diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c | 16724 |
1 files changed, 8565 insertions, 8159 deletions
diff --git a/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c b/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c index 8f1c547..154d22a 100644 --- a/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c +++ b/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ #include "cert.h" #include "ssl.h" -#include "cryptohi.h" /* for DSAU_ stuff */ +#include "cryptohi.h" /* for DSAU_ stuff */ #include "keyhi.h" #include "secder.h" #include "secitem.h" @@ -19,6 +19,8 @@ #include "sslimpl.h" #include "sslproto.h" #include "sslerr.h" +#include "ssl3ext.h" +#include "ssl3exthandle.h" #include "prtime.h" #include "prinrval.h" #include "prerror.h" @@ -29,59 +31,54 @@ #include "pk11func.h" #include "secmod.h" -#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS #include "blapi.h" -#endif #include <stdio.h> -#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ZLIB +#ifdef NSS_SSL_ENABLE_ZLIB #include "zlib.h" #endif #ifndef PK11_SETATTRS -#define PK11_SETATTRS(x,id,v,l) (x)->type = (id); \ - (x)->pValue=(v); (x)->ulValueLen = (l); +#define PK11_SETATTRS(x, id, v, l) \ + (x)->type = (id); \ + (x)->pValue = (v); \ + (x)->ulValueLen = (l); #endif -static SECStatus ssl3_AuthCertificate(sslSocket *ss); -static void ssl3_CleanupPeerCerts(sslSocket *ss); static PK11SymKey *ssl3_GenerateRSAPMS(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec, - PK11SlotInfo * serverKeySlot); + PK11SlotInfo *serverKeySlot); static SECStatus ssl3_DeriveMasterSecret(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *pms); -static SECStatus ssl3_DeriveConnectionKeysPKCS11(sslSocket *ss); -static SECStatus ssl3_HandshakeFailure( sslSocket *ss); -static SECStatus ssl3_InitState( sslSocket *ss); -static SECStatus ssl3_SendCertificate( sslSocket *ss); -static SECStatus ssl3_SendCertificateStatus( sslSocket *ss); -static SECStatus ssl3_SendEmptyCertificate( sslSocket *ss); +static SECStatus ssl3_DeriveConnectionKeys(sslSocket *ss); +static SECStatus ssl3_HandshakeFailure(sslSocket *ss); +static SECStatus ssl3_SendCertificate(sslSocket *ss); static SECStatus ssl3_SendCertificateRequest(sslSocket *ss); -static SECStatus ssl3_SendNextProto( sslSocket *ss); -static SECStatus ssl3_SendFinished( sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 flags); -static SECStatus ssl3_SendServerHello( sslSocket *ss); -static SECStatus ssl3_SendServerHelloDone( sslSocket *ss); -static SECStatus ssl3_SendServerKeyExchange( sslSocket *ss); -static SECStatus ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes( sslSocket *ss, - const unsigned char *b, - unsigned int l); -static SECStatus ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss, - ssl3CipherSpec *spec, - SSL3Hashes *hashes, - PRUint32 sender); +static SECStatus ssl3_SendNextProto(sslSocket *ss); +static SECStatus ssl3_SendFinished(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 flags); +static SECStatus ssl3_SendServerHelloDone(sslSocket *ss); +static SECStatus ssl3_SendServerKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss); +static SECStatus ssl3_HandleClientHelloPart2(sslSocket *ss, + SECItem *suites, + SECItem *comps, + sslSessionID *sid); +static SECStatus ssl3_HandleServerHelloPart2(sslSocket *ss, + const SECItem *sidBytes, + int *retErrCode); +static SECStatus ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage(sslSocket *ss, + SSL3Opaque *b, + PRUint32 length, + SSL3Hashes *hashesPtr); static SECStatus ssl3_FlushHandshakeMessages(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 flags); static SECStatus Null_Cipher(void *ctx, unsigned char *output, int *outputLen, - int maxOutputLen, const unsigned char *input, - int inputLen); -#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS -static SECStatus ssl3_AESGCMBypass(ssl3KeyMaterial *keys, PRBool doDecrypt, - unsigned char *out, int *outlen, int maxout, - const unsigned char *in, int inlen, - const unsigned char *additionalData, - int additionalDataLen); -#endif + int maxOutputLen, const unsigned char *input, + int inputLen); + +static CK_MECHANISM_TYPE ssl3_GetHashMechanismByHashType(SSLHashType hashType); +static CK_MECHANISM_TYPE ssl3_GetMgfMechanismByHashType(SSLHashType hash); +PRBool ssl_IsRsaPssSignatureScheme(SSLSignatureScheme scheme); #define MAX_SEND_BUF_LENGTH 32000 /* watch for 16-bit integer overflow */ -#define MIN_SEND_BUF_LENGTH 4000 +#define MIN_SEND_BUF_LENGTH 4000 /* This list of SSL3 cipher suites is sorted in descending order of * precedence (desirability). It only includes cipher suites we implement. @@ -91,12 +88,20 @@ static SECStatus ssl3_AESGCMBypass(ssl3KeyMaterial *keys, PRBool doDecrypt, * Important: See bug 946147 before enabling, reordering, or adding any cipher * suites to this list. */ +/* clang-format off */ static ssl3CipherSuiteCfg cipherSuites[ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED] = { /* cipher_suite policy enabled isPresent */ + /* Special TLS 1.3 suites. */ + { TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE }, + { TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE }, + { TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE }, -#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA is out of order to work around * bug 946147. */ @@ -106,14 +111,18 @@ static ssl3CipherSuiteCfg cipherSuites[ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED] = { { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, -#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */ { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,SSL_ALLOWED,PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, @@ -130,7 +139,6 @@ static ssl3CipherSuiteCfg cipherSuites[ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED] = { { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, -#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC { TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, { TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, { TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, @@ -139,10 +147,10 @@ static ssl3CipherSuiteCfg cipherSuites[ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED] = { { TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, { TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, { TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, -#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */ /* RSA */ { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, { TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, @@ -150,7 +158,6 @@ static ssl3CipherSuiteCfg cipherSuites[ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED] = { { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, { TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, { TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, - { SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, { TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, { TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, { TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, @@ -158,57 +165,55 @@ static ssl3CipherSuiteCfg cipherSuites[ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED] = { /* 56-bit DES "domestic" cipher suites */ { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, - { SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, { TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, - /* export ciphersuites with 1024-bit public key exchange keys */ - { TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, - { TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, - - /* export ciphersuites with 512-bit public key exchange keys */ - { TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, - { TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, - /* ciphersuites with no encryption */ -#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, { TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, { TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, -#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */ { TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, { TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, { TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, }; - -static const SSLSignatureAndHashAlg defaultSignatureAlgorithms[] = { - {ssl_hash_sha256, ssl_sign_rsa}, - {ssl_hash_sha384, ssl_sign_rsa}, - {ssl_hash_sha512, ssl_sign_rsa}, - {ssl_hash_sha1, ssl_sign_rsa}, -#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC - {ssl_hash_sha256, ssl_sign_ecdsa}, - {ssl_hash_sha384, ssl_sign_ecdsa}, - {ssl_hash_sha512, ssl_sign_ecdsa}, - {ssl_hash_sha1, ssl_sign_ecdsa}, -#endif - {ssl_hash_sha256, ssl_sign_dsa}, - {ssl_hash_sha1, ssl_sign_dsa} +/* clang-format on */ + +/* This is the default supported set of signature schemes. The order of the + * hashes here is all that is important, since that will (sometimes) determine + * which hash we use. The key pair (i.e., cert) is the primary thing that + * determines what we use and this doesn't affect how we select key pairs. The + * order of signature types is based on the same rules for ordering we use for + * cipher suites just for consistency. + */ +static const SSLSignatureScheme defaultSignatureSchemes[] = { + ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256, + ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384, + ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512, + ssl_sig_ecdsa_sha1, + ssl_sig_rsa_pss_sha256, + ssl_sig_rsa_pss_sha384, + ssl_sig_rsa_pss_sha512, + ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha256, + ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha384, + ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha512, + ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1, + ssl_sig_dsa_sha256, + ssl_sig_dsa_sha384, + ssl_sig_dsa_sha512, + ssl_sig_dsa_sha1 }; -PR_STATIC_ASSERT(PR_ARRAY_SIZE(defaultSignatureAlgorithms) <= - MAX_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS); +PR_STATIC_ASSERT(PR_ARRAY_SIZE(defaultSignatureSchemes) <= + MAX_SIGNATURE_SCHEMES); /* Verify that SSL_ImplementedCiphers and cipherSuites are in consistent order. */ #ifdef DEBUG -void ssl3_CheckCipherSuiteOrderConsistency() +void +ssl3_CheckCipherSuiteOrderConsistency() { unsigned int i; - /* Note that SSL_ImplementedCiphers has more elements than cipherSuites - * because it SSL_ImplementedCiphers includes SSL 2.0 cipher suites. - */ - PORT_Assert(SSL_NumImplementedCiphers >= PR_ARRAY_SIZE(cipherSuites)); + PORT_Assert(SSL_NumImplementedCiphers == PR_ARRAY_SIZE(cipherSuites)); for (i = 0; i < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(cipherSuites); ++i) { PORT_Assert(SSL_ImplementedCiphers[i] == cipherSuites[i].cipher_suite); @@ -220,363 +225,391 @@ void ssl3_CheckCipherSuiteOrderConsistency() * precedence (desirability). It only includes compression methods we * implement. */ -static const /*SSLCompressionMethod*/ PRUint8 compressions [] = { -#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ZLIB +static const SSLCompressionMethod ssl_compression_methods[] = { +#ifdef NSS_SSL_ENABLE_ZLIB ssl_compression_deflate, #endif ssl_compression_null }; -static const int compressionMethodsCount = - sizeof(compressions) / sizeof(compressions[0]); +static const unsigned int ssl_compression_method_count = + PR_ARRAY_SIZE(ssl_compression_methods); /* compressionEnabled returns true iff the compression algorithm is enabled * for the given SSL socket. */ static PRBool -compressionEnabled(sslSocket *ss, SSLCompressionMethod compression) +ssl_CompressionEnabled(sslSocket *ss, SSLCompressionMethod compression) { - switch (compression) { - case ssl_compression_null: - return PR_TRUE; /* Always enabled */ -#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ZLIB - case ssl_compression_deflate: - if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { - return ss->opt.enableDeflate; - } + SSL3ProtocolVersion version; + + if (compression == ssl_compression_null) { + return PR_TRUE; /* Always enabled */ + } + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + /* We can't easily check that the client didn't attempt TLS 1.3, + * so this will have to do. */ + PORT_Assert(ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); + version = ss->version; + } else { + version = ss->vrange.max; + } + if (version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { return PR_FALSE; -#endif - default: - return PR_FALSE; } +#ifdef NSS_SSL_ENABLE_ZLIB + if (compression == ssl_compression_deflate) { + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + return ss->opt.enableDeflate; + } +#endif + return PR_FALSE; } -static const /*SSL3ClientCertificateType */ PRUint8 certificate_types [] = { +static const /*SSL3ClientCertificateType */ PRUint8 certificate_types[] = { ct_RSA_sign, -#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC ct_ECDSA_sign, -#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */ ct_DSS_sign, }; -#define EXPORT_RSA_KEY_LENGTH 64 /* bytes */ - - /* This global item is used only in servers. It is is initialized by ** SSL_ConfigSecureServer(), and is used in ssl3_SendCertificateRequest(). */ CERTDistNames *ssl3_server_ca_list = NULL; static SSL3Statistics ssl3stats; -/* indexed by SSL3BulkCipher */ +/* Record protection algorithms, indexed by SSL3BulkCipher. + * + * The |max_records| field (|mr| below) is set to a number that is higher than + * recommended in some literature (esp. TLS 1.3) because we currently abort the + * connection when this limit is reached and we want to ensure that we only + * rarely hit this limit. See bug 1268745 for details. + */ +#define MR_MAX RECORD_SEQ_MAX /* 2^48-1 */ +#define MR_128 (0x5aULL << 28) /* For AES and similar. */ +#define MR_LOW (1ULL << 20) /* For weak ciphers. */ +/* clang-format off */ static const ssl3BulkCipherDef bulk_cipher_defs[] = { - /* |--------- Lengths --------| */ - /* cipher calg k s type i b t n */ - /* e e v l a o */ - /* y c | o g n */ - /* | r | c | c */ - /* | e | k | e */ - /* | t | | | | */ - {cipher_null, calg_null, 0, 0, type_stream, 0, 0, 0, 0}, - {cipher_rc4, calg_rc4, 16,16, type_stream, 0, 0, 0, 0}, - {cipher_rc4_40, calg_rc4, 16, 5, type_stream, 0, 0, 0, 0}, - {cipher_rc4_56, calg_rc4, 16, 7, type_stream, 0, 0, 0, 0}, - {cipher_rc2, calg_rc2, 16,16, type_block, 8, 8, 0, 0}, - {cipher_rc2_40, calg_rc2, 16, 5, type_block, 8, 8, 0, 0}, - {cipher_des, calg_des, 8, 8, type_block, 8, 8, 0, 0}, - {cipher_3des, calg_3des, 24,24, type_block, 8, 8, 0, 0}, - {cipher_des40, calg_des, 8, 5, type_block, 8, 8, 0, 0}, - {cipher_idea, calg_idea, 16,16, type_block, 8, 8, 0, 0}, - {cipher_aes_128, calg_aes, 16,16, type_block, 16,16, 0, 0}, - {cipher_aes_256, calg_aes, 32,32, type_block, 16,16, 0, 0}, - {cipher_camellia_128, calg_camellia, 16,16, type_block, 16,16, 0, 0}, - {cipher_camellia_256, calg_camellia, 32,32, type_block, 16,16, 0, 0}, - {cipher_seed, calg_seed, 16,16, type_block, 16,16, 0, 0}, - {cipher_aes_128_gcm, calg_aes_gcm, 16,16, type_aead, 4, 0,16, 8}, - {cipher_missing, calg_null, 0, 0, type_stream, 0, 0, 0, 0}, + /* |--------- Lengths ---------| */ + /* cipher calg : s : */ + /* : e b n */ + /* oid short_name mr : l o */ + /* k r o t n */ + /* e e i c a c */ + /* y t type v k g e */ + {cipher_null, calg_null, 0, 0, type_stream, 0, 0, 0, 0, + SEC_OID_NULL_CIPHER, "NULL", MR_MAX}, + {cipher_rc4, calg_rc4, 16,16, type_stream, 0, 0, 0, 0, + SEC_OID_RC4, "RC4", MR_LOW}, + {cipher_des, calg_des, 8, 8, type_block, 8, 8, 0, 0, + SEC_OID_DES_CBC, "DES-CBC", MR_LOW}, + {cipher_3des, calg_3des, 24,24, type_block, 8, 8, 0, 0, + SEC_OID_DES_EDE3_CBC, "3DES-EDE-CBC", MR_LOW}, + {cipher_aes_128, calg_aes, 16,16, type_block, 16,16, 0, 0, + SEC_OID_AES_128_CBC, "AES-128", MR_128}, + {cipher_aes_256, calg_aes, 32,32, type_block, 16,16, 0, 0, + SEC_OID_AES_256_CBC, "AES-256", MR_128}, + {cipher_camellia_128, calg_camellia, 16,16, type_block, 16,16, 0, 0, + SEC_OID_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, "Camellia-128", MR_128}, + {cipher_camellia_256, calg_camellia, 32,32, type_block, 16,16, 0, 0, + SEC_OID_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, "Camellia-256", MR_128}, + {cipher_seed, calg_seed, 16,16, type_block, 16,16, 0, 0, + SEC_OID_SEED_CBC, "SEED-CBC", MR_128}, + {cipher_aes_128_gcm, calg_aes_gcm, 16,16, type_aead, 4, 0,16, 8, + SEC_OID_AES_128_GCM, "AES-128-GCM", MR_128}, + {cipher_aes_256_gcm, calg_aes_gcm, 32,32, type_aead, 4, 0,16, 8, + SEC_OID_AES_256_GCM, "AES-256-GCM", MR_128}, + {cipher_chacha20, calg_chacha20, 32,32, type_aead, 12, 0,16, 0, + SEC_OID_CHACHA20_POLY1305, "ChaCha20-Poly1305", MR_MAX}, + {cipher_missing, calg_null, 0, 0, type_stream, 0, 0, 0, 0, + SEC_OID_UNKNOWN, "missing", 0U}, }; static const ssl3KEADef kea_defs[] = { /* indexed by SSL3KeyExchangeAlgorithm */ - /* kea exchKeyType signKeyType is_limited limit tls_keygen ephemeral */ - {kea_null, kt_null, sign_null, PR_FALSE, 0, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, - {kea_rsa, kt_rsa, sign_rsa, PR_FALSE, 0, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, - {kea_rsa_export, kt_rsa, sign_rsa, PR_TRUE, 512, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, - {kea_rsa_export_1024,kt_rsa, sign_rsa, PR_TRUE, 1024, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, - {kea_dh_dss, kt_dh, sign_dsa, PR_FALSE, 0, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, - {kea_dh_dss_export, kt_dh, sign_dsa, PR_TRUE, 512, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, - {kea_dh_rsa, kt_dh, sign_rsa, PR_FALSE, 0, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, - {kea_dh_rsa_export, kt_dh, sign_rsa, PR_TRUE, 512, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, - {kea_dhe_dss, kt_dh, sign_dsa, PR_FALSE, 0, PR_FALSE, PR_TRUE}, - {kea_dhe_dss_export, kt_dh, sign_dsa, PR_TRUE, 512, PR_FALSE, PR_TRUE}, - {kea_dhe_rsa, kt_dh, sign_rsa, PR_FALSE, 0, PR_FALSE, PR_TRUE}, - {kea_dhe_rsa_export, kt_dh, sign_rsa, PR_TRUE, 512, PR_FALSE, PR_TRUE}, - {kea_dh_anon, kt_dh, sign_null, PR_FALSE, 0, PR_FALSE, PR_TRUE}, - {kea_dh_anon_export, kt_dh, sign_null, PR_TRUE, 512, PR_FALSE, PR_TRUE}, - {kea_rsa_fips, kt_rsa, sign_rsa, PR_FALSE, 0, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, -#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC - {kea_ecdh_ecdsa, kt_ecdh, sign_ecdsa, PR_FALSE, 0, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, - {kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, kt_ecdh, sign_ecdsa, PR_FALSE, 0, PR_FALSE, PR_TRUE}, - {kea_ecdh_rsa, kt_ecdh, sign_rsa, PR_FALSE, 0, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, - {kea_ecdhe_rsa, kt_ecdh, sign_rsa, PR_FALSE, 0, PR_FALSE, PR_TRUE}, - {kea_ecdh_anon, kt_ecdh, sign_null, PR_FALSE, 0, PR_FALSE, PR_TRUE}, -#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */ + /* kea exchKeyType signKeyType authKeyType ephemeral oid */ + {kea_null, ssl_kea_null, nullKey, ssl_auth_null, PR_FALSE, 0}, + {kea_rsa, ssl_kea_rsa, nullKey, ssl_auth_rsa_decrypt, PR_FALSE, SEC_OID_TLS_RSA}, + {kea_dh_dss, ssl_kea_dh, dsaKey, ssl_auth_dsa, PR_FALSE, SEC_OID_TLS_DH_DSS}, + {kea_dh_rsa, ssl_kea_dh, rsaKey, ssl_auth_rsa_sign, PR_FALSE, SEC_OID_TLS_DH_RSA}, + {kea_dhe_dss, ssl_kea_dh, dsaKey, ssl_auth_dsa, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS_DHE_DSS}, + {kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_kea_dh, rsaKey, ssl_auth_rsa_sign, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS_DHE_RSA}, + {kea_dh_anon, ssl_kea_dh, nullKey, ssl_auth_null, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS_DH_ANON}, + {kea_ecdh_ecdsa, ssl_kea_ecdh, nullKey, ssl_auth_ecdh_ecdsa, PR_FALSE, SEC_OID_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA}, + {kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_kea_ecdh, ecKey, ssl_auth_ecdsa, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA}, + {kea_ecdh_rsa, ssl_kea_ecdh, nullKey, ssl_auth_ecdh_rsa, PR_FALSE, SEC_OID_TLS_ECDH_RSA}, + {kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_kea_ecdh, rsaKey, ssl_auth_rsa_sign, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS_ECDHE_RSA}, + {kea_ecdh_anon, ssl_kea_ecdh, nullKey, ssl_auth_null, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS_ECDH_ANON}, + {kea_ecdhe_psk, ssl_kea_ecdh_psk, nullKey, ssl_auth_psk, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS_ECDHE_PSK}, + {kea_dhe_psk, ssl_kea_dh_psk, nullKey, ssl_auth_psk, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS_DHE_PSK}, + {kea_tls13_any, ssl_kea_tls13_any, nullKey, ssl_auth_tls13_any, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS13_KEA_ANY}, }; /* must use ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef to access */ -static const ssl3CipherSuiteDef cipher_suite_defs[] = -{ -/* cipher_suite bulk_cipher_alg mac_alg key_exchange_alg */ - - {TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL, cipher_null, mac_null, kea_null}, - {TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5, cipher_null, mac_md5, kea_rsa}, - {TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, cipher_null, mac_sha, kea_rsa}, - {TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256, cipher_null, hmac_sha256, kea_rsa}, - {TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5,cipher_rc4_40, mac_md5, kea_rsa_export}, - {TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5, cipher_rc4, mac_md5, kea_rsa}, - {TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, mac_sha, kea_rsa}, - {TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5, - cipher_rc2_40, mac_md5, kea_rsa_export}, -#if 0 /* not implemented */ - {TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA, cipher_idea, mac_sha, kea_rsa}, - {TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA, - cipher_des40, mac_sha, kea_rsa_export}, -#endif - {TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, cipher_des, mac_sha, kea_rsa}, - {TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_rsa}, - {TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, cipher_des, mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss}, +static const ssl3CipherSuiteDef cipher_suite_defs[] = +{ +/* cipher_suite bulk_cipher_alg mac_alg key_exchange_alg prf_hash */ +/* Note that the prf_hash_alg is the hash function used by the PRF, see sslimpl.h. */ + + {TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL, cipher_null, mac_null, kea_null, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5, cipher_null, mac_md5, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, cipher_null, mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256, cipher_null, hmac_sha256, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256}, + {TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5, cipher_rc4, mac_md5, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, cipher_des, mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, cipher_des, mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_none}, {TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, - cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss}, - {TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss}, -#if 0 /* not implemented */ - {TLS_DH_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA, - cipher_des40, mac_sha, kea_dh_dss_export}, - {TLS_DH_DSS_DES_CBC_SHA, cipher_des, mac_sha, kea_dh_dss}, - {TLS_DH_DSS_3DES_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_dh_dss}, - {TLS_DH_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA, - cipher_des40, mac_sha, kea_dh_rsa_export}, - {TLS_DH_RSA_DES_CBC_SHA, cipher_des, mac_sha, kea_dh_rsa}, - {TLS_DH_RSA_3DES_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_dh_rsa}, - {TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA, - cipher_des40, mac_sha, kea_dh_dss_export}, - {TLS_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA, - cipher_des40, mac_sha, kea_dh_rsa_export}, -#endif - {TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, cipher_des, mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa}, + cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, cipher_des, mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, {TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, - cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa}, -#if 0 - {SSL_DH_ANON_EXPORT_RC4_40_MD5, cipher_rc4_40, mac_md5, kea_dh_anon_export}, - {TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA, - cipher_des40, mac_sha, kea_dh_anon_export}, - {TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, cipher_des, mac_sha, kea_dh_anon}, - {TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_dh_anon}, -#endif + cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, /* New TLS cipher suites */ - {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_rsa}, - {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_128, hmac_sha256, kea_rsa}, - {TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss}, - {TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa}, - {TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_128, hmac_sha256, kea_dhe_rsa}, - {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_rsa}, - {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_256, hmac_sha256, kea_rsa}, - {TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss}, - {TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa}, - {TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_256, hmac_sha256, kea_dhe_rsa}, -#if 0 - {TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_dh_dss}, - {TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_dh_rsa}, - {TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_dh_anon}, - {TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_dh_dss}, - {TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_dh_rsa}, - {TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_dh_anon}, -#endif - - {TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA, cipher_seed, mac_sha, kea_rsa}, - - {TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_camellia_128, mac_sha, kea_rsa}, + {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_128, hmac_sha256, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256}, + {TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_128, hmac_sha256, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256}, + {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_256, hmac_sha256, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256}, + {TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_256, hmac_sha256, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256}, + {TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, cipher_aes_256_gcm, mac_aead, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha384}, + + {TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA, cipher_seed, mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, + + {TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_camellia_128, mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, {TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, - cipher_camellia_128, mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss}, + cipher_camellia_128, mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_none}, {TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, - cipher_camellia_128, mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa}, - {TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_camellia_256, mac_sha, kea_rsa}, + cipher_camellia_128, mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_camellia_256, mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, {TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, - cipher_camellia_256, mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss}, + cipher_camellia_256, mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_none}, {TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, - cipher_camellia_256, mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa}, - - {TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, - cipher_des, mac_sha,kea_rsa_export_1024}, - {TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA, - cipher_rc4_56, mac_sha,kea_rsa_export_1024}, - - {SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_rsa_fips}, - {SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, cipher_des, mac_sha, kea_rsa_fips}, - - {TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, cipher_aes_128_gcm, mac_aead, kea_dhe_rsa}, - {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, cipher_aes_128_gcm, mac_aead, kea_rsa}, - {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, cipher_aes_128_gcm, mac_aead, kea_ecdhe_rsa}, - {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, cipher_aes_128_gcm, mac_aead, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa}, - - {TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, cipher_aes_128_gcm, mac_aead, kea_dhe_dss}, - {TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_128, hmac_sha256, kea_dhe_dss}, - {TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_256, hmac_sha256, kea_dhe_dss}, - -#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC - {TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, cipher_null, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_ecdsa}, - {TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_ecdsa}, - {TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_ecdsa}, - {TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_ecdsa}, - {TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_ecdsa}, - - {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, cipher_null, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa}, - {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa}, - {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa}, - {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa}, - {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_128, hmac_sha256, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa}, - {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa}, - - {TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, cipher_null, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_rsa}, - {TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_rsa}, - {TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_rsa}, - {TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_rsa}, - {TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_rsa}, - - {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, cipher_null, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_rsa}, - {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_rsa}, - {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_rsa}, - {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_rsa}, - {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_128, hmac_sha256, kea_ecdhe_rsa}, - {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_rsa}, - -#if 0 - {TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA, cipher_null, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_anon}, - {TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_anon}, - {TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_anon}, - {TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_anon}, - {TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_anon}, -#endif -#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */ + cipher_camellia_256, mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, + + {TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, cipher_aes_128_gcm, mac_aead, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256}, + {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, cipher_aes_128_gcm, mac_aead, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256}, + + {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, cipher_aes_128_gcm, mac_aead, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256}, + {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, cipher_aes_128_gcm, mac_aead, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_sha256}, + {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, cipher_aes_256_gcm, mac_aead, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_sha384}, + {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, cipher_aes_256_gcm, mac_aead, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha384}, + {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, cipher_aes_256, hmac_sha384, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_sha384}, + {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, cipher_aes_256, hmac_sha384, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha384}, + {TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, cipher_aes_128_gcm, mac_aead, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_sha256}, + {TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_128, hmac_sha256, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_sha256}, + {TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_256, hmac_sha256, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_sha256}, + {TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, cipher_aes_256_gcm, mac_aead, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_sha384}, + {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, cipher_aes_256_gcm, mac_aead, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_sha384}, + + {TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, cipher_chacha20, mac_aead, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256}, + + {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, cipher_chacha20, mac_aead, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256}, + {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, cipher_chacha20, mac_aead, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_sha256}, + + {TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, cipher_null, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none}, + + {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, cipher_null, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_128, hmac_sha256, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_sha256}, + {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none}, + + {TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, cipher_null, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, + + {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, cipher_null, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, + {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_128, hmac_sha256, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256}, + {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none}, + + {TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, cipher_aes_128_gcm, mac_aead, kea_tls13_any, ssl_hash_sha256}, + {TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, cipher_chacha20, mac_aead, kea_tls13_any, ssl_hash_sha256}, + {TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, cipher_aes_256_gcm, mac_aead, kea_tls13_any, ssl_hash_sha384}, +}; +/* clang-format on */ + +static const CK_MECHANISM_TYPE auth_alg_defs[] = { + CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, /* ssl_auth_null */ + CKM_RSA_PKCS, /* ssl_auth_rsa_decrypt */ + CKM_DSA, /* ? _SHA1 */ /* ssl_auth_dsa */ + CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, /* ssl_auth_kea (unused) */ + CKM_ECDSA, /* ssl_auth_ecdsa */ + CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, /* ssl_auth_ecdh_rsa */ + CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, /* ssl_auth_ecdh_ecdsa */ + CKM_RSA_PKCS, /* ssl_auth_rsa_sign */ + CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS, /* ssl_auth_rsa_pss */ + CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA256, /* ssl_auth_psk (just check for HKDF) */ + CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM /* ssl_auth_tls13_any */ }; +PR_STATIC_ASSERT(PR_ARRAY_SIZE(auth_alg_defs) == ssl_auth_size); static const CK_MECHANISM_TYPE kea_alg_defs[] = { - 0x80000000L, - CKM_RSA_PKCS, - CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, - CKM_KEA_KEY_DERIVE, - CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE + CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, /* ssl_kea_null */ + CKM_RSA_PKCS, /* ssl_kea_rsa */ + CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, /* ssl_kea_dh */ + CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, /* ssl_kea_fortezza (unused) */ + CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, /* ssl_kea_ecdh */ + CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, /* ssl_kea_ecdh_psk */ + CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, /* ssl_kea_dh_psk */ + CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, /* ssl_kea_tls13_any */ }; +PR_STATIC_ASSERT(PR_ARRAY_SIZE(kea_alg_defs) == ssl_kea_size); typedef struct SSLCipher2MechStr { - SSLCipherAlgorithm calg; - CK_MECHANISM_TYPE cmech; + SSLCipherAlgorithm calg; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE cmech; } SSLCipher2Mech; /* indexed by type SSLCipherAlgorithm */ static const SSLCipher2Mech alg2Mech[] = { /* calg, cmech */ - { calg_null , (CK_MECHANISM_TYPE)0x80000000L }, - { calg_rc4 , CKM_RC4 }, - { calg_rc2 , CKM_RC2_CBC }, - { calg_des , CKM_DES_CBC }, - { calg_3des , CKM_DES3_CBC }, - { calg_idea , CKM_IDEA_CBC }, - { calg_fortezza , CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64 }, - { calg_aes , CKM_AES_CBC }, - { calg_camellia , CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC }, - { calg_seed , CKM_SEED_CBC }, - { calg_aes_gcm , CKM_AES_GCM }, -/* { calg_init , (CK_MECHANISM_TYPE)0x7fffffffL } */ + { calg_null, (CK_MECHANISM_TYPE)0x80000000L }, + { calg_rc4, CKM_RC4 }, + { calg_rc2, CKM_RC2_CBC }, + { calg_des, CKM_DES_CBC }, + { calg_3des, CKM_DES3_CBC }, + { calg_idea, CKM_IDEA_CBC }, + { calg_fortezza, CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64 }, + { calg_aes, CKM_AES_CBC }, + { calg_camellia, CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC }, + { calg_seed, CKM_SEED_CBC }, + { calg_aes_gcm, CKM_AES_GCM }, + { calg_chacha20, CKM_NSS_CHACHA20_POLY1305 }, + /* { calg_init , (CK_MECHANISM_TYPE)0x7fffffffL } */ }; -#define mmech_invalid (CK_MECHANISM_TYPE)0x80000000L -#define mmech_md5 CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC -#define mmech_sha CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC +#define mmech_invalid (CK_MECHANISM_TYPE)0x80000000L +#define mmech_md5 CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC +#define mmech_sha CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC #define mmech_md5_hmac CKM_MD5_HMAC #define mmech_sha_hmac CKM_SHA_1_HMAC #define mmech_sha256_hmac CKM_SHA256_HMAC +#define mmech_sha384_hmac CKM_SHA384_HMAC +/* clang-format off */ static const ssl3MACDef mac_defs[] = { /* indexed by SSL3MACAlgorithm */ /* pad_size is only used for SSL 3.0 MAC. See RFC 6101 Sec. 5.2.3.1. */ /* mac mmech pad_size mac_size */ - { mac_null, mmech_invalid, 0, 0 }, - { mac_md5, mmech_md5, 48, MD5_LENGTH }, - { mac_sha, mmech_sha, 40, SHA1_LENGTH}, - {hmac_md5, mmech_md5_hmac, 0, MD5_LENGTH }, - {hmac_sha, mmech_sha_hmac, 0, SHA1_LENGTH}, - {hmac_sha256, mmech_sha256_hmac, 0, SHA256_LENGTH}, - { mac_aead, mmech_invalid, 0, 0 }, -}; - -/* indexed by SSL3BulkCipher */ -const char * const ssl3_cipherName[] = { - "NULL", - "RC4", - "RC4-40", - "RC4-56", - "RC2-CBC", - "RC2-CBC-40", - "DES-CBC", - "3DES-EDE-CBC", - "DES-CBC-40", - "IDEA-CBC", - "AES-128", - "AES-256", - "Camellia-128", - "Camellia-256", - "SEED-CBC", - "AES-128-GCM", - "missing" + { mac_null, mmech_invalid, 0, 0 , 0}, + { mac_md5, mmech_md5, 48, MD5_LENGTH, SEC_OID_HMAC_MD5 }, + { mac_sha, mmech_sha, 40, SHA1_LENGTH, SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA1}, + {hmac_md5, mmech_md5_hmac, 0, MD5_LENGTH, SEC_OID_HMAC_MD5}, + {hmac_sha, mmech_sha_hmac, 0, SHA1_LENGTH, SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA1}, + {hmac_sha256, mmech_sha256_hmac, 0, SHA256_LENGTH, SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA256}, + { mac_aead, mmech_invalid, 0, 0, 0 }, + {hmac_sha384, mmech_sha384_hmac, 0, SHA384_LENGTH, SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA384} }; - -#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC -/* The ECCWrappedKeyInfo structure defines how various pieces of - * information are laid out within wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey - * for ECDH key exchange. Since wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey is - * a 512-byte buffer (see sslimpl.h), the variable length field +/* clang-format on */ + +const PRUint8 tls13_downgrade_random[] = { 0x44, 0x4F, 0x57, 0x4E, + 0x47, 0x52, 0x44, 0x01 }; +const PRUint8 tls12_downgrade_random[] = { 0x44, 0x4F, 0x57, 0x4E, + 0x47, 0x52, 0x44, 0x00 }; +PR_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(tls13_downgrade_random) == + sizeof(tls13_downgrade_random)); + +/* The ECCWrappedKeyInfo structure defines how various pieces of + * information are laid out within wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey + * for ECDH key exchange. Since wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey is + * a 512-byte buffer (see sslimpl.h), the variable length field * in ECCWrappedKeyInfo can be at most (512 - 8) = 504 bytes. * - * XXX For now, NSS only supports named elliptic curves of size 571 bits + * XXX For now, NSS only supports named elliptic curves of size 571 bits * or smaller. The public value will fit within 145 bytes and EC params * will fit within 12 bytes. We'll need to revisit this when NSS * supports arbitrary curves. */ -#define MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN 504 +#define MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN 504 typedef struct ECCWrappedKeyInfoStr { - PRUint16 size; /* EC public key size in bits */ - PRUint16 encodedParamLen; /* length (in bytes) of DER encoded EC params */ - PRUint16 pubValueLen; /* length (in bytes) of EC public value */ - PRUint16 wrappedKeyLen; /* length (in bytes) of the wrapped key */ + PRUint16 size; /* EC public key size in bits */ + PRUint16 encodedParamLen; /* length (in bytes) of DER encoded EC params */ + PRUint16 pubValueLen; /* length (in bytes) of EC public value */ + PRUint16 wrappedKeyLen; /* length (in bytes) of the wrapped key */ PRUint8 var[MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN]; /* this buffer contains the */ /* EC public-key params, the EC public value and the wrapped key */ } ECCWrappedKeyInfo; -#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */ + +CK_MECHANISM_TYPE +ssl3_Alg2Mech(SSLCipherAlgorithm calg) +{ + PORT_Assert(alg2Mech[calg].calg == calg); + return alg2Mech[calg].cmech; +} #if defined(TRACE) static char * ssl3_DecodeHandshakeType(int msgType) { - char * rv; + char *rv; static char line[40]; - switch(msgType) { - case hello_request: rv = "hello_request (0)"; break; - case client_hello: rv = "client_hello (1)"; break; - case server_hello: rv = "server_hello (2)"; break; - case hello_verify_request: rv = "hello_verify_request (3)"; break; - case certificate: rv = "certificate (11)"; break; - case server_key_exchange: rv = "server_key_exchange (12)"; break; - case certificate_request: rv = "certificate_request (13)"; break; - case server_hello_done: rv = "server_hello_done (14)"; break; - case certificate_verify: rv = "certificate_verify (15)"; break; - case client_key_exchange: rv = "client_key_exchange (16)"; break; - case finished: rv = "finished (20)"; break; - default: - sprintf(line, "*UNKNOWN* handshake type! (%d)", msgType); - rv = line; + switch (msgType) { + case hello_request: + rv = "hello_request (0)"; + break; + case client_hello: + rv = "client_hello (1)"; + break; + case server_hello: + rv = "server_hello (2)"; + break; + case hello_verify_request: + rv = "hello_verify_request (3)"; + break; + case new_session_ticket: + rv = "session_ticket (4)"; + break; + case hello_retry_request: + rv = "hello_retry_request (6)"; + break; + case encrypted_extensions: + rv = "encrypted_extensions (8)"; + break; + case certificate: + rv = "certificate (11)"; + break; + case server_key_exchange: + rv = "server_key_exchange (12)"; + break; + case certificate_request: + rv = "certificate_request (13)"; + break; + case server_hello_done: + rv = "server_hello_done (14)"; + break; + case certificate_verify: + rv = "certificate_verify (15)"; + break; + case client_key_exchange: + rv = "client_key_exchange (16)"; + break; + case finished: + rv = "finished (20)"; + break; + default: + sprintf(line, "*UNKNOWN* handshake type! (%d)", msgType); + rv = line; } return rv; } @@ -584,26 +617,32 @@ ssl3_DecodeHandshakeType(int msgType) static char * ssl3_DecodeContentType(int msgType) { - char * rv; + char *rv; static char line[40]; - switch(msgType) { - case content_change_cipher_spec: - rv = "change_cipher_spec (20)"; break; - case content_alert: rv = "alert (21)"; break; - case content_handshake: rv = "handshake (22)"; break; - case content_application_data: - rv = "application_data (23)"; break; - default: - sprintf(line, "*UNKNOWN* record type! (%d)", msgType); - rv = line; + switch (msgType) { + case content_change_cipher_spec: + rv = "change_cipher_spec (20)"; + break; + case content_alert: + rv = "alert (21)"; + break; + case content_handshake: + rv = "handshake (22)"; + break; + case content_application_data: + rv = "application_data (23)"; + break; + default: + sprintf(line, "*UNKNOWN* record type! (%d)", msgType); + rv = line; } return rv; } #endif -SSL3Statistics * +SSL3Statistics * SSL_GetStatistics(void) { return &ssl3stats; @@ -619,14 +658,15 @@ typedef struct tooLongStr { #endif } tooLong; -void SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(long * x) +void +SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(long *x) { if ((sizeof *x) == sizeof(PRInt32)) { PR_ATOMIC_INCREMENT((PRInt32 *)x); } else { - tooLong * tl = (tooLong *)x; - if (PR_ATOMIC_INCREMENT(&tl->low) == 0) - PR_ATOMIC_INCREMENT(&tl->high); + tooLong *tl = (tooLong *)x; + if (PR_ATOMIC_INCREMENT(&tl->low) == 0) + PR_ATOMIC_INCREMENT(&tl->high); } } @@ -636,84 +676,82 @@ ssl3_CipherSuiteAllowedForVersionRange( const SSLVersionRange *vrange) { switch (cipherSuite) { - /* See RFC 4346 A.5. Export cipher suites must not be used in TLS 1.1 or - * later. This set of cipher suites is similar to, but different from, the - * set of cipher suites considered exportable by SSL_IsExportCipherSuite. - */ - case TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5: - case TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5: - /* TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA: never implemented - * TLS_DH_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA: never implemented - * TLS_DH_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA: never implemented - * TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA: never implemented - * TLS_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA: never implemented - * TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5: never implemented - * TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA: never implemented - */ - return vrange->min <= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0; - - case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256: - case TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256: - case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256: - case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256: - case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256: - case TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256: - case TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: - case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256: - case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256: - case TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256: - return vrange->max == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2; - - case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: - case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: - case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: - case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: - return vrange->max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2; - - /* RFC 4492: ECC cipher suites need TLS extensions to negotiate curves and - * point formats.*/ - case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA: - case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA: - case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA: - case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA: - case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA: - case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA: - case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA: - case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA: - case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA: - case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA: - case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA: - case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA: - case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA: - case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA: - case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA: - case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA: - case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA: - case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA: - case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA: - case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA: - return vrange->max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0 && - vrange->min < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3; - - default: - return vrange->min < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3; + case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256: + case TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256: + case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256: + case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384: + case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256: + case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384: + case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256: + case TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256: + case TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: + case TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384: + case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256: + case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256: + case TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256: + case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: + case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384: + case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: + case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384: + case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: + case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384: + case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: + case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384: + case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256: + case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256: + case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256: + return vrange->max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2 && + vrange->min < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3; + + /* RFC 4492: ECC cipher suites need TLS extensions to negotiate curves and + * point formats.