100755
--- a/source4/dsdb/tests/python/acl.py
+++ b/source4/dsdb/tests/python/acl.py
@@ -998,6 +998,74 @@ class AclSearchTests(AclTests):
         res_list = res[0].keys()
         self.assertEquals(sorted(res_list), sorted(ok_list))
 
+    def assert_search_on_attr(self, dn, samdb, attr, expected_list):
+
+        expected_num = len(expected_list)
+        res = samdb.search(dn, expression="(%s=*)" % attr, scope=SCOPE_SUBTREE)
+        self.assertEquals(len(res), expected_num)
+
+        res_list = [ x["dn"] for x in res if x["dn"] in expected_list ]
+        self.assertEquals(sorted(res_list), sorted(expected_list))
+
+    def test_search7(self):
+        """Checks object search visibility when users don't have full rights"""
+        self.create_clean_ou("OU=ou1," + self.base_dn)
+        mod = "(A;;LC;;;%s)(A;;LC;;;%s)" % (str(self.user_sid),
+                                            str(self.group_sid))
+        self.sd_utils.dacl_add_ace("OU=ou1," + self.base_dn, mod)
+        tmp_desc = security.descriptor.from_sddl("D:(A;;RPWPCRCCDCLCLORCWOWDSDDTSW;;;DA)" + mod,
+                                                 self.domain_sid)
+        self.ldb_admin.create_ou("OU=ou2,OU=ou1," + self.base_dn, sd=tmp_desc)
+        self.ldb_admin.create_ou("OU=ou3,OU=ou2,OU=ou1," + self.base_dn,
+                                 sd=tmp_desc)
+        self.ldb_admin.create_ou("OU=ou4,OU=ou2,OU=ou1," + self.base_dn,
+                                 sd=tmp_desc)
+        self.ldb_admin.create_ou("OU=ou5,OU=ou3,OU=ou2,OU=ou1," + self.base_dn,
+                                 sd=tmp_desc)
+        self.ldb_admin.create_ou("OU=ou6,OU=ou4,OU=ou2,OU=ou1," + self.base_dn,
+                                 sd=tmp_desc)
+
+        ou2_dn = Dn(self.ldb_admin,  "OU=ou2,OU=ou1," + self.base_dn)
+        ou1_dn = Dn(self.ldb_admin,  "OU=ou1," + self.base_dn)
+
+        # even though unprivileged users can't read these attributes for OU2,
+        # the object should still be visible in searches, because they have
+        # 'List Contents' rights still. This isn't really disclosive because
+        # ALL objects have these attributes
+        visible_attrs = ["objectClass", "distinguishedName", "name",
+                         "objectGUID"]
+        two_objects = [ou2_dn, ou1_dn]
+
+        for attr in visible_attrs:
+            # a regular user should just see the 2 objects
+            self.assert_search_on_attr(str(ou1_dn), self.ldb_user3, attr,
+                                       expected_list=two_objects)
+
+            # whereas the following users have LC rights for all the objects,
+            # so they should see them all
+            self.assert_search_on_attr(str(ou1_dn), self.ldb_user, attr,
+                                       expected_list=self.full_list)
+            self.assert_search_on_attr(str(ou1_dn), self.ldb_user2, attr,
+                                       expected_list=self.full_list)
+
+        # however when searching on the following attributes, objects will not
+        # be visible unless the user has Read Property rights
+        hidden_attrs = ["objectCategory", "instanceType", "ou", "uSNChanged",
+                        "uSNCreated", "whenCreated"]
+        one_object = [ou1_dn]
+
+        for attr in hidden_attrs:
+            self.assert_search_on_attr(str(ou1_dn), self.ldb_user3, attr,
+                                       expected_list=one_object)
+            self.assert_search_on_attr(str(ou1_dn), self.ldb_user, attr,
+                                       expected_list=one_object)
+            self.assert_search_on_attr(str(ou1_dn), self.ldb_user2, attr,
+                                       expected_list=one_object)
+
+            # admin has RP rights so can still see all the objects
+            self.assert_search_on_attr(str(ou1_dn), self.ldb_admin, attr,
+                                       expected_list=self.full_list)
+
 #tests on ldap delete operations
 class AclDeleteTests(AclTests):
 
diff --git a/source4/dsdb/tests/python/confidential_attr.py b/source4/dsdb/tests/python/confidential_attr.py
new file mode 100755
index 00000000000..1e1cf6c48f8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/source4/dsdb/tests/python/confidential_attr.py
@@ -0,0 +1,1025 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python
+# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
+#
+# Tests that confidential attributes (or attributes protected by a ACL that
+# denies read access) cannot be guessed through wildcard DB searches.
+#
+# Copyright (C) Catalyst.Net Ltd
+#
+# This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+# the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+# (at your option) any later version.
+#
+# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+# GNU General Public License for more details.
+#
+# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+# along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+#
+import optparse
+import sys
+sys.path.insert(0, "bin/python")
+
+import samba
+import os
+from samba.tests.subunitrun import SubunitOptions, TestProgram
+import samba.getopt as options
+from ldb import SCOPE_BASE, SCOPE_SUBTREE
+from samba.dsdb import SEARCH_FLAG_CONFIDENTIAL, SEARCH_FLAG_PRESERVEONDELETE
+from ldb import Message, MessageElement, Dn
+from ldb import FLAG_MOD_REPLACE, FLAG_MOD_ADD
+from samba.auth import system_session
+from samba import gensec, sd_utils
+from samba.samdb import SamDB
+from samba.credentials import Credentials, DONT_USE_KERBEROS
+import samba.tests
+from samba.tests import delete_force
+import samba.dsdb
+
+parser = optparse.OptionParser("confidential_attr.py [options] <host>")
+sambaopts = options.SambaOptions(parser)
+parser.add_option_group(sambaopts)
+parser.add_option_group(options.VersionOptions(parser))
+
+# use command line creds if available
+credopts = options.CredentialsOptions(parser)
+parser.add_option_group(credopts)
+subunitopts = SubunitOptions(parser)
+parser.add_option_group(subunitopts)
+
+opts, args = parser.parse_args()
+
+if len(args) < 1:
+    parser.print_usage()
+    sys.exit(1)
+
+host = args[0]
+if "://" not in host:
+    ldaphost = "ldap://%s" % host
+else:
+    ldaphost = host
+    start = host.rindex("://")
+    host = host.lstrip(start + 3)
+
+lp = sambaopts.get_loadparm()
+creds = credopts.get_credentials(lp)
+creds.set_gensec_features(creds.get_gensec_features() | gensec.FEATURE_SEAL)
+
+# When a user does not have access rights to view the objects' attributes,
+# Windows and Samba behave slightly differently.
