BASELINE: Update Chromium to 74.0.3729.159

Change-Id: I8d2497da544c275415aedd94dd25328d555de811
Reviewed-by: Michael Brüning <michael.bruning@qt.io>

1 files changed, 12 insertions, 11 deletions

diff --git a/chromium/third_party/blink/renderer/platform/weborigin/security_origin.cc b/chromium/third_party/blink/renderer/platform/weborigin/security_origin.cc
index 267e2e64316..d629c18cab9 100644
--- a/chromium/third_party/blink/renderer/platform/weborigin/security_origin.cc
+++ b/chromium/third_party/blink/renderer/platform/weborigin/security_origin.cc
@@ -306,6 +306,9 @@ bool SecurityOrigin::CanAccess(const SecurityOrigin* other,
     return true;
   }
 
+  // This is needed to ensure an origin can access to itself under nullified
+  // document.domain.
+  // TODO(tzik): Update the nulled domain handling and remove this condition.
   if (this == other) {
     detail = AccessResultDomainDetail::kDomainNotRelevant;
     return true;
@@ -313,11 +316,11 @@ bool SecurityOrigin::CanAccess(const SecurityOrigin* other,
 
   if (IsOpaque() || other->IsOpaque()) {
     detail = AccessResultDomainDetail::kDomainNotRelevant;
-    return false;
+    return nonce_if_opaque_ == other->nonce_if_opaque_;
   }
 
   // document.domain handling, as per
-  // https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/browsers.html#dom-document-domain:
+  // https://html.spec.whatwg.org/C/#dom-document-domain:
   //
   // 1) Neither document has set document.domain. In this case, we insist
   //    that the scheme, host, and port of the URLs match.
@@ -332,10 +335,7 @@ bool SecurityOrigin::CanAccess(const SecurityOrigin* other,
       if (host_ == other->host_ && port_ == other->port_)
         can_access = true;
     } else if (domain_was_set_in_dom_ && other->domain_was_set_in_dom_) {
-      // TODO(mkwst): If/when we ship this behavior, change this to check
-      // IsNull() rather than relying on string comparison.
-      // https://crbug.com/733150
-      if (domain_ == other->domain_ && domain_ != "null") {
+      if (domain_ == other->domain_) {
         can_access = true;
         detail = (host_ == other->host_ && port_ == other->port_)
                      ? AccessResultDomainDetail::kDomainMatchUnnecessary
@@ -545,14 +545,15 @@ scoped_refptr<SecurityOrigin> SecurityOrigin::Create(const String& protocol,
 }
 
 bool SecurityOrigin::IsSameSchemeHostPort(const SecurityOrigin* other) const {
+  // This is needed to ensure a local origin considered to have the same scheme,
+  // host, and port to itself.
+  // TODO(tzik): Make the local origin unique but not opaque, and remove this
+  // condition.
   if (this == other)
     return true;
 
-  if (IsOpaque() || other->IsOpaque()) {
-    // TODO(dcheng|nasko): Add nonce equality check here, such that opaque
-    // origins that are copy of each other can be equal.
-    return false;
-  }
+  if (IsOpaque() || other->IsOpaque())
+    return nonce_if_opaque_ == other->nonce_if_opaque_;
 
   if (host_ != other->host_)
     return false;