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authorMichael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>2020-07-22 14:52:36 +0900
committerMichael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>2020-07-22 14:52:36 +0900
commit35e142202b14fa12f8edbd7e58b33c39d3c03c62 (patch)
tree49e9edd541a4d90eef5888b7171aaa497a1817d4 /contrib
parentcc4dd2a7af13b4759cd76074a932c8cf24e32bb2 (diff)
downloadpostgresql-35e142202b14fa12f8edbd7e58b33c39d3c03c62.tar.gz
Fix corner case with PGP decompression in pgcrypto
A compressed stream may end with an empty packet, and PGP decompression finished before reading this empty packet in the remaining stream. This caused a failure in pgcrypto, handling this case as corrupted data. This commit makes sure to consume such extra data, avoiding a failure when decompression the entire stream. This corner case was reproducible with a data length of 16kB, and existed since its introduction in e94dd6a. A cheap regression test is added to cover this case. Thanks to Jeff Janes for the extra investigation. Reported-by: Frank Gagnepain Author: Kyotaro Horiguchi, Michael Paquier Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/16476-692ef7b84e5fb893@postgresql.org Backpatch-through: 9.5
Diffstat (limited to 'contrib')
-rw-r--r--contrib/pgcrypto/expected/pgp-compression.out30
-rw-r--r--contrib/pgcrypto/pgp-compress.c22
-rw-r--r--contrib/pgcrypto/sql/pgp-compression.sql21
3 files changed, 62 insertions, 11 deletions
diff --git a/contrib/pgcrypto/expected/pgp-compression.out b/contrib/pgcrypto/expected/pgp-compression.out
index 32b350b8fe..d4c57feba3 100644
--- a/contrib/pgcrypto/expected/pgp-compression.out
+++ b/contrib/pgcrypto/expected/pgp-compression.out
@@ -48,3 +48,33 @@ select pgp_sym_decrypt(
Secret message
(1 row)
+-- check corner case involving an input string of 16kB, as per bug #16476.
+SELECT setseed(0);
+ setseed
+---------
+
+(1 row)
+
+WITH random_string AS
+(
+ -- This generates a random string of 16366 bytes. This is chosen
+ -- as random so that it does not get compressed, and the decompression
+ -- would work on a string with the same length as the origin, making the
+ -- test behavior more predictible. lpad() ensures that the generated
+ -- hexadecimal value is completed by extra zero characters if random()
+ -- has generated a value strictly lower than 16.
+ SELECT string_agg(decode(lpad(to_hex((random()*256)::int), 2, '0'), 'hex'), '') as bytes
+ FROM generate_series(0, 16365)
+)
+SELECT bytes =
+ pgp_sym_decrypt_bytea(
+ pgp_sym_encrypt_bytea(bytes, 'key',
+ 'compress-algo=1,compress-level=1'),
+ 'key', 'expect-compress-algo=1')
+ AS is_same
+ FROM random_string;
+ is_same
+---------
+ t
+(1 row)
+
diff --git a/contrib/pgcrypto/pgp-compress.c b/contrib/pgcrypto/pgp-compress.c
index 0505bdee92..17f5b2ef93 100644
--- a/contrib/pgcrypto/pgp-compress.c
+++ b/contrib/pgcrypto/pgp-compress.c
@@ -243,6 +243,17 @@ decompress_read(void *priv, PullFilter *src, int len,
struct DecomprData *dec = priv;
restart:
+ if (dec->stream.avail_in == 0)
+ {
+ uint8 *tmp;
+
+ res = pullf_read(src, 8192, &tmp);
+ if (res < 0)
+ return res;
+ dec->stream.next_in = tmp;
+ dec->stream.avail_in = res;
+ }
+
if (dec->buf_data > 0)
{
if (len > dec->buf_data)
@@ -256,17 +267,6 @@ restart:
if (dec->eof)
return 0;
- if (dec->stream.avail_in == 0)
- {
- uint8 *tmp;
-
- res = pullf_read(src, 8192, &tmp);
- if (res < 0)
- return res;
- dec->stream.next_in = tmp;
- dec->stream.avail_in = res;
- }
-
dec->stream.next_out = dec->buf;
dec->stream.avail_out = dec->buf_len;
dec->pos = dec->buf;
diff --git a/contrib/pgcrypto/sql/pgp-compression.sql b/contrib/pgcrypto/sql/pgp-compression.sql
index ca9ee1fc00..87c59c6cab 100644
--- a/contrib/pgcrypto/sql/pgp-compression.sql
+++ b/contrib/pgcrypto/sql/pgp-compression.sql
@@ -28,3 +28,24 @@ select pgp_sym_decrypt(
pgp_sym_encrypt('Secret message', 'key',
'compress-algo=2, compress-level=0'),
'key', 'expect-compress-algo=0');
+
+-- check corner case involving an input string of 16kB, as per bug #16476.
+SELECT setseed(0);
+WITH random_string AS
+(
+ -- This generates a random string of 16366 bytes. This is chosen
+ -- as random so that it does not get compressed, and the decompression
+ -- would work on a string with the same length as the origin, making the
+ -- test behavior more predictible. lpad() ensures that the generated
+ -- hexadecimal value is completed by extra zero characters if random()
+ -- has generated a value strictly lower than 16.
+ SELECT string_agg(decode(lpad(to_hex((random()*256)::int), 2, '0'), 'hex'), '') as bytes
+ FROM generate_series(0, 16365)
+)
+SELECT bytes =
+ pgp_sym_decrypt_bytea(
+ pgp_sym_encrypt_bytea(bytes, 'key',
+ 'compress-algo=1,compress-level=1'),
+ 'key', 'expect-compress-algo=1')
+ AS is_same
+ FROM random_string;