+# A windows DC will always act as if the hidden attribute doesn't exist AT ALL
+# (for an unprivileged user). So, even for a user that lacks access rights,
+# the inverse/'!' queries should return ALL objects. This is similar to the
+# kludgeaclredacted behaviour on Samba.
+# However, on Samba (for implementation simplicity) we never return a matching
+# result for an unprivileged user.
+# Either approach is OK, so long as it gets applied consistently and we don't
+# disclose any sensitive details by varying what gets returned by the search.
+DC_MODE_RETURN_NONE = 0
+DC_MODE_RETURN_ALL = 1
+
+#
+# Tests start here
+#
+class ConfidentialAttrCommon(samba.tests.TestCase):
+
+    def setUp(self):
+        super(ConfidentialAttrCommon, self).setUp()
+
+        self.ldb_admin = SamDB(ldaphost, credentials=creds,
+                               session_info=system_session(lp), lp=lp)
+        self.user_pass = "samba123@"
+        self.base_dn = self.ldb_admin.domain_dn()
+        self.schema_dn = self.ldb_admin.get_schema_basedn()
+        self.sd_utils = sd_utils.SDUtils(self.ldb_admin)
+
+        # the tests work by setting the 'Confidential' bit in the searchFlags
+        # for an existing schema attribute. This only works against Windows if
+        # the systemFlags does not have FLAG_SCHEMA_BASE_OBJECT set for the
+        # schema attribute being modified. There are only a few attributes that
+        # meet this criteria (most of which only apply to 'user' objects)
+        self.conf_attr = "homePostalAddress"
+        attr_cn = "CN=Address-Home"
+        # schemaIdGuid for homePostalAddress (used for ACE tests)
+        self.conf_attr_guid = "16775781-47f3-11d1-a9c3-0000f80367c1"
+        self.conf_attr_sec_guid = "77b5b886-944a-11d1-aebd-0000f80367c1"
+        self.attr_dn = "{},{}".format(attr_cn, self.schema_dn)
+
+        userou = "OU=conf-attr-test"
+        self.ou = "{},{}".format(userou, self.base_dn)
+        self.ldb_admin.create_ou(self.ou)
+
+        # use a common username prefix, so we can use sAMAccountName=CATC-* as
+        # a search filter to only return the users we're interested in
+        self.user_prefix = "catc-"
+
+        # add a test object with this attribute set
+        self.conf_value = "abcdef"
+        self.conf_user = "{}conf-user".format(self.user_prefix)
+        self.ldb_admin.newuser(self.conf_user, self.user_pass, userou=userou)
+        self.conf_dn = self.get_user_dn(self.conf_user)
+        self.add_attr(self.conf_dn, self.conf_attr, self.conf_value)
+
+        # add a sneaky user that will try to steal our secrets
+        self.user = "{}sneaky-user".format(self.user_prefix)
+        self.ldb_admin.newuser(self.user, self.user_pass, userou=userou)
+        self.ldb_user = self.get_ldb_connection(self.user, self.user_pass)
+
+        self.all_users = [self.user, self.conf_user]
+
+        # add some other users that also have confidential attributes, so we can
+        # check we don't disclose their details, particularly in '!' searches
+        for i in range(1, 3):
+            username = "{}other-user{}".format(self.user_prefix, i)
+            self.ldb_admin.newuser(username, self.user_pass, userou=userou)
+            userdn = self.get_user_dn(username)
+            self.add_attr(userdn, self.conf_attr, "xyz{}".format(i))
+            self.all_users.append(username)
+
+        # there are 4 users in the OU, plus the OU itself
+        self.test_dn = self.ou
+        self.total_objects = len(self.all_users) + 1
+        self.objects_with_attr = 3
+
+        # sanity-check the flag is not already set (this'll cause problems if
+        # previous test run didn't clean up properly)
+        search_flags = self.get_attr_search_flags(self.attr_dn)
+        self.assertTrue(int(search_flags) & SEARCH_FLAG_CONFIDENTIAL == 0,
+                        "{} searchFlags already {}".format(self.conf_attr,
+                                                           search_flags))
+
+    def tearDown(self):
+        super(ConfidentialAttrCommon, self).tearDown()
+        self.ldb_admin.delete(self.ou, ["tree_delete:1"])
+
+    def add_attr(self, dn, attr, value):
+        m = Message()
+        m.dn = Dn(self.ldb_admin, dn)
+        m[attr] = MessageElement(value, FLAG_MOD_ADD, attr)
+        self.ldb_admin.modify(m)
+
+    def set_schema_update_now(self):
+        ldif = """
+dn:
+changetype: modify
+add: schemaUpdateNow
+schemaUpdateNow: 1
+"""
+        self.ldb_admin.modify_ldif(ldif)
+
+    def set_attr_search_flags(self, attr_dn, flags):
+        """Modifies the searchFlags for an object in the schema"""
+        m = Message()
+        m.dn = Dn(self.ldb_admin, attr_dn)
+        m['searchFlags'] = MessageElement(flags, FLAG_MOD_REPLACE,
+                                          'searchFlags')
+        self.ldb_admin.modify(m)
+
+        # note we have to update the schema for this change to take effect (on
+        # Windows, at least)
+        self.set_schema_update_now()
+
+    def get_attr_search_flags(self, attr_dn):
+        """Marks the attribute under test as being confidential"""
+        res = self.ldb_admin.search(attr_dn, scope=SCOPE_BASE,
+                                    attrs=['searchFlags'])
+        return res[0]['searchFlags'][0]
+
+    def make_attr_confidential(self):
+        """Marks the attribute under test as being confidential"""
+
+        # work out the original 'searchFlags' value before we overwrite it
+        old_value = self.get_attr_search_flags(self.attr_dn)
+
+        self.set_attr_search_flags(self.attr_dn, str(SEARCH_FLAG_CONFIDENTIAL))
+
+        # reset the value after the test completes
+        self.addCleanup(self.set_attr_search_flags, self.attr_dn, old_value)
+
+    # The behaviour of the DC can differ in some cases, depending on whether
+    # we're talking to a Windows DC or a Samba DC
+    def guess_dc_mode(self):
+        # if we're in selftest, we can be pretty sure it's a Samba DC
+        if os.environ.get('SAMBA_SELFTEST') == '1':
+            return DC_MODE_RETURN_NONE
+
+        searches = self.get_negative_match_all_searches()
+        res = self.ldb_user.search(self.test_dn, expression=searches[0],
+                                   scope=SCOPE_SUBTREE)
+
+        # we default to DC_MODE_RETURN_NONE (samba).Update this if it
+        # looks like we're talking to a Windows DC
+        if len(res) == self.total_objects:
+            return DC_MODE_RETURN_ALL
+
+        # otherwise assume samba DC behaviour
+        return DC_MODE_RETURN_NONE
+
+    def get_user_dn(self, name):
+        return "CN={},{}".format(name, self.ou)
+
+    def get_user_sid_string(self, username):
+        user_dn = self.get_user_dn(username)
+        user_sid = self.sd_utils.get_object_sid(user_dn)
+        return str(user_sid)
+
+    def get_ldb_connection(self, target_username, target_password):
+        creds_tmp = Credentials()
+        creds_tmp.set_username(target_username)
+        creds_tmp.set_password(target_password)
+        creds_tmp.set_domain(creds.get_domain())
+        creds_tmp.set_realm(creds.get_realm())
+        creds_tmp.set_workstation(creds.get_workstation())
+        features = creds_tmp.get_gensec_features() | gensec.FEATURE_SEAL
+        creds_tmp.set_gensec_features(features)
+        creds_tmp.set_kerberos_state(DONT_USE_KERBEROS)
+        ldb_target = SamDB(url=ldaphost, credentials=creds_tmp, lp=lp)
+        return ldb_target
+
+    def assert_not_in_result(self, res, exclude_dn):
+        for msg in res:
+            self.assertNotEqual(msg.dn, exclude_dn,
+                                "Search revealed object {}".format(exclude_dn))
+
+    def assert_search_result(self, expected_num, expr, samdb):
+
+        # try asking for different attributes back: None/all, the confidential
+        # attribute itself, and a random unrelated attribute
