diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'ssl')
| -rw-r--r-- | ssl/d1_both.c | 40 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | ssl/d1_clnt.c | 64 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | ssl/d1_pkt.c | 50 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | ssl/kssl.c | 26 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | ssl/s23_srvr.c | 26 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | ssl/s2_pkt.c | 30 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | ssl/s3_cbc.c | 38 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | ssl/s3_clnt.c | 152 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | ssl/s3_enc.c | 15 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | ssl/s3_pkt.c | 50 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | ssl/s3_srvr.c | 106 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | ssl/ssl_ciph.c | 18 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | ssl/ssl_lib.c | 10 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | ssl/ssl_sess.c | 30 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | ssl/ssl_task.c | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | ssl/ssltest.c | 84 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | ssl/t1_lib.c | 102 |
17 files changed, 423 insertions, 422 deletions
diff --git a/ssl/d1_both.c b/ssl/d1_both.c index 614530a527..c18ec03bd1 100644 --- a/ssl/d1_both.c +++ b/ssl/d1_both.c @@ -569,12 +569,12 @@ static int dtls1_preprocess_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr, static int dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, long max, int *ok) { - /*- - * (0) check whether the desired fragment is available - * if so: - * (1) copy over the fragment to s->init_buf->data[] - * (2) update s->init_num - */ + /*- + * (0) check whether the desired fragment is available + * if so: + * (1) copy over the fragment to s->init_buf->data[] + * (2) update s->init_num + */ pitem *item; hm_fragment *frag; int al; @@ -1289,10 +1289,10 @@ dtls1_retransmit_message(SSL *s, unsigned short seq, unsigned long frag_off, struct dtls1_retransmit_state saved_state; unsigned char save_write_sequence[8]; - /*- - OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num == 0); - OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off == 0); - */ + /*- + OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num == 0); + OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off == 0); + */ /* XDTLS: the requested message ought to be found, otherwise error */ memset(seq64be, 0, sizeof(seq64be)); @@ -1603,16 +1603,16 @@ int dtls1_heartbeat(SSL *s) */ OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381); - /*- - * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number - * as payload to distuingish different messages and add - * some random stuff. - * - Message Type, 1 byte - * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int) - * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint) - * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint) - * - Padding - */ + /*- + * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number + * as payload to distuingish different messages and add + * some random stuff. + * - Message Type, 1 byte + * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int) + * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint) + * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint) + * - Padding + */ buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding); p = buf; /* Message Type */ diff --git a/ssl/d1_clnt.c b/ssl/d1_clnt.c index 57c970cff1..1394781c04 100644 --- a/ssl/d1_clnt.c +++ b/ssl/d1_clnt.c @@ -1094,25 +1094,25 @@ int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) goto err; } - /*- - * 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ - ** in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in: - ** - ** Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length) - ** n = krb5_ap_req.length; - ** memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length); - ** if (krb5_ap_req.data) - ** kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req); - ** - ** Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper - ** (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>) - ** Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced - ** with a 2-byte length followed by the value. - ** Example: - ** KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms - ** Where "xx xx" = length bytes. Shown here with - ** optional authenticator omitted. - */ + /*- + * 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ + ** in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in: + ** + ** Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length) + ** n = krb5_ap_req.length; + ** memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length); + ** if (krb5_ap_req.data) + ** kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req); + ** + ** Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper + ** (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>) + ** Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced + ** with a 2-byte length followed by the value. + ** Example: + ** KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms + ** Where "xx xx" = length bytes. Shown here with + ** optional authenticator omitted. + */ /* KerberosWrapper.Ticket */ s2n(enc_ticket->length, p); @@ -1138,13 +1138,13 @@ int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) if (RAND_bytes(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf) <= 0) goto err; - /*- - * 