Fixed wrong function reference in OAuth server docs

1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions

diff --git a/docs/server.rst b/docs/server.rst
index 786930e..28994be 100644
--- a/docs/server.rst
+++ b/docs/server.rst
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ A few important facts regarding OAuth security
 
 * **OAuth without SSL is a Bad Idea™** and it's strongly recommended to use SSL for all interactions both with your API as well as for setting up tokens. An example of when it's especially bad is when sending POST requests with form data, this data is not accounted for in the OAuth signature and a successfull man-in-the-middle attacker could swap your form data (or files) to whatever he pleases without invalidating the signature. This is an even bigger issue if you fail to check nonce/timestamp pairs for each request, allowing an attacker who intercept your request to replay it later, overriding your initial request. **Server defaults to fail all requests which are not made over HTTPS**, you can explicitely disable this using the enforce_ssl property.
 
-* **Tokens must be random**, OAuthLib provides a method for generating secure tokens and it's packed into ``Server.generate_token``, use it. If you decide to roll your own, use ``random.SystemRandom`` which is based on ``os.urandom`` rather than the default ``random`` based on the effecient but not truly random Mersenne Twister. Predicatble tokens allow attackers to bypass virtually all defences OAuth provides.
+* **Tokens must be random**, OAuthLib provides a method for generating secure tokens and it's packed into ``oauthlib.common.generate_token``, use it. If you decide to roll your own, use ``random.SystemRandom`` which is based on ``os.urandom`` rather than the default ``random`` based on the effecient but not truly random Mersenne Twister. Predicatble tokens allow attackers to bypass virtually all defences OAuth provides.
 
 * **Timing attacks are real** and more than possible if you host your application inside a shared datacenter. Ensure all ``validate_`` methods execute in near constant time no matter which input is given. This will be covered in more detail later. Failing to account for timing attacks could **enable attackers to enumerate tokens and successfully guess HMAC secrets**. Note that RSA keys are protected through RSA blinding and are not at risk.