+        attr_filters = [None, ["*"], [self.conf_attr], ['name']]
+        for attr in attr_filters:
+            res = samdb.search(self.test_dn, expression=expr,
+                               scope=SCOPE_SUBTREE, attrs=attr)
+            self.assertTrue(len(res) == expected_num,
+                            "%u results, not %u for search %s, attr %s" %
+                            (len(res), expected_num, expr, str(attr)))
+
+    # return a selection of searches that match exactly against the test object
+    def get_exact_match_searches(self):
+        first_char = self.conf_value[:1]
+        last_char = self.conf_value[-1:]
+        test_attr = self.conf_attr
+
+        searches = [
+            # search for the attribute using a sub-string wildcard
+            # (which could reveal the attribute's actual value)
+            "({}={}*)".format(test_attr, first_char),
+            "({}=*{})".format(test_attr, last_char),
+
+            # sanity-check equality against an exact match on value
+            "({}={})".format(test_attr, self.conf_value),
+
+            # '~=' searches don't work against Samba
+            # sanity-check an approx search against an exact match on value
+            # "({}~={})".format(test_attr, self.conf_value),
+
+            # check wildcard in an AND search...
+            "(&({}={}*)(objectclass=*))".format(test_attr, first_char),
+
+            # ...an OR search (against another term that will never match)
+            "(|({}={}*)(objectclass=banana))".format(test_attr, first_char)]
+
+        return searches
+
+    # return searches that match any object with the attribute under test
+    def get_match_all_searches(self):
+        searches = [
+            # check a full wildcard against the confidential attribute
+            # (which could reveal the attribute's presence/absence)
+            "({}=*)".format(self.conf_attr),
+
+            # check wildcard in an AND search...
+            "(&(objectclass=*)({}=*))".format(self.conf_attr),
+
+            # ...an OR search (against another term that will never match)
+            "(|(objectclass=banana)({}=*))".format(self.conf_attr),
+
+            # check <=, and >= expressions that would normally find a match
+            "({}>=0)".format(self.conf_attr),
+            "({}<=ZZZZZZZZZZZ)".format(self.conf_attr)]
+
+        return searches
+
+    def assert_conf_attr_searches(self, has_rights_to=0, samdb=None):
+        """Check searches against the attribute under test work as expected"""
+
+        if samdb is None:
+            samdb = self.ldb_user
+
+        if has_rights_to == "all":
+            has_rights_to = self.objects_with_attr
+
+        # these first few searches we just expect to match against the one
+        # object under test that we're trying to guess the value of
+        expected_num = 1 if has_rights_to > 0 else 0
+        for search in self.get_exact_match_searches():
+            self.assert_search_result(expected_num, search, samdb)
+
+        # these next searches will match any objects we have rights to see
+        expected_num = has_rights_to
+        for search in self.get_match_all_searches():
+            self.assert_search_result(expected_num, search, samdb)
+
+    # The following are double negative searches (i.e. NOT non-matching-
+    # condition) which will therefore match ALL objects, including the test
+    # object(s).
+    def get_negative_match_all_searches(self):
+        first_char = self.conf_value[:1]
+        last_char = self.conf_value[-1:]
+        not_first_char = chr(ord(first_char) + 1)
+        not_last_char = chr(ord(last_char) + 1)
+
+        searches = [
+            "(!({}={}*))".format(self.conf_attr, not_first_char),
+            "(!({}=*{}))".format(self.conf_attr, not_last_char)]
+        return searches
+
+    # the following searches will not match against the test object(s). So
+    # a user with sufficient rights will see an inverse sub-set of objects.
+    # (An unprivileged user would either see all objects on Windows, or no
+    # objects on Samba)
+    def get_inverse_match_searches(self):
+        first_char = self.conf_value[:1]
+        last_char = self.conf_value[-1:]
+        searches = [
+            "(!({}={}*))".format(self.conf_attr, first_char),
+            "(!({}=*{}))".format(self.conf_attr, last_char)]
+        return searches
+
+    def negative_searches_all_rights(self, total_objects=None):
+        expected_results = {}
+
+        if total_objects is None:
+            total_objects = self.total_objects
+
+        # these searches should match ALL objects (including the OU)
+        for search in self.get_negative_match_all_searches():
+            expected_results[search] = total_objects
+
+        # a ! wildcard should only match the objects without the attribute
+        search = "(!({}=*))".format(self.conf_attr)
+        expected_results[search] = total_objects - self.objects_with_attr
+
+        # whereas the inverse searches should match all objects *except* the
+        # one under test
+        for search in self.get_inverse_match_searches():
+            expected_results[search] = total_objects - 1
+
+        return expected_results
+
+    # Returns the expected negative (i.e. '!') search behaviour when talking to
+    # a DC with DC_MODE_RETURN_ALL behaviour, i.e. we assert that users
+    # without rights always see ALL objects in '!' searches
+    def negative_searches_return_all(self, has_rights_to=0,
+                                     total_objects=None):
+        """Asserts user without rights cannot see objects in '!' searches"""
+        expected_results = {}
+
+        if total_objects is None:
+            total_objects = self.total_objects
+
+        # Windows 'hides' objects by always returning all of them, so negative
+        # searches that match all objects will simply return all objects
+        for search in self.get_negative_match_all_searches():
+            expected_results[search] = total_objects
+
+        # if the search is matching on an inverse subset (everything except the
+        # object under test), the
+        inverse_searches = self.get_inverse_match_searches()
+        inverse_searches += ["(!({}=*))".format(self.conf_attr)]
+
+        for search in inverse_searches:
+            expected_results[search] = total_objects - has_rights_to
+
+        return expected_results
+
+    # Returns the expected negative (i.e. '!') search behaviour when talking to
+    # a DC with DC_MODE_RETURN_NONE behaviour, i.e. we assert that users
+    # without rights cannot see objects in '!' searches at all
+    def negative_searches_return_none(self, has_rights_to=0):
+        expected_results = {}
+
+        # the 'match-all' searches should only return the objects we have
+        # access rights to (if any)
+        for search in self.get_negative_match_all_searches():
+            expected_results[search] = has_rights_to
+
+        # for inverse matches, we should NOT be told about any objects at all
+        inverse_searches = self.get_inverse_match_searches()
+        inverse_searches += ["(!({}=*))".format(self.conf_attr)]
+        for search in inverse_searches:
+            expected_results[search] = 0
+
+        return expected_results
+
+    # Returns the expected negative (i.e. '!') search behaviour. This varies
+    # depending on what type of DC we're talking to (i.e. Windows or Samba)
+    # and what access rights the user has
+    def negative_search_expected_results(self, has_rights_to, dc_mode,
+                                         total_objects=None):
+
+        if has_rights_to == "all":
+            expect_results = self.negative_searches_all_rights(total_objects)
+
+        # if it's a Samba DC, we only expect the 'match-all' searches to return
+        # the objects that we have access rights to (all others are hidden).