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed. - * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL); - * EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx, - * kssl_ctx->length); - * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv); - */ + /*- + * 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed. + * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL); + * EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx, + * kssl_ctx->length); + * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv); + */ memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */ EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv); @@ -1498,12 +1498,12 @@ int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, n, 0, n); - /*- - *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE; - l2n3(n,d); - l2n(s->d1->handshake_write_seq,d); - s->d1->handshake_write_seq++; - */ + /*- + *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE; + l2n3(n,d); + l2n(s->d1->handshake_write_seq,d); + s->d1->handshake_write_seq++; + */ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B; /* number of bytes to write */ diff --git a/ssl/d1_pkt.c b/ssl/d1_pkt.c index 246af2d7cf..2abb7ef1d7 100644 --- a/ssl/d1_pkt.c +++ b/ssl/d1_pkt.c @@ -432,12 +432,12 @@ static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s) rr->data = rr->input; enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 0); - /*- - * enc_err is: - * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid. - * 1: if the padding is valid - * -1: if the padding is invalid - */ + /*- + * enc_err is: + * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid. + * 1: if the padding is valid + * -1: if the padding is invalid + */ if (enc_err == 0) { /* For DTLS we simply ignore bad packets. */ rr->length = 0; @@ -540,14 +540,14 @@ static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s) } rr->off = 0; - /*- - * So at this point the following is true - * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record - * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record - * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte - * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment - * after use :-). - */ + /*- + * So at this point the following is true + * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record + * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record + * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte + * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment + * after use :-). + */ /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */ s->packet_length = 0; @@ -820,12 +820,12 @@ int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek) start: s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; - /*- - * s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record - * s->s3->rrec.data, - data - * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read - * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. - */ + /*- + * s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record + * s->s3->rrec.data, - data + * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read + * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. + */ rr = &(s->s3->rrec); /* @@ -1047,11 +1047,11 @@ int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek) } } - /*- - * s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 12 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; - * s->d1->alert_fragment_len == 7 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT. - * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) - */ + /*- + * s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 12 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; + * s->d1->alert_fragment_len == 7 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT. + * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) + */ /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */ if ((!s->server) && diff --git a/ssl/kssl.c b/ssl/kssl.c index c223a5660c..cf585679dc 100644 --- a/ssl/kssl.c +++ b/ssl/kssl.c @@ -1391,20 +1391,20 @@ krb5_error_code kssl_sget_tkt( /* UPDATE */ KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx, } } - /*- Actual Kerberos5 krb5_recvauth() has initial conversation here - * o check KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAUTHVERS - * unless KRB5_RECVAUTH_SKIP_VERSION - * o check KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAPPLVERS - * o send "0" msg if all OK - */ + /*- Actual Kerberos5 krb5_recvauth() has initial conversation here + * o check KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAUTHVERS + * unless KRB5_RECVAUTH_SKIP_VERSION + * o check KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAPPLVERS + * o send "0" msg if all OK + */ - /*- - * 20010411 was using AP_REQ instead of true KerberosWrapper - * - * if ((krb5rc = krb5_rd_req(krb5context, &krb5auth_context, - * &krb5in_data, krb5server, krb5keytab, - * &ap_option, &krb5ticket)) != 0) { Error } - */ + /*- + * 20010411 was using AP_REQ instead of true KerberosWrapper + * + * if ((krb5rc = krb5_rd_req(krb5context, &krb5auth_context, + * &krb5in_data, krb5server, krb5keytab, + * &ap_option, &krb5ticket)) != 0) { Error } + */ p = (unsigned char *)indata->data; if ((asn1ticket = (KRB5_TKTBODY *)d2i_KRB5_TICKET(NULL, &p, diff --git a/ssl/s23_srvr.c b/ssl/s23_srvr.c index 3f8ddb8d02..50f98dced4 100644 --- a/ssl/s23_srvr.c +++ b/ssl/s23_srvr.c @@ -421,19 +421,19 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s) v[0] = p[3]; /* == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR */ v[1] = p[4]; - /*- - * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2 - * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS - * record. It's format is: - * Byte Content - * 0-1 msg_length - * 2 msg_type - * 3-4 version - * 5-6 cipher_spec_length - * 7-8 session_id_length - * 9-10 challenge_length - * ... ... - */ + /*- + * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2 + * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS + * record. It's format is: + * Byte Content + * 0-1 msg_length + * 2 msg_type + * 3-4 version + * 5-6 cipher_spec_length + * 7-8 session_id_length + * 9-10 challenge_length + * ... ... + */ n = ((p[0] & 0x7f) << 8) | p[1]; if (n > (1024 * 4)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE); diff --git a/ssl/s2_pkt.c b/ssl/s2_pkt.c index 341b139b16..614b9a35d2 100644 --- a/ssl/s2_pkt.c +++ b/ssl/s2_pkt.c @@ -535,19 +535,19 @@ static int n_do_ssl_write(SSL *s, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len) s->s2->three_byte_header = 0; p = 0; } else if ((bs <= 1) && (!s->s2->escape)) { - /*- - * j <= SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER, thus - * j < SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER - */ + /*- + * j <= SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER, thus + * j < SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER + */ s->s2->three_byte_header = 0; p = 0; } else { /* we may have to use a 3 byte header */ - /*- - * If s->s2->escape is not set, then - * j <= SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER, and thus - * j < SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER. - */ + /*- + * If s->s2->escape is not set, then + * j <= SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER, and thus + * j < SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER. + */ p = (j % bs); p = (p == 0) ? 0 : (bs - p); if (s->s2->escape) { @@ -559,12 +559,12 @@ static int n_do_ssl_write(SSL *s, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len) } } - /*- - * Now - * j <= SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER - * holds, and if s->s2->three_byte_header is set, then even - * j <= SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER. - */ + /*- + * Now + * j <= SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER + * holds, and if s->s2->three_byte_header is set, then even + * j <= SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER. + */ /* * mac_size is the number of MAC bytes len is the number of data bytes we diff --git a/ssl/s3_cbc.c b/ssl/s3_cbc.c index 887f43e953..598d27edcc 100644 --- a/ssl/s3_cbc.c +++ b/ssl/s3_cbc.c @@ -761,25 +761,25 @@ void tls_fips_digest_extra(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cipher_ctx, if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(cipher_ctx) != EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) return; block_size = EVP_MD_CTX_block_size(mac_ctx); - /*- - * We are in FIPS mode if we get this far so we know we have only SHA* - * digests and TLS to deal with. - * Minimum digest padding length is 17 for SHA384/SHA512 and 9 - * otherwise. - * Additional header is 13 bytes. To get the number of digest blocks - * processed round up the amount of data plus padding to the nearest - * block length. Block length is 128 for SHA384/SHA512 and 64 otherwise. - * So we have: - * blocks = (payload_len + digest_pad + 13 + block_size - 1)/block_size - * equivalently: - * blocks = (payload_len + digest_pad + 12)/block_size + 1 - * HMAC adds a constant overhead. - * We're ultimately only interested in differences so this becomes - * blocks = (payload_len + 29)/128 - * for SHA384/SHA512 and - * blocks = (payload_len + 21)/64 - * otherwise. - */ + /*- + * We are in FIPS mode if we get this far so we know we have only SHA* + * digests and TLS to deal with. + * Minimum digest padding length is 17 for SHA384/SHA512 and 9 + * otherwise. + * Additional header is 13 bytes. To get the number of digest blocks + * processed round up the amount of data plus padding to the nearest + * block length. Block length is 128 for SHA384/SHA512 and 64 otherwise. + * So we have: + * blocks = (payload_len + digest_pad + 13 + block_size - 1)/block_size + * equivalently: + * blocks = (payload_len + digest_pad + 12)/block_size + 1 + * HMAC adds a constant overhead. + * We're ultimately only interested in differences so this becomes + * blocks = (payload_len + 29)/128 + * for SHA384/SHA512 and + * blocks = (payload_len + 21)/64 + * otherwise. + */ digest_pad = block_size == 64 ? 21 : 29; blocks_orig = (orig_len + digest_pad) / block_size; blocks_data = (data_len + digest_pad) / block_size; diff --git a/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/ssl/s3_clnt.c index 65400572d1..0e5acecabb 100644 --- a/ssl/s3_clnt.c +++ b/ssl/s3_clnt.c @@ -674,36 +674,36 @@ int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s) /* Do the message type and length last */ d = p = &(buf[4]); - /*- - * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from - * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version - * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also - * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can - * choke if we initially report a higher version then - * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This - * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it - * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports - * 1.0. - * - * Possible scenario with previous logic: - * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2 - * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0 - * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2. - * 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0. - * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate. - * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now - * know that is maximum server supports. - * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret - * containing version 1.0. - * - * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the - * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely - * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't - * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with - * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using - * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to - * the negotiated version. - */ + /*- + * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from + * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version + * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also + * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can + * choke if we initially report a higher version then + * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This + * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it + * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports + * 1.0. + * + * Possible scenario with previous logic: + * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2 + * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0 + * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2. + * 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0. + * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate. + * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now + * know that is maximum server supports. + * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret + * containing version 1.0. + * + * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the + * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely + * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't + * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with + * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using + * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to + * the negotiated version. + */ #if 0 *(p++) = s->version >> 8; *(p++) = s->version & 0xff; @@ -2361,25 +2361,25 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) goto err; } - /*- - * 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ - * in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in: - * - * Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length) - * n = krb5_ap_req.length; - * memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length); - * if (krb5_ap_req.data) - * kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req); - * - * Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper - * (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>) - * Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced - * with a 2-byte length followed by the value. - * Example: - * KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms - * Where "xx xx" = length bytes. Shown here with - * optional authenticator omitted. - */ + /*- + * 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ + * in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in: + * + * Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length) + * n = krb5_ap_req.length; + * memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length); + * if (krb5_ap_req.data) + * kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req); + * + * Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper + * (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>) + * Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced + * with a 2-byte length followed by the value. + * Example: + * KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms + * Where "xx xx" = length bytes. Shown here with + * optional authenticator omitted. + */ /* KerberosWrapper.Ticket */ s2n(enc_ticket->length, p); @@ -2407,13 +2407,13 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]), sizeof tmp_buf - 2) <= 0) goto err; - /*- - * 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed. - * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL); - * EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx, - * kssl_ctx->length); - * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv); - */ + /*- + * 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed. + * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL); + * EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx, + * kssl_ctx->length); + * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv); + */ memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */ EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv); @@ -2531,26 +2531,26 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) * ecdh_clnt_cert to 1. */ if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) && (s->cert != NULL)) { - /*- - * XXX: For now, we do not support client - * authentication using ECDH certificates. - * To add such support, one needs to add - * code that checks for appropriate - * conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1. - * For example, the cert have an ECC - * key on the same curve as the server's - * and the key should be authorized for - * key agreement. - * - * One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect - * to skip sending the certificate verify - * message. - * - * if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) && - * (s->cert->key->privatekey->type == - * EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...) - * ecdh_clnt_cert = 1; - */ + /*- + * XXX: For now, we do not support client + * authentication using ECDH certificates. + * To add such support, one needs to add + * code that checks for appropriate + * conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1. + * For example, the cert have an ECC + * key on the same curve as the server's + * and the key should be authorized for + * key agreement. + * + * One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect + * to skip sending the certificate verify + * message. + * + * if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) && + * (s->cert->key->privatekey->type == + * EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...) + * ecdh_clnt_cert = 1; + */ } if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL) { diff --git a/ssl/s3_enc.c b/ssl/s3_enc.c index 63b9f0b48a..b4a1456781 100644 --- a/ssl/s3_enc.c +++ b/ssl/s3_enc.c @@ -737,13 +737,14 @@ int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send) * are hashing because that gives an attacker a timing-oracle. */ - /*- - * npad is, at most, 48 bytes and that's with MD5: - * 16 + 48 + 8 (sequence bytes) + 1 + 2 = 75. - * - * With SHA-1 (the largest hash speced for SSLv3) the hash size - * goes up 4, but npad goes down by 8, resulting in a smaller - * total size. */ + /*- + * npad is, at most, 48 bytes and that's with MD5: + * 16 + 48 + 8 (sequence bytes) + 1 + 2 = 75. + * + * With SHA-1 (the largest hash speced for SSLv3) the hash size + * goes up 4, but npad goes down by 8, resulting in a smaller + * total size. + */ unsigned char header[75]; unsigned j = 0; memcpy(header + j, mac_sec, md_size); diff --git a/ssl/s3_pkt.c b/ssl/s3_pkt.c index bee7a7e670..5644dd8f26 100644 --- a/ssl/s3_pkt.c +++ b/ssl/s3_pkt.c @@ -415,12 +415,12 @@ static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) rr->data = rr->input; enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 0); - /*- - * enc_err is: - * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid. - * 1: if the padding is valid - * -1: if the padding is invalid - */ + /*- + * enc_err is: + * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid. + * 1: if the padding is valid + * -1: if the padding is invalid + */ if (enc_err == 0) { al = SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG); @@ -528,14 +528,14 @@ static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) } rr->off = 0; - /*- - * So at this point the following is true - * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record - * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record - * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte - * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment - * after use :-). - */ + /*- + * So at this point the following is true + * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record + * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record + * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte + * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment + * after use :-). + */ /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */ s->packet_length = 0; @@ -1030,12 +1030,12 @@ int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek) start: s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; - /*- - * s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record - * s->s3->rrec.data, - data - * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read - * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. - */ + /*- + * s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record + * s->s3->rrec.data, - data + * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read + * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. + */ rr = &(s->s3->rrec); /* get new packet if necessary */ @@ -1153,11 +1153,11 @@ int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek) } } - /*- - * s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; - * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT. - * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) - */ + /*- + * s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; + * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT. + * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) + */ /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */ if ((!s->server) && diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c index 486362d221..ef3964aa21 100644 --- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c +++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c @@ -1425,17 +1425,17 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) } } - /*- - * we now have the following setup. - * client_random - * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers - * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers - * compression - basically ignored right now - * ssl version is set - sslv3 - * s->session - The ssl session has been setup. - * s->hit - session reuse flag - * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use. - */ + /*- + * we now have the following setup. + * client_random + * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers + * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers + * compression - basically ignored right now + * ssl version is set - sslv3 + * s->session - The ssl session has been setup. + * s->hit - session reuse flag + * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use. + */ /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */ if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) { @@ -1481,22 +1481,22 @@ int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s) memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; - /*- - * There are several cases for the session ID to send - * back in the server hello: - * - For session reuse from the session cache, - * we send back the old session ID. - * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket) - * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID" - * (which doesn't actually identify the session). - * - If it is a new session, we send back the new - * session ID. - * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use, - * we send back a 0-length session ID. - * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse, - * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed - * to send back. - */ + /*- + * There are several cases for the session ID to send + * back in the server hello: + * - For session reuse from the session cache, + * we send back the old session ID. + * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket) + * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID" + * (which doesn't actually identify the session). + * - If it is a new session, we send back the new + * session ID. + * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use, + * we send back a 0-length session ID. + * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse, + * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed + * to send back. + */ if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) && !s->hit) s->session->session_id_length = 0; @@ -2524,11 +2524,11 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) } } - /*- Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here, - * but it caused problems for apache. - * kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx); - * if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL; - */ + /*- Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here, + * but it caused problems for apache. + * kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx); + * if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL; + */ } else #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ @@ -3341,14 +3341,14 @@ int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s) i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p); SSL_SESSION_free(sess); - /*- - * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as - * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length - * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) + - * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) + - * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session - * length) + max_md_size (HMAC). - */ + /*- + * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as + * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length + * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) + + * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) + + * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session + * length) + max_md_size (HMAC). + */ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen)) @@ -3431,12 +3431,12 @@ int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s) { if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) { unsigned char *p; - /*- - * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as - * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) + - * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length) - * + (ocsp response) - */ + /*- + * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as + * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) + + * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length) + * + (ocsp response) + */ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) return -1; @@ -3508,13 +3508,13 @@ int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s) p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; - /*- - * The payload looks like: - * uint8 proto_len; - * uint8 proto[proto_len]; - * uint8 padding_len; - * uint8 padding[padding_len]; - */ + /*- + * The payload looks like: + * uint8 proto_len; + * uint8 proto[proto_len]; + * uint8 padding_len; + * uint8 padding[padding_len]; + */ proto_len = p[0]; if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num) return 0; diff --git a/ssl/ssl_ciph.c b/ssl/ssl_ciph.c index 99cf677961..51a4a04a23 100644 --- a/ssl/ssl_ciph.c +++ b/ssl/ssl_ciph.c @@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ static const SSL_CIPHER cipher_aliases[] = { /* no such ciphersuites supported! */ {0, SSL_TXT_kDHd, 0, SSL_kDHd, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, /* no such ciphersuites supported! */ - {0, SSL_TXT_kDH, 0, SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, / + {0, SSL_TXT_kDH, 0, SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, {0, SSL_TXT_kEDH, 0, SSL_kEDH, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, {0, SSL_TXT_DH, 0, SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd | SSL_kEDH, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, @@ -1856,14 +1856,14 @@ int SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(int id, COMP_METHOD *cm) if (cm == NULL || cm->type == NID_undef) return 1; - /*- - * According to draft-ietf-tls-compression-04.txt, the - * compression number ranges should be the following: - * - * 0 to 63: methods defined by the IETF - * 64 to 192: external party methods assigned by IANA - * 193 to 255: reserved for private use - */ + /*- + * According to draft-ietf-tls-compression-04.txt, the + * compression number ranges should be the following: + * + * 0 to 63: methods defined by the IETF + * 64 to 192: external party methods assigned by IANA + * 193 to 255: reserved for private use + */ if (id < 193 || id > 255) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_COMP_ADD_COMPRESSION_METHOD, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_ID_NOT_WITHIN_PRIVATE_RANGE); diff --git a/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/ssl/ssl_lib.c index e3ce9ba0c3..18ec248f08 100644 --- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c +++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c @@ -1749,12 +1749,12 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth) ret->references = 1; ret->quiet_shutdown = 0; -/* ret->cipher=NULL;*/ +/* ret->cipher=NULL;*/ /*- - ret->s2->challenge=NULL; - ret->master_key=NULL; - ret->key_arg=NULL; - ret->s2->conn_id=NULL; */ + ret->s2->challenge=NULL; + ret->master_key=NULL; + ret->key_arg=NULL; + ret->s2->conn_id=NULL; */ ret->info_callback = NULL; diff --git a/ssl/ssl_sess.c b/ssl/ssl_sess.c index 74c1d1537f..fb4e8c5259 100644 --- a/ssl/ssl_sess.c +++ b/ssl/ssl_sess.c @@ -326,21 +326,21 @@ int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session) return (0); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT - /*- - * If RFC5077 ticket, use empty session ID (as server). - * Note that: - * (a) ssl_get_prev_session() does lookahead into the - * ClientHello extensions to find the session ticket. - * When ssl_get_prev_session() fails, s3_srvr.c calls - * ssl_get_new_session() in ssl3_get_client_hello(). - * At that point, it has not yet parsed the extensions, - * however, because of the lookahead, it already knows - * whether a ticket is expected or not. - * - * (b) s3_clnt.c calls ssl_get_new_session() before parsing - * ServerHello extensions, and before recording the session - * ID received from the server, so this block is a noop. - */ + /*- + * If RFC5077 ticket, use empty session ID (as server). + * Note that: + * (a) ssl_get_prev_session() does lookahead into the + * ClientHello extensions to find the session ticket. + * When ssl_get_prev_session() fails, s3_srvr.c calls + * ssl_get_new_session() in ssl3_get_client_hello(). + * At that point, it has not yet parsed the extensions, + * however, because of the lookahead, it already knows + * whether a ticket is expected or not. + * + * (b) s3_clnt.c calls ssl_get_new_session() before parsing + * ServerHello extensions, and before recording the session + * ID received from the server, so this block is a noop. + */ if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) { ss->session_id_length = 0; goto sess_id_done; diff --git a/ssl/ssl_task.c b/ssl/ssl_task.c index 521885fc50..fb770753e2 100644 --- a/ssl/ssl_task.c +++ b/ssl/ssl_task.c @@ -292,8 +292,8 @@ int doit(io_channel chan, SSL_CTX *s_ctx) if ((s_to_c == NULL) || (c_to_s == NULL)) goto err; /*- original, DRM 24-SEP-1997 - BIO_set_fd ( c_to_s, "", chan ); - BIO_set_fd ( s_to_c, "", chan ); + BIO_set_fd ( c_to_s, "", chan ); + BIO_set_fd ( s_to_c, "", chan ); */ BIO_set_fd(c_to_s, 0, chan); BIO_set_fd(s_to_c, 0, chan); diff --git a/ssl/ssltest.c b/ssl/ssltest.c index 615302ab31..9fa226c626 100644 --- a/ssl/ssltest.c +++ b/ssl/ssltest.c @@ -1170,40 +1170,40 @@ int doit_biopair(SSL *s_ssl, SSL *c_ssl, long count, (void)BIO_set_ssl(s_ssl_bio, s_ssl, BIO_NOCLOSE); do { - /*- - * c_ssl_bio: SSL filter BIO - * - * client: pseudo-I/O for SSL library - * - * client_io: client's SSL communication; usually to be - * relayed over some I/O facility, but in this - * test program, we're the server, too: - * - * server_io: server's SSL communication - * - * server: pseudo-I/O for SSL library - * - * s_ssl_bio: SSL filter BIO - * - * The client and the server each employ a "BIO pair": - * client + client_io, server + server_io. - * BIO pairs are symmetric. A BIO pair behaves similar - * to a non-blocking socketpair (but both endpoints must - * be handled by the same thread). - * [Here we could connect client and server to the ends - * of a single BIO pair, but then this code would be less - * suitable as an example for BIO pairs in general.] - * - * Useful functions for querying the state of BIO pair endpoints: - * - * BIO_ctrl_pending(bio) number of bytes we can read now - * BIO_ctrl_get_read_request(bio) number of bytes needed to fulfil - * other side's read attempt - * BIO_ctrl_get_write_guarantee(bio) number of bytes we can write now - * - * ..._read_request is never more than ..._write_guarantee; - * it depends on the application which one you should use. - */ + /*- + * c_ssl_bio: SSL filter BIO + * + * client: pseudo-I/O for SSL library + * + * client_io: client's SSL communication; usually to be + * relayed over some I/O facility, but in this + * test program, we're the server, too: + * + * server_io: server's SSL communication + * + * server: pseudo-I/O for SSL library + * + * s_ssl_bio: SSL filter BIO + * + * The client and the server each employ a "BIO pair": + * client + client_io, server + server_io. + * BIO pairs are symmetric. A BIO pair behaves similar + * to a non-blocking socketpair (but both endpoints must + * be handled by the same thread). + * [Here we could connect client and server to the ends + * of a single BIO pair, but then this code would be less + * suitable as an example for BIO pairs in general.] + * + * Useful functions for querying the state of BIO pair endpoints: + * + * BIO_ctrl_pending(bio) number of bytes we can read now + * BIO_ctrl_get_read_request(bio) number of bytes needed to fulfil + * other side's read attempt + * BIO_ctrl_get_write_guarantee(bio) number of bytes we can write now + * + * ..._read_request is never more than ..._write_guarantee; + * it depends on the application which one you should use. + */ /* * We have non-blocking behaviour throughout this test program, but @@ -1569,10 +1569,10 @@ int doit(SSL *s_ssl, SSL *c_ssl, long count) printf("server waiting in SSL_accept - %s\n", SSL_state_string_long(s_ssl)); /*- - else if (s_write) - printf("server:SSL_write()\n"); - else - printf("server:SSL_read()\n"); */ + else if (s_write) + printf("server:SSL_write()\n"); + else + printf("server:SSL_read()\n"); */ } if (do_client && debug) { @@ -1580,10 +1580,10 @@ int doit(SSL *s_ssl, SSL *c_ssl, long count) printf("client waiting in SSL_connect - %s\n", SSL_state_string_long(c_ssl)); /*- - else if (c_write) - printf("client:SSL_write()\n"); - else - printf("client:SSL_read()\n"); */ + else if (c_write) + printf("client:SSL_write()\n"); + else + printf("client:SSL_read()\n"); */ } if (!do_client && !do_server) { diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c index 45157fe699..243a70f7a6 100644 --- a/ssl/t1_lib.c +++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c @@ -386,14 +386,14 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned long size_str; long lenmax; - /*- - * check for enough space. - * 4 for the servername type and entension length - * 2 for servernamelist length - * 1 for the hostname type - * 2 for hostname length - * + hostname length - */ + /*- + * check for enough space. + * 4 for the servername type and entension length + * 2 for servernamelist length + * 1 for the hostname type + * 2 for hostname length + * + hostname length + */ if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0 || (size_str = @@ -447,12 +447,12 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, return NULL; } - /*- - * check for enough space. - * 4 for the srp type type and entension length - * 1 for the srp user identity - * + srp user identity length - */ + /*- + * check for enough space. + * 4 for the srp type type and entension length + * 1 for the srp user identity + * + srp user identity length + */ if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL; @@ -622,11 +622,11 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret); s2n(1, ret); - /*- - * Set mode: - * 1: peer may send requests - * 2: peer not allowed to send requests - */ + /*- + * Set mode: + * 1: peer may send requests + * 2: peer not allowed to send requests + */ if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS) *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; else @@ -855,11 +855,11 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret); s2n(1, ret); - /*- - * Set mode: - * 1: peer may send requests - * 2: peer not allowed to send requests - */ + /*- + * Set mode: + * 1: peer may send requests + * 2: peer not allowed to send requests + */ if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS) *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; else @@ -1399,23 +1399,23 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) { - /*- - * We shouldn't accept this extension on a - * renegotiation. - * - * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we - * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on - * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when - * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an - * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing - * anything like that, but this might change). - * - * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake - * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len > - * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen - * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new - * Finished message could have been computed.) - */ + /*- + * We shouldn't accept this extension on a + * renegotiation. + * + * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we + * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on + * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when + * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an + * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing + * anything like that, but this might change). + * + * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake + * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len > + * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen + * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new + * Finished message could have been computed.) + */ s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; } # endif @@ -2676,16 +2676,16 @@ int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s) */ OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381); - /*- - * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number - * as payload to distuingish different messages and add - * some random stuff. - * - Message Type, 1 byte - * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int) - * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint) - * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint) - * - Padding - */ + /*- + * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number + * as payload to distuingish different messages and add + * some random stuff. + * - Message Type, 1 byte + * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int) + * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint) + * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint) + * - Padding + */ buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding); p = buf; /* Message Type */ |