| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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CVE-2021-23840
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
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We test all three cases:
- An SSLv2 only client talking to a TLS capable server
- A TLS capable client talking to an SSLv2 only server
- A TLS capable client talking to a TLS capable server (should fail due
to detecting a rollback attack)
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
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This also fixes the public function RSA_padding_check_SSLv23.
Commit 6555a89 changed the padding check logic in RSA_padding_check_SSLv23
so that padding is rejected if the nul delimiter byte is not immediately
preceded by at least 8 bytes containing 0x03. Prior to that commit the
padding is rejected if it *is* preceded by at least 8 bytes containing 0x03.
Presumably this change was made to be consistent with what it says in
appendix E.3 of RFC 5246. Unfortunately that RFC is in error, and the
original behaviour was correct. This is fixed in later errata issued for
that RFC.
This has no impact on libssl for modern versions of OpenSSL because
there is no protocol support for SSLv2 in these versions. However
applications that call RSA_paddin_check_SSLv23 directly, or use the
RSA_SSLV23_PADDING mode may still be impacted. The effect of the original
error is that an RSA message encrypted by an SSLv2 only client will fail to
be decrypted properly by a TLS capable server, or a message encrypted by a
TLS capable client will fail to decrypt on an SSLv2 only server. Most
significantly an RSA message encrypted by a TLS capable client will be
successfully decrypted by a TLS capable server. This last case should fail
due to a rollback being detected.
Thanks to D. Katz and Joel Luellwitz (both from Trustwave) for reporting
this issue.
CVE-2021-23839
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
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Reduce code copying by factoring out common code into a separate function.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
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Provide a certificate with a bad issuer and check that
X509_issuer_and_serial_hash doesn't crash.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 55869f594f052561b11a2db6a7c42690051868de)
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The OpenSSL public API function X509_issuer_and_serial_hash() attempts
to create a unique hash value based on the issuer and serial number data
contained within an X509 certificate. However it fails to correctly
handle any errors that may occur while parsing the issuer field (which
might occur if the issuer field is maliciously constructed). This may
subsequently result in a NULL pointer deref and a crash leading to a
potential denial of service attack.
The function X509_issuer_and_serial_hash() is never directly called by
OpenSSL itself so applications are only vulnerable if they use this
function directly and they use it on certificates that may have been
obtained from untrusted sources.
CVE-2021-23841
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8130d654d1de922ea224fa18ee3bc7262edc39c0)
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This mostly clarifies details.
Fixes #13789
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13834)
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DCL has a total command line limitation that's too easily broken by
them.
We solve them by creating separate message scripts and using them.
Fixes #13789
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13834)
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This field has not been used since #3858 was merged in 2017 when we
moved to a table-based lookup for certificate type properties instead of
an index-based one.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13991)
(cherry picked from commit 3bc0b621a7baf1a11bc5cad69a287ad093674d68)
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'no-tests' wasn't entirely respected by test/build.info.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14081)
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The options listed in the array @disablables are regular expressions.
For most of them, it's not visible, but there are a few.
However, configdata.pm didn't quite treat them that way, which meant
that the few that are visibly regular expressions, there's a
difference between that and the corresponding the key in %disabled,
which is never a regular expression.
To correctly display the enabled and disabled options with --dump,
we must therefore go through a bit of Perl gymnastics to get the
output correct enough, primarly so that disabled features don't look
enabled.
Fixes #13790
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14081)
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CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14078)
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This folder "../apps/include" is accidentally created.
This prevents this glitch.
Fixes 19b4fe5844b ("Add a CMAC test")
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14051)
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Fixes #13944
+ changed ASN1_UTCTIME to ASN1_TIME
+ removed all Y2K code from do_updatedb
+ changed compare to ASN1_TIME_compare
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14026)
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Fixes #13815
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14029)
(cherry picked from commit af403db090ee66715e81f0062d1ef614e8d921b5)
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This (re-)allows RSA-PSS signers
Fixes #13931
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13982)
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At this point, we have transitioned completely from Travis to GitHub Actions
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13941)
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There are some options that seem to belong to the legacy build.
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13903)
(cherry picked from commit adcaebc3148fe0fde3f7641c4b607f30e1479986)
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Fixes #13910
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13911)
(cherry picked from commit 6857058016e91d3182c2117922dd8001b27f5639)
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SRP_Calc_client_key calls BN_mod_exp with private data. However it was
not setting BN_FLG_CONSTTIME and therefore not using the constant time
implementation. This could be exploited in a side channel attack to
recover the password.