+        # Whereas Windows 'hides' the objects by always returning all of them
+        elif dc_mode == DC_MODE_RETURN_NONE:
+            expect_results = self.negative_searches_return_none(has_rights_to)
+        else:
+            expect_results = self.negative_searches_return_all(has_rights_to,
+                                                               total_objects)
+        return expect_results
+
+    def assert_negative_searches(self, has_rights_to=0,
+                                 dc_mode=DC_MODE_RETURN_NONE, samdb=None):
+        """Asserts user without rights cannot see objects in '!' searches"""
+
+        if samdb is None:
+            samdb = self.ldb_user
+
+        # build a dictionary of key=search-expr, value=expected_num assertions
+        expected_results = self.negative_search_expected_results(has_rights_to,
+                                                                 dc_mode)
+
+        for search, expected_num in expected_results.items():
+            self.assert_search_result(expected_num, search, samdb)
+
+    def assert_attr_returned(self, expect_attr, samdb, attrs):
+        # does a query that should always return a successful result, and
+        # checks whether the confidential attribute is present
+        res = samdb.search(self.conf_dn, expression="(objectClass=*)",
+                           scope=SCOPE_SUBTREE, attrs=attrs)
+        self.assertTrue(len(res) == 1)
+
+        attr_returned = False
+        for msg in res:
+            if self.conf_attr in msg:
+                attr_returned = True
+        self.assertEqual(expect_attr, attr_returned)
+
+    def assert_attr_visible(self, expect_attr, samdb=None):
+        if samdb is None:
+            samdb = self.ldb_user
+
+        # sanity-check confidential attribute is/isn't returned as expected
+        # based on the filter attributes we ask for
+        self.assert_attr_returned(expect_attr, samdb, attrs=None)
+        self.assert_attr_returned(expect_attr, samdb, attrs=["*"])
+        self.assert_attr_returned(expect_attr, samdb, attrs=[self.conf_attr])
+
+        # filtering on a different attribute should never return the conf_attr
+        self.assert_attr_returned(expect_attr=False, samdb=samdb,
+                                  attrs=['name'])
+
+    def assert_attr_visible_to_admin(self):
+        # sanity-check the admin user can always see the confidential attribute
+        self.assert_conf_attr_searches(has_rights_to="all", samdb=self.ldb_admin)
+        self.assert_negative_searches(has_rights_to="all", samdb=self.ldb_admin)
+        self.assert_attr_visible(expect_attr=True, samdb=self.ldb_admin)
+
+
+class ConfidentialAttrTest(ConfidentialAttrCommon):
+    def test_basic_search(self):
+        """Basic test confidential attributes aren't disclosed via searches"""
+
+        # check we can see a non-confidential attribute in a basic searches
+        self.assert_conf_attr_searches(has_rights_to="all")
+        self.assert_negative_searches(has_rights_to="all")
+        self.assert_attr_visible(expect_attr=True)
+
+        # now make the attribute confidential. Repeat the tests and check that
+        # an ordinary user can't see the attribute, or indirectly match on the
+        # attribute via the search expression
+        self.make_attr_confidential()
+
+        self.assert_conf_attr_searches(has_rights_to=0)
+        dc_mode = self.guess_dc_mode()
+        self.assert_negative_searches(has_rights_to=0, dc_mode=dc_mode)
+        self.assert_attr_visible(expect_attr=False)
+
+        # sanity-check we haven't hidden the attribute from the admin as well
+        self.assert_attr_visible_to_admin()
+
+    def _test_search_with_allow_acl(self, allow_ace):
+        """Checks a ACE with 'CR' rights can override a confidential attr"""
+        # make the test attribute confidential and check user can't see it
+        self.make_attr_confidential()
+
+        self.assert_conf_attr_searches(has_rights_to=0)
+        dc_mode = self.guess_dc_mode()
+        self.assert_negative_searches(has_rights_to=0, dc_mode=dc_mode)
+        self.assert_attr_visible(expect_attr=False)
+
+        # apply the allow ACE to the object under test
+        self.sd_utils.dacl_add_ace(self.conf_dn, allow_ace)
+
+        # the user should now be able to see the attribute for the one object
+        # we gave it rights to
+        self.assert_conf_attr_searches(has_rights_to=1)
+        self.assert_negative_searches(has_rights_to=1, dc_mode=dc_mode)
+        self.assert_attr_visible(expect_attr=True)
+
+        # sanity-check the admin can still see the attribute
+        self.assert_attr_visible_to_admin()
+
+    def test_search_with_attr_acl_override(self):
+        """Make the confidential attr visible via an OA attr ACE"""
+
+        # set the SEC_ADS_CONTROL_ACCESS bit ('CR') for the user for the
+        # attribute under test, so the user can see it once more
+        user_sid = self.get_user_sid_string(self.user)
+        ace = "(OA;;CR;{};;{})".format(self.conf_attr_guid, user_sid)
+
+        self._test_search_with_allow_acl(ace)
+
+    def test_search_with_propset_acl_override(self):
+        """Make the confidential attr visible via a Property-set ACE"""
+
+        # set the SEC_ADS_CONTROL_ACCESS bit ('CR') for the user for the
+        # property-set containing the attribute under test (i.e. the
+        # attributeSecurityGuid), so the user can see it once more
+        user_sid = self.get_user_sid_string(self.user)
+        ace = "(OA;;CR;{};;{})".format(self.conf_attr_sec_guid, user_sid)
+
+        self._test_search_with_allow_acl(ace)
+
+    def test_search_with_acl_override(self):
+        """Make the confidential attr visible via a general 'allow' ACE"""
+
+        # set the allow SEC_ADS_CONTROL_ACCESS bit ('CR') for the user
+        user_sid = self.get_user_sid_string(self.user)
+        ace = "(A;;CR;;;{})".format(user_sid)
+
+        self._test_search_with_allow_acl(ace)
+
+    def test_search_with_blanket_oa_acl(self):
