[win32] merge changes#872,873 from maintbranch

p4raw-link: @873 on //depot/maint-5.004/perl: 990f469d529b62458be38e8659885fd26d353629
p4raw-link: @872 on //depot/maint-5.004/perl: 0b85608df162729d39cb0f96c9f88c7de0a3ceab

p4raw-id: //depot/win32/perl@935

1 files changed, 12 insertions, 2 deletions

diff --git a/pod/perlsec.pod b/pod/perlsec.pod
index 73884790b0..3fd903412d 100644
--- a/pod/perlsec.pod
+++ b/pod/perlsec.pod
@@ -36,7 +36,9 @@ L<perllocale>), results of certain system calls (readdir, readlink,
 the gecos field of getpw* calls), and all file input are marked as
 "tainted".  Tainted data may not be used directly or indirectly in any
 command that invokes a sub-shell, nor in any command that modifies
-files, directories, or processes.  Any variable set
+files, directories, or processes. (B<Important exception>: If you pass
+a list of arguments to either C<system> or C<exec>, the elements of
+that list are B<NOT> checked for taintedness.) Any variable set
 to a value derived from tainted data will itself be tainted,
 even if it is logically impossible for the tainted data
 to alter the variable.  Because taintedness is associated with each
@@ -88,7 +90,7 @@ For example:
 If you try to do something insecure, you will get a fatal error saying
 something like "Insecure dependency" or "Insecure PATH".  Note that you
 can still write an insecure B<system> or B<exec>, but only by explicitly
-doing something like the last example above.
+doing something like the "considered secure" example above.
 
 =head2 Laundering and Detecting Tainted Data
 
@@ -173,6 +175,14 @@ guarantee that the executable in question isn't itself going to turn
 around and execute some other program that is dependent on your PATH, it
 makes sure you set the PATH.
 
+The PATH isn't the only environment variable which can cause problems.
+Because some shells may use the variables IFS, CDPATH, ENV, and
+BASH_ENV, Perl checks that those are either empty or untainted when
+starting subprocesses. You may wish to add something like this to your
+setid and taint-checking scripts.
+
+    delete @ENV{qw(IFS CDPATH ENV BASH_ENV)};   # Make %ENV safer
+
 It's also possible to get into trouble with other operations that don't
 care whether they use tainted values.  Make judicious use of the file
 tests in dealing with any user-supplied filenames.  When possible, do