Since the attack is local host only this is outside of the current OpenSSL
threat model and therefore no CVE is assigned.
Thanks to Mohammed Sabt and Daniel De Almeida Braga for reporting this
issue.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13889)
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Also add a new no-deprecated CI build to test it.
Fixes #13896
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13902)
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There were a number of older style references to the pass phrase
options section, now streamlined with the current openssl(1).
Fixes #13883
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13886)
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...in case the candidate issuer cert is identical to the target cert.
Fixes #13739
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13749)
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to invalid cert
This is the backport of #13755 to v1.1.1.
Fixes #13698
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13756)
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Fixes #13840
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13857)
(cherry picked from commit 4369a882a565c42673b28c586a5c46a8bca98d17)
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Pull in check from #10878
Move disabling of pic, threads and statics up higher before they
are checked.
Fixes #12772
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12773)
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when possible using the getauxval equivalent which has similar ids as Linux, instead of bad instructions catch approach.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13650)
(cherry picked from commit 5eb24fbd1c3e0d130ba7f81f1ccf457a2b9d75ad)
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Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13821)
(cherry picked from commit b57ec7394aace731c460b509aa84039274337600)
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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13772)
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Fixes #13183
From the original issue report, before this commit, on master and on
1.1.1, the issue can be detected with the following steps:
- Start with a default SSL_CTX, initiate a TLS 1.3 connection with SNI,
"Accept" count of default context gets incremented
- After servername lookup, "Accept" count of default context gets
decremented and that of SNI context is incremented
- Server sends a "Hello Retry Request"
- Client sends the second "Client Hello", now again "Accept" count of
default context is decremented. Hence giving a negative value.
This commit fixes it by adding a check on `s->hello_retry_request` in
addition to `SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)`, to ensure the counter is moved
only on the first ClientHello.
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13297)
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Our free functions should be able to deal with the case where the object
being freed is NULL. This turns out to not be quite the case for DTLS
related objects.
Fixes #13649
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13655)
(cherry picked from commit d0afb30ef3950cacff50ec539e90073b95a276df)
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I.e.:
error: out of range immediate fixup value
This fix is identical to one of the changes made in 3405db9, which I
discovered right after taking a quick stab at fixing this.
CLA: trivial
Fixes #7878
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13757)
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This backports #13764.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13769)
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Backport of #13394
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13637)
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When X509_ATTRIBUTE_create() receives an invalid NID (e.g., -1), return
failure rather than silently constructing a broken X509_ATTRIBUTE object
that might cause NULL pointer accesses later on. This matters because
X509_ATTRIBUTE_create() is used by API functions like PKCS7_add_attribute(3)
and the NID comes straight from the user.
This bug was found while working on LibreSSL documentation.
Reviewed-by: Theo Buehler <tb@openbsd.org>
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12052)
(cherry picked from commit c4b2c53fadb158bee34aef90d5a7d500aead1f70)
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'check-update' runs a 'make update' to check that it wasn't forgotten.
'check-docs' runs 'make doc-nits'. We have that as a separate job to
make it more prominent.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13701)
(cherry picked from commit 8175476b81c6b54bfa1c8555b35561099b202c4d)
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This is a backport of the documentation from #13620.
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13691)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13686)
(cherry picked from commit 4159ebca3cb3d9586d6709c7a0166a4af5676f91)
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Define B_ENDIAN on PowerPC because it is a big endian architecture. With
this change the BN* related tests pass.
Fixes: #12199
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <sebastian@breakpoint.cc>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12371)
(cherry picked from commit 52c6c12c1cad6f1046b34f4139d1aa3e967a5530)
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If an SNI callback has been set then we may have no certificuates suitable
for TLSv1.3 use configured for the current SSL_CTX. This should not prevent
us from negotiating TLSv1.3, since we may change the SSL_CTX by the time we
need a suitable certificate.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13305)
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A servername cb may change the available certificates, so if we have one
set then we cannot rely on the configured certificates to determine if we
are capable of negotiating TLSv1.3 or not.
Fixes #13291
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13305)
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Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13635)
(cherry picked from commit 7eea331eabe8b0a7ce03c9602a2bc72e9ddfe676)
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CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13632)
(cherry picked from commit 74c8dd1c516c7017477a205fd1f5f975cfa86722)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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