+        """Make the confidential attr visible via a non-specific OA ACE"""
+
+        # this just checks that an Object Access (OA) ACE without a GUID
+        # specified will work the same as an 'Access' (A) ACE
+        user_sid = self.get_user_sid_string(self.user)
+        ace = "(OA;;CR;;;{})".format(user_sid)
+
+        self._test_search_with_allow_acl(ace)
+
+    def _test_search_with_neutral_acl(self, neutral_ace):
+        """Checks that a user does NOT gain access via an unrelated ACE"""
+
+        # make the test attribute confidential and check user can't see it
+        self.make_attr_confidential()
+
+        self.assert_conf_attr_searches(has_rights_to=0)
+        dc_mode = self.guess_dc_mode()
+        self.assert_negative_searches(has_rights_to=0, dc_mode=dc_mode)
+        self.assert_attr_visible(expect_attr=False)
+
+        # apply the ACE to the object under test
+        self.sd_utils.dacl_add_ace(self.conf_dn, neutral_ace)
+
+        # this should make no difference to the user's ability to see the attr
+        self.assert_conf_attr_searches(has_rights_to=0)
+        self.assert_negative_searches(has_rights_to=0, dc_mode=dc_mode)
+        self.assert_attr_visible(expect_attr=False)
+
+        # sanity-check the admin can still see the attribute
+        self.assert_attr_visible_to_admin()
+
+    def test_search_with_neutral_acl(self):
+        """Give the user all rights *except* CR for any attributes"""
+
+        # give the user all rights *except* CR and check it makes no difference
+        user_sid = self.get_user_sid_string(self.user)
+        ace = "(A;;RPWPCCDCLCLORCWOWDSDDTSW;;;{})".format(user_sid)
+        self._test_search_with_neutral_acl(ace)
+
+    def test_search_with_neutral_attr_acl(self):
+        """Give the user all rights *except* CR for the attribute under test"""
+
+        # giving user all OA rights *except* CR should make no difference
+        user_sid = self.get_user_sid_string(self.user)
+        rights = "RPWPCCDCLCLORCWOWDSDDTSW"
+        ace = "(OA;;{};{};;{})".format(rights, self.conf_attr_guid, user_sid)
+        self._test_search_with_neutral_acl(ace)
+
+    def test_search_with_neutral_cr_acl(self):
+        """Give the user CR rights for *another* unrelated attribute"""
+
+        # giving user object-access CR rights to an unrelated attribute
+        user_sid = self.get_user_sid_string(self.user)
+        # use the GUID for sAMAccountName here (for no particular reason)
+        unrelated_attr = "3e0abfd0-126a-11d0-a060-00aa006c33ed"
+        ace = "(OA;;CR;{};;{})".format(unrelated_attr, user_sid)
+        self._test_search_with_neutral_acl(ace)
+
+
+# Check that a Deny ACL on an attribute doesn't reveal confidential info
+class ConfidentialAttrTestDenyAcl(ConfidentialAttrCommon):
+
+    def assert_not_in_result(self, res, exclude_dn):
+        for msg in res:
+            self.assertNotEqual(msg.dn, exclude_dn,
+                                "Search revealed object {}".format(exclude_dn))
+
+    # deny ACL tests are slightly different as we are only denying access to
+    # the one object under test (rather than any objects with that attribute).
+    # Therefore we need an extra check that we don't reveal the test object
+    # in the search, if we're not supposed to
+    def assert_search_result(self, expected_num, expr, samdb,
+                             excl_testobj=False):
+
+        # try asking for different attributes back: None/all, the confidential
+        # attribute itself, and a random unrelated attribute
+        attr_filters = [None, ["*"], [self.conf_attr], ['name']]
+        for attr in attr_filters:
+            res = samdb.search(self.test_dn, expression=expr,
+                               scope=SCOPE_SUBTREE, attrs=attr)
+            self.assertTrue(len(res) == expected_num,
+                           "%u results, not %u for search %s, attr %s" %
+                            (len(res), expected_num, expr, str(attr)))
+
+            # assert we haven't revealed the hidden test-object
+            if excl_testobj:
+                self.assert_not_in_result(res, exclude_dn=self.conf_dn)
+
+    # we make a few tweaks to the regular version of this function to cater to
+    # denying specifically one object via an ACE
+    def assert_conf_attr_searches(self, has_rights_to=0, samdb=None):
+        """Check searches against the attribute under test work as expected"""
+
+        if samdb is None:
+            samdb = self.ldb_user
+
+        # make sure the test object is not returned if we've been denied rights
+        # to it via an ACE
+        excl_testobj = True if has_rights_to == "deny-one" else False
+
+        # these first few searches we just expect to match against the one
+        # object under test that we're trying to guess the value of
+        expected_num = 1 if has_rights_to == "all" else 0
+
+        for search in self.get_exact_match_searches():
+            self.assert_search_result(expected_num, search, samdb,
+                                      excl_testobj)
+
+        # these next searches will match any objects with the attribute that
+        # we have rights to see (i.e. all except the object under test)
+        if has_rights_to == "all":
+            expected_num = self.objects_with_attr
+        elif has_rights_to == "deny-one":
+            expected_num = self.objects_with_attr - 1
+
+        for search in self.get_match_all_searches():
+            self.assert_search_result(expected_num, search, samdb,
+                                      excl_testobj)
+
+    def negative_searches_return_none(self, has_rights_to=0):
+        expected_results = {}
+
+        # on Samba we will see the objects we have rights to, but the one we
+        # are denied access to will be hidden
+        searches = self.get_negative_match_all_searches()
+        searches += self.get_inverse_match_searches()
+        for search in searches:
+            expected_results[search] = self.total_objects - 1
+
+        # The wildcard returns the objects without this attribute as normal.