*/ + case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA: + case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA: + case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA: + case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA: + case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA: + case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA: + case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA: + case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA: + case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA: + case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA: + case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA: + case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA: + case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA: + case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA: + case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA: + case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA: + case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA: + case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA: + case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA: + case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA: + return vrange->max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0 && + vrange->min < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3; + + case TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: + case TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384: + case TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256: + return vrange->max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3; + + default: + return vrange->min < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3; } } /* return pointer to ssl3CipherSuiteDef for suite, or NULL */ /* XXX This does a linear search. A binary search would be better. */ -static const ssl3CipherSuiteDef * +const ssl3CipherSuiteDef * ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(ssl3CipherSuite suite) { int cipher_suite_def_len = - sizeof(cipher_suite_defs) / sizeof(cipher_suite_defs[0]); + sizeof(cipher_suite_defs) / sizeof(cipher_suite_defs[0]); int i; for (i = 0; i < cipher_suite_def_len; i++) { - if (cipher_suite_defs[i].cipher_suite == suite) - return &cipher_suite_defs[i]; + if (cipher_suite_defs[i].cipher_suite == suite) + return &cipher_suite_defs[i]; } - PORT_Assert(PR_FALSE); /* We should never get here. */ + PORT_Assert(PR_FALSE); /* We should never get here. */ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_SUITE); return NULL; } @@ -721,19 +759,141 @@ ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(ssl3CipherSuite suite) /* Find the cipher configuration struct associate with suite */ /* XXX This does a linear search. A binary search would be better. */ static ssl3CipherSuiteCfg * -ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(ssl3CipherSuite suite, ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suites) +ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfgMutable(ssl3CipherSuite suite, + ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suites) { int i; for (i = 0; i < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; i++) { - if (suites[i].cipher_suite == suite) - return &suites[i]; + if (suites[i].cipher_suite == suite) + return &suites[i]; } /* return NULL and let the caller handle it. */ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_SUITE); return NULL; } +const static ssl3CipherSuiteCfg * +ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(ssl3CipherSuite suite, const ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suites) +{ + return ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfgMutable(suite, + CONST_CAST(ssl3CipherSuiteCfg, suites)); +} + +static PRBool +ssl_NamedGroupTypeEnabled(const sslSocket *ss, SSLKEAType keaType) +{ + unsigned int i; + for (i = 0; i < SSL_NAMED_GROUP_COUNT; ++i) { + if (ss->namedGroupPreferences[i] && + ss->namedGroupPreferences[i]->keaType == keaType) { + return PR_TRUE; + } + } + return PR_FALSE; +} + +static PRBool +ssl_KEAEnabled(const sslSocket *ss, SSLKEAType keaType) +{ + switch (keaType) { + case ssl_kea_rsa: + return PR_TRUE; + + case ssl_kea_dh: + case ssl_kea_dh_psk: { + if (ss->sec.isServer && !ss->opt.enableServerDhe) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + /* If the server requires named FFDHE groups, then the client + * must have included an FFDHE group. peerSupportsFfdheGroups + * is set to true in ssl_HandleSupportedGroupsXtn(). */ + if (ss->opt.requireDHENamedGroups && + !ss->xtnData.peerSupportsFfdheGroups) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + + /* We can use the weak DH group if all of these are true: + * 1. We don't require named groups. + * 2. The peer doesn't support named groups. + * 3. This isn't TLS 1.3. + * 4. The weak group is enabled. */ + if (!ss->opt.requireDHENamedGroups && + !ss->xtnData.peerSupportsFfdheGroups && + ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 && + ss->ssl3.dheWeakGroupEnabled) { + return PR_TRUE; + } + } else { + if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 && + !ss->opt.requireDHENamedGroups) { + /* The client enables DHE cipher suites even if no DHE groups + * are enabled. Only if this isn't TLS 1.3 and named groups + * are not required. */ + return PR_TRUE; + } + } + return ssl_NamedGroupTypeEnabled(ss, ssl_kea_dh); + } + + case ssl_kea_ecdh: + case ssl_kea_ecdh_psk: + return ssl_NamedGroupTypeEnabled(ss, ssl_kea_ecdh); + + case ssl_kea_tls13_any: + return PR_TRUE; + + case ssl_kea_fortezza: + default: + PORT_Assert(0); + } + return PR_FALSE; +} + +static PRBool +ssl_HasCert(const sslSocket *ss, SSLAuthType authType) +{ + PRCList *cursor; + if (authType == ssl_auth_null || authType == ssl_auth_psk || authType == ssl_auth_tls13_any) { + return PR_TRUE; + } + for (cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->serverCerts); + cursor != &ss->serverCerts; + cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(cursor)) { + sslServerCert *cert = (sslServerCert *)cursor; + if (cert->certType.authType != authType) { + continue; + } + if (!cert->serverKeyPair || + !cert->serverKeyPair->privKey || + !cert->serverCertChain) { + continue; + } + /* When called from ssl3_config_match_init(), all the EC curves will be + * enabled, so this will essentially do nothing (unless we implement + * curve configuration). However, once we have seen the + * supported_groups extension and this is called from config_match(), + * this will filter out certificates with an unsupported curve. */ + if ((authType == ssl_auth_ecdsa || + authType == ssl_auth_ecdh_ecdsa || + authType == ssl_auth_ecdh_rsa) && + !ssl_NamedGroupEnabled(ss, cert->certType.namedCurve)) { + continue; + } + return PR_TRUE; + } + return PR_FALSE; +} + +const ssl3BulkCipherDef * +ssl_GetBulkCipherDef(const ssl3CipherSuiteDef *cipher_def) +{ + PORT_Assert(cipher_def->bulk_cipher_alg < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(bulk_cipher_defs)); + PORT_Assert(bulk_cipher_defs[cipher_def->bulk_cipher_alg].cipher == cipher_def->bulk_cipher_alg); + return &bulk_cipher_defs[cipher_def->bulk_cipher_alg]; +} /* Initialize the suite->isPresent value for config_match * Returns count of enabled ciphers supported by extant tokens, @@ -743,148 +903,130 @@ ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(ssl3CipherSuite suite, ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suites) int ssl3_config_match_init(sslSocket *ss) { - ssl3CipherSuiteCfg * suite; + ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite; const ssl3CipherSuiteDef *cipher_def; - SSLCipherAlgorithm cipher_alg; - CK_MECHANISM_TYPE cipher_mech; - SSL3KEAType exchKeyType; - int i; - int numPresent = 0; - int numEnabled = 0; - PRBool isServer; - sslServerCerts *svrAuth; + SSLCipherAlgorithm cipher_alg; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE cipher_mech; + SSLAuthType authType; + SSLKEAType keaType; + int i; + int numPresent = 0; + int numEnabled = 0; PORT_Assert(ss); if (!ss) { - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); - return 0; + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return 0; } - if (SSL3_ALL_VERSIONS_DISABLED(&ss->vrange)) { - return 0; + if (SSL_ALL_VERSIONS_DISABLED(&ss->vrange)) { + return 0; } - isServer = (PRBool)(ss->sec.isServer != 0); for (i = 0; i < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; i++) { - suite = &ss->cipherSuites[i]; - if (suite->enabled) { - ++numEnabled; - /* We need the cipher defs to see if we have a token that can handle - * this cipher. It isn't part of the static definition. - */ - cipher_def = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(suite->cipher_suite); - if (!cipher_def) { - suite->isPresent = PR_FALSE; - continue; - } - cipher_alg = bulk_cipher_defs[cipher_def->bulk_cipher_alg].calg; - PORT_Assert( alg2Mech[cipher_alg].calg == cipher_alg); - cipher_mech = alg2Mech[cipher_alg].cmech; - exchKeyType = - kea_defs[cipher_def->key_exchange_alg].exchKeyType; -#ifdef NSS_DISABLE_ECC - svrAuth = ss->serverCerts + exchKeyType; -#else - /* XXX SSLKEAType isn't really a good choice for - * indexing certificates. It doesn't work for - * (EC)DHE-* ciphers. Here we use a hack to ensure - * that the server uses an RSA cert for (EC)DHE-RSA. - */ - switch (cipher_def->key_exchange_alg) { - case kea_dhe_dss: - svrAuth = ss->serverCerts + ssl_kea_dh; - break; - case kea_ecdhe_rsa: - case kea_dhe_rsa: - svrAuth = ss->serverCerts + kt_rsa; - break; - case kea_ecdh_ecdsa: - case kea_ecdh_rsa: - /* - * XXX We ought to have different indices for - * ECDSA- and RSA-signed EC certificates so - * we could support both key exchange mechanisms - * simultaneously. For now, both of them use - * whatever is in the certificate slot for kt_ecdh - */ - case kea_dhe_dss_export: - case kea_dhe_rsa_export: - default: - svrAuth = ss->serverCerts + exchKeyType; - break; - } -#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */ - - /* Mark the suites that are backed by real tokens, certs and keys */ - suite->isPresent = (PRBool) - (((exchKeyType == kt_null) || - ((!isServer || (svrAuth->serverKeyPair && - svrAuth->SERVERKEY && - svrAuth->serverCertChain)) && - PK11_TokenExists(kea_alg_defs[exchKeyType]))) && - ((cipher_alg == calg_null) || PK11_TokenExists(cipher_mech))); - if (suite->isPresent) - ++numPresent; - } + suite = &ss->cipherSuites[i]; + if (suite->enabled) { + ++numEnabled; + /* We need the cipher defs to see if we have a token that can handle + * this cipher. It isn't part of the static definition. + */ + cipher_def = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(suite->cipher_suite); + if (!cipher_def) { + suite->isPresent = PR_FALSE; + continue; + } + cipher_alg = ssl_GetBulkCipherDef(cipher_def)->calg; + cipher_mech = ssl3_Alg2Mech(cipher_alg); + + /* Mark the suites that are backed by real tokens, certs and keys */ + suite->isPresent = PR_TRUE; + + authType = kea_defs[cipher_def->key_exchange_alg].authKeyType; + if (authType != ssl_auth_null && authType != ssl_auth_tls13_any) { + if (ss->sec.isServer && !ssl_HasCert(ss, authType)) { + suite->isPresent = PR_FALSE; + } + if (!PK11_TokenExists(auth_alg_defs[authType])) { + suite->isPresent = PR_FALSE; + } + } + + keaType = kea_defs[cipher_def->key_exchange_alg].exchKeyType; + if (keaType != ssl_kea_null && + keaType != ssl_kea_tls13_any && + !PK11_TokenExists(kea_alg_defs[keaType])) { + suite->isPresent = PR_FALSE; + } + + if (cipher_alg != calg_null && + !PK11_TokenExists(cipher_mech)) { + suite->isPresent = PR_FALSE; + } + + if (suite->isPresent) { + ++numPresent; + } + } } PORT_Assert(numPresent > 0 || numEnabled == 0); if (numPresent <= 0) { - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CIPHERS_SUPPORTED); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CIPHERS_SUPPORTED); } return numPresent; } - -/* return PR_TRUE if suite matches policy, enabled state and is applicable to - * the given version range. */ -/* It would be a REALLY BAD THING (tm) if we ever permitted the use -** of a cipher that was NOT_ALLOWED. So, if this is ever called with -** policy == SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, report no match. -*/ -/* adjust suite enabled to the availability of a token that can do the - * cipher suite. */ +/* Return PR_TRUE if suite is usable. This if the suite is permitted by policy, + * enabled, has a certificate (as needed), has a viable key agreement method, is + * usable with the negotiated TLS version, and is otherwise usable. */ static PRBool -config_match(ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite, int policy, PRBool enabled, - const SSLVersionRange *vrange, const sslSocket *ss) +config_match(const ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite, int policy, + const SSLVersionRange *vrange, const sslSocket *ss) { const ssl3CipherSuiteDef *cipher_def; + const ssl3KEADef *kea_def; + + PORT_Assert(policy != SSL_NOT_ALLOWED); + if (policy == SSL_NOT_ALLOWED) + return PR_FALSE; - PORT_Assert(policy != SSL_NOT_ALLOWED && enabled != PR_FALSE); - if (policy == SSL_NOT_ALLOWED || !enabled) - return PR_FALSE; + if (!suite->enabled || !suite->isPresent) + return PR_FALSE; + if ((suite->policy == SSL_NOT_ALLOWED) || + (suite->policy > policy)) + return PR_FALSE; + + PORT_Assert(ss != NULL); cipher_def = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(suite->cipher_suite); PORT_Assert(cipher_def != NULL); + kea_def = &kea_defs[cipher_def->key_exchange_alg]; + PORT_Assert(kea_def != NULL); + if (!ssl_KEAEnabled(ss, kea_def->exchKeyType)) { + return PR_FALSE; + } - PORT_Assert(ss != NULL); - if (ss->sec.isServer && !ss->opt.enableServerDhe && - kea_defs[cipher_def->key_exchange_alg].exchKeyType == ssl_kea_dh) - return PR_FALSE; + if (ss->sec.isServer && !ssl_HasCert(ss, kea_def->authKeyType)) { + return PR_FALSE; + } - return (PRBool)(suite->enabled && - suite->isPresent && - suite->policy != SSL_NOT_ALLOWED && - suite->policy <= policy && - ssl3_CipherSuiteAllowedForVersionRange( - suite->cipher_suite, vrange)); + return ssl3_CipherSuiteAllowedForVersionRange(suite->cipher_suite, vrange); } -/* return number of cipher suites that match policy, enabled state and are - * applicable for the configured protocol version range. */ -/* called from ssl3_SendClientHello and ssl3_ConstructV2CipherSpecsHack */ +/* Return the number of cipher suites that are usable. */ +/* called from ssl3_SendClientHello */ static int -count_cipher_suites(sslSocket *ss, int policy, PRBool enabled) +count_cipher_suites(sslSocket *ss, int policy) { int i, count = 0; - if (SSL3_ALL_VERSIONS_DISABLED(&ss->vrange)) { - return 0; + if (SSL_ALL_VERSIONS_DISABLED(&ss->vrange)) { + return 0; } for (i = 0; i < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; i++) { - if (config_match(&ss->cipherSuites[i], policy, enabled, &ss->vrange, ss)) - count++; + if (config_match(&ss->cipherSuites[i], policy, &ss->vrange, ss)) + count++; } if (count <= 0) { - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SSL_DISABLED); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SSL_DISABLED); } return count; } @@ -892,19 +1034,18 @@ count_cipher_suites(sslSocket *ss, int policy, PRBool enabled) /* * Null compression, mac and encryption functions */ - static SECStatus Null_Cipher(void *ctx, unsigned char *output, int *outputLen, int maxOutputLen, - const unsigned char *input, int inputLen) + const unsigned char *input, int inputLen) { if (inputLen > maxOutputLen) { - *outputLen = 0; /* Match PK11_CipherOp in setting outputLen */ + *outputLen = 0; /* Match PK11_CipherOp in setting outputLen */ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_OUTPUT_LEN); return SECFailure; } *outputLen = inputLen; if (input != output) - PORT_Memcpy(output, input, inputLen); + PORT_Memcpy(output, input, inputLen); return SECSuccess; } @@ -921,17 +1062,17 @@ Null_Cipher(void *ctx, unsigned char *output, int *outputLen, int maxOutputLen, */ SECStatus ssl3_NegotiateVersion(sslSocket *ss, SSL3ProtocolVersion peerVersion, - PRBool allowLargerPeerVersion) + PRBool allowLargerPeerVersion) { - if (SSL3_ALL_VERSIONS_DISABLED(&ss->vrange)) { - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SSL_DISABLED); - return SECFailure; + if (SSL_ALL_VERSIONS_DISABLED(&ss->vrange)) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SSL_DISABLED); + return SECFailure; } if (peerVersion < ss->vrange.min || - (peerVersion > ss->vrange.max && !allowLargerPeerVersion)) { - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION); - return SECFailure; + (peerVersion > ss->vrange.max && !allowLargerPeerVersion)) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION); + return SECFailure; } ss->version = PR_MIN(peerVersion, ss->vrange.max); @@ -940,469 +1081,473 @@ ssl3_NegotiateVersion(sslSocket *ss, SSL3ProtocolVersion peerVersion, return SECSuccess; } +/* Used by the client when the server produces a version number. + * This reads, validates, and normalizes the value. */ +SECStatus +ssl_ClientReadVersion(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque **b, unsigned int *len, + SSL3ProtocolVersion *version) +{ + SSL3ProtocolVersion v; + PRInt32 temp; + + temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, b, len); + if (temp < 0) { + return SECFailure; /* alert has been sent */ + } + +#ifdef TLS_1_3_DRAFT_VERSION + if (temp == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, protocol_version); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION); + return SECFailure; + } + if (temp == tls13_EncodeDraftVersion(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3)) { + v = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3; + } else { + v = (SSL3ProtocolVersion)temp; + } +#else + v = (SSL3ProtocolVersion)temp; +#endif + + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + /* If this fails, we get 0 back and the next check to fails. */ + v = dtls_DTLSVersionToTLSVersion(v); + } + + PORT_Assert(!SSL_ALL_VERSIONS_DISABLED(&ss->vrange)); + if (ss->vrange.min > v || ss->vrange.max < v) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, + (v > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) ? protocol_version + : handshake_failure); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION); + return SECFailure; + } + *version = v; + return SECSuccess; +} + static SECStatus ssl3_GetNewRandom(SSL3Random *random) { SECStatus rv; - /* first 4 bytes are reserverd for time */ rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(random->rand, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_GENERATE_RANDOM_FAILURE); + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_GENERATE_RANDOM_FAILURE); } return rv; } /* Called by ssl3_SendServerKeyExchange and ssl3_SendCertificateVerify */ SECStatus -ssl3_SignHashes(SSL3Hashes *hash, SECKEYPrivateKey *key, SECItem *buf, - PRBool isTLS) -{ - SECStatus rv = SECFailure; - PRBool doDerEncode = PR_FALSE; - int signatureLen; - SECItem hashItem; - - buf->data = NULL; - - switch (key->keyType) { - case rsaKey: - hashItem.data = hash->u.raw; - hashItem.len = hash->len; - break; - case dsaKey: - doDerEncode = isTLS; - /* ssl_hash_none is used to specify the MD5/SHA1 concatenated hash. - * In that case, we use just the SHA1 part. */ - if (hash->hashAlg == ssl_hash_none) { - hashItem.data = hash->u.s.sha; - hashItem.len = sizeof(hash->u.s.sha); - } else { - hashItem.data = hash->u.raw; - hashItem.len = hash->len; - } - break; -#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC - case ecKey: - doDerEncode = PR_TRUE; - /* ssl_hash_none is used to specify the MD5/SHA1 concatenated hash. - * In that case, we use just the SHA1 part. */ - if (hash->hashAlg == ssl_hash_none) { - hashItem.data = hash->u.s.sha; - hashItem.len = sizeof(hash->u.s.sha); - } else { - hashItem.data = hash->u.raw; - hashItem.len = hash->len; - } - break; -#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */ - default: - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY); - goto done; +ssl3_SignHashes(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Hashes *hash, SECKEYPrivateKey *key, + SECItem *buf) +{ + SECStatus rv = SECFailure; + PRBool doDerEncode = PR_FALSE; + PRBool isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + PRBool useRsaPss = ssl_IsRsaPssSignatureScheme(ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme); + SECItem hashItem; + + buf->data = NULL; + + switch (SECKEY_GetPrivateKeyType(key)) { + case rsaKey: + hashItem.data = hash->u.raw; + hashItem.len = hash->len; + break; + case dsaKey: + doDerEncode = isTLS; + /* ssl_hash_none is used to specify the MD5/SHA1 concatenated hash. + * In that case, we use just the SHA1 part. */ + if (hash->hashAlg == ssl_hash_none) { + hashItem.data = hash->u.s.sha; + hashItem.len = sizeof(hash->u.s.sha); + } else { + hashItem.data = hash->u.raw; + hashItem.len = hash->len; + } + break; + case ecKey: + doDerEncode = PR_TRUE; + /* ssl_hash_none is used to specify the MD5/SHA1 concatenated hash. + * In that case, we use just the SHA1 part. */ + if (hash->hashAlg == ssl_hash_none) { + hashItem.data = hash->u.s.sha; + hashItem.len = sizeof(hash->u.s.sha); + } else { + hashItem.data = hash->u.raw; + hashItem.len = hash->len; + } + break; + default: + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY); + goto done; } PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "hash(es) to be signed", hashItem.data, hashItem.len)); - if (hash->hashAlg == ssl_hash_none) { - signatureLen = PK11_SignatureLen(key); - if (signatureLen <= 0) { - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY); - goto done; - } + if (useRsaPss || hash->hashAlg == ssl_hash_none) { + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech = PK11_MapSignKeyType(key->keyType); + int signatureLen = PK11_SignatureLen(key); + + SECItem *params = NULL; + CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS pssParams; + SECItem pssParamsItem = { siBuffer, + (unsigned char *)&pssParams, + sizeof(pssParams) }; - buf->len = (unsigned)signatureLen; - buf->data = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(signatureLen); - if (!buf->data) - goto done; /* error code was set. */ + if (signatureLen <= 0) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY); + goto done; + } + + buf->len = (unsigned)signatureLen; + buf->data = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(signatureLen); + if (!buf->data) + goto done; /* error code was set. */ + + if (useRsaPss) { + pssParams.hashAlg = ssl3_GetHashMechanismByHashType(hash->hashAlg); + pssParams.mgf = ssl3_GetMgfMechanismByHashType(hash->hashAlg); + pssParams.sLen = hashItem.len; + params = &pssParamsItem; + mech = CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS; + } - rv = PK11_Sign(key, buf, &hashItem); + rv = PK11_SignWithMechanism(key, mech, params, buf, &hashItem); } else { - SECOidTag hashOID = ssl3_TLSHashAlgorithmToOID(hash->hashAlg); + SECOidTag hashOID = ssl3_HashTypeToOID(hash->hashAlg); rv = SGN_Digest(key, hashOID, buf, &hashItem); } if (rv != SECSuccess) { - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SIGN_HASHES_FAILURE); + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SIGN_HASHES_FAILURE); } else if (doDerEncode) { - SECItem derSig = {siBuffer, NULL, 0}; + SECItem derSig = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; - /* This also works for an ECDSA signature */ - rv = DSAU_EncodeDerSigWithLen(&derSig, buf, buf->len); - if (rv == SECSuccess) { - PORT_Free(buf->data); /* discard unencoded signature. */ - *buf = derSig; /* give caller encoded signature. */ - } else if (derSig.data) { - PORT_Free(derSig.data); - } + /* This also works for an ECDSA signature */ + rv = DSAU_EncodeDerSigWithLen(&derSig, buf, buf->len); + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + PORT_Free(buf->data); /* discard unencoded signature. */ + *buf = derSig; /* give caller encoded signature. */ + } else if (derSig.data) { + PORT_Free(derSig.data); + } } - PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "signed hashes", (unsigned char*)buf->data, buf->len)); + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + ss->sec.signatureScheme = ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme; + } + PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "signed hashes", (unsigned char *)buf->data, buf->len)); done: if (rv != SECSuccess && buf->data) { - PORT_Free(buf->data); - buf->data = NULL; + PORT_Free(buf->data); + buf->data = NULL; } return rv; } /* Called from ssl3_HandleServerKeyExchange, ssl3_HandleCertificateVerify */ SECStatus -ssl3_VerifySignedHashes(SSL3Hashes *hash, CERTCertificate *cert, - SECItem *buf, PRBool isTLS, void *pwArg) +ssl3_VerifySignedHashes(sslSocket *ss, SSLSignatureScheme scheme, SSL3Hashes *hash, + SECItem *buf) { - SECKEYPublicKey * key; - SECItem * signature = NULL; - SECStatus rv; - SECItem hashItem; - SECOidTag encAlg; - SECOidTag hashAlg; - + SECKEYPublicKey *key; + SECItem *signature = NULL; + SECStatus rv = SECFailure; + SECItem hashItem; + SECOidTag encAlg; + SECOidTag hashAlg; + void *pwArg = ss->pkcs11PinArg; + PRBool isRsaPssScheme = ssl_IsRsaPssSignatureScheme(scheme); PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "check signed hashes", - buf->data, buf->len)); + buf->data, buf->len)); - key = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(cert); + key = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(ss->sec.peerCert); if (key == NULL) { - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY_FAILURE); - return SECFailure; - } - - hashAlg = ssl3_TLSHashAlgorithmToOID(hash->hashAlg); - switch (key->keyType) { - case rsaKey: - encAlg = SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION; - hashItem.data = hash->u.raw; - hashItem.len = hash->len; - break; - case dsaKey: - encAlg = SEC_OID_ANSIX9_DSA_SIGNATURE; - /* ssl_hash_none is used to specify the MD5/SHA1 concatenated hash. - * In that case, we use just the SHA1 part. */ - if (hash->hashAlg == ssl_hash_none) { - hashItem.data = hash->u.s.sha; - hashItem.len = sizeof(hash->u.s.sha); - } else { - hashItem.data = hash->u.raw; - hashItem.len = hash->len; - } - /* Allow DER encoded DSA signatures in SSL 3.0 */ - if (isTLS || buf->len != SECKEY_SignatureLen(key)) { - signature = DSAU_DecodeDerSigToLen(buf, SECKEY_SignatureLen(key)); - if (!signature) { - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE); - return SECFailure; - } - buf = signature; - } - break; - -#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC - case ecKey: - encAlg = SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY; - /* ssl_hash_none is used to specify the MD5/SHA1 concatenated hash. - * In that case, we use just the SHA1 part. - * ECDSA signatures always encode the integers r and s using ASN.1 - * (unlike DSA where ASN.1 encoding is used with TLS but not with - * SSL3). So we can use VFY_VerifyDigestDirect for ECDSA. - */ - if (hash->hashAlg == ssl_hash_none) { - hashAlg = SEC_OID_SHA1; - hashItem.data = hash->u.s.sha; - hashItem.len = sizeof(hash->u.s.sha); - } else { - hashItem.data = hash->u.raw; - hashItem.len = hash->len; - } - break; -#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */ - - default: - SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(key); - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG); - return SECFailure; + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + hashAlg = ssl3_HashTypeToOID(hash->hashAlg); + switch (SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(key)) { + case rsaKey: + encAlg = SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION; + hashItem.data = hash->u.raw; + hashItem.len = hash->len; + if (scheme == ssl_sig_none) { + scheme = ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1md5; + } + break; + case dsaKey: + encAlg = SEC_OID_ANSIX9_DSA_SIGNATURE; + /* ssl_hash_none is used to specify the MD5/SHA1 concatenated hash. + * In that case, we use just the SHA1 part. */ + if (hash->hashAlg == ssl_hash_none) { + hashItem.data = hash->u.s.sha; + hashItem.len = sizeof(hash->u.s.sha); + } else { + hashItem.data = hash->u.raw; + hashItem.len = hash->len; + } + /* Allow DER encoded DSA signatures in SSL 3.0 */ + if (ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0 || + buf->len != SECKEY_SignatureLen(key)) { + signature = DSAU_DecodeDerSigToLen(buf, SECKEY_SignatureLen(key)); + if (!signature) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE); + goto loser; + } + buf = signature; + } + if (scheme == ssl_sig_none) { + scheme = ssl_sig_dsa_sha1; + } + break; + + case ecKey: + encAlg = SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY; + /* ssl_hash_none is used to specify the MD5/SHA1 concatenated hash. + * In that case, we use just the SHA1 part. + * ECDSA signatures always encode the integers r and s using ASN.1 + * (unlike DSA where ASN.1 encoding is used with TLS but not with + * SSL3). So we can use VFY_VerifyDigestDirect for ECDSA. + */ + if (hash->hashAlg == ssl_hash_none) { + hashAlg = SEC_OID_SHA1; + hashItem.data = hash->u.s.sha; + hashItem.len = sizeof(hash->u.s.sha); + } else { + hashItem.data = hash->u.raw; + hashItem.len = hash->len; + } + if (scheme == ssl_sig_none) { + scheme = ssl_sig_ecdsa_sha1; + } + break; + + default: + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG); + goto loser; } PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "hash(es) to be verified", - hashItem.data, hashItem.len)); - - if (hashAlg == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN || key->keyType == dsaKey) { - /* VFY_VerifyDigestDirect requires DSA signatures to be DER-encoded. - * DSA signatures are DER-encoded in TLS but not in SSL3 and the code - * above always removes the DER encoding of DSA signatures when - * present. Thus DSA signatures are always verified with PK11_Verify. - */ - rv = PK11_Verify(key, buf, &hashItem, pwArg); + hashItem.data, hashItem.len)); + + if (isRsaPssScheme || + hashAlg == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN || + SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(key) == dsaKey) { + /* VFY_VerifyDigestDirect requires DSA signatures to be DER-encoded. + * DSA signatures are DER-encoded in TLS but not in SSL3 and the code + * above always removes the DER encoding of DSA signatures when + * present. Thus DSA signatures are always verified with PK11_Verify. + */ + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech = PK11_MapSignKeyType(key->keyType); + + SECItem *params = NULL; + CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS pssParams; + SECItem pssParamsItem = { siBuffer, + (unsigned char *)&pssParams, + sizeof(pssParams) }; + + if (isRsaPssScheme) { + pssParams.hashAlg = ssl3_GetHashMechanismByHashType(hash->hashAlg); + pssParams.mgf = ssl3_GetMgfMechanismByHashType(hash->hashAlg); + pssParams.sLen = hashItem.len; + params = &pssParamsItem; + mech = CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS; + } + + rv = PK11_VerifyWithMechanism(key, mech, params, buf, &hashItem, pwArg); } else { rv = VFY_VerifyDigestDirect(&hashItem, key, buf, encAlg, hashAlg, pwArg); } - SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(key); if (signature) { - SECITEM_FreeItem(signature, PR_TRUE); + SECITEM_FreeItem(signature, PR_TRUE); } if (rv != SECSuccess) { - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE); + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE); + } + if (!ss->sec.isServer) { + ss->sec.signatureScheme = scheme; } + +loser: + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(key); +#ifdef UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE + rv = SECSuccess; + PORT_SetError(0); +#endif return rv; } - /* Caller must set hiLevel error code. */ -/* Called from ssl3_ComputeExportRSAKeyHash - * ssl3_ComputeDHKeyHash +/* Called from ssl3_ComputeDHKeyHash * which are called from ssl3_HandleServerKeyExchange. * * hashAlg: ssl_hash_none indicates the pre-1.2, MD5/SHA1 combination hash. */ SECStatus ssl3_ComputeCommonKeyHash(SSLHashType hashAlg, - PRUint8 * hashBuf, unsigned int bufLen, - SSL3Hashes *hashes, PRBool bypassPKCS11) + PRUint8 *hashBuf, unsigned int bufLen, + SSL3Hashes *hashes) { SECStatus rv; SECOidTag hashOID; -#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS - if (bypassPKCS11) { - if (hashAlg == ssl_hash_none) { - MD5_HashBuf (hashes->u.s.md5, hashBuf, bufLen); - SHA1_HashBuf(hashes->u.s.sha, hashBuf, bufLen); - hashes->len = MD5_LENGTH + SHA1_LENGTH; - } else if (hashAlg == ssl_hash_sha1) { - SHA1_HashBuf(hashes->u.raw, hashBuf, bufLen); - hashes->len = SHA1_LENGTH; - } else if (hashAlg == ssl_hash_sha256) { - SHA256_HashBuf(hashes->u.raw, hashBuf, bufLen); - hashes->len = SHA256_LENGTH; - } else if (hashAlg == ssl_hash_sha384) { - SHA384_HashBuf(hashes->u.raw, hashBuf, bufLen); - hashes->len = SHA384_LENGTH; - } else if (hashAlg == ssl_hash_sha512) { - SHA512_HashBuf(hashes->u.raw, hashBuf, bufLen); - hashes->len = SHA512_LENGTH; - } else { - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_HASH_ALGORITHM); + if (hashAlg == ssl_hash_none) { + rv = PK11_HashBuf(SEC_OID_MD5, hashes->u.s.md5, hashBuf, bufLen); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE); + return rv; + } + rv = PK11_HashBuf(SEC_OID_SHA1, hashes->u.s.sha, hashBuf, bufLen); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); + return rv; + } + hashes->len = MD5_LENGTH + SHA1_LENGTH; + } else { + hashOID = ssl3_HashTypeToOID(hashAlg); + hashes->len = HASH_ResultLenByOidTag(hashOID); + if (hashes->len == 0 || hashes->len > sizeof(hashes->u.raw)) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_HASH_ALGORITHM); return SECFailure; } - } else -#endif - { - if (hashAlg == ssl_hash_none) { - rv = PK11_HashBuf(SEC_OID_MD5, hashes->u.s.md5, hashBuf, bufLen); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE); - return rv; - } - rv = PK11_HashBuf(SEC_OID_SHA1, hashes->u.s.sha, hashBuf, bufLen); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); - return rv; - } - hashes->len = MD5_LENGTH + SHA1_LENGTH; - } else { - hashOID = ssl3_TLSHashAlgorithmToOID(hashAlg); - hashes->len = HASH_ResultLenByOidTag(hashOID); - if (hashes->len == 0 || hashes->len > sizeof(hashes->u.raw)) { - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_HASH_ALGORITHM); - return SECFailure; - } - rv = PK11_HashBuf(hashOID, hashes->u.raw, hashBuf, bufLen); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE); - return rv; - } + rv = PK11_HashBuf(hashOID, hashes->u.raw, hashBuf, bufLen); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE); + return rv; } } hashes->hashAlg = hashAlg; return SECSuccess; } -/* Caller must set hiLevel error code. -** Called from ssl3_SendServerKeyExchange and -** ssl3_HandleServerKeyExchange. -*/ -static SECStatus -ssl3_ComputeExportRSAKeyHash(SSLHashType hashAlg, - SECItem modulus, SECItem publicExponent, - SSL3Random *client_rand, SSL3Random *server_rand, - SSL3Hashes *hashes, PRBool bypassPKCS11) -{ - PRUint8 * hashBuf; - PRUint8 * pBuf; - SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; - unsigned int bufLen; - PRUint8 buf[2*SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH + 2 + 4096/8 + 2 + 4096/8]; - - bufLen = 2*SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH + 2 + modulus.len + 2 + publicExponent.len; - if (bufLen <= sizeof buf) { - hashBuf = buf; - } else { - hashBuf = PORT_Alloc(bufLen); - if (!hashBuf) { - return SECFailure; - } - } - - memcpy(hashBuf, client_rand, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); - pBuf = hashBuf + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH; - memcpy(pBuf, server_rand, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); - pBuf += SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH; - pBuf[0] = (PRUint8)(modulus.len >> 8); - pBuf[1] = (PRUint8)(modulus.len); - pBuf += 2; - memcpy(pBuf, modulus.data, modulus.len); - pBuf += modulus.len; - pBuf[0] = (PRUint8)(publicExponent.len >> 8); - pBuf[1] = (PRUint8)(publicExponent.len); - pBuf += 2; - memcpy(pBuf, publicExponent.data, publicExponent.len); - pBuf += publicExponent.len; - PORT_Assert((unsigned int)(pBuf - hashBuf) == bufLen); - - rv = ssl3_ComputeCommonKeyHash(hashAlg, hashBuf, bufLen, hashes, - bypassPKCS11); - - PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "RSAkey hash: ", hashBuf, bufLen)); - if (hashAlg == ssl_hash_none) { - PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "RSAkey hash: MD5 result", - hashes->u.s.md5, MD5_LENGTH)); - PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "RSAkey hash: SHA1 result", - hashes->u.s.sha, SHA1_LENGTH)); - } else { - PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "RSAkey hash: result", - hashes->u.raw, hashes->len)); - } - - if (hashBuf != buf && hashBuf != NULL) - PORT_Free(hashBuf); - return rv; -} - /* Caller must set hiLevel error code. */ /* Called from ssl3_HandleServerKeyExchange. */ static SECStatus -ssl3_ComputeDHKeyHash(SSLHashType hashAlg, - SECItem dh_p, SECItem dh_g, SECItem dh_Ys, - SSL3Random *client_rand, SSL3Random *server_rand, - SSL3Hashes *hashes, PRBool bypassPKCS11) -{ - PRUint8 * hashBuf; - PRUint8 * pBuf; - SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; - unsigned int bufLen; - PRUint8 buf[2*SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH + 2 + 4096/8 + 2 + 4096/8]; - - bufLen = 2*SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH + 2 + dh_p.len + 2 + dh_g.len + 2 + dh_Ys.len; +ssl3_ComputeDHKeyHash(sslSocket *ss, SSLHashType hashAlg, SSL3Hashes *hashes, + SECItem dh_p, SECItem dh_g, SECItem dh_Ys, PRBool padY) +{ + PRUint8 *hashBuf; + PRUint8 *pBuf; + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + unsigned int bufLen, yLen; + PRUint8 buf[2 * SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH + 2 + 4096 / 8 + 2 + 4096 / 8]; + + PORT_Assert(dh_p.data); + PORT_Assert(dh_g.data); + PORT_Assert(dh_Ys.data); + + yLen = padY ? dh_p.len : dh_Ys.len; + bufLen = 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH + + 2 + dh_p.len + + 2 + dh_g.len + + 2 + yLen; if (bufLen <= sizeof buf) { - hashBuf = buf; + hashBuf = buf; } else { - hashBuf = PORT_Alloc(bufLen); - if (!hashBuf) { - return SECFailure; - } - } - - memcpy(hashBuf, client_rand, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); - pBuf = hashBuf + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH; - memcpy(pBuf, server_rand, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); - pBuf += SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH; - pBuf[0] = (PRUint8)(dh_p.len >> 8); - pBuf[1] = (PRUint8)(dh_p.len); - pBuf += 2; + hashBuf = PORT_Alloc(bufLen); + if (!hashBuf) { + return SECFailure; + } + } + + memcpy(hashBuf, &ss->ssl3.hs.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); + pBuf = hashBuf + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH; + memcpy(pBuf, &ss->ssl3.hs.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); + pBuf += SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH; + pBuf = ssl_EncodeUintX(dh_p.len, 2, pBuf); memcpy(pBuf, dh_p.data, dh_p.len); - pBuf += dh_p.len; - pBuf[0] = (PRUint8)(dh_g.len >> 8); - pBuf[1] = (PRUint8)(dh_g.len); - pBuf += 2; + pBuf += dh_p.len; + pBuf = ssl_EncodeUintX(dh_g.len, 2, pBuf); memcpy(pBuf, dh_g.data, dh_g.len); - pBuf += dh_g.len; - pBuf[0] = (PRUint8)(dh_Ys.len >> 8); - pBuf[1] = (PRUint8)(dh_Ys.len); - pBuf += 2; + pBuf += dh_g.len; + pBuf = ssl_EncodeUintX(yLen, 2, pBuf); + if (padY && dh_p.len > dh_Ys.len) { + memset(pBuf, 0, dh_p.len - dh_Ys.len); + pBuf += dh_p.len - dh_Ys.len; + } + /* If we're padding Y, dh_Ys can't be longer than dh_p. */ + PORT_Assert(!padY || dh_p.len >= dh_Ys.len); memcpy(pBuf, dh_Ys.data, dh_Ys.len); - pBuf += dh_Ys.len; + pBuf += dh_Ys.len; PORT_Assert((unsigned int)(pBuf - hashBuf) == bufLen); - rv = ssl3_ComputeCommonKeyHash(hashAlg, hashBuf, bufLen, hashes, - bypassPKCS11); + rv = ssl3_ComputeCommonKeyHash(hashAlg, hashBuf, bufLen, hashes); PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "DHkey hash: ", hashBuf, bufLen)); - if (hashAlg == ssl_hash_none) { - PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "DHkey hash: MD5 result", - hashes->u.s.md5, MD5_LENGTH)); - PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "DHkey hash: SHA1 result", - hashes->u.s.sha, SHA1_LENGTH)); - } else { - PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "DHkey hash: result", - hashes->u.raw, hashes->len)); + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + if (hashAlg == ssl_hash_none) { + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "DHkey hash: MD5 result", + hashes->u.s.md5, MD5_LENGTH)); + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "DHkey hash: SHA1 result", + hashes->u.s.sha, SHA1_LENGTH)); + } else { + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "DHkey hash: result", + hashes->u.raw, hashes->len)); + } } if (hashBuf != buf && hashBuf != NULL) - PORT_Free(hashBuf); + PORT_Free(hashBuf); return rv; } -static void -ssl3_BumpSequenceNumber(SSL3SequenceNumber *num) -{ - num->low++; - if (num->low == 0) - num->high++; -} - /* Called twice, only from ssl3_DestroyCipherSpec (immediately below). */ static void ssl3_CleanupKeyMaterial(ssl3KeyMaterial *mat) { if (mat->write_key != NULL) { - PK11_FreeSymKey(mat->write_key); - mat->write_key = NULL; + PK11_FreeSymKey(mat->write_key); + mat->write_key = NULL; } if (mat->write_mac_key != NULL) { - PK11_FreeSymKey(mat->write_mac_key); - mat->write_mac_key = NULL; + PK11_FreeSymKey(mat->write_mac_key); + mat->write_mac_key = NULL; } if (mat->write_mac_context != NULL) { - PK11_DestroyContext(mat->write_mac_context, PR_TRUE); - mat->write_mac_context = NULL; + PK11_DestroyContext(mat->write_mac_context, PR_TRUE); + mat->write_mac_context = NULL; } } -/* Called from ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs() and -** ssl3_HandleChangeCipherSpecs() +/* Called from ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs() and +** ssl3_HandleChangeCipherSpecs() ** ssl3_DestroySSL3Info ** Caller must hold SpecWriteLock. */ void ssl3_DestroyCipherSpec(ssl3CipherSpec *spec, PRBool freeSrvName) { - PRBool freeit = (PRBool)(!spec->bypassCiphers); -/* PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSpecWriteLock(ss)); Don't have ss! */ - if (spec->destroy) { - spec->destroy(spec->encodeContext, freeit); - spec->destroy(spec->decodeContext, freeit); - spec->encodeContext = NULL; /* paranoia */ - spec->decodeContext = NULL; + /* PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSpecWriteLock(ss)); Don't have ss! */ + if (spec->encodeContext) { + PK11_DestroyContext(spec->encodeContext, PR_TRUE); + spec->encodeContext = NULL; + } + if (spec->decodeContext) { + PK11_DestroyContext(spec->decodeContext, PR_TRUE); + spec->decodeContext = NULL; } if (spec->destroyCompressContext && spec->compressContext) { - spec->destroyCompressContext(spec->compressContext, 1); - spec->compressContext = NULL; + spec->destroyCompressContext(spec->compressContext, 1); + spec->compressContext = NULL; } if (spec->destroyDecompressContext && spec->decompressContext) { - spec->destroyDecompressContext(spec->decompressContext, 1); - spec->decompressContext = NULL; - } - if (freeSrvName && spec->srvVirtName.data) { - SECITEM_FreeItem(&spec->srvVirtName, PR_FALSE); + spec->destroyDecompressContext(spec->decompressContext, 1); + spec->decompressContext = NULL; } if (spec->master_secret != NULL) { - PK11_FreeSymKey(spec->master_secret); - spec->master_secret = NULL; + PK11_FreeSymKey(spec->master_secret); + spec->master_secret = NULL; } spec->msItem.data = NULL; - spec->msItem.len = 0; + spec->msItem.len = 0; ssl3_CleanupKeyMaterial(&spec->client); ssl3_CleanupKeyMaterial(&spec->server); - spec->bypassCiphers = PR_FALSE; - spec->destroy=NULL; spec->destroyCompressContext = NULL; spec->destroyDecompressContext = NULL; } @@ -1413,21 +1558,21 @@ ssl3_DestroyCipherSpec(ssl3CipherSpec *spec, PRBool freeSrvName) ** Caller must hold the ssl3 handshake lock. ** Acquires & releases SpecWriteLock. */ -static SECStatus +SECStatus ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec(sslSocket *ss) { - ssl3CipherSpec * pwSpec; - ssl3CipherSpec * cwSpec; - ssl3CipherSuite suite = ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite; - SSL3MACAlgorithm mac; - SSL3BulkCipher cipher; - SSL3KeyExchangeAlgorithm kea; + ssl3CipherSpec *pwSpec; + ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec; + ssl3CipherSuite suite = ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite; + SSL3MACAlgorithm mac; + SSL3KeyExchangeAlgorithm kea; const ssl3CipherSuiteDef *suite_def; - PRBool isTLS; + PRBool isTLS; - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); - ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); /*******************************/ + ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); /*******************************/ pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec; PORT_Assert(pwSpec == ss->ssl3.prSpec); @@ -1435,49 +1580,41 @@ ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec(sslSocket *ss) /* This hack provides maximal interoperability with SSL 3 servers. */ cwSpec = ss->ssl3.cwSpec; if (cwSpec->mac_def->mac == mac_null) { - /* SSL records are not being MACed. */ - cwSpec->version = ss->version; + /* SSL records are not being MACed. */ + cwSpec->version = ss->version; } - pwSpec->version = ss->version; - isTLS = (PRBool)(pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + pwSpec->version = ss->version; + isTLS = (PRBool)(pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: Set XXX Pending Cipher Suite to 0x%04x", - SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, suite)); + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, suite)); suite_def = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(suite); if (suite_def == NULL) { - ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); - return SECFailure; /* error code set by ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef */ + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); + return SECFailure; /* error code set by ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef */ } if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { - /* Double-check that we did not pick an RC4 suite */ - PORT_Assert((suite_def->bulk_cipher_alg != cipher_rc4) && - (suite_def->bulk_cipher_alg != cipher_rc4_40) && - (suite_def->bulk_cipher_alg != cipher_rc4_56)); + /* Double-check that we did not pick an RC4 suite */ + PORT_Assert(suite_def->bulk_cipher_alg != cipher_rc4); } - cipher = suite_def->bulk_cipher_alg; - kea = suite_def->key_exchange_alg; - mac = suite_def->mac_alg; + kea = suite_def->key_exchange_alg; + mac = suite_def->mac_alg; if (mac <= ssl_mac_sha && mac != ssl_mac_null && isTLS) - mac += 2; + mac += 2; ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def = suite_def; - ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def = &kea_defs[kea]; + ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def = &kea_defs[kea]; PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea); - pwSpec->cipher_def = &bulk_cipher_defs[cipher]; - PORT_Assert(pwSpec->cipher_def->cipher == cipher); + pwSpec->cipher_def = ssl_GetBulkCipherDef(suite_def); pwSpec->mac_def = &mac_defs[mac]; PORT_Assert(pwSpec->mac_def->mac == mac); - ss->sec.keyBits = pwSpec->cipher_def->key_size * BPB; - ss->sec.secretKeyBits = pwSpec->cipher_def->secret_key_size * BPB; - ss->sec.cipherType = cipher; - pwSpec->encodeContext = NULL; pwSpec->decodeContext = NULL; @@ -1487,21 +1624,25 @@ ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec(sslSocket *ss) pwSpec->compressContext = NULL; pwSpec->decompressContext = NULL; - ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /*******************************/ + if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->ephemeral); + PORT_Assert(pwSpec->cipher_def->type == type_aead); + } + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /*******************************/ return SECSuccess; } -#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ZLIB +#ifdef NSS_SSL_ENABLE_ZLIB #define SSL3_DEFLATE_CONTEXT_SIZE sizeof(z_stream) static SECStatus ssl3_MapZlibError(int zlib_error) { switch (zlib_error) { - case Z_OK: - return SECSuccess; - default: - return SECFailure; + case Z_OK: + return SECSuccess; + default: + return SECFailure; } } @@ -1540,7 +1681,7 @@ ssl3_DeflateCompress(void *void_context, unsigned char *out, int *out_len, return SECSuccess; } - context->next_in = (unsigned char*) in; + context->next_in = (unsigned char *)in; context->avail_in = inlen; context->next_out = out; context->avail_out = maxout; @@ -1569,7 +1710,7 @@ ssl3_DeflateDecompress(void *void_context, unsigned char *out, int *out_len, return SECSuccess; } - context->next_in = (unsigned char*) in; + context->next_in = (unsigned char *)in; context->avail_in = inlen; context->next_out = out; context->avail_out = maxout; @@ -1598,7 +1739,7 @@ ssl3_DestroyDecompressContext(void *void_context, PRBool unused) return SECSuccess; } -#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ZLIB */ +#endif /* NSS_SSL_ENABLE_ZLIB */ /* Initialize the compression functions and contexts for the given * CipherSpec. */ @@ -1607,227 +1748,54 @@ ssl3_InitCompressionContext(ssl3CipherSpec *pwSpec) { /* Setup the compression functions */ switch (pwSpec->compression_method) { - case ssl_compression_null: - pwSpec->compressor = NULL; - pwSpec->decompressor = NULL; - pwSpec->compressContext = NULL; - pwSpec->decompressContext = NULL; - pwSpec->destroyCompressContext = NULL; - pwSpec->destroyDecompressContext = NULL; - break; -#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ZLIB - case ssl_compression_deflate: - pwSpec->compressor = ssl3_DeflateCompress; - pwSpec->decompressor = ssl3_DeflateDecompress; - pwSpec->compressContext = PORT_Alloc(SSL3_DEFLATE_CONTEXT_SIZE); - pwSpec->decompressContext = PORT_Alloc(SSL3_DEFLATE_CONTEXT_SIZE); - pwSpec->destroyCompressContext = ssl3_DestroyCompressContext; - pwSpec->destroyDecompressContext = ssl3_DestroyDecompressContext; - ssl3_DeflateInit(pwSpec->compressContext); - ssl3_InflateInit(pwSpec->decompressContext); - break; -#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ZLIB */ - default: - PORT_Assert(0); - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); - return SECFailure; - } - - return SECSuccess; -} - -#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS -/* Initialize encryption contexts for pending spec. - * MAC contexts are set up when computing the mac, not here. - * Master Secret already is derived in spec->msItem - * Caller holds Spec write lock. - */ -static SECStatus -ssl3_InitPendingContextsBypass(sslSocket *ss) -{ - ssl3CipherSpec * pwSpec; - const ssl3BulkCipherDef *cipher_def; - void * serverContext = NULL; - void * clientContext = NULL; - BLapiInitContextFunc initFn = (BLapiInitContextFunc)NULL; - int mode = 0; - unsigned int optArg1 = 0; - unsigned int optArg2 = 0; - PRBool server_encrypts = ss->sec.isServer; - SSLCipherAlgorithm calg; - SECStatus rv; - - PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); - PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSpecWriteLock(ss)); - PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec == ss->ssl3.pwSpec); - - pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec; - cipher_def = pwSpec->cipher_def; - - calg = cipher_def->calg; - - if (calg == ssl_calg_aes_gcm) { - pwSpec->encode = NULL; - pwSpec->decode = NULL; - pwSpec->destroy = NULL; - pwSpec->encodeContext = NULL; - pwSpec->decodeContext = NULL; - pwSpec->aead = ssl3_AESGCMBypass; - ssl3_InitCompressionContext(pwSpec); - return SECSuccess; - } - - serverContext = pwSpec->server.cipher_context; - clientContext = pwSpec->client.cipher_context; - - switch (calg) { - case ssl_calg_null: - pwSpec->encode = Null_Cipher; - pwSpec->decode = Null_Cipher; - pwSpec->destroy = NULL; - goto success; - - case ssl_calg_rc4: - initFn = (BLapiInitContextFunc)RC4_InitContext; - pwSpec->encode = (SSLCipher) RC4_Encrypt; - pwSpec->decode = (SSLCipher) RC4_Decrypt; - pwSpec->destroy = (SSLDestroy) RC4_DestroyContext; - break; - case ssl_calg_rc2: - initFn = (BLapiInitContextFunc)RC2_InitContext; - mode = NSS_RC2_CBC; - optArg1 = cipher_def->key_size; - pwSpec->encode = (SSLCipher) RC2_Encrypt; - pwSpec->decode = (SSLCipher) RC2_Decrypt; - pwSpec->destroy = (SSLDestroy) RC2_DestroyContext; - break; - case ssl_calg_des: - initFn = (BLapiInitContextFunc)DES_InitContext; - mode = NSS_DES_CBC; - optArg1 = server_encrypts; - pwSpec->encode = (SSLCipher) DES_Encrypt; - pwSpec->decode = (SSLCipher) DES_Decrypt; - pwSpec->destroy = (SSLDestroy) DES_DestroyContext; - break; - case ssl_calg_3des: - initFn = (BLapiInitContextFunc)DES_InitContext; - mode = NSS_DES_EDE3_CBC; - optArg1 = server_encrypts; - pwSpec->encode = (SSLCipher) DES_Encrypt; - pwSpec->decode = (SSLCipher) DES_Decrypt; - pwSpec->destroy = (SSLDestroy) DES_DestroyContext; - break; - case ssl_calg_aes: - initFn = (BLapiInitContextFunc)AES_InitContext; - mode = NSS_AES_CBC; - optArg1 = server_encrypts; - optArg2 = AES_BLOCK_SIZE; - pwSpec->encode = (SSLCipher) AES_Encrypt; - pwSpec->decode = (SSLCipher) AES_Decrypt; - pwSpec->destroy = (SSLDestroy) AES_DestroyContext; - break; - - case ssl_calg_camellia: - initFn = (BLapiInitContextFunc)Camellia_InitContext; - mode = NSS_CAMELLIA_CBC; - optArg1 = server_encrypts; - optArg2 = CAMELLIA_BLOCK_SIZE; - pwSpec->encode = (SSLCipher) Camellia_Encrypt; - pwSpec->decode = (SSLCipher) Camellia_Decrypt; - pwSpec->destroy = (SSLDestroy) Camellia_DestroyContext; - break; - - case ssl_calg_seed: - initFn = (BLapiInitContextFunc)SEED_InitContext; - mode = NSS_SEED_CBC; - optArg1 = server_encrypts; - optArg2 = SEED_BLOCK_SIZE; - pwSpec->encode = (SSLCipher) SEED_Encrypt; - pwSpec->decode = (SSLCipher) SEED_Decrypt; - pwSpec->destroy = (SSLDestroy) SEED_DestroyContext; - break; - - case ssl_calg_idea: - case ssl_calg_fortezza : - default: - PORT_Assert(0); - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); - goto bail_out; - } - rv = (*initFn)(serverContext, - pwSpec->server.write_key_item.data, - pwSpec->server.write_key_item.len, - pwSpec->server.write_iv_item.data, - mode, optArg1, optArg2); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - PORT_Assert(0); - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); - goto bail_out; - } - - switch (calg) { - case ssl_calg_des: - case ssl_calg_3des: - case ssl_calg_aes: - case ssl_calg_camellia: - case ssl_calg_seed: - /* For block ciphers, if the server is encrypting, then the client - * is decrypting, and vice versa. - */ - optArg1 = !optArg1; - break; - /* kill warnings. */ - case ssl_calg_null: - case ssl_calg_rc4: - case ssl_calg_rc2: - case ssl_calg_idea: - case ssl_calg_fortezza: - case ssl_calg_aes_gcm: - break; - } - - rv = (*initFn)(clientContext, - pwSpec->client.write_key_item.data, - pwSpec->client.write_key_item.len, - pwSpec->client.write_iv_item.data, - mode, optArg1, optArg2); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - PORT_Assert(0); - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); - goto bail_out; + case ssl_compression_null: + pwSpec->compressor = NULL; + pwSpec->decompressor = NULL; + pwSpec->compressContext = NULL; + pwSpec->decompressContext = NULL; + pwSpec->destroyCompressContext = NULL; + pwSpec->destroyDecompressContext = NULL; + break; +#ifdef NSS_SSL_ENABLE_ZLIB + case ssl_compression_deflate: + pwSpec->compressor = ssl3_DeflateCompress; + pwSpec->decompressor = ssl3_DeflateDecompress; + pwSpec->compressContext = PORT_Alloc(SSL3_DEFLATE_CONTEXT_SIZE); + pwSpec->decompressContext = PORT_Alloc(SSL3_DEFLATE_CONTEXT_SIZE); + pwSpec->destroyCompressContext = ssl3_DestroyCompressContext; + pwSpec->destroyDecompressContext = ssl3_DestroyDecompressContext; + ssl3_DeflateInit(pwSpec->compressContext); + ssl3_InflateInit(pwSpec->decompressContext); + break; +#endif /* NSS_SSL_ENABLE_ZLIB */ + default: + PORT_Assert(0); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; } - pwSpec->encodeContext = (ss->sec.isServer) ? serverContext : clientContext; - pwSpec->decodeContext = (ss->sec.isServer) ? clientContext : serverContext; - - ssl3_InitCompressionContext(pwSpec); - -success: return SECSuccess; - -bail_out: - return SECFailure; } -#endif -/* This function should probably be moved to pk11wrap and be named +/* This function should probably be moved to pk11wrap and be named * PK11_ParamFromIVAndEffectiveKeyBits */ static SECItem * ssl3_ParamFromIV(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mtype, SECItem *iv, CK_ULONG ulEffectiveBits) { - SECItem * param = PK11_ParamFromIV(mtype, iv); - if (param && param->data && param->len >= sizeof(CK_RC2_PARAMS)) { - switch (mtype) { - case CKM_RC2_KEY_GEN: - case CKM_RC2_ECB: - case CKM_RC2_CBC: - case CKM_RC2_MAC: - case CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL: - case CKM_RC2_CBC_PAD: - *(CK_RC2_PARAMS *)param->data = ulEffectiveBits; - default: break; - } + SECItem *param = PK11_ParamFromIV(mtype, iv); + if (param && param->data && param->len >= sizeof(CK_RC2_PARAMS)) { + switch (mtype) { + case CKM_RC2_KEY_GEN: + case CKM_RC2_ECB: + case CKM_RC2_CBC: + case CKM_RC2_MAC: + case CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL: + case CKM_RC2_CBC_PAD: + *(CK_RC2_PARAMS *)param->data = ulEffectiveBits; + default: + break; + } } return param; } @@ -1846,40 +1814,40 @@ ssl3_ParamFromIV(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mtype, SECItem *iv, CK_ULONG ulEffectiveBits) */ static unsigned int ssl3_BuildRecordPseudoHeader(unsigned char *out, - SSL3SequenceNumber seq_num, - SSL3ContentType type, - PRBool includesVersion, - SSL3ProtocolVersion version, - PRBool isDTLS, - int length) -{ - out[0] = (unsigned char)(seq_num.high >> 24); - out[1] = (unsigned char)(seq_num.high >> 16); - out[2] = (unsigned char)(seq_num.high >> 8); - out[3] = (unsigned char)(seq_num.high >> 0); - out[4] = (unsigned char)(seq_num.low >> 24); - out[5] = (unsigned char)(seq_num.low >> 16); - out[6] = (unsigned char)(seq_num.low >> 8); - out[7] = (unsigned char)(seq_num.low >> 0); + sslSequenceNumber seq_num, + SSL3ContentType type, + PRBool includesVersion, + SSL3ProtocolVersion version, + PRBool isDTLS, + int length) +{ + out[0] = (unsigned char)(seq_num >> 56); + out[1] = (unsigned char)(seq_num >> 48); + out[2] = (unsigned char)(seq_num >> 40); + out[3] = (unsigned char)(seq_num >> 32); + out[4] = (unsigned char)(seq_num >> 24); + out[5] = (unsigned char)(seq_num >> 16); + out[6] = (unsigned char)(seq_num >> 8); + out[7] = (unsigned char)(seq_num >> 0); out[8] = type; /* SSL3 MAC doesn't include the record's version field. */ if (!includesVersion) { - out[9] = MSB(length); - out[10] = LSB(length); - return 11; + out[9] = MSB(length); + out[10] = LSB(length); + return 11; } /* TLS MAC and AEAD additional data include version. */ if (isDTLS) { - SSL3ProtocolVersion dtls_version; + SSL3ProtocolVersion dtls_version; - dtls_version = dtls_TLSVersionToDTLSVersion(version); - out[9] = MSB(dtls_version); - out[10] = LSB(dtls_version); + dtls_version = dtls_TLSVersionToDTLSVersion(version); + out[9] = MSB(dtls_version); + out[10] = LSB(dtls_version); } else { - out[9] = MSB(version); - out[10] = LSB(version); + out[9] = MSB(version); + out[10] = LSB(version); } out[11] = MSB(length); out[12] = LSB(length); @@ -1888,265 +1856,251 @@ ssl3_BuildRecordPseudoHeader(unsigned char *out, static SECStatus ssl3_AESGCM(ssl3KeyMaterial *keys, - PRBool doDecrypt, - unsigned char *out, - int *outlen, - int maxout, - const unsigned char *in, - int inlen, - const unsigned char *additionalData, - int additionalDataLen) -{ - SECItem param; - SECStatus rv = SECFailure; - unsigned char nonce[12]; - unsigned int uOutLen; - CK_GCM_PARAMS gcmParams; - - static const int tagSize = 16; - static const int explicitNonceLen = 8; + PRBool doDecrypt, + unsigned char *out, + int *outlen, + int maxout, + const unsigned char *in, + int inlen, + const unsigned char *additionalData, + int additionalDataLen) +{ + SECItem param; + SECStatus rv = SECFailure; + unsigned char nonce[12]; + unsigned int uOutLen; + CK_GCM_PARAMS gcmParams; + + const int tagSize = bulk_cipher_defs[cipher_aes_128_gcm].tag_size; + const int explicitNonceLen = + bulk_cipher_defs[cipher_aes_128_gcm].explicit_nonce_size; /* See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5288#section-3 for details of how the * nonce is formed. */ memcpy(nonce, keys->write_iv, 4); if (doDecrypt) { - memcpy(nonce + 4, in, explicitNonceLen); - in += explicitNonceLen; - inlen -= explicitNonceLen; - *outlen = 0; + memcpy(nonce + 4, in, explicitNonceLen); + in += explicitNonceLen; + inlen -= explicitNonceLen; + *outlen = 0; } else { - if (maxout < explicitNonceLen) { - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INPUT_LEN); - return SECFailure; + if (maxout < explicitNonceLen) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INPUT_LEN); + return SECFailure; } - /* Use the 64-bit sequence number as the explicit nonce. */ - memcpy(nonce + 4, additionalData, explicitNonceLen); - memcpy(out, additionalData, explicitNonceLen); - out += explicitNonceLen; - maxout -= explicitNonceLen; - *outlen = explicitNonceLen; + /* Use the 64-bit sequence number as the explicit nonce. */ + memcpy(nonce + 4, additionalData, explicitNonceLen); + memcpy(out, additionalData, explicitNonceLen); + out += explicitNonceLen; + maxout -= explicitNonceLen; + *outlen = explicitNonceLen; } param.type = siBuffer; - param.data = (unsigned char *) &gcmParams; + param.data = (unsigned char *)&gcmParams; param.len = sizeof(gcmParams); gcmParams.pIv = nonce; gcmParams.ulIvLen = sizeof(nonce); - gcmParams.pAAD = (unsigned char *)additionalData; /* const cast */ + gcmParams.pAAD = (unsigned char *)additionalData; /* const cast */ gcmParams.ulAADLen = additionalDataLen; gcmParams.ulTagBits = tagSize * 8; if (doDecrypt) { - rv = PK11_Decrypt(keys->write_key, CKM_AES_GCM, ¶m, out, &uOutLen, - maxout, in, inlen); + rv = PK11_Decrypt(keys->write_key, CKM_AES_GCM, ¶m, out, &uOutLen, + maxout, in, inlen); } else { - rv = PK11_Encrypt(keys->write_key, CKM_AES_GCM, ¶m, out, &uOutLen, - maxout, in, inlen); + rv = PK11_Encrypt(keys->write_key, CKM_AES_GCM, ¶m, out, &uOutLen, + maxout, in, inlen); } - *outlen += (int) uOutLen; + *outlen += (int)uOutLen; return rv; } -#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS static SECStatus -ssl3_AESGCMBypass(ssl3KeyMaterial *keys, - PRBool doDecrypt, - unsigned char *out, - int *outlen, - int maxout, - const unsigned char *in, - int inlen, - const unsigned char *additionalData, - int additionalDataLen) -{ - SECStatus rv = SECFailure; - unsigned char nonce[12]; - unsigned int uOutLen; - AESContext *cx; - CK_GCM_PARAMS gcmParams; - - static const int tagSize = 16; - static const int explicitNonceLen = 8; +ssl3_ChaCha20Poly1305(ssl3KeyMaterial *keys, PRBool doDecrypt, + unsigned char *out, int *outlen, int maxout, + const unsigned char *in, int inlen, + const unsigned char *additionalData, + int additionalDataLen) +{ + size_t i; + SECItem param; + SECStatus rv = SECFailure; + unsigned int uOutLen; + unsigned char nonce[12]; + CK_NSS_AEAD_PARAMS aeadParams; - /* See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5288#section-3 for details of how the - * nonce is formed. */ - PORT_Assert(keys->write_iv_item.len == 4); - if (keys->write_iv_item.len != 4) { - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); - return SECFailure; - } - memcpy(nonce, keys->write_iv_item.data, 4); - if (doDecrypt) { - memcpy(nonce + 4, in, explicitNonceLen); - in += explicitNonceLen; - inlen -= explicitNonceLen; - *outlen = 0; - } else { - if (maxout < explicitNonceLen) { - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INPUT_LEN); - return SECFailure; - } - /* Use the 64-bit sequence number as the explicit nonce. */ - memcpy(nonce + 4, additionalData, explicitNonceLen); - memcpy(out, additionalData, explicitNonceLen); - out += explicitNonceLen; - maxout -= explicitNonceLen; - *outlen = explicitNonceLen; - } + const int tagSize = bulk_cipher_defs[cipher_chacha20].tag_size; - gcmParams.pIv = nonce; - gcmParams.ulIvLen = sizeof(nonce); - gcmParams.pAAD = (unsigned char *)additionalData; /* const cast */ - gcmParams.ulAADLen = additionalDataLen; - gcmParams.ulTagBits = tagSize * 8; + /* See + * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-chacha20-poly1305-04#section-2 + * for details of how the nonce is formed. */ + PORT_Memcpy(nonce, keys->write_iv, 12); - cx = (AESContext *)keys->cipher_context; - rv = AES_InitContext(cx, keys->write_key_item.data, - keys->write_key_item.len, - (unsigned char *)&gcmParams, NSS_AES_GCM, !doDecrypt, - AES_BLOCK_SIZE); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return rv; + /* XOR the last 8 bytes of the IV with the sequence number. */ + PORT_Assert(additionalDataLen >= 8); + for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i) { + nonce[4 + i] ^= additionalData[i]; } + + param.type = siBuffer; + param.len = sizeof(aeadParams); + param.data = (unsigned char *)&aeadParams; + memset(&aeadParams, 0, sizeof(aeadParams)); + aeadParams.pNonce = nonce; + aeadParams.ulNonceLen = sizeof(nonce); + aeadParams.pAAD = (unsigned char *)additionalData; + aeadParams.ulAADLen = additionalDataLen; + aeadParams.ulTagLen = tagSize; + if (doDecrypt) { - rv = AES_Decrypt(cx, out, &uOutLen, maxout, in, inlen); + rv = PK11_Decrypt(keys->write_key, CKM_NSS_CHACHA20_POLY1305, ¶m, + out, &uOutLen, maxout, in, inlen); } else { - rv = AES_Encrypt(cx, out, &uOutLen, maxout, in, inlen); + rv = PK11_Encrypt(keys->write_key, CKM_NSS_CHACHA20_POLY1305, ¶m, + out, &uOutLen, maxout, in, inlen); } - AES_DestroyContext(cx, PR_FALSE); - *outlen += (int) uOutLen; + *outlen = (int)uOutLen; return rv; } -#endif /* Initialize encryption and MAC contexts for pending spec. * Master Secret already is derived. * Caller holds Spec write lock. */ static SECStatus -ssl3_InitPendingContextsPKCS11(sslSocket *ss) -{ - ssl3CipherSpec * pwSpec; - const ssl3BulkCipherDef *cipher_def; - PK11Context * serverContext = NULL; - PK11Context * clientContext = NULL; - SECItem * param; - CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism; - CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mac_mech; - CK_ULONG macLength; - CK_ULONG effKeyBits; - SECItem iv; - SECItem mac_param; - SSLCipherAlgorithm