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authorTres Seaver <tseaver@palladion.com>2012-12-23 20:54:18 +0000
committerTres Seaver <tseaver@palladion.com>2012-12-23 20:54:18 +0000
commit44e089fdf22bd49c9954a8763f2f72632675efe6 (patch)
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downloadzope-security-44e089fdf22bd49c9954a8763f2f72632675efe6.tar.gz
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+Overview
+========
+
+Introduction
+------------
+
+The Security framework provides a generic mechanism to implement security
+policies on Python objects. This introduction provides a tutorial of the
+framework explaining concepts, design, and going through sample usage from the
+perspective of a Python programmer using the framework outside of Zope.
+
+Definitions
+-----------
+
+Principal
+~~~~~~~~~
+
+A generalization of a concept of a user.
+
+Permission
+~~~~~~~~~~
+
+A kind of access, i.e. permission to READ vs. permission to WRITE.
+Fundamentally the whole security framework is organized around checking
+permissions on objects.
+
+Purpose
+-------
+
+The security framework's primary purpose is to guard and check access to
+Python objects. It does this by providing mechanisms for explicit and
+implicit security checks on attribute access for objects. Attribute names are
+mapped onto permission names when checking access and the implementation of
+the security check is defined by the security policy, which receives the
+object, the permission name, and an interaction.
+
+Interactions are objects that represent the use of the system by one or more
+principals. An interaction contains a list of participations, which
+represents the way a single principal participates in the interaction. An
+HTTP request is one example of a participation.
+
+Its important to keep in mind that the policy provided is just a default, and
+it can be substituted with one which doesn't care about principals or
+interactions at all.
+
+Framework Components
+--------------------
+
+Low Level Components
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+These components provide the infrastructure for guarding attribute access and
+providing hooks into the higher level security framework.
+
+Checkers
+~~~~~~~~
+
+A checker is associated with an object kind, and provides the hooks that map
+attribute checks onto permissions deferring to the security manager (which in
+turn defers to the policy) to perform the check.
+
+Additionally, checkers provide for creating proxies of objects associated with
+the checker.
+
+There are several implementation variants of checkers, such as checkers that
+grant access based on attribute names.
+
+Proxies
+~~~~~~~
+
+Wrappers around Python objects that implicitly guard access to their wrapped
+contents by delegating to their associated checker. Proxies are also viral in
+nature, in that values returned by proxies are also proxied.
+
+High Level Components
+---------------------
+
+Security Management
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+Provides accessors for setting up interactions and the global security policy.
+
+Interaction
+~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+Stores transient information on the list of participations.
+
+Participation
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+Stores information about a principal participating in the interaction.
+
+Security Policy
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+Provides a single method that accepts the object, the permission, and the
+interaction of the access being checked and is used to implement the
+application logic for the security framework.
+
+Narrative (agent sandbox)
+-------------------------
+
+As an example we take a look at constructing a multi-agent distributed system,
+and then adding a security layer using the Zope security model onto it.
+
+Scenario
+~~~~~~~~
+
+Our agent simulation consists of autonomous agents that live in various agent
+homes/sandboxes and perform actions that access services available at their
+current home. Agents carry around authentication tokens which signify their
+level of access within any given home. Additionally agents attempt to migrate
+from home to home randomly.
+
+The agent simulation was constructed separately from any security aspects.
+Now we want to define and integrate a security model into the simulation. The
+full code for the simulation and the security model is available separately;
+we present only relevant code snippets here for illustration as we go through
+the implementation process.
+
+For the agent simulation we want to add a security model such that we group
+agents into two authentication groups, "norse legends", including the
+principals thor, odin, and loki, and "greek men", including prometheus,
+archimedes, and thucydides.
+
+We associate permissions with access to services and homes. We differentiate
+the homes such that certain authentication groups only have access to services
+or the home itself based on the local settings of the home in which they
+reside.
+
+We define the homes/sandboxes
+
+ - origin - all agents start here, and have access to all
+ services here.
+
+ - valhalla - only agents in the authentication group 'norse
+ legend' can reside here.
+
+ - jail - all agents can come here, but only 'norse legend's
+ can leave or access services.
+
+
+Process
+~~~~~~~
+
+Loosely we define a process for implementing this security model
+
+ - mapping permissions onto actions
+
+ - mapping authentication tokens onto permissions
+
+ - implementing checkers and security policies that use our
+ authentication tokens and permissions.
+
+ - binding checkers to our simulation classes
+
+ - inserting the hooks into the original simulation code to add
+ proxy wrappers to automatically check security.
+
+ - inserting hooks into the original simulation to register the
+ agents as the active principal in an interaction.