+        search = "(!({}=*))".format(self.conf_attr)
+        expected_results[search] = self.total_objects - self.objects_with_attr
+        return expected_results
+
+    def negative_searches_return_all(self, has_rights_to=0,
+                                     total_objects=None):
+        expected_results = {}
+
+        # When a user lacks access rights to an object, Windows 'hides' it in
+        # '!' searches by always returning it, regardless of whether it matches
+        searches = self.get_negative_match_all_searches()
+        searches += self.get_inverse_match_searches()
+        for search in searches:
+            expected_results[search] = self.total_objects
+
+        # in the wildcard case, the one object we don't have rights to gets
+        # bundled in with the objects that don't have the attribute at all
+        search = "(!({}=*))".format(self.conf_attr)
+        has_rights_to = self.objects_with_attr - 1
+        expected_results[search] = self.total_objects - has_rights_to
+        return expected_results
+
+    def assert_negative_searches(self, has_rights_to=0,
+                                 dc_mode=DC_MODE_RETURN_NONE, samdb=None):
+        """Asserts user without rights cannot see objects in '!' searches"""
+
+        if samdb is None:
+            samdb = self.ldb_user
+
+        # As the deny ACL is only denying access to one particular object, add
+        # an extra check that the denied object is not returned. (We can only
+        # assert this if the '!'/negative search behaviour is to suppress any
+        # objects we don't have access rights to)
+        excl_testobj = False
+        if has_rights_to != "all" and dc_mode == DC_MODE_RETURN_NONE:
+            excl_testobj = True
+
+        # build a dictionary of key=search-expr, value=expected_num assertions
+        expected_results = self.negative_search_expected_results(has_rights_to,
+                                                                 dc_mode)
+
+        for search, expected_num in expected_results.items():
+            self.assert_search_result(expected_num, search, samdb,
+                                      excl_testobj=excl_testobj)
+
+    def _test_search_with_deny_acl(self, ace):
+        # check the user can see the attribute initially
+        self.assert_conf_attr_searches(has_rights_to="all")
+        self.assert_negative_searches(has_rights_to="all")
+        self.assert_attr_visible(expect_attr=True)
+
+        # add the ACE that denies access to the attr under test
+        self.sd_utils.dacl_add_ace(self.conf_dn, ace)
+
+        # the user shouldn't be able to see the attribute anymore
+        self.assert_conf_attr_searches(has_rights_to="deny-one")
+        dc_mode = self.guess_dc_mode()
+        self.assert_negative_searches(has_rights_to="deny-one",
+                                      dc_mode=dc_mode)
+        self.assert_attr_visible(expect_attr=False)
+
+        # sanity-check we haven't hidden the attribute from the admin as well
+        self.assert_attr_visible_to_admin()
+
+    def test_search_with_deny_attr_acl(self):
+        """Checks a deny ACE works the same way as a confidential attribute"""
+
+        # add an ACE that denies the user Read Property (RP) access to the attr
+        # (which is similar to making the attribute confidential)
+        user_sid = self.get_user_sid_string(self.user)
+        ace = "(OD;;RP;{};;{})".format(self.conf_attr_guid, user_sid)
+
+        # check the user cannot see the attribute anymore
+        self._test_search_with_deny_acl(ace)
+
+    def test_search_with_deny_acl(self):
+        """Checks a blanket deny ACE denies access to an object's attributes"""
+
+        # add an blanket deny ACE for Read Property (RP) rights
+        user_dn = self.get_user_dn(self.user)
+        user_sid = self.sd_utils.get_object_sid(user_dn)
+        ace = "(D;;RP;;;{})".format(str(user_sid))
+
+        # check the user cannot see the attribute anymore
+        self._test_search_with_deny_acl(ace)
+
+    def test_search_with_deny_propset_acl(self):
+        """Checks a deny ACE on the attribute's Property-Set"""
+
+        # add an blanket deny ACE for Read Property (RP) rights
+        user_sid = self.get_user_sid_string(self.user)
+        ace = "(OD;;RP;{};;{})".format(self.conf_attr_sec_guid, user_sid)
+
+        # check the user cannot see the attribute anymore
+        self._test_search_with_deny_acl(ace)
+
+    def test_search_with_blanket_oa_deny_acl(self):
+        """Checks a non-specific 'OD' ACE works the same as a 'D' ACE"""
+
+        # this just checks that adding a 'Object Deny' (OD) ACE without
+        # specifying a GUID will work the same way as a 'Deny' (D) ACE
+        user_sid = self.get_user_sid_string(self.user)
+        ace = "(OD;;RP;;;{})".format(user_sid)
+
+        # check the user cannot see the attribute anymore
+        self._test_search_with_deny_acl(ace)
+
+
+# Check that using the dirsync controls doesn't reveal confidential attributes
+class ConfidentialAttrTestDirsync(ConfidentialAttrCommon):
+
+    def setUp(self):
+        super(ConfidentialAttrTestDirsync, self).setUp()
+        self.dirsync = ["dirsync:1:1:1000"]
+
+        # because we need to search on the base DN when using the dirsync
+        # controls, we need an extra filter for the inverse ('!') search,
+        # so we don't get thousands of objects returned
+        self.extra_filter = \
+            "(&(samaccountname={}*)(!(isDeleted=*)))".format(self.user_prefix)
+        self.single_obj_filter = \
+            "(&(samaccountname={})(!(isDeleted=*)))".format(self.conf_user)
+
+        self.attr_filters = [None, ["*"], ["name"]]
+
+        # Note dirsync behaviour is slighty different for the attribute under
+        # test - when you have full access rights, it only returns the objects
+        # that actually have this attribute (i.e. it doesn't return an empty
+        # message with just the DN). So we add the 'name' attribute into the
+        # attribute filter to avoid complicating our assertions further
+        self.attr_filters += [[self.conf_attr, "name"]]
+
+    def assert_search_result(self, expected_num, expr, samdb, base_dn=None):
+
+        # Note dirsync must always search on the partition base DN
+        if base_dn is None:
+            base_dn = self.base_dn
+
+        # we need an extra filter for dirsync because:
+        # - we search on the base DN, so otherwise the '!' searches return
+        #   thousands of unrelated results, and
+        # - we make the test attribute preserve-on-delete in one case, so we
+        #   want to weed out results from any previous test runs
+        search = "(&{}{})".format(expr, self.extra_filter)
+
+        for attr in self.attr_filters:
+            res = samdb.search(base_dn, expression=search, scope=SCOPE_SUBTREE,
+                               attrs=attr, controls=self.dirsync)
+            self.assertTrue(len(res) == expected_num,
+                            "%u results, not %u for search %s, attr %s" %
+                            (len(res), expected_num, search, str(attr)))
+
+    def assert_attr_returned(self, expect_attr, samdb, attrs,
+                             no_result_ok=False):
+
+        # When using dirsync, the base DN we search on needs to be a naming
+        # context. Add an extra filter to ignore all the objects we aren't
+        # interested in
+        expr = self.single_obj_filter
+        res = samdb.search(self.base_dn, expression=expr, scope=SCOPE_SUBTREE,
+                           attrs=attrs, controls=self.dirsync)
+        self.assertTrue(len(res) == 1 or no_result_ok)
+
+        attr_returned = False
+        for msg in res:
+            if self.conf_attr in msg and len(msg[self.conf_attr]) > 0:
+                attr_returned = True
+        self.assertEqual(expect_attr, attr_returned)
+
+    def assert_attr_visible(self, expect_attr, samdb=None):
+        if samdb is None:
+            samdb = self.ldb_user
+
+        # sanity-check confidential attribute is/isn't returned as expected
+        # based on the filter attributes we ask for
+        self.assert_attr_returned(expect_attr, samdb, attrs=None)
+        self.assert_attr_returned(expect_attr, samdb, attrs=["*"])
+
+        if expect_attr:
+            self.assert_attr_returned(expect_attr, samdb,
+                                      attrs=[self.conf_attr])
+        else:
+            # The behaviour with dirsync when asking solely for an attribute
+            # that you don't have rights to is a bit strange. Samba returns
+            # no result rather than an empty message with just the DN.