calg; - - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSpecWriteLock(ss)); +ssl3_InitPendingContexts(sslSocket *ss) +{ + ssl3CipherSpec *pwSpec; + const ssl3BulkCipherDef *cipher_def; + PK11Context *serverContext = NULL; + PK11Context *clientContext = NULL; + SECItem *param; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mac_mech; + CK_ULONG macLength; + CK_ULONG effKeyBits; + SECItem iv; + SECItem mac_param; + SSLCipherAlgorithm calg; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSpecWriteLock(ss)); PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec == ss->ssl3.pwSpec); - pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec; - cipher_def = pwSpec->cipher_def; - macLength = pwSpec->mac_size; - calg = cipher_def->calg; + pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec; + cipher_def = pwSpec->cipher_def; + macLength = pwSpec->mac_size; + calg = cipher_def->calg; PORT_Assert(alg2Mech[calg].calg == calg); pwSpec->client.write_mac_context = NULL; pwSpec->server.write_mac_context = NULL; - if (calg == calg_aes_gcm) { - pwSpec->encode = NULL; - pwSpec->decode = NULL; - pwSpec->destroy = NULL; - pwSpec->encodeContext = NULL; - pwSpec->decodeContext = NULL; - pwSpec->aead = ssl3_AESGCM; - return SECSuccess; + if (cipher_def->type == type_aead) { + pwSpec->encode = NULL; + pwSpec->decode = NULL; + pwSpec->encodeContext = NULL; + pwSpec->decodeContext = NULL; + switch (calg) { + case calg_aes_gcm: + pwSpec->aead = ssl3_AESGCM; + break; + case calg_chacha20: + pwSpec->aead = ssl3_ChaCha20Poly1305; + break; + default: + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + return SECSuccess; } - /* - ** Now setup the MAC contexts, + /* + ** Now setup the MAC contexts, ** crypto contexts are setup below. */ - mac_mech = pwSpec->mac_def->mmech; + mac_mech = pwSpec->mac_def->mmech; mac_param.data = (unsigned char *)&macLength; - mac_param.len = sizeof(macLength); + mac_param.len = sizeof(macLength); mac_param.type = 0; pwSpec->client.write_mac_context = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey( - mac_mech, CKA_SIGN, pwSpec->client.write_mac_key, &mac_param); - if (pwSpec->client.write_mac_context == NULL) { - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SYM_KEY_CONTEXT_FAILURE); - goto fail; + mac_mech, CKA_SIGN, pwSpec->client.write_mac_key, &mac_param); + if (pwSpec->client.write_mac_context == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SYM_KEY_CONTEXT_FAILURE); + goto fail; } pwSpec->server.write_mac_context = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey( - mac_mech, CKA_SIGN, pwSpec->server.write_mac_key, &mac_param); + mac_mech, CKA_SIGN, pwSpec->server.write_mac_key, &mac_param); if (pwSpec->server.write_mac_context == NULL) { - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SYM_KEY_CONTEXT_FAILURE); - goto fail; + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SYM_KEY_CONTEXT_FAILURE); + goto fail; } - /* + /* ** Now setup the crypto contexts. */ if (calg == calg_null) { - pwSpec->encode = Null_Cipher; - pwSpec->decode = Null_Cipher; - pwSpec->destroy = NULL; - return SECSuccess; + pwSpec->encode = Null_Cipher; + pwSpec->decode = Null_Cipher; + return SECSuccess; } - mechanism = alg2Mech[calg].cmech; + mechanism = ssl3_Alg2Mech(calg); effKeyBits = cipher_def->key_size * BPB; /* * build the server context */ iv.data = pwSpec->server.write_iv; - iv.len = cipher_def->iv_size; + iv.len = cipher_def->iv_size; param = ssl3_ParamFromIV(mechanism, &iv, effKeyBits); if (param == NULL) { - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_IV_PARAM_FAILURE); - goto fail; + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_IV_PARAM_FAILURE); + goto fail; } serverContext = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(mechanism, - (ss->sec.isServer ? CKA_ENCRYPT : CKA_DECRYPT), - pwSpec->server.write_key, param); + (ss->sec.isServer ? CKA_ENCRYPT + : CKA_DECRYPT), + pwSpec->server.write_key, param); iv.data = PK11_IVFromParam(mechanism, param, (int *)&iv.len); if (iv.data) - PORT_Memcpy(pwSpec->server.write_iv, iv.data, iv.len); + PORT_Memcpy(pwSpec->server.write_iv, iv.data, iv.len); SECITEM_FreeItem(param, PR_TRUE); if (serverContext == NULL) { - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SYM_KEY_CONTEXT_FAILURE); - goto fail; + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SYM_KEY_CONTEXT_FAILURE); + goto fail; } /* * build the client context */ iv.data = pwSpec->client.write_iv; - iv.len = cipher_def->iv_size; + iv.len = cipher_def->iv_size; param = ssl3_ParamFromIV(mechanism, &iv, effKeyBits); if (param == NULL) { - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_IV_PARAM_FAILURE); - goto fail; + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_IV_PARAM_FAILURE); + goto fail; } clientContext = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(mechanism, - (ss->sec.isServer ? CKA_DECRYPT : CKA_ENCRYPT), - pwSpec->client.write_key, param); + (ss->sec.isServer ? CKA_DECRYPT + : CKA_ENCRYPT), + pwSpec->client.write_key, param); iv.data = PK11_IVFromParam(mechanism, param, (int *)&iv.len); if (iv.data) - PORT_Memcpy(pwSpec->client.write_iv, iv.data, iv.len); - SECITEM_FreeItem(param,PR_TRUE); + PORT_Memcpy(pwSpec->client.write_iv, iv.data, iv.len); + SECITEM_FreeItem(param, PR_TRUE); if (clientContext == NULL) { - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SYM_KEY_CONTEXT_FAILURE); - goto fail; + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SYM_KEY_CONTEXT_FAILURE); + goto fail; } - pwSpec->encode = (SSLCipher) PK11_CipherOp; - pwSpec->decode = (SSLCipher) PK11_CipherOp; - pwSpec->destroy = (SSLDestroy) PK11_DestroyContext; + pwSpec->encode = (SSLCipher)PK11_CipherOp; + pwSpec->decode = (SSLCipher)PK11_CipherOp; pwSpec->encodeContext = (ss->sec.isServer) ? serverContext : clientContext; pwSpec->decodeContext = (ss->sec.isServer) ? clientContext : serverContext; @@ -2159,122 +2113,120 @@ ssl3_InitPendingContextsPKCS11(sslSocket *ss) return SECSuccess; fail: - if (serverContext != NULL) PK11_DestroyContext(serverContext, PR_TRUE); - if (clientContext != NULL) PK11_DestroyContext(clientContext, PR_TRUE); + if (serverContext != NULL) + PK11_DestroyContext(serverContext, PR_TRUE); if (pwSpec->client.write_mac_context != NULL) { - PK11_DestroyContext(pwSpec->client.write_mac_context,PR_TRUE); - pwSpec->client.write_mac_context = NULL; + PK11_DestroyContext(pwSpec->client.write_mac_context, PR_TRUE); + pwSpec->client.write_mac_context = NULL; } if (pwSpec->server.write_mac_context != NULL) { - PK11_DestroyContext(pwSpec->server.write_mac_context,PR_TRUE); - pwSpec->server.write_mac_context = NULL; + PK11_DestroyContext(pwSpec->server.write_mac_context, PR_TRUE); + pwSpec->server.write_mac_context = NULL; } return SECFailure; } +HASH_HashType +ssl3_GetTls12HashType(sslSocket *ss) +{ + if (ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { + return HASH_AlgNULL; + } + + switch (ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def->prf_hash) { + case ssl_hash_sha384: + return HASH_AlgSHA384; + case ssl_hash_sha256: + case ssl_hash_none: + /* ssl_hash_none is for pre-1.2 suites, which use SHA-256. */ + return HASH_AlgSHA256; + default: + PORT_Assert(0); + } + return HASH_AlgSHA256; +} + /* Complete the initialization of all keys, ciphers, MACs and their contexts * for the pending Cipher Spec. - * Called from: ssl3_SendClientKeyExchange (for Full handshake) - * ssl3_HandleRSAClientKeyExchange (for Full handshake) - * ssl3_HandleServerHello (for session restart) - * ssl3_HandleClientHello (for session restart) + * Called from: ssl3_SendClientKeyExchange (for Full handshake) + * ssl3_HandleRSAClientKeyExchange (for Full handshake) + * ssl3_HandleServerHello (for session restart) + * ssl3_HandleClientHello (for session restart) * Sets error code, but caller probably should override to disambiguate. * NULL pms means re-use old master_secret. * - * This code is common to the bypass and PKCS11 execution paths. For - * the bypass case, pms is NULL. If the old master secret is reused, - * pms is NULL and the master secret is already in either - * pwSpec->msItem.len (the bypass case) or pwSpec->master_secret. - * - * For the bypass case, pms is NULL. + * If the old master secret is reused, pms is NULL and the master secret is + * already in pwSpec->master_secret. */ SECStatus ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *pms) { - ssl3CipherSpec * pwSpec; - ssl3CipherSpec * cwSpec; - SECStatus rv; + ssl3CipherSpec *pwSpec; + ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec; + SECStatus rv; - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); - ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); /**************************************/ + ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); /**************************************/ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec == ss->ssl3.pwSpec); - pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec; - cwSpec = ss->ssl3.cwSpec; + pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec; + cwSpec = ss->ssl3.cwSpec; if (pms || (!pwSpec->msItem.len && !pwSpec->master_secret)) { - rv = ssl3_DeriveMasterSecret(ss, pms); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto done; /* err code set by ssl3_DeriveMasterSecret */ - } - } -#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS - if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11 && pwSpec->msItem.len && pwSpec->msItem.data) { - /* Double Bypass succeeded in extracting the master_secret */ - const ssl3KEADef * kea_def = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def; - PRBool isTLS = (PRBool)(kea_def->tls_keygen || - (pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0)); - pwSpec->bypassCiphers = PR_TRUE; - rv = ssl3_KeyAndMacDeriveBypass( pwSpec, - (const unsigned char *)&ss->ssl3.hs.client_random, - (const unsigned char *)&ss->ssl3.hs.server_random, - isTLS, - (PRBool)(kea_def->is_limited)); - if (rv == SECSuccess) { - rv = ssl3_InitPendingContextsBypass(ss); - } - } else -#endif + rv = ssl3_DeriveMasterSecret(ss, pms); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto done; /* err code set by ssl3_DeriveMasterSecret */ + } + } if (pwSpec->master_secret) { - rv = ssl3_DeriveConnectionKeysPKCS11(ss); - if (rv == SECSuccess) { - rv = ssl3_InitPendingContextsPKCS11(ss); - } + rv = ssl3_DeriveConnectionKeys(ss); + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + rv = ssl3_InitPendingContexts(ss); + } } else { - PORT_Assert(pwSpec->master_secret); - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); - rv = SECFailure; + PORT_Assert(pwSpec->master_secret); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + rv = SECFailure; } if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto done; + goto done; } /* Generic behaviors -- common to all crypto methods */ if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) { - pwSpec->read_seq_num.high = pwSpec->write_seq_num.high = 0; + pwSpec->read_seq_num = pwSpec->write_seq_num = 0; } else { - if (cwSpec->epoch == PR_UINT16_MAX) { - /* The problem here is that we have rehandshaked too many - * times (you are not allowed to wrap the epoch). The - * spec says you should be discarding the connection - * and start over, so not much we can do here. */ - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); - rv = SECFailure; - goto done; - } - /* The sequence number has the high 16 bits as the epoch. */ - pwSpec->epoch = cwSpec->epoch + 1; - pwSpec->read_seq_num.high = pwSpec->write_seq_num.high = - pwSpec->epoch << 16; - - dtls_InitRecvdRecords(&pwSpec->recvdRecords); - } - pwSpec->read_seq_num.low = pwSpec->write_seq_num.low = 0; + if (cwSpec->epoch == PR_UINT16_MAX) { + /* The problem here is that we have rehandshaked too many + * times (you are not allowed to wrap the epoch). The + * spec says you should be discarding the connection + * and start over, so not much we can do here. */ + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + rv = SECFailure; + goto done; + } + /* The sequence number has the high 16 bits as the epoch. */ + pwSpec->epoch = cwSpec->epoch + 1; + pwSpec->read_seq_num = pwSpec->write_seq_num = + (sslSequenceNumber)pwSpec->epoch << 48; + + dtls_InitRecvdRecords(&pwSpec->recvdRecords); + } done: - ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /******************************/ + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /******************************/ if (rv != SECSuccess) - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE); + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE); return rv; } /* * 60 bytes is 3 times the maximum length MAC size that is supported. */ -static const unsigned char mac_pad_1 [60] = { +static const unsigned char mac_pad_1[60] = { 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, @@ -2284,7 +2236,7 @@ static const unsigned char mac_pad_1 [60] = { 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36 }; -static const unsigned char mac_pad_2 [60] = { +static const unsigned char mac_pad_2[60] = { 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, @@ -2300,135 +2252,41 @@ static const unsigned char mac_pad_2 [60] = { */ static SECStatus ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC( - ssl3CipherSpec * spec, - PRBool useServerMacKey, + ssl3CipherSpec *spec, + PRBool useServerMacKey, const unsigned char *header, - unsigned int headerLen, - const SSL3Opaque * input, - int inputLength, - unsigned char * outbuf, - unsigned int * outLength) + unsigned int headerLen, + const SSL3Opaque *input, + int inputLength, + unsigned char *outbuf, + unsigned int *outLength) { - const ssl3MACDef * mac_def; - SECStatus rv; + const ssl3MACDef *mac_def; + SECStatus rv; PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "frag hash1: header", header, headerLen)); PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "frag hash1: input", input, inputLength)); mac_def = spec->mac_def; if (mac_def->mac == mac_null) { - *outLength = 0; - return SECSuccess; - } -#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS - if (spec->bypassCiphers) { - /* bypass version */ - const SECHashObject *hashObj = NULL; - unsigned int pad_bytes = 0; - PRUint64 write_mac_context[MAX_MAC_CONTEXT_LLONGS]; - - switch (mac_def->mac) { - case ssl_mac_null: - *outLength = 0; - return SECSuccess; - case ssl_mac_md5: - pad_bytes = 48; - hashObj = HASH_GetRawHashObject(HASH_AlgMD5); - break; - case ssl_mac_sha: - pad_bytes = 40; - hashObj = HASH_GetRawHashObject(HASH_AlgSHA1); - break; - case ssl_hmac_md5: /* used with TLS */ - hashObj = HASH_GetRawHashObject(HASH_AlgMD5); - break; - case ssl_hmac_sha: /* used with TLS */ - hashObj = HASH_GetRawHashObject(HASH_AlgSHA1); - break; - case ssl_hmac_sha256: /* used with TLS */ - hashObj = HASH_GetRawHashObject(HASH_AlgSHA256); - break; - default: - break; - } - if (!hashObj) { - PORT_Assert(0); - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); - return SECFailure; - } - - if (spec->version <= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) { - unsigned int tempLen; - unsigned char temp[MAX_MAC_LENGTH]; - - /* compute "inner" part of SSL3 MAC */ - hashObj->begin(write_mac_context); - if (useServerMacKey) - hashObj->update(write_mac_context, - spec->server.write_mac_key_item.data, - spec->server.write_mac_key_item.len); - else - hashObj->update(write_mac_context, - spec->client.write_mac_key_item.data, - spec->client.write_mac_key_item.len); - hashObj->update(write_mac_context, mac_pad_1, pad_bytes); - hashObj->update(write_mac_context, header, headerLen); - hashObj->update(write_mac_context, input, inputLength); - hashObj->end(write_mac_context, temp, &tempLen, sizeof temp); - - /* compute "outer" part of SSL3 MAC */ - hashObj->begin(write_mac_context); - if (useServerMacKey) - hashObj->update(write_mac_context, - spec->server.write_mac_key_item.data, - spec->server.write_mac_key_item.len); - else - hashObj->update(write_mac_context, - spec->client.write_mac_key_item.data, - spec->client.write_mac_key_item.len); - hashObj->update(write_mac_context, mac_pad_2, pad_bytes); - hashObj->update(write_mac_context, temp, tempLen); - hashObj->end(write_mac_context, outbuf, outLength, spec->mac_size); - rv = SECSuccess; - } else { /* is TLS */ -#define cx ((HMACContext *)write_mac_context) - if (useServerMacKey) { - rv = HMAC_Init(cx, hashObj, - spec->server.write_mac_key_item.data, - spec->server.write_mac_key_item.len, PR_FALSE); - } else { - rv = HMAC_Init(cx, hashObj, - spec->client.write_mac_key_item.data, - spec->client.write_mac_key_item.len, PR_FALSE); - } - if (rv == SECSuccess) { - HMAC_Begin(cx); - HMAC_Update(cx, header, headerLen); - HMAC_Update(cx, input, inputLength); - rv = HMAC_Finish(cx, outbuf, outLength, spec->mac_size); - HMAC_Destroy(cx, PR_FALSE); - } -#undef cx - } - } else -#endif - { - PK11Context *mac_context = - (useServerMacKey ? spec->server.write_mac_context - : spec->client.write_mac_context); - rv = PK11_DigestBegin(mac_context); - rv |= PK11_DigestOp(mac_context, header, headerLen); - rv |= PK11_DigestOp(mac_context, input, inputLength); - rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(mac_context, outbuf, outLength, spec->mac_size); + *outLength = 0; + return SECSuccess; } + PK11Context *mac_context = + (useServerMacKey ? spec->server.write_mac_context + : spec->client.write_mac_context); + rv = PK11_DigestBegin(mac_context); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(mac_context, header, headerLen); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(mac_context, input, inputLength); + rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(mac_context, outbuf, outLength, spec->mac_size); PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || *outLength == (unsigned)spec->mac_size); PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "frag hash2: result", outbuf, *outLength)); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - rv = SECFailure; - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MAC_COMPUTATION_FAILURE); + rv = SECFailure; + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MAC_COMPUTATION_FAILURE); } return rv; } @@ -2441,51 +2299,45 @@ ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC( */ static SECStatus ssl3_ComputeRecordMACConstantTime( - ssl3CipherSpec * spec, - PRBool useServerMacKey, + ssl3CipherSpec *spec, + PRBool useServerMacKey, const unsigned char *header, - unsigned int headerLen, - const SSL3Opaque * input, - int inputLen, - int originalLen, - unsigned char * outbuf, - unsigned int * outLen) -{ - CK_MECHANISM_TYPE macType; + unsigned int headerLen, + const SSL3Opaque *input, + int inputLen, + int originalLen, + unsigned char *outbuf, + unsigned int *outLen) +{ + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE macType; CK_NSS_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME_PARAMS params; - SECItem param, inputItem, outputItem; - SECStatus rv; - PK11SymKey * key; + SECItem param, inputItem, outputItem; + SECStatus rv; + PK11SymKey *key; PORT_Assert(inputLen >= spec->mac_size); PORT_Assert(originalLen >= inputLen); - if (spec->bypassCiphers) { - /* This function doesn't support PKCS#11 bypass. We fallback on the - * non-constant time version. */ - goto fallback; - } - if (spec->mac_def->mac == mac_null) { - *outLen = 0; - return SECSuccess; + *outLen = 0; + return SECSuccess; } macType = CKM_NSS_HMAC_CONSTANT_TIME; - if (spec->version <= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) { - macType = CKM_NSS_SSL3_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME; + if (spec->version == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) { + macType = CKM_NSS_SSL3_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME; } params.macAlg = spec->mac_def->mmech; params.ulBodyTotalLen = originalLen; - params.pHeader = (unsigned char *) header; /* const cast */ + params.pHeader = (unsigned char *)header; /* const cast */ params.ulHeaderLen = headerLen; - param.data = (unsigned char*) ¶ms; + param.data = (unsigned char *)¶ms; param.len = sizeof(params); param.type = 0; - inputItem.data = (unsigned char *) input; + inputItem.data = (unsigned char *)input; inputItem.len = inputLen; inputItem.type = 0; @@ -2495,279 +2347,322 @@ ssl3_ComputeRecordMACConstantTime( key = spec->server.write_mac_key; if (!useServerMacKey) { - key = spec->client.write_mac_key; + key = spec->client.write_mac_key; } rv = PK11_SignWithSymKey(key, macType, ¶m, &outputItem, &inputItem); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM) { - goto fallback; - } + if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM) { + /* ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC() expects the MAC to have been removed + * from the input length already. */ + return ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC(spec, useServerMacKey, + header, headerLen, + input, inputLen - spec->mac_size, + outbuf, outLen); + } - *outLen = 0; - rv = SECFailure; - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MAC_COMPUTATION_FAILURE); - return rv; + *outLen = 0; + rv = SECFailure; + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MAC_COMPUTATION_FAILURE); + return rv; } PORT_Assert(outputItem.len == (unsigned)spec->mac_size); *outLen = outputItem.len; return rv; - -fallback: - /* ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC expects the MAC to have been removed from the - * length already. */ - inputLen -= spec->mac_size; - return ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC(spec, useServerMacKey, header, headerLen, - input, inputLen, outbuf, outLen); } static PRBool -ssl3_ClientAuthTokenPresent(sslSessionID *sid) { +ssl3_ClientAuthTokenPresent(sslSessionID *sid) +{ PK11SlotInfo *slot = NULL; PRBool isPresent = PR_TRUE; /* we only care if we are doing client auth */ if (!sid || !sid->u.ssl3.clAuthValid) { - return PR_TRUE; + return PR_TRUE; } /* get the slot */ slot = SECMOD_LookupSlot(sid->u.ssl3.clAuthModuleID, - sid->u.ssl3.clAuthSlotID); + sid->u.ssl3.clAuthSlotID); if (slot == NULL || - !PK11_IsPresent(slot) || - sid->u.ssl3.clAuthSeries != PK11_GetSlotSeries(slot) || - sid->u.ssl3.clAuthSlotID != PK11_GetSlotID(slot) || - sid->u.ssl3.clAuthModuleID != PK11_GetModuleID(slot) || - (PK11_NeedLogin(slot) && !PK11_IsLoggedIn(slot, NULL))) { - isPresent = PR_FALSE; - } + !PK11_IsPresent(slot) || + sid->u.ssl3.clAuthSeries != PK11_GetSlotSeries(slot) || + sid->u.ssl3.clAuthSlotID != PK11_GetSlotID(slot) || + sid->u.ssl3.clAuthModuleID != PK11_GetModuleID(slot) || + (PK11_NeedLogin(slot) && !PK11_IsLoggedIn(slot, NULL))) { + isPresent = PR_FALSE; + } if (slot) { - PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); } return isPresent; } /* Caller must hold the spec read lock. */ SECStatus -ssl3_CompressMACEncryptRecord(ssl3CipherSpec * cwSpec, - PRBool isServer, - PRBool isDTLS, - PRBool capRecordVersion, - SSL3ContentType type, - const SSL3Opaque * pIn, - PRUint32 contentLen, - sslBuffer * wrBuf) -{ - const ssl3BulkCipherDef * cipher_def; - SECStatus rv; - PRUint32 macLen = 0; - PRUint32 fragLen; - PRUint32 p1Len, p2Len, oddLen = 0; - PRUint16 headerLen; +ssl3_CompressMACEncryptRecord(ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec, + PRBool isServer, + PRBool isDTLS, + PRBool capRecordVersion, + SSL3ContentType type, + const SSL3Opaque *pIn, + PRUint32 contentLen, + sslBuffer *wrBuf) +{ + const ssl3BulkCipherDef *cipher_def; + SECStatus rv; + PRUint32 macLen = 0; + PRUint32 fragLen; + PRUint32 p1Len, p2Len, oddLen = 0; unsigned int ivLen = 0; - int cipherBytes = 0; - unsigned char pseudoHeader[13]; - unsigned int pseudoHeaderLen; + unsigned char pseudoHeader[13]; + unsigned int pseudoHeaderLen; cipher_def = cwSpec->cipher_def; - headerLen = isDTLS ? DTLS_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH : SSL3_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH; if (cipher_def->type == type_block && - cwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1) { - /* Prepend the per-record explicit IV using technique 2b from - * RFC 4346 section 6.2.3.2: The IV is a cryptographically - * strong random number XORed with the CBC residue from the previous - * record. - */ - ivLen = cipher_def->iv_size; - if (ivLen > wrBuf->space - headerLen) { - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); - return SECFailure; - } - rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(wrBuf->buf + headerLen, ivLen); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_GENERATE_RANDOM_FAILURE); - return rv; - } - rv = cwSpec->encode( cwSpec->encodeContext, - wrBuf->buf + headerLen, - &cipherBytes, /* output and actual outLen */ - ivLen, /* max outlen */ - wrBuf->buf + headerLen, - ivLen); /* input and inputLen*/ - if (rv != SECSuccess || cipherBytes != ivLen) { - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_ENCRYPTION_FAILURE); - return SECFailure; - } + cwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1) { + /* Prepend the per-record explicit IV using technique 2b from + * RFC 4346 section 6.2.3.2: The IV is a cryptographically + * strong random number XORed with the CBC residue from the previous + * record. + */ + ivLen = cipher_def->iv_size; + if (ivLen > wrBuf->space) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(wrBuf->buf, ivLen); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_GENERATE_RANDOM_FAILURE); + return rv; + } + rv = cwSpec->encode(cwSpec->encodeContext, + wrBuf->buf, /* output */ + (int *)&wrBuf->len, /* outlen */ + ivLen, /* max outlen */ + wrBuf->buf, /* input */ + ivLen); /* input len */ + if (rv != SECSuccess || wrBuf->len != ivLen) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_ENCRYPTION_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } } if (cwSpec->compressor) { - int outlen; - rv = cwSpec->compressor( - cwSpec->compressContext, - wrBuf->buf + headerLen + ivLen, &outlen, - wrBuf->space - headerLen - ivLen, pIn, contentLen); - if (rv != SECSuccess) - return rv; - pIn = wrBuf->buf + headerLen + ivLen; - contentLen = outlen; + int outlen; + rv = cwSpec->compressor(cwSpec->compressContext, wrBuf->buf + ivLen, + &outlen, wrBuf->space - ivLen, pIn, contentLen); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return rv; + pIn = wrBuf->buf + ivLen; + contentLen = outlen; } pseudoHeaderLen = ssl3_BuildRecordPseudoHeader( - pseudoHeader, cwSpec->write_seq_num, type, - cwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0, cwSpec->version, - isDTLS, contentLen); + pseudoHeader, cwSpec->write_seq_num, type, + cwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0, cwSpec->version, + isDTLS, contentLen); PORT_Assert(pseudoHeaderLen <= sizeof(pseudoHeader)); if (cipher_def->type == type_aead) { - const int nonceLen = cipher_def->explicit_nonce_size; - const int tagLen = cipher_def->tag_size; - - if (headerLen + nonceLen + contentLen + tagLen > wrBuf->space) { - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); - return SECFailure; - } - - cipherBytes = contentLen; - rv = cwSpec->aead( - isServer ? &cwSpec->server : &cwSpec->client, - PR_FALSE, /* do encrypt */ - wrBuf->buf + headerLen, /* output */ - &cipherBytes, /* out len */ - wrBuf->space - headerLen, /* max out */ - pIn, contentLen, /* input */ - pseudoHeader, pseudoHeaderLen); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_ENCRYPTION_FAILURE); - return SECFailure; - } + const int nonceLen = cipher_def->explicit_nonce_size; + const int tagLen = cipher_def->tag_size; + + if (nonceLen + contentLen + tagLen > wrBuf->space) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = cwSpec->aead( + isServer ? &cwSpec->server : &cwSpec->client, + PR_FALSE, /* do encrypt */ + wrBuf->buf, /* output */ + (int *)&wrBuf->len, /* out len */ + wrBuf->space, /* max out */ + pIn, contentLen, /* input */ + pseudoHeader, pseudoHeaderLen); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_ENCRYPTION_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } } else { - /* - * Add the MAC - */ - rv = ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC(cwSpec, isServer, - pseudoHeader, pseudoHeaderLen, pIn, contentLen, - wrBuf->buf + headerLen + ivLen + contentLen, &macLen); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MAC_COMPUTATION_FAILURE); - return SECFailure; - } - p1Len = contentLen; - p2Len = macLen; - fragLen = contentLen + macLen; /* needs to be encrypted */ - PORT_Assert(fragLen <= MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 1024); - - /* - * Pad the text (if we're doing a block cipher) - * then Encrypt it - */ - if (cipher_def->type == type_block) { - unsigned char * pBuf; - int padding_length; - int i; - - oddLen = contentLen % cipher_def->block_size; - /* Assume blockSize is a power of two */ - padding_length = cipher_def->block_size - 1 - - ((fragLen) & (cipher_def->block_size - 1)); - fragLen += padding_length + 1; - PORT_Assert((fragLen % cipher_def->block_size) == 0); - - /* Pad according to TLS rules (also acceptable to SSL3). */ - pBuf = &wrBuf->buf[headerLen + ivLen + fragLen - 1]; - for (i = padding_length + 1; i > 0; --i) { - *pBuf-- = padding_length; - } - /* now, if contentLen is not a multiple of block size, fix it */ - p2Len = fragLen - p1Len; - } - if (p1Len < 256) { - oddLen = p1Len; - p1Len = 0; - } else { - p1Len -= oddLen; - } - if (oddLen) { - p2Len += oddLen; - PORT_Assert( (cipher_def->block_size < 2) || \ - (p2Len % cipher_def->block_size) == 0); - memmove(wrBuf->buf + headerLen + ivLen + p1Len, pIn + p1Len, - oddLen); - } - if (p1Len > 0) { - int cipherBytesPart1 = -1; - rv = cwSpec->encode( cwSpec->encodeContext, - wrBuf->buf + headerLen + ivLen, /* output */ - &cipherBytesPart1, /* actual outlen */ - p1Len, /* max outlen */ - pIn, p1Len); /* input, and inputlen */ - PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess && cipherBytesPart1 == (int) p1Len); - if (rv != SECSuccess || cipherBytesPart1 != (int) p1Len) { - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_ENCRYPTION_FAILURE); - return SECFailure; - } - cipherBytes += cipherBytesPart1; - } - if (p2Len > 0) { - int cipherBytesPart2 = -1; - rv = cwSpec->encode( cwSpec->encodeContext, - wrBuf->buf + headerLen + ivLen + p1Len, - &cipherBytesPart2, /* output and actual outLen */ - p2Len, /* max outlen */ - wrBuf->buf + headerLen + ivLen + p1Len, - p2Len); /* input and inputLen*/ - PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess && cipherBytesPart2 == (int) p2Len); - if (rv != SECSuccess || cipherBytesPart2 != (int) p2Len) { - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_ENCRYPTION_FAILURE); - return SECFailure; - } - cipherBytes += cipherBytesPart2; - } - } - - PORT_Assert(cipherBytes <= MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 1024); - - wrBuf->len = cipherBytes + headerLen; - wrBuf->buf[0] = type; - if (isDTLS) { - SSL3ProtocolVersion version; - - version = dtls_TLSVersionToDTLSVersion(cwSpec->version); - wrBuf->buf[1] = MSB(version); - wrBuf->buf[2] = LSB(version); - wrBuf->buf[3] = (unsigned char)(cwSpec->write_seq_num.high >> 24); - wrBuf->buf[4] = (unsigned char)(cwSpec->write_seq_num.high >> 16); - wrBuf->buf[5] = (unsigned char)(cwSpec->write_seq_num.high >> 8); - wrBuf->buf[6] = (unsigned char)(cwSpec->write_seq_num.high >> 0); - wrBuf->buf[7] = (unsigned char)(cwSpec->write_seq_num.low >> 24); - wrBuf->buf[8] = (unsigned char)(cwSpec->write_seq_num.low >> 16); - wrBuf->buf[9] = (unsigned char)(cwSpec->write_seq_num.low >> 8); - wrBuf->buf[10] = (unsigned char)(cwSpec->write_seq_num.low >> 0); - wrBuf->buf[11] = MSB(cipherBytes); - wrBuf->buf[12] = LSB(cipherBytes); + /* + * Add the MAC + */ + rv = ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC(cwSpec, isServer, pseudoHeader, + pseudoHeaderLen, pIn, contentLen, + wrBuf->buf + ivLen + contentLen, &macLen); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MAC_COMPUTATION_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + p1Len = contentLen; + p2Len = macLen; + fragLen = contentLen + macLen; /* needs to be encrypted */ + PORT_Assert(fragLen <= MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 1024); + + /* + * Pad the text (if we're doing a block cipher) + * then Encrypt it + */ + if (cipher_def->type == type_block) { + unsigned char *pBuf; + int padding_length; + int i; + + oddLen = contentLen % cipher_def->block_size; + /* Assume blockSize is a power of two */ + padding_length = cipher_def->block_size - 1 - ((fragLen) & (cipher_def->block_size - 1)); + fragLen += padding_length + 1; + PORT_Assert((fragLen % cipher_def->block_size) == 0); + + /* Pad according to TLS rules (also acceptable to SSL3). */ + pBuf = &wrBuf->buf[ivLen + fragLen - 1]; + for (i = padding_length + 1; i > 0; --i) { + *pBuf-- = padding_length; + } + /* now, if contentLen is not a multiple of block size, fix it */ + p2Len = fragLen - p1Len; + } + if (p1Len < 256) { + oddLen = p1Len; + p1Len = 0; + } else { + p1Len -= oddLen; + } + if (oddLen) { + p2Len += oddLen; + PORT_Assert((cipher_def->block_size < 2) || + (p2Len % cipher_def->block_size) == 0); + memmove(wrBuf->buf + ivLen + p1Len, pIn + p1Len, oddLen); + } + if (p1Len > 0) { + int cipherBytesPart1 = -1; + rv = cwSpec->encode(cwSpec->encodeContext, + wrBuf->buf + ivLen, /* output */ + &cipherBytesPart1, /* actual outlen */ + p1Len, /* max outlen */ + pIn, + p1Len); /* input, and inputlen */ + PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess && cipherBytesPart1 == (int)p1Len); + if (rv != SECSuccess || cipherBytesPart1 != (int)p1Len) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_ENCRYPTION_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + wrBuf->len += cipherBytesPart1; + } + if (p2Len > 0) { + int cipherBytesPart2 = -1; + rv = cwSpec->encode(cwSpec->encodeContext, + wrBuf->buf + ivLen + p1Len, + &cipherBytesPart2, /* output and actual outLen */ + p2Len, /* max outlen */ + wrBuf->buf + ivLen + p1Len, + p2Len); /* input and inputLen*/ + PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess && cipherBytesPart2 == (int)p2Len); + if (rv != SECSuccess || cipherBytesPart2 != (int)p2Len) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_ENCRYPTION_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + wrBuf->len += cipherBytesPart2; + } + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +ssl_ProtectRecord(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec, + PRBool capRecordVersion, SSL3ContentType type, + const SSL3Opaque *pIn, PRUint32 contentLen, sslBuffer *wrBuf) +{ + const ssl3BulkCipherDef *cipher_def = cwSpec->cipher_def; + PRUint16 headerLen; + sslBuffer protBuf; + SSL3ProtocolVersion version = cwSpec->version; + PRBool isTLS13; + PRUint8 *ptr = wrBuf->buf; + SECStatus rv; + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.shortHeaders) { + PORT_Assert(!IS_DTLS(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); + headerLen = TLS13_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH_SHORT; } else { - SSL3ProtocolVersion version = cwSpec->version; + headerLen = IS_DTLS(ss) ? DTLS_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH : SSL3_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH; + } + protBuf.buf = wrBuf->buf + headerLen; + protBuf.len = 0; + protBuf.space = wrBuf->space - headerLen; + + PORT_Assert(cipher_def->max_records <= RECORD_SEQ_MAX); + if ((cwSpec->write_seq_num & RECORD_SEQ_MAX) >= cipher_def->max_records) { + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[-]: write sequence number at limit 0x%0llx", + SSL_GETPID(), cwSpec->write_seq_num)); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOO_MANY_RECORDS); + return SECFailure; + } - if (capRecordVersion) { - version = PR_MIN(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0, version); - } - wrBuf->buf[1] = MSB(version); - wrBuf->buf[2] = LSB(version); - wrBuf->buf[3] = MSB(cipherBytes); - wrBuf->buf[4] = LSB(cipherBytes); + isTLS13 = (PRBool)(cwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); + +#ifdef UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE + rv = Null_Cipher(NULL, protBuf.buf, (int *)&protBuf.len, protBuf.space, + pIn, contentLen); +#else + if (isTLS13) { + rv = tls13_ProtectRecord(ss, cwSpec, type, pIn, contentLen, &protBuf); + } else { + rv = ssl3_CompressMACEncryptRecord(cwSpec, ss->sec.isServer, + IS_DTLS(ss), capRecordVersion, type, + pIn, contentLen, &protBuf); + } +#endif + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* error was set */ } - ssl3_BumpSequenceNumber(&cwSpec->write_seq_num); + PORT_Assert(protBuf.len <= MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + (isTLS13 ? 256 : 1024)); + wrBuf->len = protBuf.len + headerLen; + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.shortHeaders) { + PORT_Assert(!IS_DTLS(ss)); /* Decoder not yet implemented. */ + (void)ssl_EncodeUintX(0x8000 | protBuf.len, 2, ptr); + } else { +#ifndef UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE + if (isTLS13 && cipher_def->calg != ssl_calg_null) { + *ptr++ = content_application_data; + } else +#endif + { + *ptr++ = type; + } + + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + version = isTLS13 ? SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1 : version; + version = dtls_TLSVersionToDTLSVersion(version); + + ptr = ssl_EncodeUintX(version, 2, ptr); + ptr = ssl_EncodeUintX(cwSpec->write_seq_num, 8, ptr); + } else { + if (capRecordVersion || isTLS13) { + version = PR_MIN(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0, version); + } + ptr = ssl_EncodeUintX(version, 2, ptr); + } + (void)ssl_EncodeUintX(protBuf.len, 2, ptr); + } + ++cwSpec->write_seq_num; return SECSuccess; } /* Process the plain text before sending it. * Returns the number of bytes of plaintext that were successfully sent - * plus the number of bytes of plaintext that were copied into the - * output (write) buffer. + * plus the number of bytes of plaintext that were copied into the + * output (write) buffer. * Returns SECFailure on a hard IO error, memory error, or crypto error. * Does NOT return SECWouldBlock. * @@ -2796,24 +2691,24 @@ ssl3_CompressMACEncryptRecord(ssl3CipherSpec * cwSpec, * flag to work around such servers. */ PRInt32 -ssl3_SendRecord( sslSocket * ss, - DTLSEpoch epoch, /* DTLS only */ - SSL3ContentType type, - const SSL3Opaque * pIn, /* input buffer */ - PRInt32 nIn, /* bytes of input */ - PRInt32 flags) -{ - sslBuffer * wrBuf = &ss->sec.writeBuf; - SECStatus rv; - PRInt32 totalSent = 0; - PRBool capRecordVersion; +ssl3_SendRecord(sslSocket *ss, + ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec, /* non-NULL for DTLS retransmits */ + SSL3ContentType type, + const SSL3Opaque *pIn, /* input buffer */ + PRInt32 nIn, /* bytes of input */ + PRInt32 flags) +{ + sslBuffer *wrBuf = &ss->sec.writeBuf; + SECStatus rv; + PRInt32 totalSent = 0; + PRBool capRecordVersion; SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d] SendRecord type: %s nIn=%d", - SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ssl3_DecodeContentType(type), - nIn)); + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ssl3_DecodeContentType(type), + nIn)); PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "Send record (plain text)", pIn, nIn)); - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); if (ss->ssl3.fatalAlertSent) { SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d] Suppress write, fatal alert already sent", @@ -2824,180 +2719,172 @@ ssl3_SendRecord( sslSocket * ss, capRecordVersion = ((flags & ssl_SEND_FLAG_CAP_RECORD_VERSION) != 0); if (capRecordVersion) { - /* ssl_SEND_FLAG_CAP_RECORD_VERSION can only be used with the - * TLS initial ClientHello. */ - PORT_Assert(!IS_DTLS(ss)); - PORT_Assert(!ss->firstHsDone); - PORT_Assert(type == content_handshake); - PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_server_hello); + /* ssl_SEND_FLAG_CAP_RECORD_VERSION can only be used with the + * TLS initial ClientHello. */ + PORT_Assert(!IS_DTLS(ss)); + PORT_Assert(!ss->firstHsDone); + PORT_Assert(type == content_handshake); + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_server_hello); } if (ss->ssl3.initialized == PR_FALSE) { - /* This can happen on a server if the very first incoming record - ** looks like a defective ssl3 record (e.g. too long), and we're - ** trying to send an alert. - */ - PR_ASSERT(type == content_alert); - rv = ssl3_InitState(ss); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return SECFailure; /* ssl3_InitState has set the error code. */ - } + /* This can happen on a server if the very first incoming record + ** looks like a defective ssl3 record (e.g. too long), and we're + ** trying to send an alert. + */ + PR_ASSERT(type == content_alert); + rv = ssl3_InitState(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* ssl3_InitState has set the error code. */ + } } /* check for Token Presence */ if (!ssl3_ClientAuthTokenPresent(ss->sec.ci.sid)) { - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOKEN_INSERTION_REMOVAL); - return SECFailure; + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOKEN_INSERTION_REMOVAL); + return SECFailure; } while (nIn > 0) { - PRUint32 contentLen = PR_MIN(nIn, MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH); - unsigned int spaceNeeded; - unsigned int numRecords; - - ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); /********************************/ - - if (nIn > 1 && ss->opt.cbcRandomIV && - ss->ssl3.cwSpec->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1 && - type == content_application_data && - ss->ssl3.cwSpec->cipher_def->type == type_block /* CBC mode */) { - /* We will split the first byte of the record into its own record, - * as explained in the documentation for SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV in ssl.h - */ - numRecords = 2; - } else { - numRecords = 1; - } - - spaceNeeded = contentLen + (numRecords * SSL3_BUFFER_FUDGE); - if (ss->ssl3.cwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1 && - ss->ssl3.cwSpec->cipher_def->type == type_block) { - spaceNeeded += ss->ssl3.cwSpec->cipher_def->iv_size; - } - if (spaceNeeded > wrBuf->space) { - rv = sslBuffer_Grow(wrBuf, spaceNeeded); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: SendRecord, tried to get %d bytes", - SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, spaceNeeded)); - goto spec_locked_loser; /* sslBuffer_Grow set error code. */ - } - } - - if (numRecords == 2) { - sslBuffer secondRecord; - - rv = ssl3_CompressMACEncryptRecord(ss->ssl3.cwSpec, - ss->sec.isServer, IS_DTLS(ss), - capRecordVersion, type, pIn, - 1, wrBuf); - if (rv != SECSuccess) - goto spec_locked_loser; - - PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "send (encrypted) record data [1/2]:", - wrBuf->buf, wrBuf->len)); - - secondRecord.buf = wrBuf->buf + wrBuf->len; - secondRecord.len = 0; - secondRecord.space = wrBuf->space - wrBuf->len; - - rv = ssl3_CompressMACEncryptRecord(ss->ssl3.cwSpec, - ss->sec.isServer, IS_DTLS(ss), - capRecordVersion, type, - pIn + 1, contentLen - 1, - &secondRecord); - if (rv == SECSuccess) { - PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "send (encrypted) record data [2/2]:", - secondRecord.buf, secondRecord.len)); - wrBuf->len += secondRecord.len; - } - } else { - if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) { - rv = ssl3_CompressMACEncryptRecord(ss->ssl3.cwSpec, - ss->sec.isServer, - IS_DTLS(ss), - capRecordVersion, - type, pIn, - contentLen, wrBuf); - } else { - rv = dtls_CompressMACEncryptRecord(ss, epoch, - !!(flags & ssl_SEND_FLAG_USE_EPOCH), - type, pIn, - contentLen, wrBuf); - } - - if (rv == SECSuccess) { - PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "send (encrypted) record data:", - wrBuf->buf, wrBuf->len)); - } - } - -spec_locked_loser: - ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /************************************/ - - if (rv != SECSuccess) - return SECFailure; - - pIn += contentLen; - nIn -= contentLen; - PORT_Assert( nIn >= 0 ); - - /* If there's still some previously saved ciphertext, - * or the caller doesn't want us to send the data yet, - * then add all our new ciphertext to the amount previously saved. - */ - if ((ss->pendingBuf.len > 0) || - (flags & ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER)) { - - rv = ssl_SaveWriteData(ss, wrBuf->buf, wrBuf->len); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - /* presumably a memory error, SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY */ - return SECFailure; - } - wrBuf->len = 0; /* All cipher text is saved away. */ - - if (!(flags & ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER)) { - PRInt32 sent; - ss->handshakeBegun = 1; - sent = ssl_SendSavedWriteData(ss); - if (sent < 0 && PR_GetError() != PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) { - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SOCKET_WRITE_FAILURE); - return SECFailure; - } - if (ss->pendingBuf.len) { - flags |= ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER; - } - } - } else if (wrBuf->len > 0) { - PRInt32 sent; - ss->handshakeBegun = 1; - sent = ssl_DefSend(ss, wrBuf->buf, wrBuf->len, - flags & ~ssl_SEND_FLAG_MASK); - if (sent < 0) { - if (PR_GetError() != PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) { - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SOCKET_WRITE_FAILURE); - return SECFailure; - } - /* we got PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR, which means none was sent. */ - sent = 0; - } - wrBuf->len -= sent; - if (wrBuf->len) { - if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { - /* DTLS just says no in this case. No buffering */ - PR_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR, 0); - return SECFailure; - } - /* now take all the remaining unsent new ciphertext and - * append it to the buffer of previously unsent ciphertext. - */ - rv = ssl_SaveWriteData(ss, wrBuf->buf + sent, wrBuf->len); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - /* presumably a memory error, SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY */ - return SECFailure; - } - } - } - totalSent += contentLen; + PRUint32 contentLen = PR_MIN(nIn, MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH); + unsigned int spaceNeeded; + unsigned int numRecords; + + ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); /********************************/ + + if (nIn > 1 && ss->opt.cbcRandomIV && + ss->ssl3.cwSpec->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1 && + type == content_application_data && + ss->ssl3.cwSpec->cipher_def->type == type_block /* CBC mode */) { + /* We will split the first byte of the record into its own record, + * as explained in the documentation for SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV in ssl.h + */ + numRecords = 2; + } else { + numRecords = 1; + } + + spaceNeeded = contentLen + (numRecords * SSL3_BUFFER_FUDGE); + if (ss->ssl3.cwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1 && + ss->ssl3.cwSpec->cipher_def->type == type_block) { + spaceNeeded += ss->ssl3.cwSpec->cipher_def->iv_size; + } + if (spaceNeeded > wrBuf->space) { + rv = sslBuffer_Grow(wrBuf, spaceNeeded); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: SendRecord, tried to get %d bytes", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, spaceNeeded)); + goto spec_locked_loser; /* sslBuffer_Grow set error code. */ + } + } + + if (numRecords == 2) { + sslBuffer secondRecord; + rv = ssl_ProtectRecord(ss, ss->ssl3.cwSpec, capRecordVersion, type, + pIn, 1, wrBuf); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto spec_locked_loser; + + PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "send (encrypted) record data [1/2]:", + wrBuf->buf, wrBuf->len)); + + secondRecord.buf = wrBuf->buf + wrBuf->len; + secondRecord.len = 0; + secondRecord.space = wrBuf->space - wrBuf->len; + + rv = ssl_ProtectRecord(ss, ss->ssl3.cwSpec, capRecordVersion, type, + pIn + 1, contentLen - 1, &secondRecord); + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "send (encrypted) record data [2/2]:", + secondRecord.buf, secondRecord.len)); + wrBuf->len += secondRecord.len; + } + } else { + if (cwSpec) { + /* cwSpec can only be set for retransmissions of DTLS handshake + * messages. */ + PORT_Assert(IS_DTLS(ss) && + (type == content_handshake || + type == content_change_cipher_spec)); + } else { + cwSpec = ss->ssl3.cwSpec; + } + + rv = ssl_ProtectRecord(ss, cwSpec, !IS_DTLS(ss) && capRecordVersion, + type, pIn, contentLen, wrBuf); + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "send (encrypted) record data:", + wrBuf->buf, wrBuf->len)); + } + } + + spec_locked_loser: + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /************************************/ + + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return SECFailure; + + pIn += contentLen; + nIn -= contentLen; + PORT_Assert(nIn >= 0); + + /* If there's still some previously saved ciphertext, + * or the caller doesn't want us to send the data yet, + * then add all our new ciphertext to the amount previously saved. + */ + if ((ss->pendingBuf.len > 0) || + (flags & ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER)) { + + rv = ssl_SaveWriteData(ss, wrBuf->buf, wrBuf->len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + /* presumably a memory error, SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY */ + return SECFailure; + } + wrBuf->len = 0; /* All cipher text is saved away. */ + + if (!(flags & ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER)) { + PRInt32 sent; + ss->handshakeBegun = 1; + sent = ssl_SendSavedWriteData(ss); + if (sent < 0 && PR_GetError() != PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SOCKET_WRITE_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + if (ss->pendingBuf.len) { + flags |= ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER; + } + } + } else if (wrBuf->len > 0) { + PRInt32 sent; + ss->handshakeBegun = 1; + sent = ssl_DefSend(ss, wrBuf->buf, wrBuf->len, + flags & ~ssl_SEND_FLAG_MASK); + if (sent < 0) { + if (PR_GetError() != PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SOCKET_WRITE_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + /* we got PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR, which means none was sent. */ + sent = 0; + } + wrBuf->len -= sent; + if (wrBuf->len) { + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + /* DTLS just says no in this case. No buffering */ + PR_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR, 0); + return SECFailure; + } + /* now take all the remaining unsent new ciphertext and + * append it to the buffer of previously unsent ciphertext. + */ + rv = ssl_SaveWriteData(ss, wrBuf->buf + sent, wrBuf->len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + /* presumably a memory error, SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY */ + return SECFailure; + } + } + } + totalSent += contentLen; } return totalSent; } @@ -3009,87 +2896,86 @@ spec_locked_loser: */ int ssl3_SendApplicationData(sslSocket *ss, const unsigned char *in, - PRInt32 len, PRInt32 flags) + PRInt32 len, PRInt32 flags) { - PRInt32 totalSent = 0; - PRInt32 discarded = 0; + PRInt32 totalSent = 0; + PRInt32 discarded = 0; - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); /* These flags for internal use only */ - PORT_Assert(!(flags & (ssl_SEND_FLAG_USE_EPOCH | - ssl_SEND_FLAG_NO_RETRANSMIT))); + PORT_Assert(!(flags & ssl_SEND_FLAG_NO_RETRANSMIT)); if (len < 0 || !in) { - PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR); - return SECFailure; + PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR); + return SECFailure; } if (ss->pendingBuf.len > SSL3_PENDING_HIGH_WATER && !ssl_SocketIsBlocking(ss)) { - PORT_Assert(!ssl_SocketIsBlocking(ss)); - PORT_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR); - return SECFailure; + PORT_Assert(!ssl_SocketIsBlocking(ss)); + PORT_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR); + return SECFailure; } if (ss->appDataBuffered && len) { - PORT_Assert (in[0] == (unsigned char)(ss->appDataBuffered)); - if (in[0] != (unsigned char)(ss->appDataBuffered)) { - PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR); - return SECFailure; - } - in++; - len--; - discarded = 1; + PORT_Assert(in[0] == (unsigned char)(ss->appDataBuffered)); + if (in[0] != (unsigned char)(ss->appDataBuffered)) { + PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR); + return SECFailure; + } + in++; + len--; + discarded = 1; } while (len > totalSent) { - PRInt32 sent, toSend; - - if (totalSent > 0) { - /* - * The thread yield is intended to give the reader thread a - * chance to get some cycles while the writer thread is in - * the middle of a large application data write. (See - * Bugzilla bug 127740, comment #1.) - */ - ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); - PR_Sleep(PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT); /* PR_Yield(); */ - ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); - } - toSend = PR_MIN(len - totalSent, MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH); - /* - * Note that the 0 epoch is OK because flags will never require - * its use, as guaranteed by the PORT_Assert above. - */ - sent = ssl3_SendRecord(ss, 0, content_application_data, - in + totalSent, toSend, flags); - if (sent < 0) { - if (totalSent > 0 && PR_GetError() == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) { - PORT_Assert(ss->lastWriteBlocked); - break; - } - return SECFailure; /* error code set by ssl3_SendRecord */ - } - totalSent += sent; - if (ss->pendingBuf.len) { - /* must be a non-blocking socket */ - PORT_Assert(!ssl_SocketIsBlocking(ss)); - PORT_Assert(ss->lastWriteBlocked); - break; - } + PRInt32 sent, toSend; + + if (totalSent > 0) { + /* + * The thread yield is intended to give the reader thread a + * chance to get some cycles while the writer thread is in + * the middle of a large application data write. (See + * Bugzilla bug 127740, comment #1.) + */ + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + PR_Sleep(PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT); /* PR_Yield(); */ + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); + } + toSend = PR_MIN(len - totalSent, MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH); + /* + * Note that the 0 epoch is OK because flags will never require + * its use, as guaranteed by the PORT_Assert above. + */ + sent = ssl3_SendRecord(ss, NULL, content_application_data, + in + totalSent, toSend, flags); + if (sent < 0) { + if (totalSent > 0 && PR_GetError() == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) { + PORT_Assert(ss->lastWriteBlocked); + break; + } + return SECFailure; /* error code set by ssl3_SendRecord */ + } + totalSent += sent; + if (ss->pendingBuf.len) { + /* must be a non-blocking socket */ + PORT_Assert(!ssl_SocketIsBlocking(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->lastWriteBlocked); + break; + } } if (ss->pendingBuf.len) { - /* Must be non-blocking. */ - PORT_Assert(!ssl_SocketIsBlocking(ss)); - if (totalSent > 0) { - ss->appDataBuffered = 0x100 | in[totalSent - 1]; - } - - totalSent = totalSent + discarded - 1; - if (totalSent <= 0) { - PORT_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR); - totalSent = SECFailure; - } - return totalSent; - } + /* Must be non-blocking. */ + PORT_Assert(!ssl_SocketIsBlocking(ss)); + if (totalSent > 0) { + ss->appDataBuffered = 0x100 | in[totalSent - 1]; + } + + totalSent = totalSent + discarded - 1; + if (totalSent <= 0) { + PORT_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR); + totalSent = SECFailure; + } + return totalSent; + } ss->appDataBuffered = 0; return totalSent + discarded; } @@ -3108,7 +2994,7 @@ ssl3_SendApplicationData(sslSocket *ss, const unsigned char *in, * ssl3_SendHelloRequest(), ssl3_SendServerHelloDone(), * ssl3_SendFinished(), */ -static SECStatus +SECStatus ssl3_FlushHandshake(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 flags) { if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { @@ -3130,37 +3016,37 @@ ssl3_FlushHandshakeMessages(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 flags) static const PRInt32 allowedFlags = ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER | ssl_SEND_FLAG_CAP_RECORD_VERSION; PRInt32 count = -1; - SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + SECStatus rv; - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); if (!ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.buf || !ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len) - return rv; + return SECSuccess; /* only these flags are allowed */ PORT_Assert(!