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authorTom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>2021-11-08 11:14:56 -0500
committerTom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>2021-11-08 11:14:56 -0500
commit36bb95ef2b5fdefaa99afbd859889a360e3c7763 (patch)
tree6517ad09aa801f57e73ba7d4101f9fdfa3fe44dd /src/interfaces
parentd1bd26740a62b979e9aacb6507593946a402e39c (diff)
downloadpostgresql-36bb95ef2b5fdefaa99afbd859889a360e3c7763.tar.gz
libpq: reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption handshake.
libpq collects up to a bufferload of data whenever it reads data from the socket. When SSL or GSS encryption is requested during startup, any additional data received with the server's yes-or-no reply remained in the buffer, and would be treated as already-decrypted data once the encryption handshake completed. Thus, a man-in-the-middle with the ability to inject data into the TCP connection could stuff some cleartext data into the start of a supposedly encryption-protected database session. This could probably be abused to inject faked responses to the client's first few queries, although other details of libpq's behavior make that harder than it sounds. A different line of attack is to exfiltrate the client's password, or other sensitive data that might be sent early in the session. That has been shown to be possible with a server vulnerable to CVE-2021-23214. To fix, throw a protocol-violation error if the internal buffer is not empty after the encryption handshake. Our thanks to Jacob Champion for reporting this problem. Security: CVE-2021-23222
Diffstat (limited to 'src/interfaces')
-rw-r--r--src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c26
1 files changed, 26 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
index dfa50ede15..5e505e19bd 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
@@ -2986,6 +2986,19 @@ keep_going: /* We will come back to here until there is
pollres = pqsecure_open_client(conn);
if (pollres == PGRES_POLLING_OK)
{
+ /*
+ * At this point we should have no data already buffered.
+ * If we do, it was received before we performed the SSL
+ * handshake, so it wasn't encrypted and indeed may have
+ * been injected by a man-in-the-middle.
+ */
+ if (conn->inCursor != conn->inEnd)
+ {
+ appendPQExpBufferStr(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("received unencrypted data after SSL response\n"));
+ goto error_return;
+ }
+
/* SSL handshake done, ready to send startup packet */
conn->status = CONNECTION_MADE;
return PGRES_POLLING_WRITING;
@@ -3085,6 +3098,19 @@ keep_going: /* We will come back to here until there is
pollres = pqsecure_open_gss(conn);
if (pollres == PGRES_POLLING_OK)
{
+ /*
+ * At this point we should have no data already buffered.
+ * If we do, it was received before we performed the GSS
+ * handshake, so it wasn't encrypted and indeed may have
+ * been injected by a man-in-the-middle.
+ */
+ if (conn->inCursor != conn->inEnd)
+ {
+ appendPQExpBufferStr(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("received unencrypted data after GSSAPI encryption response\n"));
+ goto error_return;
+ }
+
/* All set for startup packet */
conn->status = CONNECTION_MADE;
return PGRES_POLLING_WRITING;