+            # Presumably this is due to dirsync module behaviour. It's not
+            # disclosive in that the DC behaves the same way as if you asked
+            # for a garbage/non-existent attribute
+            self.assert_attr_returned(expect_attr, samdb,
+                                      attrs=[self.conf_attr],
+                                      no_result_ok=True)
+            self.assert_attr_returned(expect_attr, samdb,
+                                      attrs=["garbage"], no_result_ok=True)
+
+        # filtering on a different attribute should never return the conf_attr
+        self.assert_attr_returned(expect_attr=False, samdb=samdb,
+                                  attrs=['name'])
+
+    def assert_negative_searches(self, has_rights_to=0,
+                                 dc_mode=DC_MODE_RETURN_NONE, samdb=None):
+        """Asserts user without rights cannot see objects in '!' searches"""
+
+        if samdb is None:
+            samdb = self.ldb_user
+
+        # because dirsync uses an extra filter, the total objects we expect
+        # here only includes the user objects (not the parent OU)
+        total_objects = len(self.all_users)
+        expected_results = self.negative_search_expected_results(has_rights_to,
+                                                                 dc_mode,
+                                                                 total_objects)
+
+        for search, expected_num in expected_results.items():
+            self.assert_search_result(expected_num, search, samdb)
+
+    def test_search_with_dirsync(self):
+        """Checks dirsync controls don't reveal confidential attributes"""
+
+        self.assert_conf_attr_searches(has_rights_to="all")
+        self.assert_attr_visible(expect_attr=True)
+        self.assert_negative_searches(has_rights_to="all")
+
+        # make the test attribute confidential and check user can't see it,
+        # even if they use the dirsync controls
+        self.make_attr_confidential()
+
+        self.assert_conf_attr_searches(has_rights_to=0)
+        self.assert_attr_visible(expect_attr=False)
+        dc_mode = self.guess_dc_mode()
+        self.assert_negative_searches(has_rights_to=0, dc_mode=dc_mode)
+
+        # as a final sanity-check, make sure the admin can still see the attr
+        self.assert_conf_attr_searches(has_rights_to="all",
+                                       samdb=self.ldb_admin)
+        self.assert_attr_visible(expect_attr=True, samdb=self.ldb_admin)
+        self.assert_negative_searches(has_rights_to="all",
+                                      samdb=self.ldb_admin)
+
+    def get_guid(self, dn):
+        """Returns an object's GUID (in string format)"""
+        res = self.ldb_admin.search(base=dn, attrs=["objectGUID"],
+                                    scope=SCOPE_BASE)
+        guid = res[0]['objectGUID'][0]
+        return self.ldb_admin.schema_format_value("objectGUID", guid)
+
+    def make_attr_preserve_on_delete(self):
+        """Marks the attribute under test as being preserve on delete"""
+
+        # work out the original 'searchFlags' value before we overwrite it
+        search_flags = int(self.get_attr_search_flags(self.attr_dn))
+
+        # check we've already set the confidential flag
+        self.assertTrue(search_flags & SEARCH_FLAG_CONFIDENTIAL != 0)
+        search_flags |= SEARCH_FLAG_PRESERVEONDELETE
+
+        self.set_attr_search_flags(self.attr_dn, str(search_flags))
+
+    def change_attr_under_test(self, attr_name, attr_cn):
+        # change the attribute that the test code uses
+        self.conf_attr = attr_name
+        self.attr_dn = "{},{}".format(attr_cn, self.schema_dn)
+
+        # set the new attribute for the user-under-test
+        self.add_attr(self.conf_dn, self.conf_attr, self.conf_value)
+
+        # 2 other users also have the attribute-under-test set (to a randomish
+        # value). Set the new attribute for them now (normally this gets done
+        # in the setUp())
+        for username in self.all_users:
+            if "other-user" in username:
+                dn = self.get_user_dn(username)
+                self.add_attr(dn, self.conf_attr, "xyz-blah")
+
+    def test_search_with_dirsync_deleted_objects(self):
+        """Checks dirsync doesn't reveal confidential info for deleted objs"""
+
+        # change the attribute we're testing (we'll preserve on delete for this
+        # test case, which means the attribute-under-test hangs around after
+        # the test case finishes, and would interfere with the searches for
+        # subsequent other test cases)
+        self.change_attr_under_test("carLicense", "CN=carLicense")
+
+        # Windows dirsync behaviour is a little strange when you request
+        # attributes that deleted objects no longer have, so just request 'all
+        # attributes' to simplify the test logic
+        self.attr_filters = [None, ["*"]]
+
+        # normally dirsync uses extra filters to exclude deleted objects that
+        # we're not interested in. Override these filters so they WILL include
+        # deleted objects, but only from this particular test run. We can do
+        # this by matching lastKnownParent against this test case's OU, which
+        # will match any deleted child objects.
+        ou_guid = self.get_guid(self.ou)
+        deleted_filter = "(lastKnownParent=<GUID={}>)".format(ou_guid)
+
+        # the extra-filter will get combined via AND with the search expression
+        # we're testing, i.e. filter on the confidential attribute AND only
+        # include non-deleted objects, OR deleted objects from this test run
+        exclude_deleted_objs_filter = self.extra_filter
+        self.extra_filter = "(|{}{})".format(exclude_deleted_objs_filter,
+                                             deleted_filter)
+
+        # for matching on a single object, the search expresseion becomes:
+        # match exactly by account-name AND either a non-deleted object OR a
+        # deleted object from this test run
+        match_by_name = "(samaccountname={})".format(self.conf_user)
+        not_deleted = "(!(isDeleted=*))"
+        self.single_obj_filter = "(&{}(|{}{}))".format(match_by_name,
+                                                       not_deleted,
+                                                       deleted_filter)
+
+        # check that the search filters work as expected
+        self.assert_conf_attr_searches(has_rights_to="all")
+        self.assert_attr_visible(expect_attr=True)
+        self.assert_negative_searches(has_rights_to="all")
+
+        # make the test attribute confidential *and* preserve on delete.