(flags & ~allowedFlags)); if ((flags & ~allowedFlags) != 0) { - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); - rv = SECFailure; - } else { - count = ssl3_SendRecord(ss, 0, content_handshake, ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.buf, - ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len, flags); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; } + count = ssl3_SendRecord(ss, NULL, content_handshake, + ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.buf, + ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len, flags); if (count < 0) { - int err = PORT_GetError(); - PORT_Assert(err != PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR); - if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) { - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); - } + int err = PORT_GetError(); + PORT_Assert(err != PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR); + if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + } rv = SECFailure; } else if ((unsigned int)count < ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len) { - /* short write should never happen */ - PORT_Assert((unsigned int)count >= ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len); - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); - rv = SECFailure; + /* short write should never happen */ + PORT_Assert((unsigned int)count >= ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + rv = SECFailure; } else { - rv = SECSuccess; + rv = SECSuccess; } /* Whether we succeeded or failed, toss the old handshake data. */ @@ -3174,43 +3060,34 @@ ssl3_FlushHandshakeMessages(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 flags) * Returns SECFailure if the application has required client auth. * SECSuccess otherwise. */ -static SECStatus +SECStatus ssl3_HandleNoCertificate(sslSocket *ss) { - if (ss->sec.peerCert != NULL) { - if (ss->sec.peerKey != NULL) { - SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(ss->sec.peerKey); - ss->sec.peerKey = NULL; - } - CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->sec.peerCert); - ss->sec.peerCert = NULL; - } ssl3_CleanupPeerCerts(ss); /* If the server has required client-auth blindly but doesn't * actually look at the certificate it won't know that no * certificate was presented so we shutdown the socket to ensure * an error. We only do this if we haven't already completed the - * first handshake because if we're redoing the handshake we + * first handshake because if we're redoing the handshake we * know the server is paying attention to the certificate. */ if ((ss->opt.requireCertificate == SSL_REQUIRE_ALWAYS) || - (!ss->firstHsDone && - (ss->opt.requireCertificate == SSL_REQUIRE_FIRST_HANDSHAKE))) { - PRFileDesc * lower; + (!ss->firstHsDone && + (ss->opt.requireCertificate == SSL_REQUIRE_FIRST_HANDSHAKE))) { + PRFileDesc *lower; - if (ss->sec.uncache) - ss->sec.uncache(ss->sec.ci.sid); - SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, bad_certificate); + ss->sec.uncache(ss->sec.ci.sid); + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, bad_certificate); - lower = ss->fd->lower; + lower = ss->fd->lower; #ifdef _WIN32 - lower->methods->shutdown(lower, PR_SHUTDOWN_SEND); + lower->methods->shutdown(lower, PR_SHUTDOWN_SEND); #else - lower->methods->shutdown(lower, PR_SHUTDOWN_BOTH); + lower->methods->shutdown(lower, PR_SHUTDOWN_BOTH); #endif - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CERTIFICATE); - return SECFailure; + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CERTIFICATE); + return SECFailure; } return SECSuccess; } @@ -3221,59 +3098,59 @@ ssl3_HandleNoCertificate(sslSocket *ss) /* ** Acquires both handshake and XmitBuf locks. -** Called from: ssl3_IllegalParameter <- -** ssl3_HandshakeFailure <- -** ssl3_HandleAlert <- ssl3_HandleRecord. +** Called from: ssl3_IllegalParameter <- +** ssl3_HandshakeFailure <- +** ssl3_HandleAlert <- ssl3_HandleRecord. ** ssl3_HandleChangeCipherSpecs <- ssl3_HandleRecord ** ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable <- -** ssl3_HandleHelloRequest <- -** ssl3_HandleServerHello <- +** ssl3_HandleHelloRequest <- +** ssl3_HandleServerHello <- ** ssl3_HandleServerKeyExchange <- ** ssl3_HandleCertificateRequest <- ** ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone <- -** ssl3_HandleClientHello <- +** ssl3_HandleClientHello <- ** ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello <- ** ssl3_HandleCertificateVerify <- ** ssl3_HandleClientKeyExchange <- -** ssl3_HandleCertificate <- -** ssl3_HandleFinished <- +** ssl3_HandleCertificate <- +** ssl3_HandleFinished <- ** ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage <- -** ssl3_HandleRecord <- +** ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage <- +** ssl3_HandleRecord <- ** */ SECStatus SSL3_SendAlert(sslSocket *ss, SSL3AlertLevel level, SSL3AlertDescription desc) { - PRUint8 bytes[2]; - SECStatus rv; + PRUint8 bytes[2]; + SECStatus rv; SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send alert record, level=%d desc=%d", - SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, level, desc)); + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, level, desc)); bytes[0] = level; bytes[1] = desc; ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); if (level == alert_fatal) { - if (!ss->opt.noCache && ss->sec.ci.sid && ss->sec.uncache) { - ss->sec.uncache(ss->sec.ci.sid); - } + if (!ss->opt.noCache && ss->sec.ci.sid) { + ss->sec.uncache(ss->sec.ci.sid); + } } ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER); if (rv == SECSuccess) { - PRInt32 sent; - sent = ssl3_SendRecord(ss, 0, content_alert, bytes, 2, - desc == no_certificate - ? ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER : 0); - rv = (sent >= 0) ? SECSuccess : (SECStatus)sent; + PRInt32 sent; + sent = ssl3_SendRecord(ss, NULL, content_alert, bytes, 2, + (desc == no_certificate) ? ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER : 0); + rv = (sent >= 0) ? SECSuccess : (SECStatus)sent; } if (level == alert_fatal) { ss->ssl3.fatalAlertSent = PR_TRUE; } ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); - return rv; /* error set by ssl3_FlushHandshake or ssl3_SendRecord */ + return rv; /* error set by ssl3_FlushHandshake or ssl3_SendRecord */ } /* @@ -3284,7 +3161,7 @@ ssl3_IllegalParameter(sslSocket *ss) { (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter); PORT_SetError(ss->sec.isServer ? SSL_ERROR_BAD_CLIENT - : SSL_ERROR_BAD_SERVER ); + : SSL_ERROR_BAD_SERVER); return SECFailure; } @@ -3295,56 +3172,67 @@ static SECStatus ssl3_HandshakeFailure(sslSocket *ss) { (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, handshake_failure); - PORT_SetError( ss->sec.isServer ? SSL_ERROR_BAD_CLIENT - : SSL_ERROR_BAD_SERVER ); + PORT_SetError(ss->sec.isServer ? SSL_ERROR_BAD_CLIENT + : SSL_ERROR_BAD_SERVER); return SECFailure; } -static void -ssl3_SendAlertForCertError(sslSocket * ss, PRErrorCode errCode) +void +ssl3_SendAlertForCertError(sslSocket *ss, PRErrorCode errCode) { - SSL3AlertDescription desc = bad_certificate; + SSL3AlertDescription desc = bad_certificate; PRBool isTLS = ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_1_TLS; switch (errCode) { - case SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE: desc = unsupported_certificate; break; - case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE: desc = certificate_expired; break; - case SEC_ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE: desc = certificate_revoked; break; - case SEC_ERROR_INADEQUATE_KEY_USAGE: - case SEC_ERROR_INADEQUATE_CERT_TYPE: - desc = certificate_unknown; break; - case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_CERT: - desc = isTLS ? access_denied : certificate_unknown; break; - case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER: - case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER: - desc = isTLS ? unknown_ca : certificate_unknown; break; - case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_ISSUER_CERTIFICATE: - desc = isTLS ? unknown_ca : certificate_expired; break; - - case SEC_ERROR_CERT_NOT_IN_NAME_SPACE: - case SEC_ERROR_PATH_LEN_CONSTRAINT_INVALID: - case SEC_ERROR_CA_CERT_INVALID: - case SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE: - default: desc = bad_certificate; break; + case SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE: + desc = unsupported_certificate; + break; + case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE: + desc = certificate_expired; + break; + case SEC_ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE: + desc = certificate_revoked; + break; + case SEC_ERROR_INADEQUATE_KEY_USAGE: + case SEC_ERROR_INADEQUATE_CERT_TYPE: + desc = certificate_unknown; + break; + case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_CERT: + desc = isTLS ? access_denied : certificate_unknown; + break; + case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER: + case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER: + desc = isTLS ? unknown_ca : certificate_unknown; + break; + case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_ISSUER_CERTIFICATE: + desc = isTLS ? unknown_ca : certificate_expired; + break; + + case SEC_ERROR_CERT_NOT_IN_NAME_SPACE: + case SEC_ERROR_PATH_LEN_CONSTRAINT_INVALID: + case SEC_ERROR_CA_CERT_INVALID: + case SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE: + default: + desc = bad_certificate; + break; } SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: peer certificate is no good: error=%d", - SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, errCode)); + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, errCode)); - (void) SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc); + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc); } - /* * Send decode_error alert. Set generic error number. */ SECStatus ssl3_DecodeError(sslSocket *ss) { - (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, - ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0 ? decode_error - : illegal_parameter); - PORT_SetError( ss->sec.isServer ? SSL_ERROR_BAD_CLIENT - : SSL_ERROR_BAD_SERVER ); + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, + ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0 ? decode_error + : illegal_parameter); + PORT_SetError(ss->sec.isServer ? SSL_ERROR_BAD_CLIENT + : SSL_ERROR_BAD_SERVER); return SECFailure; } @@ -3354,102 +3242,170 @@ ssl3_DecodeError(sslSocket *ss) static SECStatus ssl3_HandleAlert(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *buf) { - SSL3AlertLevel level; + SSL3AlertLevel level; SSL3AlertDescription desc; - int error; + int error; - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle alert record", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); if (buf->len != 2) { - (void)ssl3_DecodeError(ss); - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ALERT); - return SECFailure; + (void)ssl3_DecodeError(ss); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ALERT); + return SECFailure; } level = (SSL3AlertLevel)buf->buf[0]; - desc = (SSL3AlertDescription)buf->buf[1]; + desc = (SSL3AlertDescription)buf->buf[1]; buf->len = 0; SSL_TRC(5, ("%d: SSL3[%d] received alert, level = %d, description = %d", - SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, level, desc)); + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, level, desc)); switch (desc) { - case close_notify: ss->recvdCloseNotify = 1; - error = SSL_ERROR_CLOSE_NOTIFY_ALERT; break; - case unexpected_message: error = SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_UNEXPECTED_ALERT; - break; - case bad_record_mac: error = SSL_ERROR_BAD_MAC_ALERT; break; - case decryption_failed_RESERVED: - error = SSL_ERROR_DECRYPTION_FAILED_ALERT; - break; - case record_overflow: error = SSL_ERROR_RECORD_OVERFLOW_ALERT; break; - case decompression_failure: error = SSL_ERROR_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE_ALERT; - break; - case handshake_failure: error = SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE_ALERT; - break; - case no_certificate: error = SSL_ERROR_NO_CERTIFICATE; break; - case bad_certificate: error = SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_ALERT; break; - case unsupported_certificate:error = SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_CERT_ALERT;break; - case certificate_revoked: error = SSL_ERROR_REVOKED_CERT_ALERT; break; - case certificate_expired: error = SSL_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERT_ALERT; break; - case certificate_unknown: error = SSL_ERROR_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN_ALERT; - break; - case illegal_parameter: error = SSL_ERROR_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER_ALERT;break; - case inappropriate_fallback: - error = SSL_ERROR_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK_ALERT; - break; - - /* All alerts below are TLS only. */ - case unknown_ca: error = SSL_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CA_ALERT; break; - case access_denied: error = SSL_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED_ALERT; break; - case decode_error: error = SSL_ERROR_DECODE_ERROR_ALERT; break; - case decrypt_error: error = SSL_ERROR_DECRYPT_ERROR_ALERT; break; - case export_restriction: error = SSL_ERROR_EXPORT_RESTRICTION_ALERT; - break; - case protocol_version: error = SSL_ERROR_PROTOCOL_VERSION_ALERT; break; - case insufficient_security: error = SSL_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY_ALERT; - break; - case internal_error: error = SSL_ERROR_INTERNAL_ERROR_ALERT; break; - case user_canceled: error = SSL_ERROR_USER_CANCELED_ALERT; break; - case no_renegotiation: error = SSL_ERROR_NO_RENEGOTIATION_ALERT; break; - - /* Alerts for TLS client hello extensions */ - case unsupported_extension: - error = SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION_ALERT; break; - case certificate_unobtainable: - error = SSL_ERROR_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE_ALERT; break; - case unrecognized_name: - error = SSL_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME_ALERT; break; - case bad_certificate_status_response: - error = SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_STATUS_RESPONSE_ALERT; break; - case bad_certificate_hash_value: - error = SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_HASH_VALUE_ALERT; break; - default: error = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNKNOWN_ALERT; break; + case close_notify: + ss->recvdCloseNotify = 1; + error = SSL_ERROR_CLOSE_NOTIFY_ALERT; + break; + case unexpected_message: + error = SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_UNEXPECTED_ALERT; + break; + case bad_record_mac: + error = SSL_ERROR_BAD_MAC_ALERT; + break; + case decryption_failed_RESERVED: + error = SSL_ERROR_DECRYPTION_FAILED_ALERT; + break; + case record_overflow: + error = SSL_ERROR_RECORD_OVERFLOW_ALERT; + break; + case decompression_failure: + error = SSL_ERROR_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE_ALERT; + break; + case handshake_failure: + error = SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE_ALERT; + break; + case no_certificate: + error = SSL_ERROR_NO_CERTIFICATE; + break; + case bad_certificate: + error = SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_ALERT; + break; + case unsupported_certificate: + error = SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_CERT_ALERT; + break; + case certificate_revoked: + error = SSL_ERROR_REVOKED_CERT_ALERT; + break; + case certificate_expired: + error = SSL_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERT_ALERT; + break; + case certificate_unknown: + error = SSL_ERROR_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN_ALERT; + break; + case illegal_parameter: + error = SSL_ERROR_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER_ALERT; + break; + case inappropriate_fallback: + error = SSL_ERROR_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK_ALERT; + break; + + /* All alerts below are TLS only. */ + case unknown_ca: + error = SSL_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CA_ALERT; + break; + case access_denied: + error = SSL_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED_ALERT; + break; + case decode_error: + error = SSL_ERROR_DECODE_ERROR_ALERT; + break; + case decrypt_error: + error = SSL_ERROR_DECRYPT_ERROR_ALERT; + break; + case export_restriction: + error = SSL_ERROR_EXPORT_RESTRICTION_ALERT; + break; + case protocol_version: + error = SSL_ERROR_PROTOCOL_VERSION_ALERT; + break; + case insufficient_security: + error = SSL_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY_ALERT; + break; + case internal_error: + error = SSL_ERROR_INTERNAL_ERROR_ALERT; + break; + case user_canceled: + error = SSL_ERROR_USER_CANCELED_ALERT; + break; + case no_renegotiation: + error = SSL_ERROR_NO_RENEGOTIATION_ALERT; + break; + + /* Alerts for TLS client hello extensions */ + case missing_extension: + error = SSL_ERROR_MISSING_EXTENSION_ALERT; + break; + case unsupported_extension: + error = SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION_ALERT; + break; + case certificate_unobtainable: + error = SSL_ERROR_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE_ALERT; + break; + case unrecognized_name: + error = SSL_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME_ALERT; + break; + case bad_certificate_status_response: + error = SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_STATUS_RESPONSE_ALERT; + break; + case bad_certificate_hash_value: + error = SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_HASH_VALUE_ALERT; + break; + case end_of_early_data: + error = SSL_ERROR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA_ALERT; + break; + default: + error = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNKNOWN_ALERT; + break; + } + if ((ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) && + (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_server_hello)) { + /* TLS 1.3 requires all but "end of data" alerts to be + * treated as fatal. */ + switch (desc) { + case close_notify: + case user_canceled: + case end_of_early_data: + break; + default: + level = alert_fatal; + } } if (level == alert_fatal) { - if (!ss->opt.noCache) { - if (ss->sec.uncache) - ss->sec.uncache(ss->sec.ci.sid); - } - if ((ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_server_hello) && - (desc == handshake_failure)) { - /* XXX This is a hack. We're assuming that any handshake failure - * XXX on the client hello is a failure to match ciphers. - */ - error = SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP; - } - PORT_SetError(error); - return SECFailure; + if (!ss->opt.noCache) { + ss->sec.uncache(ss->sec.ci.sid); + } + if ((ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_server_hello) && + (desc == handshake_failure)) { + /* XXX This is a hack. We're assuming that any handshake failure + * XXX on the client hello is a failure to match ciphers. + */ + error = SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP; + } + PORT_SetError(error); + return SECFailure; + } + if (desc == end_of_early_data) { + return tls13_HandleEndOfEarlyData(ss); } if ((desc == no_certificate) && (ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_client_cert)) { - /* I'm a server. I've requested a client cert. He hasn't got one. */ - SECStatus rv; + /* I'm a server. I've requested a client cert. He hasn't got one. */ + SECStatus rv; - PORT_Assert(ss->sec.isServer); - ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_client_key; - rv = ssl3_HandleNoCertificate(ss); - return rv; + PORT_Assert(ss->sec.isServer); + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_client_key; + rv = ssl3_HandleNoCertificate(ss); + return rv; } return SECSuccess; } @@ -3467,61 +3423,60 @@ ssl3_HandleAlert(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *buf) static SECStatus ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs(sslSocket *ss) { - PRUint8 change = change_cipher_spec_choice; - ssl3CipherSpec * pwSpec; - SECStatus rv; - PRInt32 sent; + PRUint8 change = change_cipher_spec_choice; + ssl3CipherSpec *pwSpec; + SECStatus rv; + PRInt32 sent; SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send change_cipher_spec record", - SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss) ); - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return rv; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */ + return rv; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */ } if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) { - sent = ssl3_SendRecord(ss, 0, content_change_cipher_spec, &change, 1, - ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER); - if (sent < 0) { - return (SECStatus)sent; /* error code set by ssl3_SendRecord */ - } + sent = ssl3_SendRecord(ss, NULL, content_change_cipher_spec, &change, 1, + ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER); + if (sent < 0) { + return (SECStatus)sent; /* error code set by ssl3_SendRecord */ + } } else { - rv = dtls_QueueMessage(ss, content_change_cipher_spec, &change, 1); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return rv; - } + rv = dtls_QueueMessage(ss, content_change_cipher_spec, &change, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; + } } /* swap the pending and current write specs. */ - ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); /**************************************/ - pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec; + ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); /**************************************/ + pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec; ss->ssl3.pwSpec = ss->ssl3.cwSpec; ss->ssl3.cwSpec = pwSpec; SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d] Set Current Write Cipher Suite to Pending", - SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd )); + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); /* We need to free up the contexts, keys and certs ! */ /* If we are really through with the old cipher spec * (Both the read and write sides have changed) destroy it. */ if (ss->ssl3.prSpec == ss->ssl3.pwSpec) { - if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) { - ssl3_DestroyCipherSpec(ss->ssl3.pwSpec, PR_FALSE/*freeSrvName*/); - } else { - /* With DTLS, we need to set a holddown timer in case the final - * message got lost */ - ss->ssl3.hs.rtTimeoutMs = DTLS_FINISHED_TIMER_MS; - dtls_StartTimer(ss, dtls_FinishedTimerCb); - } + if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) { + ssl3_DestroyCipherSpec(ss->ssl3.pwSpec, PR_FALSE /*freeSrvName*/); + } else { + /* With DTLS, we need to set a holddown timer in case the final + * message got lost */ + rv = dtls_StartHolddownTimer(ss); + } } ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /**************************************/ - return SECSuccess; + return rv; } /* Called from ssl3_HandleRecord. @@ -3533,65 +3488,124 @@ ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs(sslSocket *ss) static SECStatus ssl3_HandleChangeCipherSpecs(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *buf) { - ssl3CipherSpec * prSpec; - SSL3WaitState ws = ss->ssl3.hs.ws; + ssl3CipherSpec *prSpec; + SSL3WaitState ws = ss->ssl3.hs.ws; SSL3ChangeCipherSpecChoice change; - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle change_cipher_spec record", - SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); if (ws != wait_change_cipher) { - if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { - /* Ignore this because it's out of order. */ - SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: discard out of order " - "DTLS change_cipher_spec", - SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); - buf->len = 0; - return SECSuccess; - } - (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CHANGE_CIPHER); - return SECFailure; - } - - if(buf->len != 1) { - (void)ssl3_DecodeError(ss); - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CHANGE_CIPHER); - return SECFailure; + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + /* Ignore this because it's out of order. */ + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: discard out of order " + "DTLS change_cipher_spec", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + buf->len = 0; + return SECSuccess; + } + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CHANGE_CIPHER); + return SECFailure; + } + /* Handshake messages should not span ChangeCipherSpec. */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.header_bytes) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CHANGE_CIPHER); + return SECFailure; + } + if (buf->len != 1) { + (void)ssl3_DecodeError(ss); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CHANGE_CIPHER); + return SECFailure; } change = (SSL3ChangeCipherSpecChoice)buf->buf[0]; if (change != change_cipher_spec_choice) { - /* illegal_parameter is correct here for both SSL3 and TLS. */ - (void)ssl3_IllegalParameter(ss); - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CHANGE_CIPHER); - return SECFailure; + /* illegal_parameter is correct here for both SSL3 and TLS. */ + (void)ssl3_IllegalParameter(ss); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CHANGE_CIPHER); + return SECFailure; } buf->len = 0; /* Swap the pending and current read specs. */ - ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); /*************************************/ - prSpec = ss->ssl3.prSpec; + ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); /*************************************/ + prSpec = ss->ssl3.prSpec; - ss->ssl3.prSpec = ss->ssl3.crSpec; - ss->ssl3.crSpec = prSpec; - ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_finished; + ss->ssl3.prSpec = ss->ssl3.crSpec; + ss->ssl3.crSpec = prSpec; + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_finished; SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d] Set Current Read Cipher Suite to Pending", - SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd )); + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); /* If we are really through with the old cipher prSpec * (Both the read and write sides have changed) destroy it. */ if (ss->ssl3.prSpec == ss->ssl3.pwSpec) { - ssl3_DestroyCipherSpec(ss->ssl3.prSpec, PR_FALSE/*freeSrvName*/); + ssl3_DestroyCipherSpec(ss->ssl3.prSpec, PR_FALSE /*freeSrvName*/); } - ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /*************************************/ + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /*************************************/ return SECSuccess; } +static CK_MECHANISM_TYPE +ssl3_GetMgfMechanismByHashType(SSLHashType hash) +{ + switch (hash) { + case ssl_hash_sha256: + return CKG_MGF1_SHA256; + case ssl_hash_sha384: + return CKG_MGF1_SHA384; + case ssl_hash_sha512: + return CKG_MGF1_SHA512; + default: + PORT_Assert(0); + } + return CKG_MGF1_SHA256; +} + +/* Function valid for >= TLS 1.2, only. */ +static CK_MECHANISM_TYPE +ssl3_GetHashMechanismByHashType(SSLHashType hashType) +{ + switch (hashType) { + case ssl_hash_sha512: + return CKM_SHA512; + case ssl_hash_sha384: + return CKM_SHA384; + case ssl_hash_sha256: + case ssl_hash_none: + /* ssl_hash_none is for pre-1.2 suites, which use SHA-256. */ + return CKM_SHA256; + case ssl_hash_sha1: + return CKM_SHA_1; + default: + PORT_Assert(0); + } + return CKM_SHA256; +} + +/* Function valid for >= TLS 1.2, only. */ +static CK_MECHANISM_TYPE +ssl3_GetPrfHashMechanism(sslSocket *ss) +{ + return ssl3_GetHashMechanismByHashType(ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def->prf_hash); +} + +static SSLHashType +ssl3_GetSuitePrfHash(sslSocket *ss) +{ + /* ssl_hash_none is for pre-1.2 suites, which use SHA-256. */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def->prf_hash == ssl_hash_none) { + return ssl_hash_sha256; + } + return ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def->prf_hash; +} + /* This method completes the derivation of the MS from the PMS. ** ** 1. Derive the MS, if possible, else return an error. @@ -3657,67 +3671,71 @@ static SECStatus ssl3_ComputeMasterSecretInt(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *pms, PK11SymKey **msp) { - ssl3CipherSpec * pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec; - const ssl3KEADef *kea_def= ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def; - unsigned char * cr = (unsigned char *)&ss->ssl3.hs.client_random; - unsigned char * sr = (unsigned char *)&ss->ssl3.hs.server_random; - PRBool isTLS = (PRBool)(kea_def->tls_keygen || - (pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0)); - PRBool isTLS12= - (PRBool)(isTLS && pwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2); + ssl3CipherSpec *pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec; + unsigned char *cr = (unsigned char *)&ss->ssl3.hs.client_random; + unsigned char *sr = (unsigned char *)&ss->ssl3.hs.server_random; + PRBool isTLS = (PRBool)(pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + PRBool isTLS12 = + (PRBool)(isTLS && pwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2); /* * Whenever isDH is true, we need to use CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH * which, unlike CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, converts arbitrary size * data into a 48-byte value, and does not expect to return the version. */ - PRBool isDH = (PRBool) ((ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType == kt_dh) || - (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType == kt_ecdh)); + PRBool isDH = (PRBool)((ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType == ssl_kea_dh) || + (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType == ssl_kea_ecdh)); CK_MECHANISM_TYPE master_derive; CK_MECHANISM_TYPE key_derive; - SECItem params; - CK_FLAGS keyFlags; - CK_VERSION pms_version; - CK_VERSION *pms_version_ptr = NULL; + SECItem params; + CK_FLAGS keyFlags; + CK_VERSION pms_version; + CK_VERSION *pms_version_ptr = NULL; /* master_params may be used as a CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS */ CK_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS master_params; - unsigned int master_params_len; + unsigned int master_params_len; if (isTLS12) { - if(isDH) master_derive = CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH; - else master_derive = CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE; - key_derive = CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE; - keyFlags = CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY; + if (isDH) + master_derive = CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH; + else + master_derive = CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE; + key_derive = CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE; + keyFlags = CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY; } else if (isTLS) { - if(isDH) master_derive = CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH; - else master_derive = CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE; - key_derive = CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE; - keyFlags = CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY; + if (isDH) + master_derive = CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH; + else + master_derive = CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE; + key_derive = CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE; + keyFlags = CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY; } else { - if (isDH) master_derive = CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH; - else master_derive = CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE; - key_derive = CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE; - keyFlags = 0; + if (isDH) + master_derive = CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH; + else + master_derive = CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE; + key_derive = CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE; + keyFlags = 0; } if (!isDH) { pms_version_ptr = &pms_version; } - master_params.pVersion = pms_version_ptr; - master_params.RandomInfo.pClientRandom = cr; + master_params.pVersion = pms_version_ptr; + master_params.RandomInfo.pClientRandom = cr; master_params.RandomInfo.ulClientRandomLen = SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH; - master_params.RandomInfo.pServerRandom = sr; + master_params.RandomInfo.pServerRandom = sr; master_params.RandomInfo.ulServerRandomLen = SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH; if (isTLS12) { - master_params.prfHashMechanism = CKM_SHA256; + master_params.prfHashMechanism = ssl3_GetPrfHashMechanism(ss); master_params_len = sizeof(CK_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS); } else { /* prfHashMechanism is not relevant with this PRF */ master_params_len = sizeof(CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS); } - params.data = (unsigned char *) &master_params; - params.len = master_params_len; + params.data = (unsigned char *)&master_params; + params.len = master_params_len; return ssl3_ComputeMasterSecretFinish(ss, master_derive, key_derive, pms_version_ptr, ¶ms, @@ -3742,8 +3760,8 @@ tls_ComputeExtendedMasterSecretInt(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *pms, /* * TODO(ekr@rtfm.com): Verify that the slot can handle this key expansion * mode. Bug 1198298 */ - PRBool isDH = (PRBool) ((ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType == kt_dh) || - (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType == kt_ecdh)); + PRBool isDH = (PRBool)((ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType == ssl_kea_dh) || + (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType == ssl_kea_ecdh)); CK_MECHANISM_TYPE master_derive; CK_MECHANISM_TYPE key_derive; SECItem params; @@ -3754,7 +3772,7 @@ tls_ComputeExtendedMasterSecretInt(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *pms, rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(ss, pwSpec, &hashes, 0); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - PORT_Assert(0); /* Should never fail */ + PORT_Assert(0); /* Should never fail */ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE); return SECFailure; } @@ -3767,20 +3785,20 @@ tls_ComputeExtendedMasterSecretInt(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *pms, } if (pwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { - /* TLS 1.2 */ - extended_master_params.prfHashMechanism = CKM_SHA256; + /* TLS 1.2+ */ + extended_master_params.prfHashMechanism = ssl3_GetPrfHashMechanism(ss); key_derive = CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE; } else { /* TLS < 1.2 */ extended_master_params.prfHashMechanism = CKM_TLS_PRF; - key_derive = CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE; + key_derive = CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE; } extended_master_params.pVersion = pms_version_ptr; extended_master_params.pSessionHash = hashes.u.raw; extended_master_params.ulSessionHashLen = hashes.len; - params.data = (unsigned char *) &extended_master_params; + params.data = (unsigned char *)&extended_master_params; params.len = sizeof extended_master_params; return ssl3_ComputeMasterSecretFinish(ss, master_derive, key_derive, @@ -3788,7 +3806,6 @@ tls_ComputeExtendedMasterSecretInt(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *pms, keyFlags, pms, msp); } - /* Wrapper method to compute the master secret and return it in |*msp|. ** ** Called from ssl3_ComputeMasterSecret @@ -3821,11 +3838,11 @@ static SECStatus ssl3_DeriveMasterSecret(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *pms) { SECStatus rv; - PK11SymKey* ms = NULL; + PK11SymKey *ms = NULL; ssl3CipherSpec *pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec; - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSpecWriteLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSpecWriteLock(ss)); PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec == ss->ssl3.pwSpec); if (pms) { @@ -3835,43 +3852,17 @@ ssl3_DeriveMasterSecret(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *pms) return rv; } -#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS - if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) { - SECItem * keydata; - /* In hope of doing a "double bypass", - * need to extract the master secret's value from the key object - * and store it raw in the sslSocket struct. - */ - rv = PK11_ExtractKeyValue(pwSpec->master_secret); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return rv; - } - /* This returns the address of the secItem inside the key struct, - * not a copy or a reference. So, there's no need to free it. - */ - keydata = PK11_GetKeyData(pwSpec->master_secret); - if (keydata && keydata->len <= sizeof pwSpec->raw_master_secret) { - memcpy(pwSpec->raw_master_secret, keydata->data, keydata->len); - pwSpec->msItem.data = pwSpec->raw_master_secret; - pwSpec->msItem.len = keydata->len; - } else { - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); - return SECFailure; - } - } -#endif - return SECSuccess; } -/* +/* * Derive encryption and MAC Keys (and IVs) from master secret * Sets a useful error code when returning SECFailure. * * Called only from ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(), * which in turn is called from - * sendRSAClientKeyExchange (for Full handshake) - * sendDHClientKeyExchange (for Full handshake) + * ssl3_SendRSAClientKeyExchange (for Full handshake) + * ssl3_SendDHClientKeyExchange (for Full handshake) * ssl3_HandleClientKeyExchange (for Full handshake) * ssl3_HandleServerHello (for session restart) * ssl3_HandleClientHello (for session restart) @@ -3880,279 +3871,239 @@ ssl3_DeriveMasterSecret(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *pms) * */ static SECStatus -ssl3_DeriveConnectionKeysPKCS11(sslSocket *ss) -{ - ssl3CipherSpec * pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec; - const ssl3KEADef * kea_def = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def; - unsigned char * cr = (unsigned char *)&ss->ssl3.hs.client_random; - unsigned char * sr = (unsigned char *)&ss->ssl3.hs.server_random; - PRBool isTLS = (PRBool)(kea_def->tls_keygen || - (pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0)); - PRBool isTLS12= - (PRBool)(isTLS && pwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2); - /* following variables used in PKCS11 path */ +ssl3_DeriveConnectionKeys(sslSocket *ss) +{ + ssl3CipherSpec *pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec; + unsigned char *cr = (unsigned char *)&ss->ssl3.hs.client_random; + unsigned char *sr = (unsigned char *)&ss->ssl3.hs.server_random; + PRBool isTLS = (PRBool)(pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + PRBool isTLS12 = + (PRBool)(isTLS && pwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2); const ssl3BulkCipherDef *cipher_def = pwSpec->cipher_def; - PK11SlotInfo * slot = NULL; - PK11SymKey * symKey = NULL; - void * pwArg = ss->pkcs11PinArg; - int keySize; + PK11SlotInfo *slot = NULL; + PK11SymKey *symKey = NULL; + void *pwArg = ss->pkcs11PinArg; + int keySize; CK_TLS12_KEY_MAT_PARAMS key_material_params; /* may be used as a - * CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS */ - unsigned int key_material_params_len; - CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT returnedKeys; - CK_MECHANISM_TYPE key_derive; - CK_MECHANISM_TYPE bulk_mechanism; - SSLCipherAlgorithm calg; - SECItem params; - PRBool skipKeysAndIVs = (PRBool)(cipher_def->calg == calg_null); - - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSpecWriteLock(ss)); + * CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS */ + unsigned int key_material_params_len; + CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT returnedKeys; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE key_derive; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE bulk_mechanism; + SSLCipherAlgorithm calg; + SECItem params; + PRBool skipKeysAndIVs = (PRBool)(cipher_def->calg == calg_null); + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSpecWriteLock(ss)); PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec == ss->ssl3.pwSpec); if (!pwSpec->master_secret) { - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE); - return SECFailure; + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; } /* * generate the key material */ - key_material_params.ulMacSizeInBits = pwSpec->mac_size * BPB; - key_material_params.ulKeySizeInBits = cipher_def->secret_key_size* BPB; - key_material_params.ulIVSizeInBits = cipher_def->iv_size * BPB; + key_material_params.ulMacSizeInBits = pwSpec->mac_size * BPB; + key_material_params.ulKeySizeInBits = cipher_def->secret_key_size * BPB; + key_material_params.ulIVSizeInBits = cipher_def->iv_size * BPB; if (cipher_def->type == type_block && - pwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1) { - /* Block ciphers in >= TLS 1.1 use a per-record, explicit IV. */ - key_material_params.ulIVSizeInBits = 0; - memset(pwSpec->client.write_iv, 0, cipher_def->iv_size); - memset(pwSpec->server.write_iv, 0, cipher_def->iv_size); + pwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1) { + /* Block ciphers in >= TLS 1.1 use a per-record, explicit IV. */ + key_material_params.ulIVSizeInBits = 0; + memset(pwSpec->client.write_iv, 0, cipher_def->iv_size); + memset(pwSpec->server.write_iv, 0, cipher_def->iv_size); } - key_material_params.bIsExport = (CK_BBOOL)(kea_def->is_limited); - - key_material_params.RandomInfo.pClientRandom = cr; + key_material_params.bIsExport = PR_FALSE; + key_material_params.RandomInfo.pClientRandom = cr; key_material_params.RandomInfo.ulClientRandomLen = SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH; - key_material_params.RandomInfo.pServerRandom = sr; + key_material_params.RandomInfo.pServerRandom = sr; key_material_params.RandomInfo.ulServerRandomLen = SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH; - key_material_params.pReturnedKeyMaterial = &returnedKeys; + key_material_params.pReturnedKeyMaterial = &returnedKeys; returnedKeys.pIVClient = pwSpec->client.write_iv; returnedKeys.pIVServer = pwSpec->server.write_iv; - keySize = cipher_def->key_size; + keySize = cipher_def->key_size; if (skipKeysAndIVs) { - keySize = 0; + keySize = 0; key_material_params.ulKeySizeInBits = 0; - key_material_params.ulIVSizeInBits = 0; - returnedKeys.pIVClient = NULL; - returnedKeys.pIVServer = NULL; + key_material_params.ulIVSizeInBits = 0; + returnedKeys.pIVClient = NULL; + returnedKeys.pIVServer = NULL; } calg = cipher_def->calg; - PORT_Assert( alg2Mech[calg].calg == calg); - bulk_mechanism = alg2Mech[calg].cmech; + bulk_mechanism = ssl3_Alg2Mech(calg); if (isTLS12) { - key_derive = CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE; - key_material_params.prfHashMechanism = CKM_SHA256; - key_material_params_len = sizeof(CK_TLS12_KEY_MAT_PARAMS); + key_derive = CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE; + key_material_params.prfHashMechanism = ssl3_GetPrfHashMechanism(ss); + key_material_params_len = sizeof(CK_TLS12_KEY_MAT_PARAMS); } else if (isTLS) { - key_derive = CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE; - key_material_params_len = sizeof(CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS); + key_derive = CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE; + key_material_params_len = sizeof(CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS); } else { - key_derive = CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE; - key_material_params_len = sizeof(CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS); + key_derive = CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE; + key_material_params_len = sizeof(CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS); } params.data = (unsigned char *)&key_material_params; - params.len = key_material_params_len; + params.len = key_material_params_len; /* CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE is defined to set ENCRYPT, DECRYPT, and * DERIVE by DEFAULT */ symKey = PK11_Derive(pwSpec->master_secret, key_derive, ¶ms, bulk_mechanism, CKA_ENCRYPT, keySize); if (!symKey) { - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE); - return SECFailure; + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; } /* we really should use the actual mac'ing mechanism here, but we * don't because these types are used to map keytype anyway and both * mac's map to the same keytype. */ - slot = PK11_GetSlotFromKey(symKey); + slot = PK11_GetSlotFromKey(symKey); PK11_FreeSlot(slot); /* slot is held until the key is freed */ pwSpec->client.write_mac_key = - PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, symKey, PK11_OriginDerive, - CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC, returnedKeys.hClientMacSecret, PR_TRUE, pwArg); - if (pwSpec->client.write_mac_key == NULL ) { - goto loser; /* loser sets err */ + PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, symKey, PK11_OriginDerive, + CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC, returnedKeys.hClientMacSecret, PR_TRUE, pwArg); + if (pwSpec->client.write_mac_key == NULL) { + goto loser; /* loser sets err */ } pwSpec->server.write_mac_key = - PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, symKey, PK11_OriginDerive, - CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC, returnedKeys.hServerMacSecret, PR_TRUE, pwArg); - if (pwSpec->server.write_mac_key == NULL ) { - goto loser; /* loser sets err */ + PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, symKey, PK11_OriginDerive, + CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC, returnedKeys.hServerMacSecret, PR_TRUE, pwArg); + if (pwSpec->server.write_mac_key == NULL) { + goto loser; /* loser sets err */ } if (!skipKeysAndIVs) { - pwSpec->client.write_key = - PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, symKey, PK11_OriginDerive, - bulk_mechanism, returnedKeys.hClientKey, PR_TRUE, pwArg); - if (pwSpec->client.write_key == NULL ) { - goto loser; /* loser sets err */ - } - pwSpec->server.write_key = - PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, symKey, PK11_OriginDerive, - bulk_mechanism, returnedKeys.hServerKey, PR_TRUE, pwArg); - if (pwSpec->server.write_key == NULL ) { - goto loser; /* loser sets err */ - } + pwSpec->client.write_key = + PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, symKey, PK11_OriginDerive, + bulk_mechanism, returnedKeys.hClientKey, PR_TRUE, pwArg); + if (pwSpec->client.write_key == NULL) { + goto loser; /* loser sets err */ + } + pwSpec->server.write_key = + PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, symKey, PK11_OriginDerive, + bulk_mechanism, returnedKeys.hServerKey, PR_TRUE, pwArg); + if (pwSpec->server.write_key == NULL) { + goto loser; /* loser sets err */ + } } PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey); return SECSuccess; - loser: - if (symKey) PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey); + if (symKey) + PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey); ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE); return SECFailure; } /* ssl3_InitHandshakeHashes creates handshake hash contexts and hashes in - * buffered messages in ss->ssl3.hs.messages. */ -static SECStatus + * buffered messages in ss->ssl3.hs.messages. Called from + * ssl3_NegotiateCipherSuite(), tls13_HandleClientHelloPart2(), + * and ssl3_HandleServerHello. */ +SECStatus ssl3_InitHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss) { - SSL_TRC(30,("%d: SSL3[%d]: start handshake hashes", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: start handshake hashes", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_unknown); -#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS - if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) { - PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.sha_obj && !ss->ssl3.hs.sha_clone); - if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { - /* If we ever support ciphersuites where the PRF hash isn't SHA-256 - * then this will need to be updated. */ - ss->ssl3.hs.sha_obj = HASH_GetRawHashObject(HASH_AlgSHA256); - if (!ss->ssl3.hs.sha_obj) { - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE); - return SECFailure; - } - ss->ssl3.hs.sha_clone = (void (*)(void *, void *))SHA256_Clone; - ss->ssl3.hs.hashType = handshake_hash_single; - ss->ssl3.hs.sha_obj->begin(ss->ssl3.hs.sha_cx); - } else { - ss->ssl3.hs.hashType = handshake_hash_combo; - MD5_Begin((MD5Context *)ss->ssl3.hs.md5_cx); - SHA1_Begin((SHA1Context *)ss->ssl3.hs.sha_cx); - } - } else -#endif - { - PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.md5 && !ss->ssl3.hs.sha); - /* - * note: We should probably lookup an SSL3 slot for these - * handshake hashes in hopes that we wind up with the same slots - * that the master secret will wind up in ... - */ - if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { - /* If we ever support ciphersuites where the PRF hash isn't SHA-256 - * then this will need to be updated. */ - ss->ssl3.hs.sha = PK11_CreateDigestContext(SEC_OID_SHA256); - if (ss->ssl3.hs.sha == NULL) { - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); - return SECFailure; - } - ss->ssl3.hs.hashType = handshake_hash_single; - - if (PK11_DigestBegin(ss->ssl3.hs.sha) != SECSuccess) { - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE); - return SECFailure; - } - - /* Create a backup SHA-1 hash for a potential client auth - * signature. - * - * In TLS 1.2, ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes always uses the - * handshake hash function (SHA-256). If the server or the client - * does not support SHA-256 as a signature hash, we can either - * maintain a backup SHA-1 handshake hash or buffer all handshake - * messages. - */ - if (!ss->sec.isServer) { - ss->ssl3.hs.backupHash = PK11_CreateDigestContext(SEC_OID_SHA1); - if (ss->ssl3.hs.backupHash == NULL) { - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); - return SECFailure; - } - - if (PK11_DigestBegin(ss->ssl3.hs.backupHash) != SECSuccess) { - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); - return SECFailure; - } - } - } else { - /* Both ss->ssl3.hs.md5 and ss->ssl3.hs.sha should be NULL or - * created successfully. */ - ss->ssl3.hs.md5 = PK11_CreateDigestContext(SEC_OID_MD5); - if (ss->ssl3.hs.md5 == NULL) { - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE); - return SECFailure; - } - ss->ssl3.hs.sha = PK11_CreateDigestContext(SEC_OID_SHA1); - if (ss->ssl3.hs.sha == NULL) { - PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.md5, PR_TRUE); - ss->ssl3.hs.md5 = NULL; - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); - return SECFailure; - } - ss->ssl3.hs.hashType = handshake_hash_combo; - - if (PK11_DigestBegin(ss->ssl3.hs.md5) != SECSuccess) { - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE); - return SECFailure; - } - if (PK11_DigestBegin(ss->ssl3.hs.sha) != SECSuccess) { - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); - return SECFailure; - } - } - } - - if (ss->ssl3.hs.messages.len > 0) { - if (ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf, - ss->ssl3.hs.messages.len) != - SECSuccess) { - return SECFailure; - } - PORT_Free(ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf); - ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf = NULL; - ss->ssl3.hs.messages.len = 0; - ss->ssl3.hs.messages.space = 0; + if (ss->version == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { + ss->ssl3.hs.hashType = handshake_hash_record; + } else { + PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.md5 && !ss->ssl3.hs.sha); + /* + * note: We should probably lookup an SSL3 slot for these + * handshake hashes in hopes that we wind up with the same slots + * that the master secret will wind up in ... + */ + if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + /* determine the hash from the prf */ + const SECOidData *hash_oid = + SECOID_FindOIDByMechanism(ssl3_GetPrfHashMechanism(ss)); + + /* Get the PKCS #11 mechanism for the Hash from the cipher suite (prf_hash) + * Convert that to the OidTag. We can then use that OidTag to create our + * PK11Context */ + PORT_Assert(hash_oid != NULL); + if (hash_oid == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + ss->ssl3.hs.sha = PK11_CreateDigestContext(hash_oid->offset); + if (ss->ssl3.hs.sha == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + ss->ssl3.hs.hashType = handshake_hash_single; + + if (PK11_DigestBegin(ss->ssl3.hs.sha) != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + } else { + /* Both ss->ssl3.hs.md5 and ss->ssl3.hs.sha should be NULL or + * created successfully. */ + ss->ssl3.hs.md5 = PK11_CreateDigestContext(SEC_OID_MD5); + if (ss->ssl3.hs.md5 == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + ss->ssl3.hs.sha = PK11_CreateDigestContext(SEC_OID_SHA1); + if (ss->ssl3.hs.sha == NULL) { + PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.md5, PR_TRUE); + ss->ssl3.hs.md5 = NULL; + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + ss->ssl3.hs.hashType = handshake_hash_combo; + + if (PK11_DigestBegin(ss->ssl3.hs.md5) != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + if (PK11_DigestBegin(ss->ssl3.hs.sha) != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + } + } + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType != handshake_hash_record && + ss->ssl3.hs.messages.len > 0) { + if (ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf, + ss->ssl3.hs.messages.len) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + sslBuffer_Clear(&ss->ssl3.hs.messages); } return SECSuccess; } -static SECStatus +SECStatus ssl3_RestartHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss) { SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; - SSL_TRC(30,("%d: SSL3[%d]: reset handshake hashes", - SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd )); + SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: reset handshake hashes", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); ss->ssl3.hs.hashType = handshake_hash_unknown; ss->ssl3.hs.messages.len = 0; -#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS - ss->ssl3.hs.sha_obj = NULL; - ss->ssl3.hs.sha_clone = NULL; -#endif if (ss->ssl3.hs.md5) { - PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.md5,PR_TRUE); - ss->ssl3.hs.md5 = NULL; + PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.md5, PR_TRUE); + ss->ssl3.hs.md5 = NULL; } if (ss->ssl3.hs.sha) { - PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.sha,PR_TRUE); - ss->ssl3.hs.sha = NULL; + PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.sha, PR_TRUE); + ss->ssl3.hs.sha = NULL; } return rv; } @@ -4160,64 +4111,56 @@ ssl3_RestartHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss) /* * Handshake messages */ -/* Called from ssl3_InitHandshakeHashes() -** ssl3_AppendHandshake() -** ssl3_StartHandshakeHash() -** ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello() -** ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() +/* Called from ssl3_InitHandshakeHashes() +** ssl3_AppendHandshake() +** ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello() +** ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() ** Caller must hold the ssl3Handshake lock. */ -static SECStatus -ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss, const unsigned char *b, - unsigned int l) +SECStatus +ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss, const unsigned char *b, unsigned int l) { - SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); - /* We need to buffer the handshake messages until we have established - * which handshake hash function to use. */ - if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_unknown) { - return sslBuffer_Append(&ss->ssl3.hs.messages, b, l); + /* With TLS 1.3, and versions TLS.1.1 and older, we keep the hash(es) + * always up to date. However, we must initially buffer the handshake + * messages, until we know what to do. + * If ss->ssl3.hs.hashType != handshake_hash_unknown, + * it means we know what to do. We calculate (hash our input), + * and we stop appending to the buffer. + * + * With TLS 1.2, we always append all handshake messages, + * and never update the hash, because the hash function we must use for + * certificate_verify might be different from the hash function we use + * when signing other handshake hashes. */ + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_unknown || + ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_record) { + return sslBuffer_Append(&ss->ssl3.hs.messages, b, l); } PRINT_BUF(90, (NULL, "handshake hash input:", b, l)); -#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS - if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) { - if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_single) { - ss->ssl3.hs.sha_obj->update(ss->ssl3.hs.sha_cx, b, l); - } else { - MD5_Update((MD5Context *)ss->ssl3.hs.md5_cx, b, l); - SHA1_Update((SHA1Context *)ss->ssl3.hs.sha_cx, b, l); - } - return rv; - } -#endif if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_single) { - rv = PK11_DigestOp(ss->ssl3.hs.sha, b, l); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE); - return rv; - } - if (ss->ssl3.hs.backupHash) { - rv = PK11_DigestOp(ss->ssl3.hs.backupHash, b, l); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); - return rv; - } - } - } else { - rv = PK11_DigestOp(ss->ssl3.hs.md5, b, l); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE); - return rv; - } - rv = PK11_DigestOp(ss->ssl3.hs.sha, b, l); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); - return rv; - } + PORT_Assert(ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); + rv = PK11_DigestOp(ss->ssl3.hs.sha, b, l); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE); + return rv; + } + } else if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_combo) { + rv = PK11_DigestOp(ss->ssl3.hs.md5, b, l); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE); + return rv; + } + rv = PK11_DigestOp(ss->ssl3.hs.sha, b, l); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); + return rv; + } } return rv; } @@ -4230,40 +4173,40 @@ ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss, const unsigned char *b, SECStatus ssl3_AppendHandshake(sslSocket *ss, const void *void_src, PRInt32 bytes) { - unsigned char * src = (unsigned char *)void_src; - int room = ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.space - ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len; - SECStatus rv; + unsigned char *src = (unsigned char *)void_src; + int room = ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.space - ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len; + SECStatus rv; - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); /* protects sendBuf. */ + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); /* protects sendBuf. */ if (!bytes) - return SECSuccess; + return SECSuccess; if (ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.space < MAX_SEND_BUF_LENGTH && room < bytes) { - rv = sslBuffer_Grow(&ss->sec.ci.sendBuf, PR_MAX(MIN_SEND_BUF_LENGTH, - PR_MIN(MAX_SEND_BUF_LENGTH, ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len + bytes))); - if (rv != SECSuccess) - return rv; /* sslBuffer_Grow has set a memory error code. */ - room = ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.space - ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len; + rv = sslBuffer_Grow(&ss->sec.ci.sendBuf, PR_MAX(MIN_SEND_BUF_LENGTH, + PR_MIN(MAX_SEND_BUF_LENGTH, ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len + bytes))); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return rv; /* sslBuffer_Grow has set a memory error code. */ + room = ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.space - ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len; } - PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "Append to Handshake", (unsigned char*)void_src, bytes)); + PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "Append to Handshake", (unsigned char *)void_src, bytes)); rv = ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(ss, src, bytes); if (rv != SECSuccess) - return rv; /* error code set by ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes */ + return rv; /* error code set by ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes */ while (bytes > room) { - if (room > 0) - PORT_Memcpy(ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.buf + ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len, src, - room); - ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len += room; - rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return rv; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */ - } - bytes -= room; - src += room; - room = ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.space; - PORT_Assert(ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len == 0); + if (room > 0) + PORT_Memcpy(ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.buf + ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len, src, + room); + ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len += room; + rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */ + } + bytes -= room; + src += room; + room = ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.space; + PORT_Assert(ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len == 0); } PORT_Memcpy(ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.buf + ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len, src, bytes); ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len += bytes; @@ -4274,8 +4217,8 @@ SECStatus ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 num, PRInt32 lenSize) { SECStatus rv; - PRUint8 b[4]; - PRUint8 * p = b; + PRUint8 b[4]; + PRUint8 *p = b; PORT_Assert(lenSize <= 4 && lenSize > 0); if (lenSize < 4 && num >= (1L << (lenSize * 8))) { @@ -4284,18 +4227,18 @@ ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 num, PRInt32 lenSize) } switch (lenSize) { - case 4: - *p++ = (num >> 24) & 0xff; - case 3: - *p++ = (num >> 16) & 0xff; - case 2: - *p++ = (num >> 8) & 0xff; - case 1: - *p = num & 0xff; + case 4: + *p++ = (num >> 24) & 0xff; + case 3: + *p++ = (num >> 16) & 0xff; + case 2: + *p++ = (num >> 8) & 0xff; + case 1: + *p = num & 0xff; } SSL_TRC(60, ("%d: number:", SSL_GETPID())); rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, &b[0], lenSize); - return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */ + return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */ } SECStatus @@ -4304,18 +4247,18 @@ ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable( { SECStatus rv; - PORT_Assert((bytes < (1<<8) && lenSize == 1) || - (bytes < (1L<<16) && lenSize == 2) || - (bytes < (1L<<24) && lenSize == 3)); + PORT_Assert((bytes < (1 << 8) && lenSize == 1) || + (bytes < (1L << 16) && lenSize == 2) || + (bytes < (1L << 24) && lenSize == 3)); - SSL_TRC(60,("%d: append variable:", SSL_GETPID())); + SSL_TRC(60, ("%d: append variable:", SSL_GETPID())); rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, bytes, lenSize); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */ + return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */ } SSL_TRC(60, ("data:")); rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, src, bytes); - return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */ + return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */ } SECStatus @@ -4328,61 +4271,47 @@ ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(sslSocket *ss, SSL3HandshakeType t, PRUint32 length) * dtls_StageHandshakeMessage to mark the message boundary. */ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { - rv = dtls_StageHandshakeMessage(ss); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return rv; - } + rv = dtls_StageHandshakeMessage(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; + } } - SSL_TRC(30,("%d: SSL3[%d]: append handshake header: type %s", - SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ssl3_DecodeHandshakeType(t))); + SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: append handshake header: type %s", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ssl3_DecodeHandshakeType(t))); rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, t, 1); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */ + return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */ } rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, length, 3); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */ + return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */ } if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { - /* Note that we make an unfragmented message here. We fragment in the - * transmission code, if necessary */ - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.sendMessageSeq, 2); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */ - } - ss->ssl3.hs.sendMessageSeq++; + /* Note that we make an unfragmented message here. We fragment in the + * transmission code, if necessary */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.sendMessageSeq, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */ + } + ss->ssl3.hs.sendMessageSeq++; - /* 0 is the fragment offset, because it's not fragmented yet */ - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 3); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */ - } + /* 0 is the fragment offset, because it's not fragmented yet */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 3); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */ + } - /* Fragment length -- set to the packet length because not fragmented */ - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, length, 3); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */ - } + /* Fragment length -- set to the packet length because not fragmented */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, length, 3); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */ + } } - return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */ -} - -/* ssl3_AppendSignatureAndHashAlgorithm appends the serialisation of - * |sigAndHash| to the current handshake message. */ -SECStatus -ssl3_AppendSignatureAndHashAlgorithm( - sslSocket *ss, const SSLSignatureAndHashAlg* sigAndHash) -{ - PRUint8 serialized[2]; - - serialized[0] = (PRUint8)sigAndHash->hashAlg; - serialized[1] = (PRUint8)sigAndHash->sigAlg; - - return ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, serialized, sizeof(serialized)); + return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */ } /************************************************************************** @@ -4402,17 +4331,17 @@ ssl3_AppendSignatureAndHashAlgorithm( */ SECStatus ssl3_ConsumeHandshake(sslSocket *ss, void *v, PRInt32 bytes, SSL3Opaque **b, - PRUint32 *length) + PRUint32 *length) { - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); if ((PRUint32)bytes > *length) { - return ssl3_DecodeError(ss); + return ssl3_DecodeError(ss); } PORT_Memcpy(v, *b, bytes); PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "consume bytes:", *b, bytes)); - *b += bytes; + *b += bytes; *length -= bytes; return SECSuccess; } @@ -4430,24 +4359,24 @@ ssl3_ConsumeHandshake(sslSocket *ss, void *v, PRInt32 bytes, SSL3Opaque **b, */ PRInt32 ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 bytes, SSL3Opaque **b, - PRUint32 *length) + PRUint32 *length) { - PRUint8 *buf = *b; - int i; - PRInt32 num = 0; + PRUint8 *buf = *b; + int i; + PRInt32 num = 0; - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); - PORT_Assert( bytes <= sizeof num); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(bytes <= sizeof num); if ((PRUint32)bytes > *length) { - return ssl3_DecodeError(ss); + return ssl3_DecodeError(ss); } PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "consume bytes:", *b, bytes)); for (i = 0; i < bytes; i++) - num = (num << 8) + buf[i]; - *b += bytes; + num = (num << 8) + buf[i]; + *b += bytes; *length -= bytes; return num; } @@ -4461,134 +4390,236 @@ ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 bytes, SSL3Opaque **b, * Returns SECFailure (-1) on failure. * On error, an alert has been sent, and a generic error code has been set. * - * RADICAL CHANGE for NSS 3.11. All callers of this function make copies + * RADICAL CHANGE for NSS 3.11. All callers of this function make copies * of the data returned in the SECItem *i, so making a copy of it here - * is simply wasteful. So, This function now just sets SECItem *i to + * is simply wasteful. So, This function now just sets SECItem *i to * point to the values in the buffer **b. */ SECStatus ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(sslSocket *ss, SECItem *i, PRInt32 bytes, - SSL3Opaque **b, PRUint32 *length) + SSL3Opaque **b, PRUint32 *length) { - PRInt32 count; + PRInt32 count; PORT_Assert(bytes <= 3); - i->len = 0; + i->len = 0; i->data = NULL; i->type = siBuffer; count = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, bytes, b, length); - if (count < 0) { /* Can't test for SECSuccess here. */ - return SECFailure; + if (count < 0) { /* Can't test for SECSuccess here. */ + return SECFailure; } if (count > 0) { - if ((PRUint32)count > *length) { - return ssl3_DecodeError(ss); - } - i->data = *b; - i->len = count; - *b += count; - *length -= count; + if ((PRUint32)count > *length) { + return ssl3_DecodeError(ss); + } + i->data = *b; + i->len = count; + *b += count; + *length -= count; } return SECSuccess; } -/* tlsHashOIDMap contains the mapping between TLS hash identifiers and the - * SECOidTag used internally by NSS. */ -static const struct { - SSLHashType tlsHash; - SECOidTag oid; -} tlsHashOIDMap[] = { - { ssl_hash_sha1, SEC_OID_SHA1 }, - { ssl_hash_sha256, SEC_OID_SHA256 }, - { ssl_hash_sha384, SEC_OID_SHA384 }, - { ssl_hash_sha512, SEC_OID_SHA512 } -}; +/* Helper function to encode an unsigned integer into a buffer. */ +PRUint8 * +ssl_EncodeUintX(PRUint64 value, unsigned int bytes, PRUint8 *to) +{ + PRUint64 encoded; + + PORT_Assert(bytes > 0 && bytes <= sizeof(encoded)); + + encoded = PR_htonll(value); + memcpy(to, ((unsigned char *)(&encoded)) + (sizeof(encoded) - bytes), bytes); + return to + bytes; +} /* ssl3_TLSHashAlgorithmToOID converts a TLS hash identifier into an OID value. * If the hash is not recognised, SEC_OID_UNKNOWN is returned. * * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1 */ SECOidTag -ssl3_TLSHashAlgorithmToOID(SSLHashType hashFunc) -{ - unsigned int i; - - for (i = 0; i < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(tlsHashOIDMap); i++) { - if (hashFunc == tlsHashOIDMap[i].tlsHash) { - return tlsHashOIDMap[i].oid; - } +ssl3_HashTypeToOID(SSLHashType hashType) +{ + switch (hashType) { + case ssl_hash_sha1: + return SEC_OID_SHA1; + case ssl_hash_sha256: + return SEC_OID_SHA256; + case ssl_hash_sha384: + return SEC_OID_SHA384; + case ssl_hash_sha512: + return SEC_OID_SHA512; + default: + break; } return SEC_OID_UNKNOWN; } -/* ssl3_TLSSignatureAlgorithmForKeyType returns the TLS 1.2 signature algorithm - * identifier for a given KeyType. */ -static SECStatus -ssl3_TLSSignatureAlgorithmForKeyType(KeyType keyType, SSLSignType *out) -{ - switch (keyType) { - case rsaKey: - *out = ssl_sign_rsa; - return SECSuccess; - case dsaKey: - *out = ssl_sign_dsa; - return SECSuccess; - case ecKey: - *out = ssl_sign_ecdsa; - return SECSuccess; - default: - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY); - return SECFailure; +SSLHashType +ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType(SSLSignatureScheme scheme) +{ + switch (scheme) { + case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1: + case ssl_sig_dsa_sha1: + case ssl_sig_ecdsa_sha1: + return ssl_hash_sha1; + case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha256: + case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_sha256: + case ssl_sig_dsa_sha256: + return ssl_hash_sha256; + case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha384: + case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_sha384: + case ssl_sig_dsa_sha384: + return ssl_hash_sha384; + case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha512: + case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_sha512: + case ssl_sig_dsa_sha512: + return ssl_hash_sha512; + case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1md5: + return ssl_hash_none; /* Special for TLS 1.0/1.1. */ + case ssl_sig_none: + case ssl_sig_ed25519: + case ssl_sig_ed448: + break; } + PORT_Assert(0); + return ssl_hash_none; +} + +KeyType +ssl_SignatureSchemeToKeyType(SSLSignatureScheme scheme) +{ + switch (scheme) { + case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha256: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha384: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha512: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_sha256: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_sha384: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_sha512: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1md5: + return rsaKey; + case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256: + case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384: + case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512: + case ssl_sig_ecdsa_sha1: + return ecKey; + case ssl_sig_dsa_sha256: + case ssl_sig_dsa_sha384: + case ssl_sig_dsa_sha512: + case ssl_sig_dsa_sha1: + return dsaKey; + case ssl_sig_none: + case ssl_sig_ed25519: + case ssl_sig_ed448: + break; + } + PORT_Assert(0); + return nullKey; } -/* ssl3_TLSSignatureAlgorithmForCertificate returns the TLS 1.2 signature - * algorithm identifier for the given certificate. */ -static SECStatus -ssl3_TLSSignatureAlgorithmForCertificate(CERTCertificate *cert, - SSLSignType *out) +static SSLNamedGroup +ssl_NamedGroupForSignatureScheme(SSLSignatureScheme scheme) { - SECKEYPublicKey *key; - KeyType keyType; - - key = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(cert); - if (key == NULL) { - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY_FAILURE); - return SECFailure; + switch (scheme) { + case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256: + return ssl_grp_ec_secp256r1; + case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384: + return ssl_grp_ec_secp384r1; + case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512: + return ssl_grp_ec_secp521r1; + default: + break; } + PORT_Assert(0); + return 0; +} - keyType = key->keyType; - SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(key); - return ssl3_TLSSignatureAlgorithmForKeyType(keyType, out); +/* Validate that the signature scheme works for the given key. + * If |allowSha1| is set, we allow the use of SHA-1. + * If |matchGroup| is set, we also check that the group and hash match. */ +static PRBool +ssl_SignatureSchemeValidForKey(PRBool allowSha1, PRBool matchGroup, + KeyType keyType, + const sslNamedGroupDef *ecGroup, + SSLSignatureScheme scheme) +{ + if (!ssl_IsSupportedSignatureScheme(scheme)) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + if (keyType != ssl_SignatureSchemeToKeyType(scheme)) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + if (!allowSha1 && ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType(scheme) == ssl_hash_sha1) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + if (keyType != ecKey) { + return PR_TRUE; + } + if (!ecGroup) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + /* If |allowSha1| is present and the scheme is ssl_sig_ecdsa_sha1, it's OK. + * This scheme isn't bound to a specific group. */ + if (allowSha1 && (scheme == ssl_sig_ecdsa_sha1)) { + return PR_TRUE; + } + if (!matchGroup) { + return PR_TRUE; + } + return ecGroup->name == ssl_NamedGroupForSignatureScheme(scheme); } -/* ssl3_CheckSignatureAndHashAlgorithmConsistency checks that the signature +/* ssl3_CheckSignatureSchemeConsistency checks that the signature * algorithm identifier in |sigAndHash| is consistent with the public key in * |cert|. It also checks the hash algorithm against the configured signature * algorithms. If all the tests pass, SECSuccess is returned. Otherwise, * PORT_SetError is called and SECFailure is returned. */ SECStatus -ssl3_CheckSignatureAndHashAlgorithmConsistency( - sslSocket *ss, const SSLSignatureAndHashAlg *sigAndHash, - CERTCertificate* cert) +ssl_CheckSignatureSchemeConsistency( + sslSocket *ss, SSLSignatureScheme scheme, CERTCertificate *cert) { - SECStatus rv; - SSLSignType sigAlg; unsigned int i; + const sslNamedGroupDef *group = NULL; + SECKEYPublicKey *key; + KeyType keyType; + PRBool isTLS13 = ss->version == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3; - rv = ssl3_TLSSignatureAlgorithmForCertificate(cert, &sigAlg); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return rv; + key = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(cert); + if (key == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + keyType = SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(key); + if (keyType == ecKey) { + group = ssl_ECPubKey2NamedGroup(key); + } + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(key); + + /* If we're a client, check that the signature algorithm matches the signing + * key type of the cipher suite. */ + if (!isTLS13 && + !ss->sec.isServer && + ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->signKeyType != keyType) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_INCORRECT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM); + return SECFailure; } - if (sigAlg != sigAndHash->sigAlg) { + + /* Verify that the signature scheme matches the signing key. */ + if (!ssl_SignatureSchemeValidForKey(!isTLS13 /* allowSha1 */, + isTLS13 /* matchGroup */, + keyType, group, scheme)) { PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_INCORRECT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM); return SECFailure; } - for (i = 0; i < ss->ssl3.signatureAlgorithmCount; ++i) { - const SSLSignatureAndHashAlg *alg = &ss->ssl3.signatureAlgorithms[i]; - if (sigAndHash->sigAlg == alg->sigAlg && - sigAndHash->hashAlg == alg->hashAlg) { + for (i = 0; i < ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount; ++i) { + if (scheme == ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[i]) { return SECSuccess; } } @@ -4597,69 +4628,70 @@ ssl3_CheckSignatureAndHashAlgorithmConsistency( } PRBool -ssl3_IsSupportedSignatureAlgorithm(const SSLSignatureAndHashAlg *alg) -{ - static const SSLHashType supportedHashes[] = { - ssl_hash_sha1, - ssl_hash_sha256, - ssl_hash_sha384, - ssl_hash_sha512 - }; - - static const SSLSignType supportedSigAlgs[] = { - ssl_sign_rsa, -#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC - ssl_sign_ecdsa, -#endif - ssl_sign_dsa - }; - - unsigned int i; - PRBool hashOK = PR_FALSE; - PRBool signOK = PR_FALSE; +ssl_IsSupportedSignatureScheme(SSLSignatureScheme scheme) +{ + switch (scheme) { + case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha256: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha384: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha512: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_sha256: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_sha384: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_sha512: + case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256: + case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384: + case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512: + case ssl_sig_dsa_sha1: + case ssl_sig_dsa_sha256: + case ssl_sig_dsa_sha384: + case ssl_sig_dsa_sha512: + case ssl_sig_ecdsa_sha1: + return PR_TRUE; + + case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1md5: + case ssl_sig_none: + case ssl_sig_ed25519: + case ssl_sig_ed448: + return PR_FALSE; + } + return PR_FALSE; +} - for (i = 0; i < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(supportedHashes); ++i) { - if (alg->hashAlg == supportedHashes[i]) { - hashOK = PR_TRUE; - break; - } - } +PRBool +ssl_IsRsaPssSignatureScheme(SSLSignatureScheme scheme) +{ + switch (scheme) { + case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_sha256: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_sha384: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_sha512: + return PR_TRUE; - for (i = 0; i < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(supportedSigAlgs); ++i) { - if (alg->sigAlg == supportedSigAlgs[i]) { - signOK = PR_TRUE; - break; - } + default: + return PR_FALSE; } - - return hashOK && signOK; + return PR_FALSE; } -/* ssl3_ConsumeSignatureAndHashAlgorithm reads a SignatureAndHashAlgorithm - * structure from |b| and puts the resulting value into |out|. |b| and |length| - * are updated accordingly. +/* ssl_ConsumeSignatureScheme reads a SSLSignatureScheme (formerly + * SignatureAndHashAlgorithm) structure from |b| and puts the resulting value + * into |out|. |b| and |length| are updated accordingly. * * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1 */ SECStatus -ssl3_ConsumeSignatureAndHashAlgorithm(sslSocket *ss, - SSL3Opaque **b, - PRUint32 *length, - SSLSignatureAndHashAlg *out) +ssl_ConsumeSignatureScheme(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque **b, + PRUint32 *length, SSLSignatureScheme *out) { - PRUint8 bytes[2]; - SECStatus rv; + PRInt32 tmp; - rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshake(ss, bytes, sizeof(bytes), b, length); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return rv; + tmp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, b, length); + if (tmp < 0) { + return SECFailure; /* Error code set already. */ } - - out->hashAlg = (SSLHashType)bytes[0]; - out->sigAlg = (SSLSignType)bytes[1]; - if (!ssl3_IsSupportedSignatureAlgorithm(out)) { + if (!ssl_IsSupportedSignatureScheme((SSLSignatureScheme)tmp)) { PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM); return SECFailure; } + *out = (SSLSignatureScheme)tmp; return SECSuccess; } @@ -4667,6 +4699,32 @@ ssl3_ConsumeSignatureAndHashAlgorithm(sslSocket *ss, * end of Consume Handshake functions. **************************************************************************/ +static SECStatus +ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHash(unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len, + SSLHashType hashAlg, SSL3Hashes *hashes) +{ + SECStatus rv = SECFailure; + PK11Context *hashContext = PK11_CreateDigestContext( + ssl3_HashTypeToOID(hashAlg)); + + if (!hashContext) { + return rv; + } + rv = PK11_DigestBegin(hashContext); + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + rv = PK11_DigestOp(hashContext, buf, len); + } + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + rv = PK11_DigestFinal(hashContext, hashes->u.raw, &hashes->len, + sizeof(hashes->u.raw)); + } + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + hashes->hashAlg = hashAlg; + } + PK11_DestroyContext(hashContext, PR_TRUE); + return rv; +} + /* Extract the hashes of handshake messages to this point. * Called from ssl3_SendCertificateVerify * ssl3_SendFinished @@ -4674,21 +4732,21 @@ ssl3_ConsumeSignatureAndHashAlgorithm(sslSocket *ss, * * Caller must hold the SSL3HandshakeLock. * Caller must hold a read or write lock on the Spec R/W lock. - * (There is presently no way to assert on a Read lock.) + * (There is presently no way to assert on a Read lock.) */ -static SECStatus -ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(sslSocket * ss, - ssl3CipherSpec *spec, /* uses ->master_secret */ - SSL3Hashes * hashes, /* output goes here. */ - PRUint32 sender) -{ - SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; - PRBool isTLS = (PRBool)(spec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); - unsigned int outLength; - SSL3Opaque md5_inner[MAX_MAC_LENGTH]; - SSL3Opaque sha_inner[MAX_MAC_LENGTH]; - - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); +SECStatus +ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss, + ssl3CipherSpec *spec, /* uses ->master_secret */ + SSL3Hashes *hashes, /* output goes here. */ + PRUint32 sender) +{ + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + PRBool isTLS = (PRBool)(spec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + unsigned int outLength; + SSL3Opaque md5_inner[MAX_MAC_LENGTH]; + SSL3Opaque sha_inner[MAX_MAC_LENGTH]; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_unknown) { PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); return SECFailure; @@ -4696,406 +4754,288 @@ ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(sslSocket * ss, hashes->hashAlg = ssl_hash_none; -#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS - if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11 && - ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_single) { - /* compute them without PKCS11 */ - PRUint64 sha_cx[MAX_MAC_CONTEXT_LLONGS]; - - ss->ssl3.hs.sha_clone(sha_cx, ss->ssl3.hs.sha_cx); - ss->ssl3.hs.sha_obj->end(sha_cx, hashes->u.raw, &hashes->len, - sizeof(hashes->u.raw)); - - PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "SHA-256: result", hashes->u.raw, hashes->len)); + if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_single) { + PK11Context *h; + unsigned int stateLen; + unsigned char stackBuf[1024]; + unsigned char *stateBuf = NULL; + + h = ss->ssl3.hs.sha; + stateBuf = PK11_SaveContextAlloc(h, stackBuf, + sizeof(stackBuf), &stateLen); + if (stateBuf == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE); + goto tls12_loser; + } + rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(h, hashes->u.raw, &hashes->len, + sizeof(hashes->u.raw)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE); + rv = SECFailure; + goto tls12_loser; + } - /* If we ever support ciphersuites where the PRF hash isn't SHA-256 - * then this will need to be updated. */ - hashes->hashAlg = ssl_hash_sha256; - rv = SECSuccess; - } else if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) { - /* compute them without PKCS11 */ - PRUint64 md5_cx[MAX_MAC_CONTEXT_LLONGS]; - PRUint64 sha_cx[MAX_MAC_CONTEXT_LLONGS]; + hashes->hashAlg = ssl3_GetSuitePrfHash(ss); + rv = SECSuccess; -#define md5cx ((MD5Context *)md5_cx) -#define shacx ((SHA1Context *)sha_cx) + tls12_loser: + if (stateBuf) { + if (PK11_RestoreContext(h, stateBuf, stateLen) != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE); + rv = SECFailure; + } + if (stateBuf != stackBuf) { + PORT_ZFree(stateBuf, stateLen); + } + } + } else if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_record) { + rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHash(ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf, + ss->ssl3.hs.messages.len, + ssl3_GetSuitePrfHash(ss), + hashes); + } else { + PK11Context *md5; + PK11Context *sha = NULL; + unsigned char *md5StateBuf = NULL; + unsigned char *shaStateBuf = NULL; + unsigned int md5StateLen, shaStateLen; + unsigned char md5StackBuf[256]; + unsigned char shaStackBuf[512]; + + md5StateBuf = PK11_SaveContextAlloc(ss->ssl3.hs.md5, md5StackBuf, + sizeof md5StackBuf, &md5StateLen); + if (md5StateBuf == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + md5 = ss->ssl3.hs.md5; - MD5_Clone (md5cx, (MD5Context *)ss->ssl3.hs.md5_cx); - SHA1_Clone(shacx, (SHA1Context *)ss->ssl3.hs.sha_cx); + shaStateBuf = PK11_SaveContextAlloc(ss->ssl3.hs.sha, shaStackBuf, + sizeof shaStackBuf, &shaStateLen); + if (shaStateBuf == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + sha = ss->ssl3.hs.sha; - if (!isTLS) { - /* compute hashes for SSL3. */ - unsigned char s[4]; + if (!isTLS) { + /* compute hashes for SSL3. */ + unsigned char s[4]; - if (!spec->msItem.data) { + if (!spec->master_secret) { PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HANDSHAKE); - return SECFailure; + rv = SECFailure; + goto loser; } - s[0] = (unsigned char)(sender >> 24); - s[1] = (unsigned char)(sender >> 16); - s[2] = (unsigned char)(sender >> 8); - s[3] = (unsigned char)sender; + s[0] = (unsigned char)(sender >> 24); + s[1] = (unsigned char)(sender >> 16); + s[2] = (unsigned char)(sender >> 8); + s[3] = (unsigned char)sender; - if (sender != 0) { - MD5_Update(md5cx, s, 4); - PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 inner: sender", s, 4)); - } + if (sender != 0) { + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(md5, s, 4); + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 inner: sender", s, 4)); + } - PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 inner: MAC Pad 1", mac_pad_1, - mac_defs[mac_md5].pad_size)); + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 inner: MAC Pad 1", mac_pad_1, + mac_defs[mac_md5].pad_size)); - MD5_Update(md5cx, spec->msItem.data, spec->msItem.len); - MD5_Update(md5cx, mac_pad_1, mac_defs[mac_md5].pad_size); - MD5_End(md5cx, md5_inner, &outLength, MD5_LENGTH); + rv |= PK11_DigestKey(md5, spec->master_secret); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(md5, mac_pad_1, mac_defs[mac_md5].pad_size); + rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(md5, md5_inner, &outLength, MD5_LENGTH); + PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || outLength == MD5_LENGTH); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE); + rv = SECFailure; + goto loser; + } - PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 inner: result", md5_inner, outLength)); + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 inner: result", md5_inner, outLength)); - if (sender != 0) { - SHA1_Update(shacx, s, 4); - PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA inner: sender", s, 4)); - } + if (sender != 0) { + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(sha, s, 4); + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA inner: sender", s, 4)); + } - PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA inner: MAC Pad 1", mac_pad_1, - mac_defs[mac_sha].pad_size)); + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA inner: MAC Pad 1", mac_pad_1, + mac_defs[mac_sha].pad_size)); - SHA1_Update(shacx, spec->msItem.data, spec->msItem.len); - SHA1_Update(shacx, mac_pad_1, mac_defs[mac_sha].pad_size); - SHA1_End(shacx, sha_inner, &outLength, SHA1_LENGTH); + rv |= PK11_DigestKey(sha, spec->master_secret); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(sha, mac_pad_1, mac_defs[mac_sha].pad_size); + rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(sha, sha_inner, &outLength, SHA1_LENGTH); + PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || outLength == SHA1_LENGTH); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); + rv = SECFailure; + goto loser; + } - PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA inner: result", sha_inner, outLength)); - PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 outer: MAC Pad 2", mac_pad_2, - mac_defs[mac_md5].pad_size)); - PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 outer: MD5 inner", md5_inner, MD5_LENGTH)); + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA inner: result", sha_inner, outLength)); - MD5_Begin(md5cx); - MD5_Update(md5cx, spec->msItem.data, spec->msItem.len); - MD5_Update(md5cx, mac_pad_2, mac_defs[mac_md5].pad_size); - MD5_Update(md5cx, md5_inner, MD5_LENGTH); - } - MD5_End(md5cx, hashes->u.s.md5, &outLength, MD5_LENGTH); + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 outer: MAC Pad 2", mac_pad_2, + mac_defs[mac_md5].pad_size)); + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 outer: MD5 inner", md5_inner, MD5_LENGTH)); - PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "MD5 outer: result", hashes->u.s.md5, MD5_LENGTH)); + rv |= PK11_DigestBegin(md5); + rv |= PK11_DigestKey(md5, spec->master_secret); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(md5, mac_pad_2, mac_defs[mac_md5].pad_size); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(md5, md5_inner, MD5_LENGTH); + } + rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(md5, hashes->u.s.md5, &outLength, MD5_LENGTH); + PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || outLength == MD5_LENGTH); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE); + rv = SECFailure; + goto loser; + } - if (!isTLS) { - PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA outer: MAC Pad 2", mac_pad_2, - mac_defs[mac_sha].pad_size)); - PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA outer: SHA inner", sha_inner, SHA1_LENGTH)); + PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "MD5 outer: result", hashes->u.s.md5, MD5_LENGTH)); - SHA1_Begin(shacx); - SHA1_Update(shacx, spec->msItem.data, spec->msItem.len); - SHA1_Update(shacx, mac_pad_2, mac_defs[mac_sha].pad_size); - SHA1_Update(shacx, sha_inner, SHA1_LENGTH); - } - SHA1_End(shacx, hashes->u.s.sha, &outLength, SHA1_LENGTH); + if (!isTLS) { + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA outer: MAC Pad 2", mac_pad_2, + mac_defs[mac_sha].pad_size)); + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA outer: SHA inner", sha_inner, SHA1_LENGTH)); - PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "SHA outer: result", hashes->u.s.sha, SHA1_LENGTH)); + rv |= PK11_DigestBegin(sha); + rv |= PK11_DigestKey(sha, spec->master_secret); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(sha, mac_pad_2, mac_defs[mac_sha].pad_size); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(sha, sha_inner, SHA1_LENGTH); + } + rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(sha, hashes->u.s.sha, &outLength, SHA1_LENGTH); + PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || outLength == SHA1_LENGTH); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); + rv = SECFailure; + goto loser; + } - hashes->len = MD5_LENGTH + SHA1_LENGTH; - rv = SECSuccess; -#undef md5cx -#undef shacx - } else -#endif - if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_single) { - /* compute hashes with PKCS11 */ - PK11Context *h; - unsigned int stateLen; - unsigned char stackBuf[1024]; - unsigned char *stateBuf = NULL; - - h = ss->ssl3.hs.sha; - stateBuf = PK11_SaveContextAlloc(h, stackBuf, - sizeof(stackBuf), &stateLen); - if (stateBuf == NULL) { - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE); - goto tls12_loser; - } - rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(h, hashes->u.raw, &hashes->len, - sizeof(hashes->u.raw)); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE); - rv = SECFailure; - goto tls12_loser; - } - /* If we ever support ciphersuites where the PRF hash isn't SHA-256 - * then this will need to be updated. */ - hashes->hashAlg = ssl_hash_sha256; - rv = SECSuccess; - -tls12_loser: - if (stateBuf) { - if (PK11_RestoreContext(h, stateBuf, stateLen) != SECSuccess) { - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE); - rv = SECFailure; - } - if (stateBuf != stackBuf) { - PORT_ZFree(stateBuf, stateLen); - } - } - } else { - /* compute hashes with PKCS11 */ - PK11Context * md5; - PK11Context * sha = NULL; - unsigned char *md5StateBuf = NULL; - unsigned char *shaStateBuf = NULL; - unsigned int md5StateLen, shaStateLen; - unsigned char md5StackBuf[256]; - unsigned char shaStackBuf[512]; - - md5StateBuf = PK11_SaveContextAlloc(ss->ssl3.hs.md5, md5StackBuf, - sizeof md5StackBuf, &md5StateLen); - if (md5StateBuf == NULL) { - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE); - goto loser; - } - md5 = ss->ssl3.hs.md5; - - shaStateBuf = PK11_SaveContextAlloc(ss->ssl3.hs.sha, shaStackBuf, - sizeof shaStackBuf, &shaStateLen); - if (shaStateBuf == NULL) { - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); - goto loser; - } - sha = ss->ssl3.hs.sha; - - if (!isTLS) { - /* compute hashes for SSL3. */ - unsigned char s[4]; + PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "SHA outer: result", hashes->u.s.sha, SHA1_LENGTH)); - if (!spec->master_secret) { - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HANDSHAKE); - return SECFailure; - } - - s[0] = (unsigned char)(sender >> 24); - s[1] = (unsigned char)(sender >> 16); - s[2] = (unsigned char)(sender >> 8); - s[3] = (unsigned char)sender; - - if (sender != 0) { - rv |= PK11_DigestOp(md5, s, 4); - PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 inner: sender", s, 4)); - } - - PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 inner: MAC Pad 1", mac_pad_1, - mac_defs[mac_md5].pad_size)); - - rv |= PK11_DigestKey(md5,spec->master_secret); - rv |= PK11_DigestOp(md5, mac_pad_1, mac_defs[mac_md5].pad_size); - rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(md5, md5_inner, &outLength, MD5_LENGTH); - PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || outLength == MD5_LENGTH); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE); - rv = SECFailure; - goto loser; - } - - PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 inner: result", md5_inner, outLength)); - - if (sender != 0) { - rv |= PK11_DigestOp(sha, s, 4); - PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA inner: sender", s, 4)); - } - - PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA inner: MAC Pad 1", mac_pad_1, - mac_defs[mac_sha].pad_size)); - - rv |= PK11_DigestKey(sha, spec->master_secret); - rv |= PK11_DigestOp(sha, mac_pad_1, mac_defs[mac_sha].pad_size); - rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(sha, sha_inner, &outLength, SHA1_LENGTH); - PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || outLength == SHA1_LENGTH); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); - rv = SECFailure; - goto loser; - } - - PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA inner: result", sha_inner, outLength)); - - PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 outer: MAC Pad 2", mac_pad_2, - mac_defs[mac_md5].pad_size)); - PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 outer: MD5 inner", md5_inner, MD5_LENGTH)); - - rv |= PK11_DigestBegin(md5); - rv |= PK11_DigestKey(md5, spec->master_secret); - rv |= PK11_DigestOp(md5, mac_pad_2, mac_defs[mac_md5].pad_size); - rv |= PK11_DigestOp(md5, md5_inner, MD5_LENGTH); - } - rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(md5, hashes->u.s.md5, &outLength, MD5_LENGTH); - PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || outLength == MD5_LENGTH); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE); - rv = SECFailure; - goto loser; - } - - PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "MD5 outer: result", hashes->u.s.md5, MD5_LENGTH)); - - if (!isTLS) { - PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA outer: MAC Pad 2", mac_pad_2, - mac_defs[mac_sha].pad_size)); - PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA outer: SHA inner", sha_inner, SHA1_LENGTH)); - - rv |= PK11_DigestBegin(sha); - rv |= PK11_DigestKey(sha,spec->master_secret); - rv |= PK11_DigestOp(sha, mac_pad_2, mac_defs[mac_sha].pad_size); - rv |= PK11_DigestOp(sha, sha_inner, SHA1_LENGTH); - } - rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(sha, hashes->u.s.sha, &outLength, SHA1_LENGTH); - PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || outLength == SHA1_LENGTH); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); - rv = SECFailure; - goto loser; - } - - PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "SHA outer: result", hashes->u.s.sha, SHA1_LENGTH)); - - hashes->len = MD5_LENGTH + SHA1_LENGTH; - rv = SECSuccess; + hashes->len = MD5_LENGTH + SHA1_LENGTH; + rv = SECSuccess; loser: - if (md5StateBuf) { - if (PK11_RestoreContext(ss->ssl3.hs.md5, md5StateBuf, md5StateLen) - != SECSuccess) - { - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE); - rv = SECFailure; - } - if (md5StateBuf != md5StackBuf) { - PORT_ZFree(md5StateBuf, md5StateLen); - } - } - if (shaStateBuf) { - if (PK11_RestoreContext(ss->ssl3.hs.sha, shaStateBuf, shaStateLen) - != SECSuccess) - { - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); - rv = SECFailure; - } - if (shaStateBuf != shaStackBuf) { - PORT_ZFree(shaStateBuf, shaStateLen); - } - } + if (md5StateBuf) { + if (PK11_RestoreContext(ss->ssl3.hs.md5, md5StateBuf, md5StateLen) != + SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE); + rv = SECFailure; + } + if (md5StateBuf != md5StackBuf) { + PORT_ZFree(md5StateBuf, md5StateLen); + } + } + if (shaStateBuf) { + if (PK11_RestoreContext(ss->ssl3.hs.sha, shaStateBuf, shaStateLen) != + SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); + rv = SECFailure; + } + if (shaStateBuf != shaStackBuf) { + PORT_ZFree(shaStateBuf, shaStateLen); + } + } } return rv; } -static SECStatus -ssl3_ComputeBackupHandshakeHashes(sslSocket * ss, - SSL3Hashes * hashes) /* output goes here. */ -{ - SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; +/************************************************************************** + * end of Handshake Hash functions. + * Begin Send and Handle functions for handshakes. + **************************************************************************/ - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); - PORT_Assert( !ss->sec.isServer ); - PORT_Assert( ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_single ); +#ifdef TRACE +#define CHTYPE(t) \ + case client_hello_##t: \ + return #t; - rv = PK11_DigestFinal(ss->ssl3.hs.backupHash, hashes->u.raw, &hashes->len, - sizeof(hashes->u.raw)); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); - rv = SECFailure; - goto loser; +static const char * +ssl_ClientHelloTypeName(sslClientHelloType type) +{ + switch (type) { + CHTYPE(initial); + CHTYPE(retry); + CHTYPE(retransmit); /* DTLS only */ + CHTYPE(renegotiation); /* TLS <= 1.2 only */ } - hashes->hashAlg = ssl_hash_sha1; - -loser: - PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.backupHash, PR_TRUE); - ss->ssl3.hs.backupHash = NULL; - return rv; + PORT_Assert(0); + return NULL; } +#undef CHTYPE +#endif -/* - * SSL 2 based implementations pass in the initial outbound buffer - * so that the handshake hash can contain the included information. +/* Called from ssl3_HandleHelloRequest(), + * ssl3_RedoHandshake() + * ssl_BeginClientHandshake (when resuming ssl3 session) + * dtls_HandleHelloVerifyRequest(with resending=PR_TRUE) * - * Called from ssl2_BeginClientHandshake() in sslcon.c + * The |type| argument indicates what is going on here: + * - client_hello_initial is set for the very first ClientHello + * - client_hello_retry indicates that this is a second attempt after receiving + * a HelloRetryRequest (in TLS 1.3) + * - client_hello_retransmit is used in DTLS when resending + * - client_hello_renegotiation is used to renegotiate (in TLS <1.3) */ SECStatus -ssl3_StartHandshakeHash(sslSocket *ss, unsigned char * buf, int length) +ssl3_SendClientHello(sslSocket *ss, sslClientHelloType type) { + sslSessionID *sid; + ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec; SECStatus rv; + int i; + int length; + int num_suites; + int actual_count = 0; + PRBool isTLS = PR_FALSE; + PRBool requestingResume = PR_FALSE, fallbackSCSV = PR_FALSE; + PRInt32 total_exten_len = 0; + unsigned paddingExtensionLen; + unsigned numCompressionMethods; + PRUint16 version; + PRInt32 flags; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send %s ClientHello handshake", SSL_GETPID(), + ss->fd, ssl_ClientHelloTypeName(type))); - ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); /**************************************/ + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); - rv = ssl3_InitState(ss); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto done; /* ssl3_InitState has set the error code. */ - } - rv = ssl3_RestartHandshakeHashes(ss); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto done; + /* shouldn't get here if SSL3 is disabled, but ... */ + if (SSL_ALL_VERSIONS_DISABLED(&ss->vrange)) { + PR_NOT_REACHED("No versions of SSL 3.0 or later are enabled"); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SSL_DISABLED); + return SECFailure; } - PORT_Memset(&ss->ssl3.hs.client_random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); - PORT_Memcpy( - &ss->ssl3.hs.client_random.rand[SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH - SSL_CHALLENGE_BYTES], - &ss->sec.ci.clientChallenge, - SSL_CHALLENGE_BYTES); - - rv = ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(ss, buf, length); - /* if it failed, ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes has set the error code. */ - -done: - ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); /**************************************/ - return rv; -} - -/************************************************************************** - * end of Handshake Hash functions. - * Begin Send and Handle functions for handshakes. - **************************************************************************/ - -/* Called from ssl3_HandleHelloRequest(), - * ssl3_RedoHandshake() - * ssl2_BeginClientHandshake (when resuming ssl3 session) - * dtls_HandleHelloVerifyRequest(with resending=PR_TRUE) - */ -SECStatus -ssl3_SendClientHello(sslSocket *ss, PRBool resending) -{ - sslSessionID * sid; - ssl3CipherSpec * cwSpec; - SECStatus rv; - int i; - int length; - int num_suites; - int actual_count = 0; - PRBool isTLS = PR_FALSE; - PRBool requestingResume = PR_FALSE, fallbackSCSV = PR_FALSE; - PRInt32 total_exten_len = 0; - unsigned paddingExtensionLen; - unsigned numCompressionMethods; - PRInt32 flags; - - SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send client_hello handshake", SSL_GETPID(), - ss->fd)); - - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss) ); + /* If we are responding to a HelloRetryRequest, don't reinitialize. We need + * to maintain the handshake hashes. */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) { + PORT_Assert(type == client_hello_retry); + } else { + rv = ssl3_InitState(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* ssl3_InitState has set the error code. */ + } - rv = ssl3_InitState(ss); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return rv; /* ssl3_InitState has set the error code. */ + rv = ssl3_RestartHandshakeHashes(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; + } } + /* These must be reset every handshake. */ ss->ssl3.hs.sendingSCSV = PR_FALSE; ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo = 0; - PORT_Assert(IS_DTLS(ss) || !resending); - + PORT_Assert(IS_DTLS(ss) || type != client_hello_retransmit); SECITEM_FreeItem(&ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.ticket, PR_FALSE); ss->ssl3.hs.receivedNewSessionTicket = PR_FALSE; + ssl3_ResetExtensionData(&ss->xtnData); - /* We might be starting a session renegotiation in which case we should - * clear previous state. - */ - PORT_Memset(&ss->xtnData, 0, sizeof(TLSExtensionData)); - - rv = ssl3_RestartHandshakeHashes(ss); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return rv; + /* How many suites does our PKCS11 support (regardless of policy)? */ + num_suites = ssl3_config_match_init(ss); + if (!num_suites) { + return SECFailure; /* ssl3_config_match_init has set error code. */ } /* @@ -5103,25 +5043,26 @@ ssl3_SendClientHello(sslSocket *ss, PRBool resending) * work around a Windows SChannel bug. Ensure that it is still enabled. */ if (ss->firstHsDone) { - if (SSL3_ALL_VERSIONS_DISABLED(&ss->vrange)) { - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SSL_DISABLED); - return SECFailure; - } + PORT_Assert(type != client_hello_initial); + if (SSL_ALL_VERSIONS_DISABLED(&ss->vrange)) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SSL_DISABLED); + return SECFailure; + } - if (ss->clientHelloVersion < ss->vrange.min || - ss->clientHelloVersion > ss->vrange.max) { - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP); - return SECFailure; - } + if (ss->clientHelloVersion < ss->vrange.min || + ss->clientHelloVersion > ss->vrange.max) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP); + return SECFailure; + } } /* We ignore ss->sec.ci.sid here, and use ssl_Lookup because Lookup * handles expired entries and other details. - * XXX If we've been called from ssl2_BeginClientHandshake, then + * XXX If we've been called from ssl_BeginClientHandshake, then * this lookup is duplicative and wasteful. */ sid = (ss->opt.noCache) ? NULL - : ssl_LookupSID(&ss->sec.ci.peer, ss->sec.ci.port, ss->peerID, ss->url); + : ssl_LookupSID(&ss->sec.ci.peer, ss->sec.ci.port, ss->peerID, ss->url); /* We can't resume based on a different token. If the sid exists, * make sure the token that holds the master secret still exists ... @@ -5129,161 +5070,152 @@ ssl3_SendClientHello(sslSocket *ss, PRBool resending) * the private key still exists, is logged in, hasn't been removed, etc. */ if (sid) { - PRBool sidOK = PR_TRUE; - if (sid->u.ssl3.keys.msIsWrapped) { - /* Session key was wrapped, which means it was using PKCS11, */ - PK11SlotInfo *slot = NULL; - if (sid->u.ssl3.masterValid && !ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) { - slot = SECMOD_LookupSlot(sid->u.ssl3.masterModuleID, - sid->u.ssl3.masterSlotID); - } - if (slot == NULL) { - sidOK = PR_FALSE; - } else { - PK11SymKey *wrapKey = NULL; - if (!PK11_IsPresent(slot) || - ((wrapKey = PK11_GetWrapKey(slot, - sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapIndex, - sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech, - sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapSeries, - ss->pkcs11PinArg)) == NULL) ) { - sidOK = PR_FALSE; - } - if (wrapKey) PK11_FreeSymKey(wrapKey); - PK11_FreeSlot(slot); - slot = NULL; - } - } - /* If we previously did client-auth, make sure that the token that - ** holds the private key still exists, is logged in, hasn't been - ** removed, etc. - */ - if (sidOK && !ssl3_ClientAuthTokenPresent(sid)) { - sidOK = PR_FALSE; - } - - if (sidOK) { - /* Set ss->version based on the session cache */ - if (ss->firstHsDone) { - /* - * Windows SChannel compares the client_version inside the RSA - * EncryptedPreMasterSecret of a renegotiation with the - * client_version of the initial ClientHello rather than the - * ClientHello in the renegotiation. To work around this bug, we - * continue to use the client_version used in the initial - * ClientHello when renegotiating. - * - * The client_version of the initial ClientHello is still - * available in ss->clientHelloVersion. Ensure that - * sid->version is bounded within - * [ss->vrange.min, ss->clientHelloVersion], otherwise we - * can't use sid. - */ - if (sid->version >= ss->vrange.min && - sid->version <= ss->clientHelloVersion) { - ss->version = ss->clientHelloVersion; - } else { - sidOK = PR_FALSE; - } - } else { + PRBool sidOK = PR_TRUE; + const ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite; + + /* Check that the cipher suite we need is enabled. */ + suite = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite, + ss->cipherSuites); + PORT_Assert(suite); + if (!suite || !config_match(suite, ss->ssl3.policy, &ss->vrange, ss)) { + sidOK = PR_FALSE; + } + + /* Check that we can recover the master secret. */ + if (sidOK && sid->u.ssl3.keys.msIsWrapped) { + PK11SlotInfo *slot = NULL; + if (sid->u.ssl3.masterValid) { + slot = SECMOD_LookupSlot(sid->u.ssl3.masterModuleID, + sid->u.ssl3.masterSlotID); + } + if (slot == NULL) { + sidOK = PR_FALSE; + } else { + PK11SymKey *wrapKey = NULL; + if (!PK11_IsPresent(slot) || + ((wrapKey = PK11_GetWrapKey(slot, + sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapIndex, + sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech, + sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapSeries, + ss->pkcs11PinArg)) == NULL)) { + sidOK = PR_FALSE; + } + if (wrapKey) + PK11_FreeSymKey(wrapKey); + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + slot = NULL; + } + } + /* If we previously did client-auth, make sure that the token that + ** holds the private key still exists, is logged in, hasn't been + ** removed, etc. + */ + if (sidOK && !ssl3_ClientAuthTokenPresent(sid)) { + sidOK = PR_FALSE; + } + + if (sidOK) { + /* Set version based on the sid. */ + if (ss->firstHsDone) { + /* + * Windows SChannel compares the client_version inside the RSA + * EncryptedPreMasterSecret of a renegotiation with the + * client_version of the initial ClientHello rather than the + * ClientHello in the renegotiation. To work around this bug, we + * continue to use the client_version used in the initial + * ClientHello when renegotiating. + * + * The client_version of the initial ClientHello is still + * available in ss->clientHelloVersion. Ensure that + * sid->version is bounded within + * [ss->vrange.min, ss->clientHelloVersion], otherwise we + * can't use sid. + */ + if (sid->version >= ss->vrange.min && + sid->version <= ss->clientHelloVersion) { + version = ss->clientHelloVersion; + } else { + sidOK = PR_FALSE; + } + } else { /* * Check sid->version is OK first. * Previously, we would cap the version based on sid->version, * but that prevents negotiation of a higher version if the * previous session was reduced (e.g., with version fallback) */ - if (sid->version < ss->vrange.min || + if (sid->version < ss->vrange.min || sid->version > ss->vrange.max) { - sidOK = PR_FALSE; - } else { - rv = ssl3_NegotiateVersion(ss, SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_MAX_SUPPORTED, - PR_TRUE); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return rv; /* error code was set */ - } - } - } - } + sidOK = PR_FALSE; + } else { + version = ss->vrange.max; + } + } + } - if (!sidOK) { - SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(& ssl3stats.sch_sid_cache_not_ok ); - if (ss->sec.uncache) - (*ss->sec.uncache)(sid); - ssl_FreeSID(sid); - sid = NULL; - } + if (!sidOK) { + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.sch_sid_cache_not_ok); + ss->sec.uncache(sid); + ssl_FreeSID(sid); + sid = NULL; + } } if (sid) { - requestingResume = PR_TRUE; - SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(& ssl3stats.sch_sid_cache_hits ); + requestingResume = PR_TRUE; + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.sch_sid_cache_hits); - PRINT_BUF(4, (ss, "client, found session-id:", sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, - sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength)); + PRINT_BUF(4, (ss, "client, found session-id:", sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, + sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength)); - ss->ssl3.policy = sid->u.ssl3.policy; + ss->ssl3.policy = sid->u.ssl3.policy; } else { - SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(& ssl3stats.sch_sid_cache_misses ); - - /* - * Windows SChannel compares the client_version inside the RSA - * EncryptedPreMasterSecret of a renegotiation with the - * client_version of the initial ClientHello rather than the - * ClientHello in the renegotiation. To work around this bug, we - * continue to use the client_version used in the initial - * ClientHello when renegotiating. - */ - if (ss->firstHsDone) { - ss->version = ss->clientHelloVersion; - } else { - rv = ssl3_NegotiateVersion(ss, SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_MAX_SUPPORTED, - PR_TRUE); - if (rv != SECSuccess) - return rv; /* error code was set */ - } - - sid = ssl3_NewSessionID(ss, PR_FALSE); - if (!sid) { - return SECFailure; /* memory error is set */ + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.sch_sid_cache_misses); + + /* + * Windows SChannel compares the client_version inside the RSA + * EncryptedPreMasterSecret of a renegotiation with the + * client_version of the initial ClientHello rather than the + * ClientHello in the renegotiation. To work around this bug, we + * continue to use the client_version used in the initial + * ClientHello when renegotiating. + */ + if (ss->firstHsDone) { + version = ss->clientHelloVersion; + } else { + version = ss->vrange.max; + } + + sid = ssl3_NewSessionID(ss, PR_FALSE); + if (!sid) { + return SECFailure; /* memory error is set */ } + /* ss->version isn't set yet, but the sid needs a sane value. */ + sid->version = version; } - isTLS = (ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + isTLS = (version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); cwSpec = ss->ssl3.cwSpec; if (cwSpec->mac_def->mac == mac_null) { - /* SSL records are not being MACed. */ - cwSpec->version = ss->version; + /* SSL records are not being MACed. */ + cwSpec->version = version; } ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); if (ss->sec.ci.sid != NULL) { - ssl_FreeSID(ss->sec.ci.sid); /* decrement ref count, free if zero */ + ssl_FreeSID(ss->sec.ci.sid); /* decrement ref count, free if zero */ } ss->sec.ci.sid = sid; - ss->sec.send = ssl3_SendApplicationData; - - /* shouldn't get here if SSL3 is disabled, but ... */ - if (SSL3_ALL_VERSIONS_DISABLED(&ss->vrange)) { - PR_NOT_REACHED("No versions of SSL 3.0 or later are enabled"); - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SSL_DISABLED); - return SECFailure; - } - - /* how many suites does our PKCS11 support (regardless of policy)? */ - num_suites = ssl3_config_match_init(ss); - if (!num_suites) - return SECFailure; /* ssl3_config_match_init has set error code. */ - /* HACK for SCSV in SSL 3.0. On initial handshake, prepend SCSV, * only if TLS is disabled. */ if (!ss->firstHsDone && !isTLS) { - /* Must set this before calling Hello Extension Senders, - * to suppress sending of empty RI extension. - */ - ss->ssl3.hs.sendingSCSV = PR_TRUE; + /* Must set this before calling Hello Extension Senders, + * to suppress sending of empty RI extension. + */ + ss->ssl3.hs.sendingSCSV = PR_TRUE; } /* When we attempt session resumption (only), we must lock the sid to @@ -5297,62 +5229,68 @@ ssl3_SendClientHello(sslSocket *ss, PRBool resending) PR_RWLock_Rlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); } + if (ss->vrange.max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 && + type == client_hello_initial) { + rv = tls13_SetupClientHello(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + } if (isTLS || (ss->firstHsDone && ss->peerRequestedProtection)) { - PRUint32 maxBytes = 65535; /* 2^16 - 1 */ - PRInt32 extLen; + PRUint32 maxBytes = 65535; /* 2^16 - 1 */ + PRInt32 extLen; - extLen = ssl3_CallHelloExtensionSenders(ss, PR_FALSE, maxBytes, NULL); - if (extLen < 0) { - if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); } - return SECFailure; - } - total_exten_len += extLen; - - if (total_exten_len > 0) - total_exten_len += 2; - } + extLen = ssl3_CallHelloExtensionSenders(ss, PR_FALSE, maxBytes, NULL); + if (extLen < 0) { + if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { + PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); + } + return SECFailure; + } + total_exten_len += extLen; -#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC - if (!total_exten_len || !isTLS) { - /* not sending the elliptic_curves and ec_point_formats extensions */ - ssl3_DisableECCSuites(ss, NULL); /* disable all ECC suites */ + if (total_exten_len > 0) + total_exten_len += 2; } -#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { - ssl3_DisableNonDTLSSuites(ss); + ssl3_DisableNonDTLSSuites(ss); } /* how many suites are permitted by policy and user preference? */ - num_suites = count_cipher_suites(ss, ss->ssl3.policy, PR_TRUE); + num_suites = count_cipher_suites(ss, ss->ssl3.policy); if (!num_suites) { - if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); } - return SECFailure; /* count_cipher_suites has set error code. */ + if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { + PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); + } + return SECFailure; /* count_cipher_suites has set error code. */ } fallbackSCSV = ss->opt.enableFallbackSCSV && (!requestingResume || - ss->version < sid->version); + version < sid->version); /* make room for SCSV */ if (ss->ssl3.hs.sendingSCSV) { - ++num_suites; + ++num_suites; } if (fallbackSCSV) { - ++num_suites; + ++num_suites; } /* count compression methods */ numCompressionMethods = 0; - for (i = 0; i < compressionMethodsCount; i++) { - if (compressionEnabled(ss, compressions[i])) - numCompressionMethods++; + for (i = 0; i < ssl_compression_method_count; i++) { + if (ssl_CompressionEnabled(ss, ssl_compression_methods[i])) + numCompressionMethods++; } length = sizeof(SSL3ProtocolVersion) + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH + - 1 + ((sid == NULL) ? 0 : sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength) + - 2 + num_suites*sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite) + - 1 + numCompressionMethods + total_exten_len; + 1 + (sid->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 + ? 