+
+
+Defining a Permission Model
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+We define the following permissions::
+
+ NotAllowed = 'Not Allowed'
+ Public = Checker.CheckerPublic
+ TransportAgent = 'Transport Agent'
+ AccessServices = 'Access Services'
+ AccessAgents = 'Access Agents'
+ AccessTimeService = 'Access Time Services'
+ AccessAgentService = 'Access Agent Service'
+ AccessHomeService = 'Access Home Service'
+
+and create a dictionary database mapping homes to authentication groups which
+are linked to associated permissions.
+
+
+Defining and Binding Checkers
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+Checkers are the foundational unit for the security framework. They define
+what attributes can be accessed or set on a given instance. They can be used
+implicitly via Proxy objects, to guard all attribute access automatically or
+explicitly to check a given access for an operation.
+
+Checker construction expects two functions or dictionaries, one is used to map
+attribute names to permissions for attribute access and another to do the same
+for setting attributes.
+
+We use the following checker factory function::
+
+ def PermissionMapChecker(permissions_map={},
+ setattr_permission_func=NoSetAttr):
+ res = {}
+ for k,v in permissions_map.items():
+ for iv in v:
+ res[iv]=k
+ return checker.Checker(res.get, setattr_permission_func)
+
+ time_service_checker = PermissionMapChecker(
+ # permission : [methods]
+ {'AccessTimeService':['getTime']}
+ )
+
+with the NoSetAttr function defined as a lambda which always return the
+permission `NotAllowed`.
+
+To bind the checkers to the simulation classes we register our checkers with
+the security model's global checker registry::
+
+ import sandbox_simulation
+ from zope.security.checker import defineChecker
+ defineChecker(sandbox_simulation.TimeService, time_service_checker)
+
+
+Defining a Security Policy
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+We implement our security policy such that it checks the current agent's
+authentication token against the given permission in the home of the object
+being accessed::
+
+ @implementer(ISecurityPolicy)
+ class SimulationSecurityPolicy:
+
+ createInteraction = staticmethod(simpleinteraction.createInteraction)
+
+ def checkPermission(self, permission, object, interaction):
+
+ home = object.getHome()
+ db = getattr(SimulationSecurityDatabase, home.getId(), None)
+
+ if db is None:
+ return False
+
+ allowed = db.get('any', ())
+ if permission in allowed or ALL in allowed:
+ return True
+
+ if interaction is None:
+ return False
+ if not interaction.participations:
+ return False
+ for participation in interaction.participations:
+ token = participation.principal.getAuthenticationToken()
+ allowed = db.get(token, ())
+ if permission not in allowed:
+ return False
+
+ return True
+
+There are no specific requirements for the interaction class, so we can just
+use `zope.security.simpleinteraction.Interaction`.
+
+Since an interaction can have more than one principal, we check that *all* of
+them are given the necessary permission. This is not really necessary since
+we only create interactions with a single active principal.
+
+There is some additional code present to allow for shortcuts in defining the
+permission database when defining permissions for all auth groups and all
+permissions.
+
+
+Integration
+~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+At this point we have implemented our security model, and we need to integrate
+it with our simulation model. We do so in three separate steps.
+
+First we make it such that agents only access homes that are wrapped in a
+security proxy. By doing this all access to homes and services (proxies have
+proxied return values for their methods) is implicitly guarded by our security
+policy.
+
+The second step is that we want to associate the active agent with the
+security context so the security policy will know which agent's authentication
+token to validate against.
+
+The third step is to set our security policy as the default policy for the
+Zope security framework. It is possible to create custom security policies at
+a finer grained than global, but such is left as an exercise for the reader.
+
+
+Interaction Access
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+The *default* implementation of the interaction management interfaces defines
+interactions on a per thread basis with a function for an accessor. This
+model is not appropriate for all systems, as it restricts one to a single
+active interaction per thread at any given moment. Reimplementing the
+interaction access methods though is easily doable and is noted here for
+completeness.
+
+
+Perspectives
+~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+It's important to keep in mind that there is a lot more that is possible using
+the security framework than what's been presented here. All of the
+interactions are interface based, such that if you need to re-implement the
+semantics to suite your application a new implementation of the interface will
+be sufficient. Additional possibilities range from restricted interpreters
+and dynamic loading of untrusted code to non Zope web application security
+systems. Insert imagination here ;-).
+
+
+Zope Perspective
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+A Zope3 programmer will never commonly need to interact with the low level
+security framework. Zope3 defines a second security package over top the low
+level framework and authentication sources and checkers are handled via zcml
+registration. Still those developing Zope3 will hopefully find this useful as
+an introduction into the underpinnings of the security framework.
+
+
+Code
+~~~~
+
+The complete code for this example is available.
+
+- sandbox.py - the agent framework
+
+- sandbox_security.py - the security implementation and binding to the agent
+ framework.
+
+
+Authors
+~~~~~~~
+
+- Kapil Thangavelu <hazmat at objectrealms.net>
+- Guido Wesdorp <guido at infrae.com>
+- Marius Gedminas <marius at pov.lt>
+
+
Untrusted interpreters
======================