+        self.make_attr_confidential()
+        self.make_attr_preserve_on_delete()
+
+        # check we can't see the objects now, even with using dirsync controls
+        self.assert_conf_attr_searches(has_rights_to=0)
+        self.assert_attr_visible(expect_attr=False)
+        dc_mode = self.guess_dc_mode()
+        self.assert_negative_searches(has_rights_to=0, dc_mode=dc_mode)
+
+        # now delete the users (except for the user whose LDB connection
+        # we're currently using)
+        for user in self.all_users:
+            if user != self.user:
+                self.ldb_admin.delete(self.get_user_dn(user))
+
+        # check we still can't see the objects
+        self.assert_conf_attr_searches(has_rights_to=0)
+        self.assert_negative_searches(has_rights_to=0, dc_mode=dc_mode)
+
+TestProgram(module=__name__, opts=subunitopts)
diff --git a/source4/dsdb/tests/python/ldap.py b/source4/dsdb/tests/python/ldap.py
index 4235541fdbe..2514d0a9d72 100755
--- a/source4/dsdb/tests/python/ldap.py
+++ b/source4/dsdb/tests/python/ldap.py
@@ -599,6 +599,15 @@ class BasicTests(samba.tests.TestCase):
         except LdbError, (num, _):
             self.assertEquals(num, ERR_NO_SUCH_ATTRIBUTE)
 
+        #
+        # When searching the unknown attribute should be ignored
+        expr = "(|(cn=ldaptestgroup)(thisdoesnotexist=x))"
+        res = ldb.search(base=self.base_dn,
+                         expression=expr,
+                         scope=SCOPE_SUBTREE)
+        self.assertTrue(len(res) == 1,
+                        "Search including unknown attribute failed")
+
         delete_force(self.ldb, "cn=ldaptestgroup,cn=users," + self.base_dn)
 
         # attributes not in objectclasses and mandatory attributes missing test
diff --git a/source4/selftest/tests.py b/source4/selftest/tests.py
index 226617f3b6a..ee7841a492a 100755
--- a/source4/selftest/tests.py
+++ b/source4/selftest/tests.py
@@ -376,6 +376,9 @@ plantestsuite_loadlist("samba.tests.dns_forwarder", "fl2003dc:local", [python, o
 
 plantestsuite_loadlist("samba.tests.dns_tkey", "fl2008r2dc", [python, os.path.join(srcdir(), "python/samba/tests/dns_tkey.py"), '$SERVER', '$SERVER_IP', '--machine-pass', '-U"$USERNAME%$PASSWORD"', '--workgroup=$DOMAIN', '$LOADLIST', '$LISTOPT'])
 plantestsuite_loadlist("samba.tests.dns_wildcard", "ad_dc", [python, os.path.join(srcdir(), "python/samba/tests/dns_wildcard.py"), '$SERVER', '$SERVER_IP', '--machine-pass', '-U"$USERNAME%$PASSWORD"', '--workgroup=$DOMAIN', '$LOADLIST', '$LISTOPT'])
+
+plantestsuite_loadlist("samba.tests.dns_invalid", "ad_dc", [python, os.path.join(srcdir(), "python/samba/tests/dns_invalid.py"), '$SERVER_IP', '--machine-pass', '-U"$USERNAME%$PASSWORD"', '--workgroup=$DOMAIN', '$LOADLIST', '$LISTOPT'])
+
 for t in smbtorture4_testsuites("dns_internal."):
     plansmbtorture4testsuite(t, "ad_dc_ntvfs:local", '//$SERVER/whavever')
 
@@ -793,6 +796,9 @@ for env in ["ad_dc_ntvfs", "fl2000dc", "fl2003dc", "fl2008r2dc"]:
         # therefore skip it in that configuration
         plantestsuite_loadlist("samba4.ldap.passwords.python(%s)" % env, env, [python, os.path.join(samba4srcdir, "dsdb/tests/python/passwords.py"), "$SERVER", '-U"$USERNAME%$PASSWORD"', "-W$DOMAIN", '$LOADLIST', '$LISTOPT'])
 
+env = "ad_dc_ntvfs"
+plantestsuite_loadlist("samba4.ldap.confidential_attr.python(%s)" % env, env, [python, os.path.join(samba4srcdir, "dsdb/tests/python/confidential_attr.py"), '$SERVER', '-U"$USERNAME%$PASSWORD"', '--workgroup=$DOMAIN', '$LOADLIST', '$LISTOPT'])
+
 for env in ["ad_dc_ntvfs"]:
     # This test takes a lot of time, so we run it against a minimum of
     # environments, please only add new ones if there's really a
diff --git a/source4/torture/drs/python/cracknames.py b/source4/torture/drs/python/cracknames.py
index d8c8ae53d60..9bf90f9c997 100644
--- a/source4/torture/drs/python/cracknames.py
+++ b/source4/torture/drs/python/cracknames.py
@@ -149,6 +149,44 @@ class DrsCracknamesTestCase(drs_base.DrsBaseTestCase):
 
         self.ldb_dc1.delete(user)
 
+    def test_NoSPNAttribute(self):
+        """
+        Verifies that, if we try and cracknames with the desired output
+        being an SPN, it returns
+        DRSUAPI_DS_NAME_STATUS_NOT_UNIQUE.
+        """
+        username = "Cracknames_no_SPN"
+        user = "cn=%s,%s" % (username, self.ou)
+
+        user_record = {
+            "dn": user,
+            "objectclass": "user",
+            "sAMAccountName" : username,
+            "userPrincipalName" : "test4@test.com",
+            "displayName" : "test4"}
+
+        self.ldb_dc1.add(user_record)
+
+        (result, ctr) = self._do_cracknames(user,
+                                            drsuapi.DRSUAPI_DS_NAME_FORMAT_FQDN_1779,
+                                            drsuapi.DRSUAPI_DS_NAME_FORMAT_GUID)
+
+        self.assertEquals(ctr.count, 1)
+        self.assertEquals(ctr.array[0].status,
+                          drsuapi.DRSUAPI_DS_NAME_STATUS_OK)
+
+        user_guid = ctr.array[0].result_name
+
+        (result, ctr) = self._do_cracknames(user_guid,
+                                            drsuapi.DRSUAPI_DS_NAME_FORMAT_GUID,
+                                            drsuapi.DRSUAPI_DS_NAME_FORMAT_SERVICE_PRINCIPAL)
+
+        self.assertEquals(ctr.count, 1)
+        self.assertEquals(ctr.array[0].status,
+                          drsuapi.DRSUAPI_DS_NAME_STATUS_NOT_FOUND)
+
+        self.ldb_dc1.delete(user)
+
     def _do_cracknames(self, name, format_offered, format_desired):
         req = drsuapi.DsNameRequest1()
         names = drsuapi.DsNameString()