0 + : sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength) + + 2 + num_suites * sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite) + + 1 + numCompressionMethods + total_exten_len; if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { - length += 1 + ss->ssl3.hs.cookieLen; + length += 1 + ss->ssl3.hs.cookie.len; } /* A padding extension may be included to ensure that the record containing @@ -5360,8 +5298,9 @@ ssl3_SendClientHello(sslSocket *ss, PRBool resending) * (inclusive). Initial, ClientHello records with such lengths trigger bugs * in F5 devices. * - * This is not done for DTLS nor for renegotiation. */ - if (!IS_DTLS(ss) && isTLS && !ss->firstHsDone) { + * This is not done for DTLS, for renegotiation, or when there are no + * extensions. */ + if (!IS_DTLS(ss) && isTLS && !ss->firstHsDone && total_exten_len) { paddingExtensionLen = ssl3_CalculatePaddingExtensionLength(length); total_exten_len += paddingExtensionLen; length += paddingExtensionLen; @@ -5371,157 +5310,192 @@ ssl3_SendClientHello(sslSocket *ss, PRBool resending) rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, client_hello, length); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); } - return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { + PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); + } + return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ } if (ss->firstHsDone) { - /* The client hello version must stay unchanged to work around - * the Windows SChannel bug described above. */ - PORT_Assert(ss->version == ss->clientHelloVersion); + /* The client hello version must stay unchanged to work around + * the Windows SChannel bug described above. */ + PORT_Assert(version == ss->clientHelloVersion); } - ss->clientHelloVersion = ss->version; + ss->clientHelloVersion = PR_MIN(version, SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2); if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { - PRUint16 version; + PRUint16 dtlsVersion; - version = dtls_TLSVersionToDTLSVersion(ss->clientHelloVersion); - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, version, 2); + dtlsVersion = dtls_TLSVersionToDTLSVersion(ss->clientHelloVersion); + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, dtlsVersion, 2); } else { - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ss->clientHelloVersion, 2); + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ss->clientHelloVersion, 2); } if (rv != SECSuccess) { - if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); } - return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { + PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); + } + return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ } - if (!resending) { /* Don't re-generate if we are in DTLS re-sending mode */ - rv = ssl3_GetNewRandom(&ss->ssl3.hs.client_random); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); } - return rv; /* err set by GetNewRandom. */ - } + /* Generate a new random if this is the first attempt. */ + if (type == client_hello_initial) { + rv = ssl3_GetNewRandom(&ss->ssl3.hs.client_random); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { + PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); + } + return rv; /* err set by GetNewRandom. */ + } } rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, &ss->ssl3.hs.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); } - return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { + PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); + } + return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ } - if (sid) - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable( - ss, sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength, 1); + if (sid->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable( + ss, sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength, 1); else - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 1); + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 1); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); } - return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { + PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); + } + return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ } if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable( - ss, ss->ssl3.hs.cookie, ss->ssl3.hs.cookieLen, 1); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); } - return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ - } + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable( + ss, ss->ssl3.hs.cookie.data, ss->ssl3.hs.cookie.len, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { + PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); + } + return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + } } - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, num_suites*sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite), 2); + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, num_suites * sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite), 2); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); } - return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { + PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); + } + return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ } if (ss->ssl3.hs.sendingSCSV) { - /* Add the actual SCSV */ - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, - sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite)); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); } - return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ - } - actual_count++; + /* Add the actual SCSV */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, + sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { + PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); + } + return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + } + actual_count++; } if (fallbackSCSV) { - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV, - sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite)); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); } - return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ - } - actual_count++; + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV, + sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { + PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); + } + return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + } + actual_count++; } for (i = 0; i < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; i++) { - ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite = &ss->cipherSuites[i]; - if (config_match(suite, ss->ssl3.policy, PR_TRUE, &ss->vrange, ss)) { - actual_count++; - if (actual_count > num_suites) { - if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); } - /* set error card removal/insertion error */ - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOKEN_INSERTION_REMOVAL); - return SECFailure; - } - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, suite->cipher_suite, - sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite)); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); } - return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ - } - } + ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite = &ss->cipherSuites[i]; + if (config_match(suite, ss->ssl3.policy, &ss->vrange, ss)) { + actual_count++; + if (actual_count > num_suites) { + if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { + PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); + } + /* set error card removal/insertion error */ + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOKEN_INSERTION_REMOVAL); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, suite->cipher_suite, + sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { + PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); + } + return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + } + } } /* if cards were removed or inserted between count_cipher_suites and * generating our list, detect the error here rather than send it off to * the server.. */ if (actual_count != num_suites) { - /* Card removal/insertion error */ - if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); } - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOKEN_INSERTION_REMOVAL); - return SECFailure; + /* Card removal/insertion error */ + if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { + PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); + } + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOKEN_INSERTION_REMOVAL); + return SECFailure; } rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, numCompressionMethods, 1); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); } - return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { + PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); + } + return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ } - for (i = 0; i < compressionMethodsCount; i++) { - if (!compressionEnabled(ss, compressions[i])) - continue; - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, compressions[i], 1); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); } - return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ - } + for (i = 0; i < ssl_compression_method_count; i++) { + if (!ssl_CompressionEnabled(ss, ssl_compression_methods[i])) + continue; + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_compression_methods[i], 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { + PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); + } + return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + } } if (total_exten_len) { - PRUint32 maxBytes = total_exten_len - 2; - PRInt32 extLen; - - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, maxBytes, 2); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); } - return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ - } - - extLen = ssl3_CallHelloExtensionSenders(ss, PR_TRUE, maxBytes, NULL); - if (extLen < 0) { - if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); } - return SECFailure; - } - maxBytes -= extLen; - - extLen = ssl3_AppendPaddingExtension(ss, paddingExtensionLen, maxBytes); - if (extLen < 0) { - if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); } - return SECFailure; - } - maxBytes -= extLen; - - PORT_Assert(!maxBytes); - } + PRUint32 maxBytes = total_exten_len - 2; + PRInt32 extLen; + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, maxBytes, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { + PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); + } + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + + extLen = ssl3_AppendPaddingExtension(ss, paddingExtensionLen, maxBytes); + if (extLen < 0) { + if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { + PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); + } + return SECFailure; + } + maxBytes -= extLen; + + extLen = ssl3_CallHelloExtensionSenders(ss, PR_TRUE, maxBytes, NULL); + if (extLen < 0) { + if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { + PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); + } + return SECFailure; + } + maxBytes -= extLen; + + PORT_Assert(!maxBytes); + } if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); @@ -5532,68 +5506,74 @@ ssl3_SendClientHello(sslSocket *ss, PRBool resending) } if (ss->ssl3.hs.sendingSCSV) { - /* Since we sent the SCSV, pretend we sent empty RI extension. */ - TLSExtensionData *xtnData = &ss->xtnData; - xtnData->advertised[xtnData->numAdvertised++] = - ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn; + /* Since we sent the SCSV, pretend we sent empty RI extension. */ + TLSExtensionData *xtnData = &ss->xtnData; + xtnData->advertised[xtnData->numAdvertised++] = + ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn; } flags = 0; if (!ss->firstHsDone && !IS_DTLS(ss)) { - flags |= ssl_SEND_FLAG_CAP_RECORD_VERSION; + flags |= ssl_SEND_FLAG_CAP_RECORD_VERSION; } rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, flags); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return rv; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */ + return rv; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */ + } + + if (version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + rv = tls13_MaybeDo0RTTHandshake(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* error code set already. */ + } } ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_server_hello; - return rv; + return SECSuccess; } - -/* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete - * ssl3 Hello Request. +/* Called from ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a + * complete ssl3 Hello Request. * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. */ static SECStatus ssl3_HandleHelloRequest(sslSocket *ss) { sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; - SECStatus rv; + SECStatus rv; SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle hello_request handshake", - SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_server_hello) - return SECSuccess; + return SECSuccess; if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != idle_handshake || ss->sec.isServer) { - (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_REQUEST); - return SECFailure; + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_REQUEST); + return SECFailure; } if (ss->opt.enableRenegotiation == SSL_RENEGOTIATE_NEVER) { - (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_warning, no_renegotiation); - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED); - return SECFailure; + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_warning, no_renegotiation); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED); + return SECFailure; } if (sid) { - if (ss->sec.uncache) - ss->sec.uncache(sid); - ssl_FreeSID(sid); - ss->sec.ci.sid = NULL; + ss->sec.uncache(sid); + ssl_FreeSID(sid); + ss->sec.ci.sid = NULL; } if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { - dtls_RehandshakeCleanup(ss); + dtls_RehandshakeCleanup(ss); } ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); - rv = ssl3_SendClientHello(ss, PR_FALSE); + rv = ssl3_SendClientHello(ss, client_hello_renegotiation); ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); return rv; @@ -5626,7 +5606,7 @@ ssl_FindIndexByWrapMechanism(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech) const CK_MECHANISM_TYPE *pMech = wrapMechanismList; while (mech != *pMech && *pMech != UNKNOWN_WRAP_MECHANISM) { - ++pMech; + ++pMech; } return (*pMech == UNKNOWN_WRAP_MECHANISM) ? -1 : (pMech - wrapMechanismList); @@ -5634,116 +5614,118 @@ ssl_FindIndexByWrapMechanism(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech) static PK11SymKey * ssl_UnwrapSymWrappingKey( - SSLWrappedSymWrappingKey *pWswk, - SECKEYPrivateKey * svrPrivKey, - SSL3KEAType exchKeyType, - CK_MECHANISM_TYPE masterWrapMech, - void * pwArg) -{ - PK11SymKey * unwrappedWrappingKey = NULL; - SECItem wrappedKey; -#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC - PK11SymKey * Ks; - SECKEYPublicKey pubWrapKey; - ECCWrappedKeyInfo *ecWrapped; -#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */ + SSLWrappedSymWrappingKey *pWswk, + SECKEYPrivateKey *svrPrivKey, + SSLAuthType authType, + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE masterWrapMech, + void *pwArg) +{ + PK11SymKey *unwrappedWrappingKey = NULL; + SECItem wrappedKey; + PK11SymKey *Ks; + SECKEYPublicKey pubWrapKey; + ECCWrappedKeyInfo *ecWrapped; /* found the wrapping key on disk. */ PORT_Assert(pWswk->symWrapMechanism == masterWrapMech); - PORT_Assert(pWswk->exchKeyType == exchKeyType); + PORT_Assert(pWswk->authType == authType); if (pWswk->symWrapMechanism != masterWrapMech || - pWswk->exchKeyType != exchKeyType) { - goto loser; + pWswk->authType != authType) { + goto loser; } wrappedKey.type = siBuffer; wrappedKey.data = pWswk->wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey; - wrappedKey.len = pWswk->wrappedSymKeyLen; + wrappedKey.len = pWswk->wrappedSymKeyLen; PORT_Assert(wrappedKey.len <= sizeof pWswk->wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey); - switch (exchKeyType) { - - case kt_rsa: - unwrappedWrappingKey = - PK11_PubUnwrapSymKey(svrPrivKey, &wrappedKey, - masterWrapMech, CKA_UNWRAP, 0); - break; - -#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC - case kt_ecdh: - /* - * For kt_ecdh, we first create an EC public key based on - * data stored with the wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey. Next, - * we do an ECDH computation involving this public key and - * the SSL server's (long-term) EC private key. The resulting - * shared secret is treated the same way as Fortezza's Ks, i.e., - * it is used to recover the symmetric wrapping key. - * - * The data in wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey is laid out as defined - * in the ECCWrappedKeyInfo structure. - */ - ecWrapped = (ECCWrappedKeyInfo *) pWswk->wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey; + switch (authType) { - PORT_Assert(ecWrapped->encodedParamLen + ecWrapped->pubValueLen + - ecWrapped->wrappedKeyLen <= MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN); + case ssl_auth_rsa_decrypt: + case ssl_auth_rsa_sign: /* bad: see Bug 1248320 */ + unwrappedWrappingKey = + PK11_PubUnwrapSymKey(svrPrivKey, &wrappedKey, + masterWrapMech, CKA_UNWRAP, 0); + break; - if (ecWrapped->encodedParamLen + ecWrapped->pubValueLen + - ecWrapped->wrappedKeyLen > MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN) { - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); - goto loser; - } + case ssl_auth_ecdsa: + case ssl_auth_ecdh_rsa: + case ssl_auth_ecdh_ecdsa: + /* + * For ssl_auth_ecd*, we first create an EC public key based on + * data stored with the wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey. Next, + * we do an ECDH computation involving this public key and + * the SSL server's (long-term) EC private key. The resulting + * shared secret is treated the same way as Fortezza's Ks, i.e., + * it is used to recover the symmetric wrapping key. + * + * The data in wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey is laid out as defined + * in the ECCWrappedKeyInfo structure. + */ + ecWrapped = (ECCWrappedKeyInfo *)pWswk->wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey; + + PORT_Assert(ecWrapped->encodedParamLen + ecWrapped->pubValueLen + + ecWrapped->wrappedKeyLen <= + MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN); + + if (ecWrapped->encodedParamLen + ecWrapped->pubValueLen + + ecWrapped->wrappedKeyLen > + MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } - pubWrapKey.keyType = ecKey; - pubWrapKey.u.ec.size = ecWrapped->size; - pubWrapKey.u.ec.DEREncodedParams.len = ecWrapped->encodedParamLen; - pubWrapKey.u.ec.DEREncodedParams.data = ecWrapped->var; - pubWrapKey.u.ec.publicValue.len = ecWrapped->pubValueLen; - pubWrapKey.u.ec.publicValue.data = ecWrapped->var + - ecWrapped->encodedParamLen; - - wrappedKey.len = ecWrapped->wrappedKeyLen; - wrappedKey.data = ecWrapped->var + ecWrapped->encodedParamLen + - ecWrapped->pubValueLen; - - /* Derive Ks using ECDH */ - Ks = PK11_PubDeriveWithKDF(svrPrivKey, &pubWrapKey, PR_FALSE, NULL, - NULL, CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, masterWrapMech, - CKA_DERIVE, 0, CKD_NULL, NULL, NULL); - if (Ks == NULL) { - goto loser; - } + pubWrapKey.keyType = ecKey; + pubWrapKey.u.ec.size = ecWrapped->size; + pubWrapKey.u.ec.DEREncodedParams.len = ecWrapped->encodedParamLen; + pubWrapKey.u.ec.DEREncodedParams.data = ecWrapped->var; + pubWrapKey.u.ec.publicValue.len = ecWrapped->pubValueLen; + pubWrapKey.u.ec.publicValue.data = ecWrapped->var + + ecWrapped->encodedParamLen; + + wrappedKey.len = ecWrapped->wrappedKeyLen; + wrappedKey.data = ecWrapped->var + ecWrapped->encodedParamLen + + ecWrapped->pubValueLen; + + /* Derive Ks using ECDH */ + Ks = PK11_PubDeriveWithKDF(svrPrivKey, &pubWrapKey, PR_FALSE, NULL, + NULL, CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, masterWrapMech, + CKA_DERIVE, 0, CKD_NULL, NULL, NULL); + if (Ks == NULL) { + goto loser; + } - /* Use Ks to unwrap the wrapping key */ - unwrappedWrappingKey = PK11_UnwrapSymKey(Ks, masterWrapMech, NULL, - &wrappedKey, masterWrapMech, - CKA_UNWRAP, 0); - PK11_FreeSymKey(Ks); - - break; -#endif + /* Use Ks to unwrap the wrapping key */ + unwrappedWrappingKey = PK11_UnwrapSymKey(Ks, masterWrapMech, NULL, + &wrappedKey, masterWrapMech, + CKA_UNWRAP, 0); + PK11_FreeSymKey(Ks); - default: - /* Assert? */ - SET_ERROR_CODE - goto loser; + break; + + default: + PORT_Assert(0); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + goto loser; } loser: return unwrappedWrappingKey; } -/* Each process sharing the server session ID cache has its own array of - * SymKey pointers for the symmetric wrapping keys that are used to wrap - * the master secrets. There is one key for each KEA type. These Symkeys +/* Each process sharing the server session ID cache has its own array of SymKey + * pointers for the symmetric wrapping keys that are used to wrap the master + * secrets. There is one key for each authentication type. These Symkeys * correspond to the wrapped SymKeys kept in the server session cache. */ typedef struct { - PK11SymKey * symWrapKey[kt_kea_size]; + PK11SymKey *symWrapKey[ssl_auth_size]; } ssl3SymWrapKey; -static PZLock * symWrapKeysLock = NULL; -static ssl3SymWrapKey symWrapKeys[SSL_NUM_WRAP_MECHS]; +static PZLock *symWrapKeysLock = NULL; +static ssl3SymWrapKey symWrapKeys[SSL_NUM_WRAP_MECHS]; -SECStatus ssl_FreeSymWrapKeysLock(void) +SECStatus +ssl_FreeSymWrapKeysLock(void) { if (symWrapKeysLock) { PZ_DestroyLock(symWrapKeysLock); @@ -5757,21 +5739,21 @@ SECStatus ssl_FreeSymWrapKeysLock(void) SECStatus SSL3_ShutdownServerCache(void) { - int i, j; + int i, j; if (!symWrapKeysLock) - return SECSuccess; /* lock was never initialized */ + return SECSuccess; /* lock was never initialized */ PZ_Lock(symWrapKeysLock); /* get rid of all symWrapKeys */ for (i = 0; i < SSL_NUM_WRAP_MECHS; ++i) { - for (j = 0; j < kt_kea_size; ++j) { - PK11SymKey ** pSymWrapKey; - pSymWrapKey = &symWrapKeys[i].symWrapKey[j]; - if (*pSymWrapKey) { - PK11_FreeSymKey(*pSymWrapKey); - *pSymWrapKey = NULL; - } - } + for (j = 0; j < ssl_auth_size; ++j) { + PK11SymKey **pSymWrapKey; + pSymWrapKey = &symWrapKeys[i].symWrapKey[j]; + if (*pSymWrapKey) { + PK11_FreeSymKey(*pSymWrapKey); + *pSymWrapKey = NULL; + } + } } PZ_Unlock(symWrapKeysLock); @@ -5779,7 +5761,8 @@ SSL3_ShutdownServerCache(void) return SECSuccess; } -SECStatus ssl_InitSymWrapKeysLock(void) +SECStatus +ssl_InitSymWrapKeysLock(void) { symWrapKeysLock = PZ_NewLock(nssILockOther); return symWrapKeysLock ? SECSuccess : SECFailure; @@ -5789,43 +5772,53 @@ SECStatus ssl_InitSymWrapKeysLock(void) * If that fails, look for one on disk. * If that fails, generate a new one, put the new one on disk, * Put the new key in the in-memory array. + * + * Note that this function performs some fairly inadvisable functions with + * certificate private keys. ECDSA keys are used with ECDH; similarly, RSA + * signing keys are used to encrypt. Bug 1248320. */ -static PK11SymKey * -getWrappingKey( sslSocket * ss, - PK11SlotInfo * masterSecretSlot, - SSL3KEAType exchKeyType, - CK_MECHANISM_TYPE masterWrapMech, - void * pwArg) -{ - SECKEYPrivateKey * svrPrivKey; - SECKEYPublicKey * svrPubKey = NULL; - PK11SymKey * unwrappedWrappingKey = NULL; - PK11SymKey ** pSymWrapKey; - CK_MECHANISM_TYPE asymWrapMechanism = CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM; - int length; - int symWrapMechIndex; - SECStatus rv; - SECItem wrappedKey; +PK11SymKey * +ssl3_GetWrappingKey(sslSocket *ss, + PK11SlotInfo *masterSecretSlot, + const sslServerCert *serverCert, + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE masterWrapMech, + void *pwArg) +{ + SSLAuthType authType; + SECKEYPrivateKey *svrPrivKey; + SECKEYPublicKey *svrPubKey = NULL; + PK11SymKey *unwrappedWrappingKey = NULL; + PK11SymKey **pSymWrapKey; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE asymWrapMechanism = CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM; + int length; + int symWrapMechIndex; + SECStatus rv; + SECItem wrappedKey; SSLWrappedSymWrappingKey wswk; -#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC - PK11SymKey * Ks = NULL; - SECKEYPublicKey *pubWrapKey = NULL; - SECKEYPrivateKey *privWrapKey = NULL; + PK11SymKey *Ks = NULL; + SECKEYPublicKey *pubWrapKey = NULL; + SECKEYPrivateKey *privWrapKey = NULL; ECCWrappedKeyInfo *ecWrapped; -#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */ - svrPrivKey = ss->serverCerts[exchKeyType].SERVERKEY; - PORT_Assert(svrPrivKey != NULL); - if (!svrPrivKey) { - return NULL; /* why are we here?!? */ + PORT_Assert(serverCert); + PORT_Assert(serverCert->serverKeyPair); + PORT_Assert(serverCert->serverKeyPair->privKey); + PORT_Assert(serverCert->serverKeyPair->pubKey); + if (!serverCert || !serverCert->serverKeyPair || + !serverCert->serverKeyPair->privKey || + !serverCert->serverKeyPair->pubKey) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return NULL; /* hmm */ } + authType = serverCert->certType.authType; + svrPrivKey = serverCert->serverKeyPair->privKey; symWrapMechIndex = ssl_FindIndexByWrapMechanism(masterWrapMech); PORT_Assert(symWrapMechIndex >= 0); if (symWrapMechIndex < 0) - return NULL; /* invalid masterWrapMech. */ + return NULL; /* invalid masterWrapMech. */ - pSymWrapKey = &symWrapKeys[symWrapMechIndex].symWrapKey[exchKeyType]; + pSymWrapKey = &symWrapKeys[symWrapMechIndex].symWrapKey[authType]; ssl_InitSessionCacheLocks(PR_TRUE); @@ -5833,29 +5826,29 @@ getWrappingKey( sslSocket * ss, unwrappedWrappingKey = *pSymWrapKey; if (unwrappedWrappingKey != NULL) { - if (PK11_VerifyKeyOK(unwrappedWrappingKey)) { - unwrappedWrappingKey = PK11_ReferenceSymKey(unwrappedWrappingKey); - goto done; - } - /* slot series has changed, so this key is no good any more. */ - PK11_FreeSymKey(unwrappedWrappingKey); - *pSymWrapKey = unwrappedWrappingKey = NULL; + if (PK11_VerifyKeyOK(unwrappedWrappingKey)) { + unwrappedWrappingKey = PK11_ReferenceSymKey(unwrappedWrappingKey); + goto done; + } + /* slot series has changed, so this key is no good any more. */ + PK11_FreeSymKey(unwrappedWrappingKey); + *pSymWrapKey = unwrappedWrappingKey = NULL; } /* Try to get wrapped SymWrapping key out of the (disk) cache. */ /* Following call fills in wswk on success. */ - if (ssl_GetWrappingKey(symWrapMechIndex, exchKeyType, &wswk)) { - /* found the wrapped sym wrapping key on disk. */ - unwrappedWrappingKey = - ssl_UnwrapSymWrappingKey(&wswk, svrPrivKey, exchKeyType, + if (ssl_GetWrappingKey(symWrapMechIndex, authType, &wswk)) { + /* found the wrapped sym wrapping key on disk. */ + unwrappedWrappingKey = + ssl_UnwrapSymWrappingKey(&wswk, svrPrivKey, authType, masterWrapMech, pwArg); - if (unwrappedWrappingKey) { - goto install; - } + if (unwrappedWrappingKey) { + goto install; + } } - if (!masterSecretSlot) /* caller doesn't want to create a new one. */ - goto loser; + if (!masterSecretSlot) /* caller doesn't want to create a new one. */ + goto loser; length = PK11_GetBestKeyLength(masterSecretSlot, masterWrapMech); /* Zero length means fixed key length algorithm, or error. @@ -5864,163 +5857,163 @@ getWrappingKey( sslSocket * ss, unwrappedWrappingKey = PK11_KeyGen(masterSecretSlot, masterWrapMech, NULL, length, pwArg); if (!unwrappedWrappingKey) { - goto loser; + goto loser; } /* Prepare the buffer to receive the wrappedWrappingKey, * the symmetric wrapping key wrapped using the server's pub key. */ - PORT_Memset(&wswk, 0, sizeof wswk); /* eliminate UMRs. */ + PORT_Memset(&wswk, 0, sizeof wswk); /* eliminate UMRs. */ - if (ss->serverCerts[exchKeyType].serverKeyPair) { - svrPubKey = ss->serverCerts[exchKeyType].serverKeyPair->pubKey; - } - if (svrPubKey == NULL) { - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); - goto loser; - } + svrPubKey = serverCert->serverKeyPair->pubKey; wrappedKey.type = siBuffer; - wrappedKey.len = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrength(svrPubKey); + wrappedKey.len = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrength(svrPubKey); wrappedKey.data = wswk.wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey; PORT_Assert(wrappedKey.len <= sizeof wswk.wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey); if (wrappedKey.len > sizeof wswk.wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey) - goto loser; + goto loser; /* wrap symmetric wrapping key in server's public key. */ - switch (exchKeyType) { - case kt_rsa: - asymWrapMechanism = CKM_RSA_PKCS; - rv = PK11_PubWrapSymKey(asymWrapMechanism, svrPubKey, - unwrappedWrappingKey, &wrappedKey); - break; - -#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC - case kt_ecdh: - /* - * We generate an ephemeral EC key pair. Perform an ECDH - * computation involving this ephemeral EC public key and - * the SSL server's (long-term) EC private key. The resulting - * shared secret is treated in the same way as Fortezza's Ks, - * i.e., it is used to wrap the wrapping key. To facilitate - * unwrapping in ssl_UnwrapWrappingKey, we also store all - * relevant info about the ephemeral EC public key in - * wswk.wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey and lay it out as - * described in the ECCWrappedKeyInfo structure. - */ - PORT_Assert(svrPubKey->keyType == ecKey); - if (svrPubKey->keyType != ecKey) { - /* something is wrong in sslsecur.c if this isn't an ecKey */ - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); - rv = SECFailure; - goto ec_cleanup; - } - - privWrapKey = SECKEY_CreateECPrivateKey( - &svrPubKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams, &pubWrapKey, NULL); - if ((privWrapKey == NULL) || (pubWrapKey == NULL)) { - rv = SECFailure; - goto ec_cleanup; - } - - /* Set the key size in bits */ - if (pubWrapKey->u.ec.size == 0) { - pubWrapKey->u.ec.size = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(svrPubKey); - } - - PORT_Assert(pubWrapKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.len + - pubWrapKey->u.ec.publicValue.len < MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN); - if (pubWrapKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.len + - pubWrapKey->u.ec.publicValue.len >= MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN) { - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY); - rv = SECFailure; - goto ec_cleanup; - } - - /* Derive Ks using ECDH */ - Ks = PK11_PubDeriveWithKDF(svrPrivKey, pubWrapKey, PR_FALSE, NULL, - NULL, CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, masterWrapMech, - CKA_DERIVE, 0, CKD_NULL, NULL, NULL); - if (Ks == NULL) { - rv = SECFailure; - goto ec_cleanup; - } - - ecWrapped = (ECCWrappedKeyInfo *) (wswk.wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey); - ecWrapped->size = pubWrapKey->u.ec.size; - ecWrapped->encodedParamLen = pubWrapKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.len; - PORT_Memcpy(ecWrapped->var, pubWrapKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.data, - pubWrapKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.len); - - ecWrapped->pubValueLen = pubWrapKey->u.ec.publicValue.len; - PORT_Memcpy(ecWrapped->var + ecWrapped->encodedParamLen, - pubWrapKey->u.ec.publicValue.data, - pubWrapKey->u.ec.publicValue.len); - - wrappedKey.len = MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN - - (ecWrapped->encodedParamLen + ecWrapped->pubValueLen); - wrappedKey.data = ecWrapped->var + ecWrapped->encodedParamLen + - ecWrapped->pubValueLen; - - /* wrap symmetricWrapping key with the local Ks */ - rv = PK11_WrapSymKey(masterWrapMech, NULL, Ks, - unwrappedWrappingKey, &wrappedKey); - - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto ec_cleanup; - } - - /* Write down the length of wrapped key in the buffer - * wswk.wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey at the appropriate offset - */ - ecWrapped->wrappedKeyLen = wrappedKey.len; - -ec_cleanup: - if (privWrapKey) SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privWrapKey); - if (pubWrapKey) SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubWrapKey); - if (Ks) PK11_FreeSymKey(Ks); - asymWrapMechanism = masterWrapMech; - break; -#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */ - - default: - rv = SECFailure; - break; + switch (authType) { + case ssl_auth_rsa_decrypt: + case ssl_auth_rsa_sign: /* bad: see Bug 1248320 */ + asymWrapMechanism = CKM_RSA_PKCS; + rv = PK11_PubWrapSymKey(asymWrapMechanism, svrPubKey, + unwrappedWrappingKey, &wrappedKey); + break; + + case ssl_auth_ecdsa: + case ssl_auth_ecdh_rsa: + case ssl_auth_ecdh_ecdsa: + /* + * We generate an ephemeral EC key pair. Perform an ECDH + * computation involving this ephemeral EC public key and + * the SSL server's (long-term) EC private key. The resulting + * shared secret is treated in the same way as Fortezza's Ks, + * i.e., it is used to wrap the wrapping key. To facilitate + * unwrapping in ssl_UnwrapWrappingKey, we also store all + * relevant info about the ephemeral EC public key in + * wswk.wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey and lay it out as + * described in the ECCWrappedKeyInfo structure. + */ + PORT_Assert(SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(svrPubKey) == ecKey); + if (SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(svrPubKey) != ecKey) { + /* something is wrong in sslsecur.c if this isn't an ecKey */ + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + rv = SECFailure; + goto ec_cleanup; + } + + privWrapKey = SECKEY_CreateECPrivateKey( + &svrPubKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams, &pubWrapKey, NULL); + if ((privWrapKey == NULL) || (pubWrapKey == NULL)) { + rv = SECFailure; + goto ec_cleanup; + } + + /* Set the key size in bits */ + if (pubWrapKey->u.ec.size == 0) { + pubWrapKey->u.ec.size = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(svrPubKey); + } + + PORT_Assert(pubWrapKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.len + + pubWrapKey->u.ec.publicValue.len < + MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN); + if (pubWrapKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.len + + pubWrapKey->u.ec.publicValue.len >= + MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY); + rv = SECFailure; + goto ec_cleanup; + } + + /* Derive Ks using ECDH */ + Ks = PK11_PubDeriveWithKDF(svrPrivKey, pubWrapKey, PR_FALSE, NULL, + NULL, CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, masterWrapMech, + CKA_DERIVE, 0, CKD_NULL, NULL, NULL); + if (Ks == NULL) { + rv = SECFailure; + goto ec_cleanup; + } + + ecWrapped = (ECCWrappedKeyInfo *)(wswk.wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey); + ecWrapped->size = pubWrapKey->u.ec.size; + ecWrapped->encodedParamLen = pubWrapKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.len; + PORT_Memcpy(ecWrapped->var, pubWrapKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.data, + pubWrapKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.len); + + ecWrapped->pubValueLen = pubWrapKey->u.ec.publicValue.len; + PORT_Memcpy(ecWrapped->var + ecWrapped->encodedParamLen, + pubWrapKey->u.ec.publicValue.data, + pubWrapKey->u.ec.publicValue.len); + + wrappedKey.len = MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN - + (ecWrapped->encodedParamLen + ecWrapped->pubValueLen); + wrappedKey.data = ecWrapped->var + ecWrapped->encodedParamLen + + ecWrapped->pubValueLen; + + /* wrap symmetricWrapping key with the local Ks */ + rv = PK11_WrapSymKey(masterWrapMech, NULL, Ks, + unwrappedWrappingKey, &wrappedKey); + + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto ec_cleanup; + } + + /* Write down the length of wrapped key in the buffer + * wswk.wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey at the appropriate offset + */ + ecWrapped->wrappedKeyLen = wrappedKey.len; + + ec_cleanup: + if (privWrapKey) + SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privWrapKey); + if (pubWrapKey) + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubWrapKey); + if (Ks) + PK11_FreeSymKey(Ks); + asymWrapMechanism = masterWrapMech; + break; + + default: + rv = SECFailure; + break; } if (rv != SECSuccess) { - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); - goto loser; + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto loser; } PORT_Assert(asymWrapMechanism != CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM); - wswk.symWrapMechanism = masterWrapMech; - wswk.symWrapMechIndex = symWrapMechIndex; + wswk.symWrapMechanism = masterWrapMech; + wswk.symWrapMechIndex = symWrapMechIndex; wswk.asymWrapMechanism = asymWrapMechanism; - wswk.exchKeyType = exchKeyType; - wswk.wrappedSymKeyLen = wrappedKey.len; + wswk.authType = authType; + wswk.wrappedSymKeyLen = wrappedKey.len; /* put it on disk. */ - /* If the wrapping key for this KEA type has already been set, - * then abandon the value we just computed and + /* If the wrapping key for this KEA type has already been set, + * then abandon the value we just computed and * use the one we got from the disk. */ if (ssl_SetWrappingKey(&wswk)) { - /* somebody beat us to it. The original contents of our wswk - * has been replaced with the content on disk. Now, discard - * the key we just created and unwrap this new one. - */ - PK11_FreeSymKey(unwrappedWrappingKey); - - unwrappedWrappingKey = - ssl_UnwrapSymWrappingKey(&wswk, svrPrivKey, exchKeyType, + /* somebody beat us to it. The original contents of our wswk + * has been replaced with the content on disk. Now, discard + * the key we just created and unwrap this new one. + */ + PK11_FreeSymKey(unwrappedWrappingKey); + + unwrappedWrappingKey = + ssl_UnwrapSymWrappingKey(&wswk, svrPrivKey, authType, masterWrapMech, pwArg); } install: if (unwrappedWrappingKey) { - *pSymWrapKey = PK11_ReferenceSymKey(unwrappedWrappingKey); + *pSymWrapKey = PK11_ReferenceSymKey(unwrappedWrappingKey); } loser: @@ -6029,6 +6022,7 @@ done: return unwrappedWrappingKey; } +#ifdef NSS_ALLOW_SSLKEYLOGFILE /* hexEncode hex encodes |length| bytes from |in| and writes it as |length*2| * bytes to |out|. */ static void @@ -6038,23 +6032,23 @@ hexEncode(char *out, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int length) unsigned int i; for (i = 0; i < length; i++) { - *(out++) = hextable[in[i] >> 4]; - *(out++) = hextable[in[i] & 15]; + *(out++) = hextable[in[i] >> 4]; + *(out++) = hextable[in[i] & 15]; } } +#endif /* Called from ssl3_SendClientKeyExchange(). */ -/* Presently, this always uses PKCS11. There is no bypass for this. */ static SECStatus -sendRSAClientKeyExchange(sslSocket * ss, SECKEYPublicKey * svrPubKey) +ssl3_SendRSAClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, SECKEYPublicKey *svrPubKey) { - PK11SymKey * pms = NULL; - SECStatus rv = SECFailure; - SECItem enc_pms = {siBuffer, NULL, 0}; - PRBool isTLS; + PK11SymKey *pms = NULL; + SECStatus rv = SECFailure; + SECItem enc_pms = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + PRBool isTLS; - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); /* Generate the pre-master secret ... */ ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); @@ -6063,68 +6057,71 @@ sendRSAClientKeyExchange(sslSocket * ss, SECKEYPublicKey * svrPubKey) pms = ssl3_GenerateRSAPMS(ss, ss->ssl3.pwSpec, NULL); ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); if (pms == NULL) { - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); - goto loser; + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto loser; } /* Get the wrapped (encrypted) pre-master secret, enc_pms */ - enc_pms.len = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrength(svrPubKey); - enc_pms.data = (unsigned char*)PORT_Alloc(enc_pms.len); + enc_pms.len = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrength(svrPubKey); + enc_pms.data = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(enc_pms.len); if (enc_pms.data == NULL) { - goto loser; /* err set by PORT_Alloc */ + goto loser; /* err set by PORT_Alloc */ } /* wrap pre-master secret in server's public key. */ rv = PK11_PubWrapSymKey(CKM_RSA_PKCS, svrPubKey, pms, &enc_pms); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); - goto loser; + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto loser; } +#ifdef NSS_ALLOW_SSLKEYLOGFILE if (ssl_keylog_iob) { - SECStatus extractRV = PK11_ExtractKeyValue(pms); - if (extractRV == SECSuccess) { - SECItem * keyData = PK11_GetKeyData(pms); - if (keyData && keyData->data && keyData->len) { + SECStatus extractRV = PK11_ExtractKeyValue(pms); + if (extractRV == SECSuccess) { + SECItem *keyData = PK11_GetKeyData(pms); + if (keyData && keyData->data && keyData->len) { #ifdef TRACE - if (ssl_trace >= 100) { - ssl_PrintBuf(ss, "Pre-Master Secret", - keyData->data, keyData->len); - } + if (ssl_trace >= 100) { + ssl_PrintBuf(ss, "Pre-Master Secret", + keyData->data, keyData->len); + } #endif - if (ssl_keylog_iob && enc_pms.len >= 8 && keyData->len == 48) { - /* https://developer.mozilla.org/en/NSS_Key_Log_Format */ - - /* There could be multiple, concurrent writers to the - * keylog, so we have to do everything in a single call to - * fwrite. */ - char buf[4 + 8*2 + 1 + 48*2 + 1]; - - strcpy(buf, "RSA "); - hexEncode(buf + 4, enc_pms.data, 8); - buf[20] = ' '; - hexEncode(buf + 21, keyData->data, 48); - buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = '\n'; - - fwrite(buf, sizeof(buf), 1, ssl_keylog_iob); - fflush(ssl_keylog_iob); - } - } - } + if (ssl_keylog_iob && enc_pms.len >= 8 && keyData->len == 48) { + /* https://developer.mozilla.org/en/NSS_Key_Log_Format */ + + /* There could be multiple, concurrent writers to the + * keylog, so we have to do everything in a single call to + * fwrite. */ + char buf[4 + 8 * 2 + 1 + 48 * 2 + 1]; + + strcpy(buf, "RSA "); + hexEncode(buf + 4, enc_pms.data, 8); + buf[20] = ' '; + hexEncode(buf + 21, keyData->data, 48); + buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = '\n'; + + fwrite(buf, sizeof(buf), 1, ssl_keylog_iob); + fflush(ssl_keylog_iob); + } + } + } } +#endif - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, client_key_exchange, - isTLS ? enc_pms.len + 2 : enc_pms.len); + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, client_key_exchange, + isTLS ? enc_pms.len + 2 + : enc_pms.len); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto loser; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + goto loser; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ } if (isTLS) { - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, enc_pms.data, enc_pms.len, 2); + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, enc_pms.data, enc_pms.len, 2); } else { - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, enc_pms.data, enc_pms.len); + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, enc_pms.data, enc_pms.len); } if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto loser; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + goto loser; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ } rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(ss, pms); @@ -6132,278 +6129,476 @@ sendRSAClientKeyExchange(sslSocket * ss, SECKEYPublicKey * svrPubKey) pms = NULL; if (rv != SECSuccess) { - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); - goto loser; + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto loser; } rv = SECSuccess; loser: if (enc_pms.data != NULL) { - PORT_Free(enc_pms.data); + PORT_Free(enc_pms.data); } if (pms != NULL) { - PK11_FreeSymKey(pms); + PK11_FreeSymKey(pms); } return rv; } +/* DH shares need to be padded to the size of their prime. Some implementations + * require this. TLS 1.3 also requires this. */ +SECStatus +ssl_AppendPaddedDHKeyShare(const sslSocket *ss, const SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey, + PRBool appendLength) +{ + SECStatus rv; + unsigned int pad = pubKey->u.dh.prime.len - pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.len; + + if (appendLength) { + rv = ssl3_ExtAppendHandshakeNumber(ss, pubKey->u.dh.prime.len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; + } + } + while (pad) { + rv = ssl3_ExtAppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; + } + --pad; + } + rv = ssl3_ExtAppendHandshake(ss, pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.data, + pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; + } + return SECSuccess; +} + /* Called from ssl3_SendClientKeyExchange(). */ -/* Presently, this always uses PKCS11. There is no bypass for this. */ static SECStatus -sendDHClientKeyExchange(sslSocket * ss, SECKEYPublicKey * svrPubKey) +ssl3_SendDHClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, SECKEYPublicKey *svrPubKey) { - PK11SymKey * pms = NULL; - SECStatus rv = SECFailure; - PRBool isTLS; - CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target; - - SECKEYDHParams dhParam; /* DH parameters */ - SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey = NULL; /* Ephemeral DH key */ - SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey = NULL; /* Ephemeral DH key */ + PK11SymKey *pms = NULL; + SECStatus rv; + PRBool isTLS; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target; + + const ssl3DHParams *params; + ssl3DHParams customParams; + const sslNamedGroupDef *groupDef; + static const sslNamedGroupDef customGroupDef = { + ssl_grp_ffdhe_custom, 0, ssl_kea_dh, SEC_OID_TLS_DHE_CUSTOM, PR_FALSE + }; + sslEphemeralKeyPair *keyPair = NULL; + SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey; - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); /* Copy DH parameters from server key */ - if (svrPubKey->keyType != dhKey) { - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY); - goto loser; + if (SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(svrPubKey) != dhKey) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY); + return SECFailure; } - dhParam.prime.data = svrPubKey->u.dh.prime.data; - dhParam.prime.len = svrPubKey->u.dh.prime.len; - dhParam.base.data = svrPubKey->u.dh.base.data; - dhParam.base.len = svrPubKey->u.dh.base.len; - /* Generate ephemeral DH keypair */ - privKey = SECKEY_CreateDHPrivateKey(&dhParam, &pubKey, NULL); - if (!privKey || !pubKey) { - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SEC_ERROR_KEYGEN_FAIL); - rv = SECFailure; - goto loser; + /* Work out the parameters. */ + rv = ssl_ValidateDHENamedGroup(ss, &svrPubKey->u.dh.prime, + &svrPubKey->u.dh.base, + &groupDef, ¶ms); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + /* If we require named groups, we will have already validated the group + * in ssl_HandleDHServerKeyExchange() */ + PORT_Assert(!ss->opt.requireDHENamedGroups && + !ss->xtnData.peerSupportsFfdheGroups); + + customParams.name = ssl_grp_ffdhe_custom; + customParams.prime.data = svrPubKey->u.dh.prime.data; + customParams.prime.len = svrPubKey->u.dh.prime.len; + customParams.base.data = svrPubKey->u.dh.base.data; + customParams.base.len = svrPubKey->u.dh.base.len; + params = &customParams; + groupDef = &customGroupDef; + } + ss->sec.keaGroup = groupDef; + + rv = ssl_CreateDHEKeyPair(groupDef, params, &keyPair); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SEC_ERROR_KEYGEN_FAIL); + goto loser; } + pubKey = keyPair->keys->pubKey; PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "DH public value:", - pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.data, - pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.len)); + pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.data, + pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.len)); - if (isTLS) target = CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH; - else target = CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH; + if (isTLS) + target = CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH; + else + target = CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH; /* Determine the PMS */ - - pms = PK11_PubDerive(privKey, svrPubKey, PR_FALSE, NULL, NULL, - CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, target, CKA_DERIVE, 0, NULL); + pms = PK11_PubDerive(keyPair->keys->privKey, svrPubKey, + PR_FALSE, NULL, NULL, CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, + target, CKA_DERIVE, 0, NULL); if (pms == NULL) { - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); - goto loser; + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto loser; } - SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privKey); - privKey = NULL; - - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, client_key_exchange, - pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.len + 2); + /* Note: send the DH share padded to avoid triggering bugs. */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, client_key_exchange, + params->prime.len + 2); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto loser; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + goto loser; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ } - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, - pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.data, - pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.len, 2); - SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey); - pubKey = NULL; - + rv = ssl_AppendPaddedDHKeyShare(ss, pubKey, PR_TRUE); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto loser; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + goto loser; /* err set by ssl_AppendPaddedDHKeyShare */ } rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(ss, pms); - PK11_FreeSymKey(pms); - pms = NULL; - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); - goto loser; + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto loser; } - rv = SECSuccess; + PK11_FreeSymKey(pms); + ssl_FreeEphemeralKeyPair(keyPair); + return SECSuccess; loser: - - if(pms) PK11_FreeSymKey(pms); - if(privKey) SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privKey); - if(pubKey) SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey); - return rv; + if (pms) + PK11_FreeSymKey(pms); + if (keyPair) + ssl_FreeEphemeralKeyPair(keyPair); + return SECFailure; } - - - - /* Called from ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone(). */ static SECStatus ssl3_SendClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss) { - SECKEYPublicKey * serverKey = NULL; - SECStatus rv = SECFailure; - PRBool isTLS; + SECKEYPublicKey *serverKey = NULL; + SECStatus rv = SECFailure; SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send client_key_exchange handshake", - SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); if (ss->sec.peerKey == NULL) { - serverKey = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(ss->sec.peerCert); - if (serverKey == NULL) { - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY_FAILURE); - return SECFailure; - } + serverKey = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(ss->sec.peerCert); + if (serverKey == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } } else { - serverKey = ss->sec.peerKey; - ss->sec.peerKey = NULL; /* we're done with it now */ + serverKey = ss->sec.peerKey; + ss->sec.peerKey = NULL; /* we're done with it now */ } - isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); - /* enforce limits on kea key sizes. */ - if (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->is_limited) { - unsigned int keyLen = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(serverKey); - - if (keyLen > ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->key_size_limit) { - if (isTLS) - (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, export_restriction); - else - (void)ssl3_HandshakeFailure(ss); - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_PUB_KEY_SIZE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED); - goto loser; - } - } - - ss->sec.keaType = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType; + ss->sec.keaType = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType; ss->sec.keaKeyBits = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(serverKey); switch (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType) { - case kt_rsa: - rv = sendRSAClientKeyExchange(ss, serverKey); - break; + case ssl_kea_rsa: + rv = ssl3_SendRSAClientKeyExchange(ss, serverKey); + break; - case kt_dh: - rv = sendDHClientKeyExchange(ss, serverKey); - break; + case ssl_kea_dh: + rv = ssl3_SendDHClientKeyExchange(ss, serverKey); + break; -#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC - case kt_ecdh: - rv = ssl3_SendECDHClientKeyExchange(ss, serverKey); - break; -#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */ + case ssl_kea_ecdh: + rv = ssl3_SendECDHClientKeyExchange(ss, serverKey); + break; - default: - /* got an unknown or unsupported Key Exchange Algorithm. */ - SEND_ALERT - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG); - break; + default: + PORT_Assert(0); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + break; } SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: DONE sending client_key_exchange", - SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); -loser: - if (serverKey) - SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(serverKey); - return rv; /* err code already set. */ + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(serverKey); + return rv; /* err code already set. */ +} + +SECStatus +ssl_PickSignatureScheme(sslSocket *ss, + SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey, + SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey, + const SSLSignatureScheme *peerSchemes, + unsigned int peerSchemeCount, + PRBool requireSha1) +{ + unsigned int i, j; + const sslNamedGroupDef *group = NULL; + KeyType keyType; + PK11SlotInfo *slot; + PRBool slotDoesPss; + PRBool isTLS13 = ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3; + + /* We can't require SHA-1 in TLS 1.3. */ + PORT_Assert(!(requireSha1 && isTLS13)); + if (!pubKey || !privKey) { + PORT_Assert(0); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + slot = PK11_GetSlotFromPrivateKey(privKey); + if (!slot) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + slotDoesPss = PK11_DoesMechanism(slot, auth_alg_defs[ssl_auth_rsa_pss]); + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + + keyType = SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(pubKey); + if (keyType == ecKey) { + group = ssl_ECPubKey2NamedGroup(pubKey); + } + + /* Here we look for the first local preference that the client has + * indicated support for in their signature_algorithms extension. */ + for (i = 0; i < ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount; ++i) { + SSLHashType hashType; + SECOidTag hashOID; + SSLSignatureScheme preferred = ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[i]; + PRUint32 policy; + + if (!ssl_SignatureSchemeValidForKey(!isTLS13 /* allowSha1 */, + PR_TRUE /* matchGroup */, + keyType, group, preferred)) { + continue; + } + + /* Skip RSA-PSS schemes when the certificate's private key slot does + * not support this signature mechanism. */ + if (ssl_IsRsaPssSignatureScheme(preferred) && !slotDoesPss) { + continue; + } + + hashType = ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType(preferred); + if (requireSha1 && (hashType != ssl_hash_sha1)) { + continue; + } + hashOID = ssl3_HashTypeToOID(hashType); + if ((NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(hashOID, &policy) == SECSuccess) && + !(policy & NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX)) { + /* we ignore hashes we don't support */ + continue; + } + + for (j = 0; j < peerSchemeCount; j++) { + if (peerSchemes[j] == preferred) { + ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme = preferred; + return SECSuccess; + } + } + } + + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* ssl3_PickServerSignatureScheme selects a signature scheme for signing the + * handshake. Most of this is determined by the key pair we are using. + * Prior to TLS 1.2, the MD5/SHA1 combination is always used. With TLS 1.2, a + * client may advertise its support for signature and hash combinations. */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_PickServerSignatureScheme(sslSocket *ss) +{ + sslKeyPair *keyPair = ss->sec.serverCert->serverKeyPair; + PRBool isTLS12 = ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2; + + if (!isTLS12 || !ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_signature_algorithms_xtn)) { + /* If the client didn't provide any signature_algorithms extension then + * we can assume that they support SHA-1: RFC5246, Section 7.4.1.4.1. */ + switch (SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(keyPair->pubKey)) { + case rsaKey: + if (isTLS12) { + ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme = ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1; + } else { + ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme = ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1md5; + } + break; + case ecKey: + ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme = ssl_sig_ecdsa_sha1; + break; + case dsaKey: + ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme = ssl_sig_dsa_sha1; + break; + default: + PORT_Assert(0); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY); + return SECFailure; + } + return SECSuccess; + } + + /* Sets error code, if needed. */ + return ssl_PickSignatureScheme(ss, keyPair->pubKey, keyPair->privKey, + ss->xtnData.clientSigSchemes, + ss->xtnData.numClientSigScheme, + PR_FALSE /* requireSha1 */); +} + +static SECStatus +ssl_PickClientSignatureScheme(sslSocket *ss, const SSLSignatureScheme *schemes, + unsigned int numSchemes) +{ + SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey = ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey; + SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey; + SECStatus rv; + + pubKey = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate); + PORT_Assert(pubKey); + if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 && + (SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(pubKey) == rsaKey || + SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(pubKey) == dsaKey) && + SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(pubKey) <= 1024) { + /* If the key is a 1024-bit RSA or DSA key, assume conservatively that + * it may be unable to sign SHA-256 hashes. This is the case for older + * Estonian ID cards that have 1024-bit RSA keys. In FIPS 186-2 and + * older, DSA key size is at most 1024 bits and the hash function must + * be SHA-1. + */ + rv = ssl_PickSignatureScheme(ss, pubKey, privKey, schemes, numSchemes, + PR_TRUE /* requireSha1 */); + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey); + return SECSuccess; + } + /* If this fails, that's because the peer doesn't advertise SHA-1, + * so fall back to the full negotiation. */ + } + rv = ssl_PickSignatureScheme(ss, pubKey, privKey, schemes, numSchemes, + PR_FALSE /* requireSha1 */); + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey); + return rv; } /* Called from ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone(). */ static SECStatus -ssl3_SendCertificateVerify(sslSocket *ss) +ssl3_SendCertificateVerify(sslSocket *ss, SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey) { - SECStatus rv = SECFailure; - PRBool isTLS; - PRBool isTLS12; - SECItem buf = {siBuffer, NULL, 0}; - SSL3Hashes hashes; - KeyType keyType; - unsigned int len; - SSLSignatureAndHashAlg sigAndHash; + SECStatus rv = SECFailure; + PRBool isTLS12; + SECItem buf = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + SSL3Hashes hashes; + unsigned int len; + SSLHashType hashAlg; - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send certificate_verify handshake", - SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); - if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_single && - ss->ssl3.hs.backupHash) { - rv = ssl3_ComputeBackupHandshakeHashes(ss, &hashes); - PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.backupHash); + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_record) { + hashAlg = ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType(ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme); } else { - rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(ss, ss->ssl3.pwSpec, &hashes, 0); + /* Use ssl_hash_none to represent the MD5+SHA1 combo. */ + hashAlg = ssl_hash_none; + } + if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_record && + hashAlg != ssl3_GetSuitePrfHash(ss)) { + rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHash(ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf, + ss->ssl3.hs.messages.len, + hashAlg, &hashes); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE); + } + } else { + rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(ss, ss->ssl3.pwSpec, &hashes, 0); } ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto done; /* err code was set by ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes */ + goto done; /* err code was set by ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHash(es) */ } - isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); - isTLS12 = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2); - keyType = ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey->keyType; - rv = ssl3_SignHashes(&hashes, ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey, &buf, isTLS); - if (rv == SECSuccess) { - PK11SlotInfo * slot; - sslSessionID * sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; - - /* Remember the info about the slot that did the signing. - ** Later, when doing an SSL restart handshake, verify this. - ** These calls are mere accessors, and can't fail. - */ - slot = PK11_GetSlotFromPrivateKey(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey); - sid->u.ssl3.clAuthSeries = PK11_GetSlotSeries(slot); - sid->u.ssl3.clAuthSlotID = PK11_GetSlotID(slot); - sid->u.ssl3.clAuthModuleID = PK11_GetModuleID(slot); - sid->u.ssl3.clAuthValid = PR_TRUE; - PK11_FreeSlot(slot); - } - SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey); - ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey = NULL; + isTLS12 = (PRBool)(ss->version == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2); + PORT_Assert(ss->version <= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2); + + rv = ssl3_SignHashes(ss, &hashes, privKey, &buf); + if (rv == SECSuccess && !ss->sec.isServer) { + /* Remember the info about the slot that did the signing. + ** Later, when doing an SSL restart handshake, verify this. + ** These calls are mere accessors, and can't fail. + */ + PK11SlotInfo *slot; + sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; + + slot = PK11_GetSlotFromPrivateKey(privKey); + sid->u.ssl3.clAuthSeries = PK11_GetSlotSeries(slot); + sid->u.ssl3.clAuthSlotID = PK11_GetSlotID(slot); + sid->u.ssl3.clAuthModuleID = PK11_GetModuleID(slot); + sid->u.ssl3.clAuthValid = PR_TRUE; + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + } if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto done; /* err code was set by ssl3_SignHashes */ + goto done; /* err code was set by ssl3_SignHashes */ } len = buf.len + 2 + (isTLS12 ? 2 : 0); rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, certificate_verify, len); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto done; /* error code set by AppendHandshake */ + goto done; /* error code set by AppendHandshake */ } if (isTLS12) { - rv = ssl3_TLSSignatureAlgorithmForKeyType(keyType, - &sigAndHash.sigAlg); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto done; - } - sigAndHash.hashAlg = hashes.hashAlg; - - rv = ssl3_AppendSignatureAndHashAlgorithm(ss, &sigAndHash); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto done; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ - } + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto done; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } } rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, buf.data, buf.len, 2); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto done; /* error code set by AppendHandshake */ + goto done; /* error code set by AppendHandshake */ } done: if (buf.data) - PORT_Free(buf.data); + PORT_Free(buf.data); return rv; } +/* Once a cipher suite has been selected, make sure that the necessary secondary + * information is properly set. */ +SECStatus +ssl3_SetCipherSuite(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSuite chosenSuite, + PRBool initHashes) +{ + ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite = chosenSuite; + ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(chosenSuite); + if (!ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def) { + PORT_Assert(0); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def = &kea_defs[ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def->key_exchange_alg]; + ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo |= ssl_preinfo_cipher_suite; + + if (!initHashes) { + return SECSuccess; + } + /* Now we've have a cipher suite, initialize the handshake hashes. */ + return ssl3_InitHandshakeHashes(ss); +} + /* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete * ssl3 ServerHello message. * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. @@ -6411,162 +6606,190 @@ done: static SECStatus ssl3_HandleServerHello(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length) { - sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; - PRInt32 temp; /* allow for consume number failure */ - PRBool suite_found = PR_FALSE; - int i; - int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO; - SECStatus rv; - SECItem sidBytes = {siBuffer, NULL, 0}; - PRBool sid_match; - PRBool isTLS = PR_FALSE; - SSL3AlertDescription desc = illegal_parameter; - SSL3ProtocolVersion version; + PRInt32 temp; /* allow for consume number failure */ + PRBool suite_found = PR_FALSE; + int i; + int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO; + SECStatus rv; + SECItem sidBytes = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + PRBool isTLS = PR_FALSE; + SSL3AlertDescription desc = illegal_parameter; +#ifndef TLS_1_3_DRAFT_VERSION + SSL3ProtocolVersion downgradeCheckVersion; +#endif SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle server_hello handshake", - SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); - PORT_Assert( ss->ssl3.initialized ); + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.initialized); if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_server_hello) { errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_SERVER_HELLO; - desc = unexpected_message; - goto alert_loser; + desc = unexpected_message; + goto alert_loser; } /* clean up anything left from previous handshake. */ if (ss->ssl3.clientCertChain != NULL) { - CERT_DestroyCertificateList(ss->ssl3.clientCertChain); - ss->ssl3.clientCertChain = NULL; + CERT_DestroyCertificateList(ss->ssl3.clientCertChain); + ss->ssl3.clientCertChain = NULL; } if (ss->ssl3.clientCertificate != NULL) { - CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate); - ss->ssl3.clientCertificate = NULL; + CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate); + ss->ssl3.clientCertificate = NULL; } if (ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey != NULL) { - SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey); - ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey = NULL; + SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey); + ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey = NULL; } - temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &b, &length); - if (temp < 0) { - goto loser; /* alert has been sent */ + rv = ssl_ClientReadVersion(ss, &b, &length, &ss->version); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* alert has been sent */ } - version = (SSL3ProtocolVersion)temp; - if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { - /* RFC 4347 required that you verify that the server versions - * match (Section 4.2.1) in the HelloVerifyRequest and the - * ServerHello. - * - * RFC 6347 suggests (SHOULD) that servers always use 1.0 - * in HelloVerifyRequest and allows the versions not to match, - * especially when 1.2 is being negotiated. - * - * Therefore we do not check for matching here. - */ - version = dtls_DTLSVersionToTLSVersion(version); - if (version == 0) { /* Insane version number */ - goto alert_loser; - } + /* We got a HelloRetryRequest, but the server didn't pick 1.3. Scream. */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry && ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + desc = illegal_parameter; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO; + goto alert_loser; } - rv = ssl3_NegotiateVersion(ss, version, PR_FALSE); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - desc = (version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) ? protocol_version - : handshake_failure; - errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION; - goto alert_loser; + /* Check that the server negotiated the same version as it did + * in the first handshake. This isn't really the best place for + * us to be getting this version number, but it's what we have. + * (1294697). */ + if (ss->firstHsDone && (ss->version != ss->ssl3.crSpec->version)) { + desc = illegal_parameter; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION; + goto alert_loser; } ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo |= ssl_preinfo_version; isTLS = (ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); - rv = ssl3_InitHandshakeHashes(ss); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - desc = internal_error; - errCode = PORT_GetError(); - goto alert_loser; - } - rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshake( - ss, &ss->ssl3.hs.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH, &b, &length); + ss, &ss->ssl3.hs.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH, &b, &length); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto loser; /* alert has been sent */ + goto loser; /* alert has been sent */ } - rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &sidBytes, 1, &b, &length); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto loser; /* alert has been sent */ +#ifndef TLS_1_3_DRAFT_VERSION + /* Check the ServerHello.random per + * [draft-ietf-tls-tls13-11 Section 6.3.1.1]. + * + * TLS 1.3 clients receiving a TLS 1.2 or below ServerHello MUST check + * that the top eight octets are not equal to either of these values. + * TLS 1.2 clients SHOULD also perform this check if the ServerHello + * indicates TLS 1.1 or below. If a match is found the client MUST + * abort the handshake with a fatal "illegal_parameter" alert. + * + * Disable this test during the TLS 1.3 draft version period. + */ + downgradeCheckVersion = ss->ssl3.downgradeCheckVersion ? ss->ssl3.downgradeCheckVersion + : ss->vrange.max; + + if (downgradeCheckVersion >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2 && + downgradeCheckVersion > ss->version) { + /* Both sections use the same sentinel region. */ + unsigned char *downgrade_sentinel = + ss->ssl3.hs.server_random.rand + + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH - sizeof(tls13_downgrade_random); + if (!PORT_Memcmp(downgrade_sentinel, + tls13_downgrade_random, + sizeof(tls13_downgrade_random)) || + !PORT_Memcmp(downgrade_sentinel, + tls12_downgrade_random, + sizeof(tls12_downgrade_random))) { + desc = illegal_parameter; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO; + goto alert_loser; + } } - if (sidBytes.len > SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES) { - if (isTLS) - desc = decode_error; - goto alert_loser; /* malformed. */ +#endif + + if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &sidBytes, 1, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* alert has been sent */ + } + if (sidBytes.len > SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES) { + if (isTLS) + desc = decode_error; + goto alert_loser; /* malformed. */ + } } /* find selected cipher suite in our list. */ temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &b, &length); if (temp < 0) { - goto loser; /* alert has been sent */ + goto loser; /* alert has been sent */ + } + i = ssl3_config_match_init(ss); + PORT_Assert(i > 0); + if (i <= 0) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto loser; } - ssl3_config_match_init(ss); for (i = 0; i < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; i++) { - ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite = &ss->cipherSuites[i]; - if (temp == suite->cipher_suite) { - SSLVersionRange vrange = {ss->version, ss->version}; - if (!config_match(suite, ss->ssl3.policy, PR_TRUE, &vrange, ss)) { - /* config_match already checks whether the cipher suite is - * acceptable for the version, but the check is repeated here - * in order to give a more precise error code. */ - if (!ssl3_CipherSuiteAllowedForVersionRange(temp, &vrange)) { - desc = handshake_failure; - errCode = SSL_ERROR_CIPHER_DISALLOWED_FOR_VERSION; - goto alert_loser; - } - - break; /* failure */ - } - - suite_found = PR_TRUE; - break; /* success */ - } + ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite = &ss->cipherSuites[i]; + if (temp == suite->cipher_suite) { + SSLVersionRange vrange = { ss->version, ss->version }; + if (!config_match(suite, ss->ssl3.policy, &vrange, ss)) { + /* config_match already checks whether the cipher suite is + * acceptable for the version, but the check is repeated here + * in order to give a more precise error code. */ + if (!ssl3_CipherSuiteAllowedForVersionRange(temp, &vrange)) { + desc = handshake_failure; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_CIPHER_DISALLOWED_FOR_VERSION; + goto alert_loser; + } + + break; /* failure */ + } + + suite_found = PR_TRUE; + break; /* success */ + } } if (!suite_found) { - desc = handshake_failure; - errCode = SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP; - goto alert_loser; - } - ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite = (ssl3CipherSuite)temp; - ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef((ssl3CipherSuite)temp); - ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo |= ssl_preinfo_cipher_suite; - PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def); - if (!ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def) { - PORT_SetError(errCode = SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); - goto loser; /* we don't send alerts for our screw-ups. */ + desc = handshake_failure; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP; + goto alert_loser; } - /* find selected compression method in our list. */ - temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 1, &b, &length); - if (temp < 0) { - goto loser; /* alert has been sent */ - } - suite_found = PR_FALSE; - for (i = 0; i < compressionMethodsCount; i++) { - if (temp == compressions[i]) { - if (!compressionEnabled(ss, compressions[i])) { - break; /* failure */ - } - suite_found = PR_TRUE; - break; /* success */ - } + rv = ssl3_SetCipherSuite(ss, (ssl3CipherSuite)temp, PR_TRUE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + desc = internal_error; + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto alert_loser; } - if (!suite_found) { - desc = handshake_failure; - errCode = SSL_ERROR_NO_COMPRESSION_OVERLAP; - goto alert_loser; + + if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + /* find selected compression method in our list. */ + temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 1, &b, &length); + if (temp < 0) { + goto loser; /* alert has been sent */ + } + suite_found = PR_FALSE; + for (i = 0; i < ssl_compression_method_count; i++) { + if (temp == ssl_compression_methods[i]) { + if (!ssl_CompressionEnabled(ss, ssl_compression_methods[i])) { + break; /* failure */ + } + suite_found = PR_TRUE; + break; /* success */ + } + } + if (!suite_found) { + desc = handshake_failure; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_NO_COMPRESSION_OVERLAP; + goto alert_loser; + } + ss->ssl3.hs.compression = (SSLCompressionMethod)temp; + } else { + ss->ssl3.hs.compression = ssl_compression_null; } - ss->ssl3.hs.compression = (SSLCompressionMethod)temp; /* Note that if !isTLS and the extra stuff is not extensions, we * do NOT goto alert_loser. @@ -6578,36 +6801,72 @@ ssl3_HandleServerHello(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length) * extension in SSL 3.0. */ if (length != 0) { - SECItem extensions; - rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &extensions, 2, &b, &length); - if (rv != SECSuccess || length != 0) { - if (isTLS) - goto alert_loser; - } else { - rv = ssl3_HandleHelloExtensions(ss, &extensions.data, - &extensions.len); - if (rv != SECSuccess) - goto alert_loser; - } - } - if ((ss->opt.requireSafeNegotiation || + SECItem extensions; + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &extensions, 2, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess || length != 0) { + if (isTLS) + goto alert_loser; + } else { + rv = ssl3_HandleExtensions(ss, &extensions.data, + &extensions.len, server_hello); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto alert_loser; + } + } + + if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + rv = tls13_HandleServerHelloPart2(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto loser; + } + } else { + rv = ssl3_HandleServerHelloPart2(ss, &sidBytes, &errCode); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + } + + return SECSuccess; + +alert_loser: + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc); + +loser: + /* Clean up the temporary pointer to the handshake buffer. */ + ss->xtnData.signedCertTimestamps.len = 0; + ssl_MapLowLevelError(errCode); + return SECFailure; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleServerHelloPart2(sslSocket *ss, const SECItem *sidBytes, + int *retErrCode) +{ + SSL3AlertDescription desc = handshake_failure; + int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO; + SECStatus rv; + PRBool sid_match; + sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; + + if ((ss->opt.requireSafeNegotiation || (ss->firstHsDone && (ss->peerRequestedProtection || - ss->opt.enableRenegotiation == SSL_RENEGOTIATE_REQUIRES_XTN))) && - !ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn)) { - desc = handshake_failure; - errCode = ss->firstHsDone ? SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED - : SSL_ERROR_UNSAFE_NEGOTIATION; - goto alert_loser; + ss->opt.enableRenegotiation == + SSL_RENEGOTIATE_REQUIRES_XTN))) && + !ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn)) { + desc = handshake_failure; + errCode = ss->firstHsDone ? SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED + : SSL_ERROR_UNSAFE_NEGOTIATION; + goto alert_loser; } /* Any errors after this point are not "malformed" errors. */ - desc = handshake_failure; + desc = handshake_failure; /* we need to call ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec here so we can check the * key exchange algorithm. */ rv = ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec(ss); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto alert_loser; /* error code is set. */ + goto alert_loser; /* error code is set. */ } /* We may or may not have sent a session id, we may get one back or @@ -6615,179 +6874,174 @@ ssl3_HandleServerHello(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length) * Attempt to restore the master secret to see if this is so... * Don't consider failure to find a matching SID an error. */ - sid_match = (PRBool)(sidBytes.len > 0 && - sidBytes.len == sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength && - !PORT_Memcmp(sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, sidBytes.data, sidBytes.len)); - - if (sid_match && - sid->version == ss->version && - sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite == ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite) do { - ssl3CipherSpec *pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec; - - SECItem wrappedMS; /* wrapped master secret. */ - - /* [draft-ietf-tls-session-hash-06; Section 5.3] - * - * o If the original session did not use the "extended_master_secret" - * extension but the new ServerHello contains the extension, the - * client MUST abort the handshake. - */ - if (!sid->u.ssl3.keys.extendedMasterSecretUsed && - ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_extended_master_secret_xtn)) { - errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNEXPECTED_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET; + sid_match = (PRBool)(sidBytes->len > 0 && + sidBytes->len == + sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength && + !PORT_Memcmp(sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, + sidBytes->data, sidBytes->len)); + + if (sid_match) { + if (sid->version != ss->version || + sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite != ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite) { + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO; goto alert_loser; } + do { + ssl3CipherSpec *pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec; + + SECItem wrappedMS; /* wrapped master secret. */ + + /* [draft-ietf-tls-session-hash-06; Section 5.3] + * + * o If the original session did not use the "extended_master_secret" + * extension but the new ServerHello contains the extension, the + * client MUST abort the handshake. + */ + if (!sid->u.ssl3.keys.extendedMasterSecretUsed && + ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_extended_master_secret_xtn)) { + errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNEXPECTED_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET; + goto alert_loser; + } - /* - * o If the original session used an extended master secret but the new - * ServerHello does not contain the "extended_master_secret" - * extension, the client SHOULD abort the handshake. - * - * TODO(ekr@rtfm.com): Add option to refuse to resume when EMS is not - * used at all (bug 1176526). - */ - if (sid->u.ssl3.keys.extendedMasterSecretUsed && - !ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_extended_master_secret_xtn)) { - errCode = SSL_ERROR_MISSING_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET; - goto alert_loser; - } + /* + * o If the original session used an extended master secret but the new + * ServerHello does not contain the "extended_master_secret" + * extension, the client SHOULD abort the handshake. + * + * TODO(ekr@rtfm.com): Add option to refuse to resume when EMS is not + * used at all (bug 1176526). + */ + if (sid->u.ssl3.keys.extendedMasterSecretUsed && + !ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_extended_master_secret_xtn)) { + errCode = SSL_ERROR_MISSING_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET; + goto alert_loser; + } - ss->sec.authAlgorithm = sid->authAlgorithm; - ss->sec.authKeyBits = sid->authKeyBits; - ss->sec.keaType = sid->keaType; - ss->sec.keaKeyBits = sid->keaKeyBits; - - /* 3 cases here: - * a) key is wrapped (implies using PKCS11) - * b) key is unwrapped, but we're still using PKCS11 - * c) key is unwrapped, and we're bypassing PKCS11. - */ - if (sid->u.ssl3.keys.msIsWrapped) { - PK11SlotInfo *slot; - PK11SymKey * wrapKey; /* wrapping key */ - CK_FLAGS keyFlags = 0; - -#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS - if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) { - /* we cannot restart a non-bypass session in a - ** bypass socket. - */ - break; - } -#endif - /* unwrap master secret with PKCS11 */ - slot = SECMOD_LookupSlot(sid->u.ssl3.masterModuleID, - sid->u.ssl3.masterSlotID); - if (slot == NULL) { - break; /* not considered an error. */ - } - if (!PK11_IsPresent(slot)) { - PK11_FreeSlot(slot); - break; /* not considered an error. */ - } - wrapKey = PK11_GetWrapKey(slot, sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapIndex, - sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech, - sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapSeries, - ss->pkcs11PinArg); - PK11_FreeSlot(slot); - if (wrapKey == NULL) { - break; /* not considered an error. */ - } - - if (ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) { /* isTLS */ - keyFlags = CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY; - } - - wrappedMS.data = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret; - wrappedMS.len = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len; - pwSpec->master_secret = - PK11_UnwrapSymKeyWithFlags(wrapKey, sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech, - NULL, &wrappedMS, CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, - CKA_DERIVE, sizeof(SSL3MasterSecret), keyFlags); - errCode = PORT_GetError(); - PK11_FreeSymKey(wrapKey); - if (pwSpec->master_secret == NULL) { - break; /* errorCode set just after call to UnwrapSymKey. */ - } -#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS - } else if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) { - /* MS is not wrapped */ - wrappedMS.data = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret; - wrappedMS.len = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len; - memcpy(pwSpec->raw_master_secret, wrappedMS.data, wrappedMS.len); - pwSpec->msItem.data = pwSpec->raw_master_secret; - pwSpec->msItem.len = wrappedMS.len; -#endif - } else { - /* We CAN restart a bypass session in a non-bypass socket. */ - /* need to import the raw master secret to session object */ - PK11SlotInfo *slot = PK11_GetInternalSlot(); - wrappedMS.data = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret; - wrappedMS.len = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len; - pwSpec->master_secret = - PK11_ImportSymKey(slot, CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, - PK11_OriginUnwrap, CKA_ENCRYPT, - &wrappedMS, NULL); - PK11_FreeSlot(slot); - if (pwSpec->master_secret == NULL) { - break; - } - } - - /* Got a Match */ - SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(& ssl3stats.hsh_sid_cache_hits ); - - /* If we sent a session ticket, then this is a stateless resume. */ - if (ss->xtnData.sentSessionTicketInClientHello) - SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(& ssl3stats.hsh_sid_stateless_resumes ); - - if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_session_ticket_xtn)) - ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_new_session_ticket; - else - ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_change_cipher; - - ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming = PR_TRUE; - - /* copy the peer cert from the SID */ - if (sid->peerCert != NULL) { - ss->sec.peerCert = CERT_DupCertificate(sid->peerCert); - } - - /* NULL value for PMS because we are reusing the old MS */ - rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(ss, NULL); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto alert_loser; /* err code was set */ - } - return SECSuccess; - } while (0); + ss->sec.authType = sid->authType; + ss->sec.authKeyBits = sid->authKeyBits; + ss->sec.keaType = sid->keaType; + ss->sec.keaKeyBits = sid->keaKeyBits; + + if (sid->u.ssl3.keys.msIsWrapped) { + PK11SlotInfo *slot; + PK11SymKey *wrapKey; /* wrapping key */ + CK_FLAGS keyFlags = 0; + + /* unwrap master secret */ + slot = SECMOD_LookupSlot(sid->u.ssl3.masterModuleID, + sid->u.ssl3.masterSlotID); + if (slot == NULL) { + break; /* not considered an error. */ + } + if (!PK11_IsPresent(slot)) { + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + break; /* not considered an error. */ + } + wrapKey = PK11_GetWrapKey(slot, sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapIndex, + sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech, + sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapSeries, + ss->pkcs11PinArg); + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + if (wrapKey == NULL) { + break; /* not considered an error. */ + } + + if (ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) { /* isTLS */ + keyFlags = + CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY; + } + + wrappedMS.data = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret; + wrappedMS.len = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len; + pwSpec->master_secret = + PK11_UnwrapSymKeyWithFlags(wrapKey, sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech, + NULL, &wrappedMS, CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, + CKA_DERIVE, sizeof(SSL3MasterSecret), keyFlags); + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + PK11_FreeSymKey(wrapKey); + if (pwSpec->master_secret == NULL) { + break; /* errorCode set just after call to UnwrapSymKey. */ + } + } else { + /* need to import the raw master secret to session object */ + PK11SlotInfo *slot = PK11_GetInternalSlot(); + wrappedMS.data = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret; + wrappedMS.len = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len; + pwSpec->master_secret = + PK11_ImportSymKey(slot, CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, + PK11_OriginUnwrap, CKA_ENCRYPT, + &wrappedMS, NULL); + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + if (pwSpec->master_secret == NULL) { + break; + } + } + + /* Got a Match */ + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.hsh_sid_cache_hits); + + /* If we sent a session ticket, then this is a stateless resume. */ + if (ss->xtnData.sentSessionTicketInClientHello) + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.hsh_sid_stateless_resumes); + + if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_session_ticket_xtn)) + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_new_session_ticket; + else + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_change_cipher; + + ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming = PR_TRUE; + + /* copy the peer cert from the SID */ + if (sid->peerCert != NULL) { + ss->sec.peerCert = CERT_DupCertificate(sid->peerCert); + } + + /* NULL value for PMS because we are reusing the old MS */ + rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(ss, NULL); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto alert_loser; /* err code was set */ + } + return SECSuccess; + } while (0); + } if (sid_match) - SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(& ssl3stats.hsh_sid_cache_not_ok ); + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.hsh_sid_cache_not_ok); else - SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(& ssl3stats.hsh_sid_cache_misses ); + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.hsh_sid_cache_misses); /* throw the old one away */ sid->u.ssl3.keys.resumable = PR_FALSE; - if (ss->sec.uncache) - (*ss->sec.uncache)(sid); + ss->sec.uncache(sid); ssl_FreeSID(sid); /* get a new sid */ ss->sec.ci.sid = sid = ssl3_NewSessionID(ss, PR_FALSE); if (sid == NULL) { - goto alert_loser; /* memory error is set. */ + goto alert_loser; /* memory error is set. */ } sid->version = ss->version; - sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength = sidBytes.len; - PORT_Memcpy(sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, sidBytes.data, sidBytes.len); + sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength = sidBytes->len; + if (sidBytes->len > 0) { + PORT_Memcpy(sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, sidBytes->data, sidBytes->len); + } sid->u.ssl3.keys.extendedMasterSecretUsed = - ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_extended_master_secret_xtn); + ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_extended_master_secret_xtn); + + /* Copy Signed Certificate Timestamps, if any. */ + if (ss->xtnData.signedCertTimestamps.len) { + rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &sid->u.ssl3.signedCertTimestamps, + &ss->xtnData.signedCertTimestamps); + ss->xtnData.signedCertTimestamps.len = 0; + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + } ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming = PR_FALSE; - if (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->signKeyType != sign_null) { - /* All current cipher suites other than those with sign_null (i.e., + if (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->authKeyType != ssl_auth_null) { + /* All current cipher suites other than those with ssl_auth_null (i.e., * (EC)DH_anon_* suites) require a certificate, so use that signal. */ ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_server_cert; } else { @@ -6803,413 +7057,376 @@ alert_loser: (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc); loser: - errCode = ssl_MapLowLevelError(errCode); + *retErrCode = errCode; return SECFailure; } - -/* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete - * ssl3 ServerKeyExchange message. - * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. - */ static SECStatus -ssl3_HandleServerKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length) +ssl_HandleDHServerKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length) { - PLArenaPool * arena = NULL; - SECKEYPublicKey *peerKey = NULL; - PRBool isTLS, isTLS12; - SECStatus rv; - int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_KEY_EXCH; - SSL3AlertDescription desc = illegal_parameter; - SSL3Hashes hashes; - SECItem signature = {siBuffer, NULL, 0}; - SSLSignatureAndHashAlg sigAndHash; + SECStatus rv; + int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_KEY_EXCH; + SSL3AlertDescription desc = illegal_parameter; + SSLHashType hashAlg; + PRBool isTLS = ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0; + SSLSignatureScheme sigScheme; + + SECItem dh_p = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + SECItem dh_g = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + SECItem dh_Ys = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + unsigned dh_p_bits; + unsigned dh_g_bits; + PRInt32 minDH; - sigAndHash.hashAlg = ssl_hash_none; + SSL3Hashes hashes; + SECItem signature = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + PLArenaPool *arena = NULL; + SECKEYPublicKey *peerKey = NULL; - SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle server_key_exchange handshake", - SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &dh_p, 2, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* malformed. */ + } - if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_server_key) { - errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_SERVER_KEY_EXCH; - desc = unexpected_message; + rv = NSS_OptionGet(NSS_DH_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &minDH); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + minDH = SSL_DH_MIN_P_BITS; + } + dh_p_bits = SECKEY_BigIntegerBitLength(&dh_p); + if (dh_p_bits < minDH) { + errCode = SSL_ERROR_WEAK_SERVER_EPHEMERAL_DH_KEY; goto alert_loser; } - - isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); - isTLS12 = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2); - - switch (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType) { - - case kt_rsa: { - SECItem modulus = {siBuffer, NULL, 0}; - SECItem exponent = {siBuffer, NULL, 0}; - - rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &modulus, 2, &b, &length); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto loser; /* malformed. */ - } - /* This exchange method is only used by export cipher suites. - * Those are broken and so this code will eventually be removed. */ - if (SECKEY_BigIntegerBitLength(&modulus) < 512) { - desc = isTLS ? insufficient_security : illegal_parameter; + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &dh_g, 2, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* malformed. */ + } + /* Abort if dh_g is 0, 1, or obviously too big. */ + dh_g_bits = SECKEY_BigIntegerBitLength(&dh_g); + if (dh_g_bits > dh_p_bits || dh_g_bits <= 1) { + goto alert_loser; + } + if (ss->opt.requireDHENamedGroups) { + /* If we're doing named groups, make sure it's good. */ + rv = ssl_ValidateDHENamedGroup(ss, &dh_p, &dh_g, NULL, NULL); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = SSL_ERROR_WEAK_SERVER_EPHEMERAL_DH_KEY; goto alert_loser; } - rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &exponent, 2, &b, &length); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto loser; /* malformed. */ - } - if (isTLS12) { - rv = ssl3_ConsumeSignatureAndHashAlgorithm(ss, &b, &length, - &sigAndHash); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto loser; /* malformed or unsupported. */ - } - rv = ssl3_CheckSignatureAndHashAlgorithmConsistency(ss, - &sigAndHash, ss->sec.peerCert); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto loser; - } - } - rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &signature, 2, &b, &length); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto loser; /* malformed. */ - } - if (length != 0) { - if (isTLS) - desc = decode_error; - goto alert_loser; /* malformed. */ - } - - /* failures after this point are not malformed handshakes. */ - /* TLS: send decrypt_error if signature failed. */ - desc = isTLS ? decrypt_error : handshake_failure; - - /* - * check to make sure the hash is signed by right guy - */ - rv = ssl3_ComputeExportRSAKeyHash(sigAndHash.hashAlg, modulus, exponent, - &ss->ssl3.hs.client_random, - &ss->ssl3.hs.server_random, - &hashes, ss->opt.bypassPKCS11); + } + + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &dh_Ys, 2, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* malformed. */ + } + if (!ssl_IsValidDHEShare(&dh_p, &dh_Ys)) { + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_DHE_KEY_SHARE; + goto alert_loser; + } + + if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { + rv = ssl_ConsumeSignatureScheme(ss, &b, &length, &sigScheme); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - errCode = - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); - goto alert_loser; - } - rv = ssl3_VerifySignedHashes(&hashes, ss->sec.peerCert, &signature, - isTLS, ss->pkcs11PinArg); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - errCode = - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); - goto alert_loser; - } - - /* - * we really need to build a new key here because we can no longer - * ignore calling SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey. Using the key may allocate - * pkcs11 slots and ID's. - */ - arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE); - if (arena == NULL) { - goto no_memory; - } - - peerKey = PORT_ArenaZNew(arena, SECKEYPublicKey); - if (peerKey == NULL) { - goto no_memory; - } - - peerKey->arena = arena; - peerKey->keyType = rsaKey; - peerKey->pkcs11Slot = NULL; - peerKey->pkcs11ID = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - if (SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &peerKey->u.rsa.modulus, &modulus) || - SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &peerKey->u.rsa.publicExponent, &exponent)) - { - goto no_memory; - } - ss->sec.peerKey = peerKey; - ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_cert_request; - return SECSuccess; - } - - case kt_dh: { - SECItem dh_p = {siBuffer, NULL, 0}; - SECItem dh_g = {siBuffer, NULL, 0}; - SECItem dh_Ys = {siBuffer, NULL, 0}; - unsigned dh_p_bits; - unsigned dh_g_bits; - unsigned dh_Ys_bits; - PRInt32 minDH; - - rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &dh_p, 2, &b, &length); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto loser; /* malformed. */ - } - - rv = NSS_OptionGet(NSS_DH_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &minDH); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - minDH = SSL_DH_MIN_P_BITS; - } - dh_p_bits = SECKEY_BigIntegerBitLength(&dh_p); - if (dh_p_bits < minDH) { - errCode = SSL_ERROR_WEAK_SERVER_EPHEMERAL_DH_KEY; - goto alert_loser; - } - rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &dh_g, 2, &b, &length); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto loser; /* malformed. */ - } - /* Abort if dh_g is 0, 1, or obviously too big. */ - dh_g_bits = SECKEY_BigIntegerBitLength(&dh_g); - if (dh_g_bits > dh_p_bits || dh_g_bits <= 1) - goto alert_loser; - rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &dh_Ys, 2, &b, &length); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto loser; /* malformed. */ - } - dh_Ys_bits = SECKEY_BigIntegerBitLength(&dh_Ys); - if (dh_Ys_bits > dh_p_bits || dh_Ys_bits <= 1) - goto alert_loser; - if (isTLS12) { - rv = ssl3_ConsumeSignatureAndHashAlgorithm(ss, &b, &length, - &sigAndHash); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto loser; /* malformed or unsupported. */ - } - rv = ssl3_CheckSignatureAndHashAlgorithmConsistency(ss, - &sigAndHash, ss->sec.peerCert); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto loser; - } - } - rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &signature, 2, &b, &length); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto loser; /* malformed. */ - } - if (length != 0) { - if (isTLS) - desc = decode_error; - goto alert_loser; /* malformed. */ - } - - PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "Server DH p", dh_p.data, dh_p.len)); - PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "Server DH g", dh_g.data, dh_g.len)); - PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "Server DH Ys", dh_Ys.data, dh_Ys.len)); - - /* failures after this point are not malformed handshakes. */ - /* TLS: send decrypt_error if signature failed. */ - desc = isTLS ? decrypt_error : handshake_failure; - - /* - * check to make sure the hash is signed by right guy - */ - rv = ssl3_ComputeDHKeyHash(sigAndHash.hashAlg, dh_p, dh_g, dh_Ys, - &ss->ssl3.hs.client_random, - &ss->ssl3.hs.server_random, - &hashes, ss->opt.bypassPKCS11); + goto loser; /* malformed or unsupported. */ + } + rv = ssl_CheckSignatureSchemeConsistency(ss, sigScheme, + ss->sec.peerCert); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - errCode = - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); - goto alert_loser; - } - rv = ssl3_VerifySignedHashes(&hashes, ss->sec.peerCert, &signature, - isTLS, ss->pkcs11PinArg); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - errCode = - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); - goto alert_loser; - } - - /* - * we really need to build a new key here because we can no longer - * ignore calling SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey. Using the key may allocate - * pkcs11 slots and ID's. - */ - arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE); - if (arena == NULL) { - goto no_memory; - } - - peerKey = PORT_ArenaZNew(arena, SECKEYPublicKey); - if (peerKey == NULL) { - goto no_memory; - } - - peerKey->arena = arena; - peerKey->keyType = dhKey; - peerKey->pkcs11Slot = NULL; - peerKey->pkcs11ID = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - - if (SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &peerKey->u.dh.prime, &dh_p) || - SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &peerKey->u.dh.base, &dh_g) || - SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &peerKey->u.dh.publicValue, &dh_Ys)) - { - goto no_memory; - } - ss->sec.peerKey = peerKey; - ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_cert_request; - return SECSuccess; - } - -#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC - case kt_ecdh: - rv = ssl3_HandleECDHServerKeyExchange(ss, b, length); - return rv; -#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */ - - default: - desc = handshake_failure; - errCode = SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG; - break; /* goto alert_loser; */ + goto loser; + } + hashAlg = ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType(sigScheme); + } else { + /* Use ssl_hash_none to represent the MD5+SHA1 combo. */ + hashAlg = ssl_hash_none; + sigScheme = ssl_sig_none; + } + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &signature, 2, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* malformed. */ + } + if (length != 0) { + if (isTLS) { + desc = decode_error; + } + goto alert_loser; /* malformed. */ + } + + PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "Server DH p", dh_p.data, dh_p.len)); + PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "Server DH g", dh_g.data, dh_g.len)); + PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "Server DH Ys", dh_Ys.data, dh_Ys.len)); + + /* failures after this point are not malformed handshakes. */ + /* TLS: send decrypt_error if signature failed. */ + desc = isTLS ? decrypt_error : handshake_failure; + + /* + * Check to make sure the hash is signed by right guy. + */ + rv = ssl3_ComputeDHKeyHash(ss, hashAlg, &hashes, + dh_p, dh_g, dh_Ys, PR_FALSE /* padY */); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto alert_loser; + } + rv = ssl3_VerifySignedHashes(ss, sigScheme, &hashes, &signature); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto alert_loser; } + /* + * we really need to build a new key here because we can no longer + * ignore calling SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey. Using the key may allocate + * pkcs11 slots and ID's. + */ + arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE); + if (arena == NULL) { + errCode = SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY; + goto loser; + } + + peerKey = PORT_ArenaZNew(arena, SECKEYPublicKey); + if (peerKey == NULL) { + errCode = SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY; + goto loser; + } + + peerKey->arena = arena; + peerKey->keyType = dhKey; + peerKey->pkcs11Slot = NULL; + peerKey->pkcs11ID = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + + if (SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &peerKey->u.dh.prime, &dh_p) || + SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &peerKey->u.dh.base, &dh_g) || + SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &peerKey->u.dh.publicValue, &dh_Ys)) { + errCode = SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY; + goto loser; + } + ss->sec.peerKey = peerKey; + return SECSuccess; + alert_loser: (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc); loser: if (arena) { PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE); } - PORT_SetError( errCode ); - return SECFailure; - -no_memory: /* no-memory error has already been set. */ - if (arena) { - PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE); - } - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + PORT_SetError(ssl_MapLowLevelError(errCode)); return SECFailure; } -/* - * Returns the TLS signature algorithm for the client authentication key and - * whether it is an RSA or DSA key that may be able to sign only SHA-1 hashes. +/* Called from ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a + * complete ssl3 ServerKeyExchange message. + * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. */ static SECStatus -ssl3_ExtractClientKeyInfo(sslSocket *ss, - SSLSignType *sigAlg, - PRBool *preferSha1) +ssl3_HandleServerKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length) { - SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; - SECKEYPublicKey *pubk; + SECStatus rv; - pubk = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate); - if (pubk == NULL) { - rv = SECFailure; - goto done; - } + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle server_key_exchange handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); - rv = ssl3_TLSSignatureAlgorithmForKeyType(pubk->keyType, sigAlg); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto done; + if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_server_key) { + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_SERVER_KEY_EXCH); + return SECFailure; } - /* If the key is a 1024-bit RSA or DSA key, assume conservatively that - * it may be unable to sign SHA-256 hashes. This is the case for older - * Estonian ID cards that have 1024-bit RSA keys. In FIPS 186-2 and - * older, DSA key size is at most 1024 bits and the hash function must - * be SHA-1. - */ - if (pubk->keyType == rsaKey || pubk->keyType == dsaKey) { - *preferSha1 = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrength(pubk) <= 128; - } else { - *preferSha1 = PR_FALSE; + switch (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType) { + case ssl_kea_dh: + rv = ssl_HandleDHServerKeyExchange(ss, b, length); + break; + + case ssl_kea_ecdh: + rv = ssl3_HandleECDHServerKeyExchange(ss, b, length); + break; + + default: + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, handshake_failure); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG); + rv = SECFailure; + break; } -done: - if (pubk) - SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubk); + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_cert_request; + } + /* All Handle*ServerKeyExchange functions set the error code. */ return rv; } -/* Destroys the backup handshake hash context if we don't need it. Note that - * this function selects the hash algorithm for client authentication - * signatures; ssl3_SendCertificateVerify uses the presence of the backup hash - * to determine whether to use SHA-1 or SHA-256. */ -static void -ssl3_DestroyBackupHandshakeHashIfNotNeeded(sslSocket *ss, - const SECItem *algorithms) +typedef struct dnameNode { + struct dnameNode *next; + SECItem name; +} dnameNode; + +/* + * Parse the ca_list structure in a CertificateRequest. + * + * Called from: + * ssl3_HandleCertificateRequest + * tls13_HandleCertificateRequest + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_ParseCertificateRequestCAs(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque **b, PRUint32 *length, + PLArenaPool *arena, CERTDistNames *ca_list) { - SECStatus rv; - SSLSignType sigAlg; - PRBool preferSha1; - PRBool supportsSha1 = PR_FALSE; - PRBool supportsSha256 = PR_FALSE; - PRBool needBackupHash = PR_FALSE; - unsigned int i; + PRInt32 remaining; + int nnames = 0; + dnameNode *node; + int i; + + remaining = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, b, length); + if (remaining < 0) + return SECFailure; /* malformed, alert has been sent */ + + if ((PRUint32)remaining > *length) + goto alert_loser; + + ca_list->head = node = PORT_ArenaZNew(arena, dnameNode); + if (node == NULL) + goto no_mem; + + while (remaining > 0) { + PRInt32 len; + + if (remaining < 2) + goto alert_loser; /* malformed */ -#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS - /* Backup handshake hash is not supported in PKCS #11 bypass mode. */ - if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) { - PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.backupHash); - return; + node->name.len = len = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, b, length); + if (len <= 0) + return SECFailure; /* malformed, alert has been sent */ + + remaining -= 2; + if (remaining < len) + goto alert_loser; /* malformed */ + + node->name.data = *b; + *b += len; + *length -= len; + remaining -= len; + nnames++; + if (remaining <= 0) + break; /* success */ + + node->next = PORT_ArenaZNew(arena, dnameNode); + node = node->next; + if (node == NULL) + goto no_mem; } -#endif - PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.backupHash); - /* Determine the key's signature algorithm and whether it prefers SHA-1. */ - rv = ssl3_ExtractClientKeyInfo(ss, &sigAlg, &preferSha1); + ca_list->nnames = nnames; + ca_list->names = PORT_ArenaNewArray(arena, SECItem, nnames); + if (nnames > 0 && ca_list->names == NULL) + goto no_mem; + + for (i = 0, node = (dnameNode *)ca_list->head; + i < nnames; + i++, node = node->next) { + ca_list->names[i] = node->name; + } + + return SECSuccess; + +no_mem: + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY); + return SECFailure; + +alert_loser: + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, + ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0 ? illegal_parameter + : decode_error); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_REQUEST); + return SECFailure; +} + +SECStatus +ssl_ParseSignatureSchemes(const sslSocket *ss, PLArenaPool *arena, + SSLSignatureScheme **schemesOut, + unsigned int *numSchemesOut, + unsigned char **b, unsigned int *len) +{ + SECStatus rv; + SECItem buf; + SSLSignatureScheme *schemes; + unsigned int numSchemes = 0; + unsigned int max; + + rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &buf, 2, b, len); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto done; + return SECFailure; + } + /* An empty or odd-length value is invalid. */ + if (buf.len == 0 || (buf.len & 1) != 0) { + ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error); + return SECFailure; } - /* Determine the server's hash support for that signature algorithm. */ - for (i = 0; i < algorithms->len; i += 2) { - if (algorithms->data[i+1] == sigAlg) { - if (algorithms->data[i] == ssl_hash_sha1) { - supportsSha1 = PR_TRUE; - } else if (algorithms->data[i] == ssl_hash_sha256) { - supportsSha256 = PR_TRUE; - } - } + /* Limit the number of schemes we read. */ + max = PR_MIN(buf.len / 2, MAX_SIGNATURE_SCHEMES); + + if (arena) { + schemes = PORT_ArenaZNewArray(arena, SSLSignatureScheme, max); + } else { + schemes = PORT_ZNewArray(SSLSignatureScheme, max); + } + if (!schemes) { + ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, internal_error); + return SECFailure; } - /* If either the server does not support SHA-256 or the client key prefers - * SHA-1, leave the backup hash. */ - if (supportsSha1 && (preferSha1 || !supportsSha256)) { - needBackupHash = PR_TRUE; + for (; max; --max) { + PRInt32 tmp; + tmp = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &buf.data, &buf.len); + if (tmp < 0) { + PORT_Assert(0); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + if (ssl_IsSupportedSignatureScheme((SSLSignatureScheme)tmp)) { + schemes[numSchemes++] = (SSLSignatureScheme)tmp; + } } -done: - if (!needBackupHash) { - PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.backupHash, PR_TRUE); - ss->ssl3.hs.backupHash = NULL; + if (!numSchemes) { + if (!arena) { + PORT_Free(schemes); + } + schemes = NULL; } -} -typedef struct dnameNode { - struct dnameNode *next; - SECItem name; -} dnameNode; + *schemesOut = schemes; + *numSchemesOut = numSchemes; + return SECSuccess; +} -/* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete - * ssl3 Certificate Request message. +/* Called from ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered + * a complete ssl3 Certificate Request message. * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. */ static SECStatus ssl3_HandleCertificateRequest(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length) { - PLArenaPool * arena = NULL; - dnameNode * node; - PRInt32 remaining; - PRBool isTLS = PR_FALSE; - PRBool isTLS12 = PR_FALSE; - int i; - int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_REQUEST; - int nnames = 0; - SECStatus rv; - SSL3AlertDescription desc = illegal_parameter; - SECItem cert_types = {siBuffer, NULL, 0}; - SECItem algorithms = {siBuffer, NULL, 0}; - CERTDistNames ca_list; + PLArenaPool *arena = NULL; + PRBool isTLS = PR_FALSE; + PRBool isTLS12 = PR_FALSE; + int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_REQUEST; + SECStatus rv; + SSL3AlertDescription desc = illegal_parameter; + SECItem cert_types = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + SSLSignatureScheme *signatureSchemes = NULL; + unsigned int signatureSchemeCount = 0; + CERTDistNames ca_list; SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle certificate_request handshake", - SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_cert_request) { desc = unexpected_message; @@ -7225,140 +7442,39 @@ ssl3_HandleCertificateRequest(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length) isTLS12 = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2); rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &cert_types, 1, &b, &length); if (rv != SECSuccess) - goto loser; /* malformed, alert has been sent */ - - if (isTLS12) { - rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &algorithms, 2, &b, &length); - if (rv != SECSuccess) - goto loser; /* malformed, alert has been sent */ - /* An empty or odd-length value is invalid. - * SignatureAndHashAlgorithm - * supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>; - */ - if (algorithms.len == 0 || (algorithms.len & 1) != 0) - goto alert_loser; - } + goto loser; /* malformed, alert has been sent */ arena = ca_list.arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE); if (arena == NULL) - goto no_mem; - - remaining = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &b, &length); - if (remaining < 0) - goto loser; /* malformed, alert has been sent */ - - if ((PRUint32)remaining > length) - goto alert_loser; - - ca_list.head = node = PORT_ArenaZNew(arena, dnameNode); - if (node == NULL) - goto no_mem; - - while (remaining > 0) { - PRInt32 len; - - if (remaining < 2) - goto alert_loser; /* malformed */ - - node->name.len = len = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &b, &length); - if (len <= 0) - goto loser; /* malformed, alert has been sent */ - - remaining -= 2; - if (remaining < len) - goto alert_loser; /* malformed */ - - node->name.data = b; - b += len; - length -= len; - remaining -= len; - nnames++; - if (remaining <= 0) - break; /* success */ - - node->next = PORT_ArenaZNew(arena, dnameNode); - node = node->next; - if (node == NULL) - goto no_mem; - } - - ca_list.nnames = nnames; - ca_list.names = PORT_ArenaNewArray(arena, SECItem, nnames); - if (nnames > 0 && ca_list.names == NULL) goto no_mem; - for(i = 0, node = (dnameNode*)ca_list.head; - i < nnames; - i++, node = node->next) { - ca_list.names[i] = node->name; + if (isTLS12) { + rv = ssl_ParseSignatureSchemes(ss, arena, + &signatureSchemes, + &signatureSchemeCount, + &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_REQUEST); + goto loser; /* malformed, alert has been sent */ + } } + rv = ssl3_ParseCertificateRequestCAs(ss, &b, &length, arena, &ca_list); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto done; /* alert sent in ssl3_ParseCertificateRequestCAs */ + if (length != 0) - goto alert_loser; /* malformed */ + goto alert_loser; /* malformed */ - desc = no_certificate; ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_hello_done; - if (ss->getClientAuthData != NULL) { - PORT_Assert((ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo & ssl_preinfo_all) == - ssl_preinfo_all); - /* XXX Should pass cert_types and algorithms in this call!! */ - rv = (SECStatus)(*ss->getClientAuthData)(ss->getClientAuthDataArg, - ss->fd, &ca_list, - &ss->ssl3.clientCertificate, - &ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey); - } else { - rv = SECFailure; /* force it to send a no_certificate alert */ - } - switch (rv) { - case SECWouldBlock: /* getClientAuthData has put up a dialog box. */ - ssl3_SetAlwaysBlock(ss); - break; /* not an error */ - - case SECSuccess: - /* check what the callback function returned */ - if ((!ss->ssl3.clientCertificate) || (!ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey)) { - /* we are missing either the key or cert */ - if (ss->ssl3.clientCertificate) { - /* got a cert, but no key - free it */ - CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate); - ss->ssl3.clientCertificate = NULL; - } - if (ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey) { - /* got a key, but no cert - free it */ - SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey); - ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey = NULL; - } - goto send_no_certificate; - } - /* Setting ssl3.clientCertChain non-NULL will cause - * ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone to call SendCertificate. - */ - ss->ssl3.clientCertChain = CERT_CertChainFromCert( - ss->ssl3.clientCertificate, - certUsageSSLClient, PR_FALSE); - if (ss->ssl3.clientCertChain == NULL) { - CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate); - ss->ssl3.clientCertificate = NULL; - SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey); - ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey = NULL; - goto send_no_certificate; - } - if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_single) { - ssl3_DestroyBackupHandshakeHashIfNotNeeded(ss, &algorithms); - } - break; /* not an error */ - - case SECFailure: - default: -send_no_certificate: - if (isTLS) { - ss->ssl3.sendEmptyCert = PR_TRUE; - } else { - (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_warning, no_certificate); - } - rv = SECSuccess; - break; + rv = ssl3_CompleteHandleCertificateRequest(ss, signatureSchemes, + signatureSchemeCount, &ca_list); + if (rv == SECFailure) { + PORT_Assert(0); + errCode = SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE; + desc = internal_error; + goto alert_loser; } goto done; @@ -7369,59 +7485,135 @@ no_mem: alert_loser: if (isTLS && desc == illegal_parameter) - desc = decode_error; + desc = decode_error; (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc); loser: PORT_SetError(errCode); rv = SECFailure; done: if (arena != NULL) - PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE); + PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE); + return rv; +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_CompleteHandleCertificateRequest(sslSocket *ss, + const SSLSignatureScheme *signatureSchemes, + unsigned int signatureSchemeCount, + CERTDistNames *ca_list) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + if (ss->getClientAuthData != NULL) { + PORT_Assert((ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo & ssl_preinfo_all) == + ssl_preinfo_all); + /* XXX Should pass cert_types and algorithms in this call!! */ + rv = (SECStatus)(*ss->getClientAuthData)(ss->getClientAuthDataArg, + ss->fd, ca_list, + &ss->ssl3.clientCertificate, + &ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey); + } else { + rv = SECFailure; /* force it to send a no_certificate alert */ + } + switch (rv) { + case SECWouldBlock: /* getClientAuthData has put up a dialog box. */ + ssl3_SetAlwaysBlock(ss); + break; /* not an error */ + + case SECSuccess: + /* check what the callback function returned */ + if ((!ss->ssl3.clientCertificate) || (!ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey)) { + /* we are missing either the key or cert */ + if (ss->ssl3.clientCertificate) { + /* got a cert, but no key - free it */ + CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate); + ss->ssl3.clientCertificate = NULL; + } + if (ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey) { + /* got a key, but no cert - free it */ + SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey); + ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey = NULL; + } + goto send_no_certificate; + } + /* Setting ssl3.clientCertChain non-NULL will cause + * ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone to call SendCertificate. + */ + ss->ssl3.clientCertChain = CERT_CertChainFromCert( + ss->ssl3.clientCertificate, + certUsageSSLClient, PR_FALSE); + if (ss->ssl3.clientCertChain == NULL) { + CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate); + ss->ssl3.clientCertificate = NULL; + SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey); + ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey = NULL; + goto send_no_certificate; + } + if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_record || + ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_single) { + rv = ssl_PickClientSignatureScheme(ss, signatureSchemes, + signatureSchemeCount); + } + break; /* not an error */ + + case SECFailure: + default: + send_no_certificate: + if (ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) { + ss->ssl3.sendEmptyCert = PR_TRUE; + } else { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_warning, no_certificate); + } + rv = SECSuccess; + break; + } + return rv; } static SECStatus ssl3_CheckFalseStart(sslSocket *ss) { - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); - PORT_Assert( !ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending ); - PORT_Assert( !ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart ); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending); + PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart); if (!ss->canFalseStartCallback) { - SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: no false start callback so no false start", - SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: no false start callback so no false start", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); } else { - PRBool maybeFalseStart; - SECStatus rv; + PRBool maybeFalseStart; + SECStatus rv; - /* An attacker can control the selected ciphersuite so we only wish to - * do False Start in the case that the selected ciphersuite is - * sufficiently strong that the attack can gain no advantage. - * Therefore we always require an 80-bit cipher. */ + /* An attacker can control the selected ciphersuite so we only wish to + * do False Start in the case that the selected ciphersuite is + * sufficiently strong that the attack can gain no advantage. + * Therefore we always require an 80-bit cipher. */ ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); maybeFalseStart = ss->ssl3.cwSpec->cipher_def->secret_key_size >= 10; ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); - if (!maybeFalseStart) { - SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: no false start due to weak cipher", - SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); - } else { + if (!maybeFalseStart) { + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: no false start due to weak cipher", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + } else { PORT_Assert((ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo & ssl_preinfo_all) == ssl_preinfo_all); - rv = (ss->canFalseStartCallback)(ss->fd, - ss->canFalseStartCallbackData, - &ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart); - if (rv == SECSuccess) { - SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: false start callback returned %s", - SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, - ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart ? "TRUE" : "FALSE")); - } else { - SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: false start callback failed (%s)", - SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, - PR_ErrorToName(PR_GetError()))); - } - return rv; - } + rv = (ss->canFalseStartCallback)(ss->fd, + ss->canFalseStartCallbackData, + &ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart); + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: false start callback returned %s", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, + ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart ? "TRUE" + : "FALSE")); + } else { + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: false start callback failed (%s)", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, + PR_ErrorToName(PR_GetError()))); + } + return rv; + } } ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart = PR_FALSE; @@ -7429,22 +7621,21 @@ ssl3_CheckFalseStart(sslSocket *ss) } PRBool -ssl3_WaitingForStartOfServerSecondRound(sslSocket *ss) +ssl3_WaitingForServerSecondRound(sslSocket *ss) { PRBool result; - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); switch (ss->ssl3.hs.ws) { - case wait_new_session_ticket: - result = PR_TRUE; - break; - case wait_change_cipher: - result = !ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_session_ticket_xtn); - break; - default: - result = PR_FALSE; - break; + case wait_new_session_ticket: + case wait_change_cipher: + case wait_finished: + result = PR_TRUE; + break; + default: + result = PR_FALSE; + break; } return result; @@ -7452,27 +7643,27 @@ ssl3_WaitingForStartOfServerSecondRound(sslSocket *ss) static SECStatus ssl3_SendClientSecondRound(sslSocket *ss); -/* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete - * ssl3 Server Hello Done message. +/* Called from ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered + * a complete ssl3 Server Hello Done message. * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. */ static SECStatus ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone(sslSocket *ss) { - SECStatus rv; - SSL3WaitState ws = ss->ssl3.hs.ws; + SECStatus rv; + SSL3WaitState ws = ss->ssl3.hs.ws; SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle server_hello_done handshake", - SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); /* Skipping CertificateRequest is always permitted. */ - if (ws != wait_hello_done && - ws != wait_cert_request) { - SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_DONE); - return SECFailure; + if (ws != wait_hello_done && + ws != wait_cert_request) { + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_DONE); + return SECFailure; } rv = ssl3_SendClientSecondRound(ss); @@ -7490,20 +7681,12 @@ ssl3_SendClientSecondRound(sslSocket *ss) SECStatus rv; PRBool sendClientCert; - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); sendClientCert = !ss->ssl3.sendEmptyCert && - ss->ssl3.clientCertChain != NULL && - ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey != NULL; - - if (!sendClientCert && - ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_single && - ss->ssl3.hs.backupHash) { - /* Don't need the backup handshake hash. */ - PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.backupHash, PR_TRUE); - ss->ssl3.hs.backupHash = NULL; - } + ss->ssl3.clientCertChain != NULL && + ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey != NULL; /* We must wait for the server's certificate to be authenticated before * sending the client certificate in order to disclosing the client @@ -7530,50 +7713,52 @@ ssl3_SendClientSecondRound(sslSocket *ss) * application data. */ if (ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget) { - PR_NOT_REACHED("unexpected ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget"); - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); - return SECFailure; + PR_NOT_REACHED("unexpected ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget"); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; } if (ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending && - (sendClientCert || ss->ssl3.sendEmptyCert || ss->firstHsDone)) { - SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%p]: deferring ssl3_SendClientSecondRound because" - " certificate authentication is still pending.", - SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); - ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget = ssl3_SendClientSecondRound; - return SECWouldBlock; + (sendClientCert || ss->ssl3.sendEmptyCert || ss->firstHsDone)) { + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%p]: deferring ssl3_SendClientSecondRound because" + " certificate authentication is still pending.", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget = ssl3_SendClientSecondRound; + return SECWouldBlock; } - ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); /*******************************/ + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); /*******************************/ if (ss->ssl3.sendEmptyCert) { - ss->ssl3.sendEmptyCert = PR_FALSE; - rv = ssl3_SendEmptyCertificate(ss); - /* Don't send verify */ - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto loser; /* error code is set. */ - } + ss->ssl3.sendEmptyCert = PR_FALSE; + rv = ssl3_SendEmptyCertificate(ss); + /* Don't send verify */ + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* error code is set. */ + } } else if (sendClientCert) { - rv = ssl3_SendCertificate(ss); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto loser; /* error code is set. */ - } + rv = ssl3_SendCertificate(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* error code is set. */ + } } rv = ssl3_SendClientKeyExchange(ss); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto loser; /* err is set. */ + goto loser; /* err is set. */ } if (sendClientCert) { - rv = ssl3_SendCertificateVerify(ss); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto loser; /* err is set. */ + rv = ssl3_SendCertificateVerify(ss, ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey); + SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey); + ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey = NULL; + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err is set. */ } } rv = ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs(ss); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto loser; /* err code was set. */ + goto loser; /* err code was set. */ } /* This must be done after we've set ss->ssl3.cwSpec in @@ -7585,56 +7770,56 @@ ssl3_SendClientSecondRound(sslSocket *ss) ss->enoughFirstHsDone = PR_TRUE; if (!ss->firstHsDone) { - /* XXX: If the server's certificate hasn't been authenticated by this - * point, then we may be leaking this NPN message to an attacker. - */ - rv = ssl3_SendNextProto(ss); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto loser; /* err code was set. */ - } - - if (ss->opt.enableFalseStart) { - if (!ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending) { - /* When we fix bug 589047, we will need to know whether we are - * false starting before we try to flush the client second - * round to the network. With that in mind, we purposefully - * call ssl3_CheckFalseStart before calling ssl3_SendFinished, - * which includes a call to ssl3_FlushHandshake, so that - * no application develops a reliance on such flushing being - * done before its false start callback is called. - */ - ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); - rv = ssl3_CheckFalseStart(ss); - ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto loser; - } - } else { - /* The certificate authentication and the server's Finished - * message are racing each other. If the certificate - * authentication wins, then we will try to false start in - * ssl3_AuthCertificateComplete. - */ - SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%p]: deferring false start check because" - " certificate authentication is still pending.", - SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); - } - } + /* XXX: If the server's certificate hasn't been authenticated by this + * point, then we may be leaking this NPN message to an attacker. + */ + rv = ssl3_SendNextProto(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err code was set. */ + } + + if (ss->opt.enableFalseStart) { + if (!ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending) { + /* When we fix bug 589047, we will need to know whether we are + * false starting before we try to flush the client second + * round to the network. With that in mind, we purposefully + * call ssl3_CheckFalseStart before calling ssl3_SendFinished, + * which includes a call to ssl3_FlushHandshake, so that + * no application develops a reliance on such flushing being + * done before its false start callback is called. + */ + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + rv = ssl3_CheckFalseStart(ss); + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + } else { + /* The certificate authentication and the server's Finished + * message are racing each other. If the certificate + * authentication wins, then we will try to false start in + * ssl3_AuthCertificateComplete. + */ + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%p]: deferring false start check because" + " certificate authentication is still pending.", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + } + } } rv = ssl3_SendFinished(ss, 0); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto loser; /* err code was set. */ + goto loser; /* err code was set. */ } - ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); /*******************************/ + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); /*******************************/ if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_session_ticket_xtn)) - ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_new_session_ticket; + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_new_session_ticket; else - ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_change_cipher; + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_change_cipher; - PORT_Assert(ssl3_WaitingForStartOfServerSecondRound(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ssl3_WaitingForServerSecondRound(ss)); return SECSuccess; @@ -7652,18 +7837,18 @@ ssl3_SendHelloRequest(sslSocket *ss) SECStatus rv; SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send hello_request handshake", SSL_GETPID(), - ss->fd)); + ss->fd)); - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, hello_request, 0); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake */ + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake */ } rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, 0); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return rv; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */ + return rv; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */ } ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_client_hello; return SECSuccess; @@ -7671,7 +7856,7 @@ ssl3_SendHelloRequest(sslSocket *ss) /* * Called from: - * ssl3_HandleClientHello() + * ssl3_HandleClientHello() */ static SECComparison ssl3_ServerNameCompare(const SECItem *name1, const SECItem *name2) @@ -7690,10 +7875,10 @@ ssl3_ServerNameCompare(const SECItem *name1, const SECItem *name2) /* Sets memory error when returning NULL. * Called from: - * ssl3_SendClientHello() - * ssl3_HandleServerHello() - * ssl3_HandleClientHello() - * ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello() + * ssl3_SendClientHello() + * ssl3_HandleServerHello() + * ssl3_HandleClientHello() + * ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello() */ sslSessionID * ssl3_NewSessionID(sslSocket *ss, PRBool is_server) @@ -7702,14 +7887,14 @@ ssl3_NewSessionID(sslSocket *ss, PRBool is_server) sid = PORT_ZNew(sslSessionID); if (sid == NULL) - return sid; + return sid; if (is_server) { - const SECItem * srvName; - SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + const SECItem *srvName; + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; - ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); /********************************/ - srvName = &ss->ssl3.prSpec->srvVirtName; + ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); /********************************/ + srvName = &ss->ssl3.hs.srvVirtName; if (srvName->len && srvName->data) { rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &sid->u.ssl3.srvName, srvName); } @@ -7719,34 +7904,34 @@ ssl3_NewSessionID(sslSocket *ss, PRBool is_server) return NULL; } } - sid->peerID = (ss->peerID == NULL) ? NULL : PORT_Strdup(ss->peerID); - sid->urlSvrName = (ss->url == NULL) ? NULL : PORT_Strdup(ss->url); - sid->addr = ss->sec.ci.peer; - sid->port = ss->sec.ci.port; - sid->references = 1; - sid->cached = never_cached; - sid->version = ss->version; + sid->peerID = (ss->peerID == NULL) ? NULL : PORT_Strdup(ss->peerID); + sid->urlSvrName = (ss->url == NULL) ? NULL : PORT_Strdup(ss->url); + sid->addr = ss->sec.ci.peer; + sid->port = ss->sec.ci.port; + sid->references = 1; + sid->cached = never_cached; + sid->version = ss->version; sid->u.ssl3.keys.resumable = PR_TRUE; - sid->u.ssl3.policy = SSL_ALLOWED; + sid->u.ssl3.policy = SSL_ALLOWED; sid->u.ssl3.clientWriteKey = NULL; sid->u.ssl3.serverWriteKey = NULL; sid->u.ssl3.keys.extendedMasterSecretUsed = PR_FALSE; if (is_server) { - SECStatus rv; - int pid = SSL_GETPID(); - - sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength = SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES; - sid->u.ssl3.sessionID[0] = (pid >> 8) & 0xff; - sid->u.ssl3.sessionID[1] = pid & 0xff; - rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(sid->u.ssl3.sessionID + 2, - SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES -2); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - ssl_FreeSID(sid); - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_GENERATE_RANDOM_FAILURE); - return NULL; - } + SECStatus rv; + int pid = SSL_GETPID(); + + sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength = SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES; + sid->u.ssl3.sessionID[0] = (pid >> 8) & 0xff; + sid->u.ssl3.sessionID[1] = pid & 0xff; + rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(sid->u.ssl3.sessionID + 2, + SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES - 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_FreeSID(sid); + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_GENERATE_RANDOM_FAILURE); + return NULL; + } } return sid; } @@ -7756,95 +7941,302 @@ static SECStatus ssl3_SendServerHelloSequence(sslSocket *ss) { const ssl3KEADef *kea_def; - SECStatus rv; + SECStatus rv; SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: begin send server_hello sequence", - SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); rv = ssl3_SendServerHello(ss); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return rv; /* err code is set. */ + return rv; /* err code is set. */ } rv = ssl3_SendCertificate(ss); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return rv; /* error code is set. */ + return rv; /* error code is set. */ } rv = ssl3_SendCertificateStatus(ss); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return rv; /* error code is set. */ + return rv; /* error code is set. */ } /* We have to do this after the call to ssl3_SendServerHello, * because kea_def is set up by ssl3_SendServerHello(). */ kea_def = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def; - ss->ssl3.hs.usedStepDownKey = PR_FALSE; - - if (kea_def->is_limited && kea_def->exchKeyType == kt_rsa) { - /* see if we can legally use the key in the cert. */ - unsigned int keyLen; /* bytes */ - - keyLen = PK11_GetPrivateModulusLen( - ss->serverCerts[kea_def->exchKeyType].SERVERKEY); - - if (keyLen > 0 && - keyLen * BPB <= kea_def->key_size_limit ) { - /* XXX AND cert is not signing only!! */ - /* just fall through and use it. */ - } else if (ss->stepDownKeyPair != NULL) { - ss->ssl3.hs.usedStepDownKey = PR_TRUE; - rv = ssl3_SendServerKeyExchange(ss); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return rv; /* err code was set. */ - } - } else { -#ifndef HACKED_EXPORT_SERVER - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_PUB_KEY_SIZE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED); - return rv; -#endif - } - } else if (kea_def->ephemeral) { + + if (kea_def->ephemeral) { rv = ssl3_SendServerKeyExchange(ss); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return rv; /* err code was set. */ + return rv; /* err code was set. */ } } if (ss->opt.requestCertificate) { - rv = ssl3_SendCertificateRequest(ss); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return rv; /* err code is set. */ - } + rv = ssl3_SendCertificateRequest(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err code is set. */ + } } rv = ssl3_SendServerHelloDone(ss); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return rv; /* err code is set. */ + return rv; /* err code is set. */ } ss->ssl3.hs.ws = (ss->opt.requestCertificate) ? wait_client_cert - : wait_client_key; + : wait_client_key; return SECSuccess; } /* An empty TLS Renegotiation Info (RI) extension */ -static const PRUint8 emptyRIext[5] = {0xff, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00}; +static const PRUint8 emptyRIext[5] = { 0xff, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00 }; static PRBool -ssl3_KEAAllowsSessionTicket(SSL3KeyExchangeAlgorithm kea) -{ - switch (kea) { - case kea_dhe_dss: - case kea_dhe_dss_export: - case kea_dh_dss_export: - case kea_dh_dss: - /* TODO: Fix session tickets for DSS. The server code rejects the - * session ticket received from the client. Bug 1174677 */ - return PR_FALSE; - default: - return PR_TRUE; - }; +ssl3_KEASupportsTickets(const ssl3KEADef *kea_def) +{ + if (kea_def->signKeyType == dsaKey) { + /* TODO: Fix session tickets for DSS. The server code rejects the + * session ticket received from the client. Bug 1174677 */ + return PR_FALSE; + } + return PR_TRUE; +} + +/* Select a cipher suite. +** +** NOTE: This suite selection algorithm should be the same as the one in +** ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello(). +** +** If TLS 1.0 is enabled, we could handle the case where the client +** offered TLS 1.1 but offered only export cipher suites by choosing TLS +** 1.0 and selecting one of those export cipher suites. However, a secure +** TLS 1.1 client should not have export cipher suites enabled at all, +** and a TLS 1.1 client should definitely not be offering *only* export +** cipher suites. Therefore, we refuse to negotiate export cipher suites +** with any client that indicates support for TLS 1.1 or higher when we +** (the server) have TLS 1.1 support enabled. +*/ +SECStatus +ssl3_NegotiateCipherSuite(sslSocket *ss, const SECItem *suites, + PRBool initHashes) +{ + int j; + int i; + + for (j = 0; j < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; j++) { + ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite = &ss->cipherSuites[j]; + SSLVersionRange vrange = { ss->version, ss->version }; + if (!config_match(suite, ss->ssl3.policy, &vrange, ss)) { + continue; + } + for (i = 0; i + 1 < suites->len; i += 2) { + PRUint16 suite_i = (suites->data[i] << 8) | suites->data[i + 1]; + if (suite_i == suite->cipher_suite) { + return ssl3_SetCipherSuite(ss, suite_i, initHashes); + } + } + } + return SECFailure; +} + +/* + * Call the SNI config hook. + * + * Called from: + * ssl3_HandleClientHello + * tls13_HandleClientHelloPart2 + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_ServerCallSNICallback(sslSocket *ss) +{ + int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO; + SSL3AlertDescription desc = illegal_parameter; + int ret = 0; + +#ifdef SSL_SNI_ALLOW_NAME_CHANGE_2HS +#error("No longer allowed to set SSL_SNI_ALLOW_NAME_CHANGE_2HS") +#endif + if (!ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_server_name_xtn)) { + if (ss->firstHsDone) { + /* Check that we don't have the name is current spec + * if this extension was not negotiated on the 2d hs. */ + PRBool passed = PR_TRUE; + ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); /*******************************/ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.srvVirtName.data) { + passed = PR_FALSE; + } + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /***************************/ + if (!passed) { + errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME_ALERT; + desc = handshake_failure; + goto alert_loser; + } + } + return SECSuccess; + } + + if (ss->sniSocketConfig) + do { /* not a loop */ + PORT_Assert((ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo & ssl_preinfo_all) == + ssl_preinfo_all); + + ret = SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT; + /* If extension is negotiated, the len of names should > 0. */ + if (ss->xtnData.sniNameArrSize) { + /* Calling client callback to reconfigure the socket. */ + ret = (SECStatus)(*ss->sniSocketConfig)(ss->fd, + ss->xtnData.sniNameArr, + ss->xtnData.sniNameArrSize, + ss->sniSocketConfigArg); + } + if (ret <= SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT) { + /* Application does not know the name or was not able to + * properly reconfigure the socket. */ + errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME_ALERT; + desc = unrecognized_name; + break; + } else if (ret == SSL_SNI_CURRENT_CONFIG_IS_USED) { + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + SECItem pwsNameBuf = { 0, NULL, 0 }; + SECItem *pwsName = &pwsNameBuf; + SECItem *cwsName; + + ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); /*******************************/ + cwsName = &ss->ssl3.hs.srvVirtName; + /* not allow name change on the 2d HS */ + if (ss->firstHsDone) { + if (ssl3_ServerNameCompare(pwsName, cwsName)) { + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /******************/ + errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME_ALERT; + desc = handshake_failure; + ret = SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT; + break; + } + } + if (pwsName->data) { + SECITEM_FreeItem(pwsName, PR_FALSE); + } + if (cwsName->data) { + rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, pwsName, cwsName); + } + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /**************************/ + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = SSL_ERROR_INTERNAL_ERROR_ALERT; + desc = internal_error; + ret = SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT; + break; + } + } else if ((unsigned int)ret < ss->xtnData.sniNameArrSize) { + /* Application has configured new socket info. Lets check it + * and save the name. */ + SECStatus rv; + SECItem *name = &ss->xtnData.sniNameArr[ret]; + int configedCiphers; + SECItem *pwsName; + + /* get rid of the old name and save the newly picked. */ + /* This code is protected by ssl3HandshakeLock. */ + ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); /*******************************/ + /* not allow name change on the 2d HS */ + if (ss->firstHsDone) { + SECItem *cwsName = &ss->ssl3.hs.srvVirtName; + if (ssl3_ServerNameCompare(name, cwsName)) { + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /******************/ + errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME_ALERT; + desc = handshake_failure; + ret = SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT; + break; + } + } + pwsName = &ss->ssl3.hs.srvVirtName; + if (pwsName->data) { + SECITEM_FreeItem(pwsName, PR_FALSE); + } + rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, pwsName, name); + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /***************************/ + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = SSL_ERROR_INTERNAL_ERROR_ALERT; + desc = internal_error; + ret = SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT; + break; + } + configedCiphers = ssl3_config_match_init(ss); + if (configedCiphers <= 0) { + /* no ciphers are working/supported */ + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + desc = handshake_failure; + ret = SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT; + break; + } + /* Need to tell the client that application has picked + * the name from the offered list and reconfigured the socket. + */ + ssl3_RegisterExtensionSender(ss, &ss->xtnData, ssl_server_name_xtn, + ssl3_SendServerNameXtn); + } else { + /* Callback returned index outside of the boundary. */ + PORT_Assert((unsigned int)ret < ss->xtnData.sniNameArrSize); + errCode = SSL_ERROR_INTERNAL_ERROR_ALERT; + desc = internal_error; + ret = SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT; + break; + } + } while (0); + ssl3_FreeSniNameArray(&ss->xtnData); + if (ret <= SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT) { + /* desc and errCode should be set. */ + goto alert_loser; + } + + return SECSuccess; + +alert_loser: + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc); + PORT_SetError(errCode); + return SECFailure; +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_SelectServerCert(sslSocket *ss) +{ + const ssl3KEADef *kea_def = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def; + PRCList *cursor; + + /* This picks the first certificate that has: + * a) the right authentication method, and + * b) the right named curve (EC only) + * + * We might want to do some sort of ranking here later. For now, it's all + * based on what order they are configured in. */ + for (cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->serverCerts); + cursor != &ss->serverCerts; + cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(cursor)) { + sslServerCert *cert = (sslServerCert *)cursor; + if (cert->certType.authType != kea_def->authKeyType) { + continue; + } + if ((cert->certType.authType == ssl_auth_ecdsa || + cert->certType.authType == ssl_auth_ecdh_rsa || + cert->certType.authType == ssl_auth_ecdh_ecdsa) && + !ssl_NamedGroupEnabled(ss, cert->certType.namedCurve)) { + continue; + } + + /* Found one. */ + ss->sec.serverCert = cert; + ss->sec.authType = cert->certType.authType; + ss->sec.authKeyBits = cert->serverKeyBits; + + /* Don't pick a signature scheme if we aren't going to use it. */ + if (kea_def->signKeyType == nullKey) { + return SECSuccess; + } + return ssl3_PickServerSignatureScheme(ss); + } + + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP); + return SECFailure; } /* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete @@ -7854,29 +8246,27 @@ ssl3_KEAAllowsSessionTicket(SSL3KeyExchangeAlgorithm kea) static SECStatus ssl3_HandleClientHello(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length) { - sslSessionID * sid = NULL; - PRInt32 tmp; - unsigned int i; - int j; - SECStatus rv; - int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO; - SSL3AlertDescription desc = illegal_parameter; - SSL3AlertLevel level = alert_fatal; + sslSessionID *sid = NULL; + PRInt32 tmp; + unsigned int i; + SECStatus rv; + int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO; + SSL3AlertDescription desc = illegal_parameter; + SSL3AlertLevel level = alert_fatal; SSL3ProtocolVersion version; - SECItem sidBytes = {siBuffer, NULL, 0}; - SECItem cookieBytes = {siBuffer, NULL, 0}; - SECItem suites = {siBuffer, NULL, 0}; - SECItem comps = {siBuffer, NULL, 0}; - PRBool haveSpecWriteLock = PR_FALSE; - PRBool haveXmitBufLock = PR_FALSE; - PRBool canOfferSessionTicket = PR_FALSE; + TLSExtension *versionExtension; + SECItem sidBytes = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + SECItem cookieBytes = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + SECItem suites = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + SECItem comps = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + PRBool isTLS13; SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle client_hello handshake", - SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); - PORT_Assert( ss->ssl3.initialized ); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.initialized); ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo = 0; if (!ss->sec.isServer || @@ -7886,126 +8276,82 @@ ssl3_HandleClientHello(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length) errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CLIENT_HELLO; goto alert_loser; } - if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws == idle_handshake && - ss->opt.enableRenegotiation == SSL_RENEGOTIATE_NEVER) { - desc = no_renegotiation; - level = alert_warning; - errCode = SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED; - goto alert_loser; + if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws == idle_handshake) { + /* Refuse re-handshake when we have already negotiated TLS 1.3. */ + if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + desc = unexpected_message; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED; + goto alert_loser; + } + if (ss->opt.enableRenegotiation == SSL_RENEGOTIATE_NEVER) { + desc = no_renegotiation; + level = alert_warning; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED; + goto alert_loser; + } } /* Get peer name of client */ rv = ssl_GetPeerInfo(ss); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return rv; /* error code is set. */ - } - - /* Clearing the handshake pointers so that ssl_Do1stHandshake won't - * call ssl2_HandleMessage. - * - * The issue here is that TLS ordinarily starts out in - * ssl2_HandleV3HandshakeRecord() because of the backward-compatibility - * code paths. That function zeroes these next pointers. But with DTLS, - * we don't even try to do the v2 ClientHello so we skip that function - * and need to reset these values here. - */ - if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { - ss->nextHandshake = 0; - ss->securityHandshake = 0; + return rv; /* error code is set. */ } /* We might be starting session renegotiation in which case we should * clear previous state. */ - PORT_Memset(&ss->xtnData, 0, sizeof(TLSExtensionData)); + ssl3_ResetExtensionData(&ss->xtnData); ss->statelessResume = PR_FALSE; if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { - dtls_RehandshakeCleanup(ss); + dtls_RehandshakeCleanup(ss); } tmp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &b, &length); if (tmp < 0) - goto loser; /* malformed, alert already sent */ + goto loser; /* malformed, alert already sent */ - /* Translate the version */ + /* Translate the version. */ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { - ss->clientHelloVersion = version = - dtls_DTLSVersionToTLSVersion((SSL3ProtocolVersion)tmp); + ss->clientHelloVersion = version = + dtls_DTLSVersionToTLSVersion((SSL3ProtocolVersion)tmp); } else { - ss->clientHelloVersion = version = (SSL3ProtocolVersion)tmp; + ss->clientHelloVersion = version = (SSL3ProtocolVersion)tmp; } - rv = ssl3_NegotiateVersion(ss, version, PR_TRUE); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - desc = (version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) ? protocol_version - : handshake_failure; - errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION; - goto alert_loser; - } - ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo |= ssl_preinfo_version; - - rv = ssl3_InitHandshakeHashes(ss); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - desc = internal_error; - errCode = PORT_GetError(); - goto alert_loser; - } - - /* grab the client random data. */ + /* Grab the client random data. */ rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshake( - ss, &ss->ssl3.hs.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH, &b, &length); + ss, &ss->ssl3.hs.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH, &b, &length); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto loser; /* malformed */ + goto loser; /* malformed */ } - /* grab the client's SID, if present. */ + /* Grab the client's SID, if present. */ rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &sidBytes, 1, &b, &length); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto loser; /* malformed */ + goto loser; /* malformed */ } - /* grab the client's cookie, if present. */ + /* Grab the client's cookie, if present. */ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { - rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &cookieBytes, 1, &b, &length); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto loser; /* malformed */ - } + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &cookieBytes, 1, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* malformed */ + } } - /* grab the list of cipher suites. */ + /* Grab the list of cipher suites. */ rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &suites, 2, &b, &length); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto loser; /* malformed */ + goto loser; /* malformed */ } - /* If the ClientHello version is less than our maximum version, check for a - * TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV and reject the connection if found. */ - if (ss->vrange.max > ss->clientHelloVersion) { - for (i = 0; i + 1 < suites.len; i += 2) { - PRUint16 suite_i = (suites.data[i] << 8) | suites.data[i + 1]; - if (suite_i != TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV) - continue; - desc = inappropriate_fallback; - errCode = SSL_ERROR_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK_ALERT; - goto alert_loser; - } - } - - /* grab the list of compression methods. */ + /* Grab the list of compression methods. */ rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &comps, 1, &b, &length); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto loser; /* malformed */ + goto loser; /* malformed */ } - /* TLS 1.3 requires that compression be empty */ - if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { - if (comps.len != 1 || comps.data[0] != ssl_compression_null) { - goto loser; - } - } - desc = handshake_failure; - /* Handle TLS hello extensions for SSL3 & TLS. We do not know if * we are restarting a previous session until extensions have been * parsed, since we might have received a SessionTicket extension. @@ -8014,280 +8360,384 @@ ssl3_HandleClientHello(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length) */ if (length) { - /* Get length of hello extensions */ - PRInt32 extension_length; - extension_length = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &b, &length); - if (extension_length < 0) { - goto loser; /* alert already sent */ - } - if (extension_length != length) { - ssl3_DecodeError(ss); /* send alert */ - goto loser; - } - rv = ssl3_HandleHelloExtensions(ss, &b, &length); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto loser; /* malformed */ - } + /* Get length of hello extensions */ + PRInt32 extension_length; + extension_length = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &b, &length); + if (extension_length < 0) { + goto loser; /* alert already sent */ + } + if (extension_length != length) { + ssl3_DecodeError(ss); /* send alert */ + goto loser; + } + + rv = ssl3_ParseExtensions(ss, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* malformed */ + } } + + versionExtension = ssl3_FindExtension(ss, ssl_tls13_supported_versions_xtn); + if (versionExtension) { + rv = tls13_NegotiateVersion(ss, versionExtension); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + desc = (errCode == SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION) ? protocol_version : illegal_parameter; + goto alert_loser; + } + } else { + /* The PR_MIN here ensures that we never negotiate 1.3 if the + * peer didn't offer "supported_versions". */ + rv = ssl3_NegotiateVersion(ss, + PR_MIN(version, + SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2), + PR_TRUE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + desc = (version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) ? protocol_version + : handshake_failure; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION; + goto alert_loser; + } + } + isTLS13 = ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3; + ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo |= ssl_preinfo_version; + + /* You can't resume TLS 1.3 like this. */ + if (isTLS13 && sidBytes.len) { + goto alert_loser; + } + + /* Generate the Server Random now so it is available + * when we process the ClientKeyShare in TLS 1.3 */ + rv = ssl3_GetNewRandom(&ss->ssl3.hs.server_random); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = SSL_ERROR_GENERATE_RANDOM_FAILURE; + goto loser; + } + +#ifndef TLS_1_3_DRAFT_VERSION + /* + * [draft-ietf-tls-tls13-11 Section 6.3.1.1]. + * TLS 1.3 server implementations which respond to a ClientHello with a + * client_version indicating TLS 1.2 or below MUST set the last eight + * bytes of their Random value to the bytes: + * + * 44 4F 57 4E 47 52 44 01 + * + * TLS 1.2 server implementations which respond to a ClientHello with a + * client_version indicating TLS 1.1 or below SHOULD set the last eight + * bytes of their Random value to the bytes: + * + * 44 4F 57 4E 47 52 44 00 + * + * TODO(ekr@rtfm.com): Note this change was not added in the SSLv2 + * compat processing code since that will most likely be removed before + * we ship the final version of TLS 1.3. Bug 1306672. + */ + if (ss->vrange.max > ss->version) { + unsigned char *downgrade_sentinel = + ss->ssl3.hs.server_random.rand + + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH - sizeof(tls13_downgrade_random); + + switch (ss->vrange.max) { + case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3: + PORT_Memcpy(downgrade_sentinel, + tls13_downgrade_random, + sizeof(tls13_downgrade_random)); + break; + case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2: + PORT_Memcpy(downgrade_sentinel, + tls12_downgrade_random, + sizeof(tls12_downgrade_random)); + break; + default: + /* Do not change random. */ + break; + } + } +#endif + + /* Now parse the rest of the extensions. */ + rv = ssl3_HandleParsedExtensions(ss, client_hello); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* malformed */ + } + + /* If the ClientHello version is less than our maximum version, check for a + * TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV and reject the connection if found. */ + if (ss->vrange.max > ss->clientHelloVersion) { + for (i = 0; i + 1 < suites.len; i += 2) { + PRUint16 suite_i = (suites.data[i] << 8) | suites.data[i + 1]; + if (suite_i != TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV) + continue; + desc = inappropriate_fallback; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK_ALERT; + goto alert_loser; + } + } + + /* TLS 1.3 requires that compression only include null. */ + if (isTLS13) { + if (comps.len != 1 || comps.data[0] != ssl_compression_null) { + goto alert_loser; + } + } + if (!ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn)) { - /* If we didn't receive an RI extension, look for the SCSV, - * and if found, treat it just like an empty RI extension - * by processing a local copy of an empty RI extension. - */ - for (i = 0; i + 1 < suites.len; i += 2) { - PRUint16 suite_i = (suites.data[i] << 8) | suites.data[i + 1]; - if (suite_i == TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV) { - SSL3Opaque * b2 = (SSL3Opaque *)emptyRIext; - PRUint32 L2 = sizeof emptyRIext; - (void)ssl3_HandleHelloExtensions(ss, &b2, &L2); - break; - } - } + /* If we didn't receive an RI extension, look for the SCSV, + * and if found, treat it just like an empty RI extension + * by processing a local copy of an empty RI extension. + */ + for (i = 0; i + 1 < suites.len; i += 2) { + PRUint16 suite_i = (suites.data[i] << 8) | suites.data[i + 1]; + if (suite_i == TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV) { + SSL3Opaque *b2 = (SSL3Opaque *)emptyRIext; + PRUint32 L2 = sizeof emptyRIext; + (void)ssl3_HandleExtensions(ss, &b2, &L2, client_hello); + break; + } + } + } + /* This is a second check for TLS 1.3 and re-handshake to stop us + * from re-handshake up to TLS 1.3, so it happens after version + * negotiation. */ + if (ss->firstHsDone && ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + desc = unexpected_message; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED; + goto alert_loser; } if (ss->firstHsDone && (ss->opt.enableRenegotiation == SSL_RENEGOTIATE_REQUIRES_XTN || - ss->opt.enableRenegotiation == SSL_RENEGOTIATE_TRANSITIONAL) && - !ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn)) { - desc = no_renegotiation; - level = alert_warning; - errCode = SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED; - goto alert_loser; - } - if ((ss->opt.requireSafeNegotiation || + ss->opt.enableRenegotiation == SSL_RENEGOTIATE_TRANSITIONAL) && + !ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn)) { + desc = no_renegotiation; + level = alert_warning; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED; + goto alert_loser; + } + if ((ss->opt.requireSafeNegotiation || (ss->firstHsDone && ss->peerRequestedProtection)) && - !ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn)) { - desc = handshake_failure; - errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNSAFE_NEGOTIATION; - goto alert_loser; + !ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn)) { + desc = handshake_failure; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNSAFE_NEGOTIATION; + goto alert_loser; } - /* We do stateful resumes only if either of the following - * conditions are satisfied: (1) the client does not support the - * session ticket extension, or (2) the client support the session - * ticket extension, but sent an empty ticket. + /* We do stateful resumes only if we are in TLS < 1.3 and + * either of the following conditions are satisfied: + * (1) the client does not support the session ticket extension, or + * (2) the client support the session ticket extension, but sent an + * empty ticket. */ - if (!ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_session_ticket_xtn) || - ss->xtnData.emptySessionTicket) { - if (sidBytes.len > 0 && !ss->opt.noCache) { - SSL_TRC(7, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: server, lookup client session-id for 0x%08x%08x%08x%08x", - SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ss->sec.ci.peer.pr_s6_addr32[0], - ss->sec.ci.peer.pr_s6_addr32[1], - ss->sec.ci.peer.pr_s6_addr32[2], - ss->sec.ci.peer.pr_s6_addr32[3])); - if (ssl_sid_lookup) { - sid = (*ssl_sid_lookup)(&ss->sec.ci.peer, sidBytes.data, - sidBytes.len, ss->dbHandle); - } else { - errCode = SSL_ERROR_SERVER_CACHE_NOT_CONFIGURED; - goto loser; - } - } + if ((ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) && + (!ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_session_ticket_xtn) || + ss->xtnData.emptySessionTicket)) { + if (sidBytes.len > 0 && !ss->opt.noCache) { + SSL_TRC(7, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: server, lookup client session-id for 0x%08x%08x%08x%08x", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ss->sec.ci.peer.pr_s6_addr32[0], + ss->sec.ci.peer.pr_s6_addr32[1], + ss->sec.ci.peer.pr_s6_addr32[2], + ss->sec.ci.peer.pr_s6_addr32[3])); + if (ssl_sid_lookup) { + sid = (*ssl_sid_lookup)(&ss->sec.ci.peer, sidBytes.data, + sidBytes.len, ss->dbHandle); + } else { + errCode = SSL_ERROR_SERVER_CACHE_NOT_CONFIGURED; + goto loser; + } + } } else if (ss->statelessResume) { - /* Fill in the client's session ID if doing a stateless resume. - * (When doing stateless resumes, server echos client's SessionID.) - */ - sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; - PORT_Assert(sid != NULL); /* Should have already been filled in.*/ - - if (sidBytes.len > 0 && sidBytes.len <= SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES) { - sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength = sidBytes.len; - PORT_Memcpy(sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, sidBytes.data, - sidBytes.len); - sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength = sidBytes.len; - } else { - sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength = 0; - } - ss->sec.ci.sid = NULL; + /* Fill in the client's session ID if doing a stateless resume. + * (When doing stateless resumes, server echos client's SessionID.) + * This branch also handles TLS 1.3 resumption-PSK. + */ + sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; + PORT_Assert(sid != NULL); /* Should have already been filled in.*/ + + if (sidBytes.len > 0 && sidBytes.len <= SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES) { + sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength = sidBytes.len; + PORT_Memcpy(sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, sidBytes.data, + sidBytes.len); + sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength = sidBytes.len; + } else { + sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength = 0; + } + ss->sec.ci.sid = NULL; } - /* We only send a session ticket extension if the client supports - * the extension and we are unable to do either a stateful or - * stateless resume. - * - * TODO: send a session ticket if performing a stateful - * resumption. (As per RFC4507, a server may issue a session - * ticket while doing a (stateless or stateful) session resume, - * but OpenSSL-0.9.8g does not accept session tickets while - * resuming.) - */ - if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_session_ticket_xtn) && sid == NULL) { - canOfferSessionTicket = PR_TRUE; + /* Free a potentially leftover session ID from a previous handshake. */ + if (ss->sec.ci.sid) { + ssl_FreeSID(ss->sec.ci.sid); + ss->sec.ci.sid = NULL; } if (sid != NULL) { - /* We've found a session cache entry for this client. - * Now, if we're going to require a client-auth cert, - * and we don't already have this client's cert in the session cache, - * and this is the first handshake on this connection (not a redo), - * then drop this old cache entry and start a new session. - */ - if ((sid->peerCert == NULL) && ss->opt.requestCertificate && - ((ss->opt.requireCertificate == SSL_REQUIRE_ALWAYS) || - (ss->opt.requireCertificate == SSL_REQUIRE_NO_ERROR) || - ((ss->opt.requireCertificate == SSL_REQUIRE_FIRST_HANDSHAKE) - && !ss->firstHsDone))) { - - SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(& ssl3stats.hch_sid_cache_not_ok ); - if (ss->sec.uncache) - ss->sec.uncache(sid); - ssl_FreeSID(sid); - sid = NULL; - } - } - -#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC - /* Disable any ECC cipher suites for which we have no cert. */ - ssl3_FilterECCipherSuitesByServerCerts(ss); -#endif + /* We've found a session cache entry for this client. + * Now, if we're going to require a client-auth cert, + * and we don't already have this client's cert in the session cache, + * and this is the first handshake on this connection (not a redo), + * then drop this old cache entry and start a new session. + */ + if ((sid->peerCert == NULL) && ss->opt.requestCertificate && + ((ss->opt.requireCertificate == SSL_REQUIRE_ALWAYS) || + (ss->opt.requireCertificate == SSL_REQUIRE_NO_ERROR) || + ((ss->opt.requireCertificate == SSL_REQUIRE_FIRST_HANDSHAKE) && + !ss->firstHsDone))) { + + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.hch_sid_cache_not_ok); + ss->sec.uncache(sid); + ssl_FreeSID(sid); + sid = NULL; + } + } if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { - ssl3_DisableNonDTLSSuites(ss); + ssl3_DisableNonDTLSSuites(ss); } #ifdef PARANOID /* Look for a matching cipher suite. */ j = ssl3_config_match_init(ss); - if (j <= 0) { /* no ciphers are working/supported by PK11 */ - errCode = PORT_GetError(); /* error code is already set. */ - goto alert_loser; + if (j <= 0) { /* no ciphers are working/supported by PK11 */ + errCode = PORT_GetError(); /* error code is already set. */ + goto alert_loser; } #endif + if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + rv = tls13_HandleClientHelloPart2(ss, &suites, sid); + } else { + rv = ssl3_HandleClientHelloPart2(ss, &suites, &comps, sid); + } + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto loser; + } + return SECSuccess; + +alert_loser: + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, level, desc); +/* FALLTHRU */ +loser: + PORT_SetError(errCode); + return SECFailure; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleClientHelloPart2(sslSocket *ss, + SECItem *suites, + SECItem *comps, + sslSessionID *sid) +{ + PRBool haveSpecWriteLock = PR_FALSE; + PRBool haveXmitBufLock = PR_FALSE; + int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO; + SSL3AlertDescription desc = illegal_parameter; + SECStatus rv; + unsigned int i; + int j; + /* If we already have a session for this client, be sure to pick the ** same cipher suite and compression method we picked before. ** This is not a loop, despite appearances. */ - if (sid) do { - ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite; + if (sid) + do { + ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite; #ifdef PARANOID - SSLVersionRange vrange = {ss->version, ss->version}; + SSLVersionRange vrange = { ss->version, ss->version }; #endif - /* Check that the cached compression method is still enabled. */ - if (!compressionEnabled(ss, sid->u.ssl3.compression)) - break; - - /* Check that the cached compression method is in the client's list */ - for (i = 0; i < comps.len; i++) { - if (comps.data[i] == sid->u.ssl3.compression) - break; - } - if (i == comps.len) - break; - - suite = ss->cipherSuites; - /* Find the entry for the cipher suite used in the cached session. */ - for (j = ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; j > 0; --j, ++suite) { - if (suite->cipher_suite == sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite) - break; - } - PORT_Assert(j > 0); - if (j <= 0) - break; + /* Check that the cached compression method is still enabled. */ + if (!ssl_CompressionEnabled(ss, sid->u.ssl3.compression)) + break; + + /* Check that the cached compression method is in the client's list */ + for (i = 0; i < comps->len; i++) { + if (comps->data[i] == sid->u.ssl3.compression) + break; + } + if (i == comps->len) + break; + + suite = ss->cipherSuites; + /* Find the entry for the cipher suite used in the cached session. */ + for (j = ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; j > 0; --j, ++suite) { + if (suite->cipher_suite == sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite) + break; + } + PORT_Assert(j > 0); + if (j <= 0) + break; #ifdef PARANOID - /* Double check that the cached cipher suite is still enabled, - * implemented, and allowed by policy. Might have been disabled. - * The product policy won't change during the process lifetime. - * Implemented ("isPresent") shouldn't change for servers. - */ - if (!config_match(suite, ss->ssl3.policy, PR_TRUE, &vrange, ss)) - break; + /* Double check that the cached cipher suite is still enabled, + * implemented, and allowed by policy. Might have been disabled. + * The product policy won't change during the process lifetime. + * Implemented ("isPresent") shouldn't change for servers. + */ + if (!config_match(suite, ss->ssl3.policy, &vrange, ss)) + break; #else - if (!suite->enabled) - break; + if (!suite->enabled) + break; #endif - /* Double check that the cached cipher suite is in the client's list */ - for (i = 0; i + 1 < suites.len; i += 2) { - PRUint16 suite_i = (suites.data[i] << 8) | suites.data[i + 1]; - if (suite_i == suite->cipher_suite) { - ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite = suite->cipher_suite; - ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def = - ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite); - ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo |= ssl_preinfo_cipher_suite; - - /* Use the cached compression method. */ - ss->ssl3.hs.compression = sid->u.ssl3.compression; - goto compression_found; - } - } - } while (0); - - /* START A NEW SESSION */ + /* Double check that the cached cipher suite is in the client's + * list. If it isn't, fall through and start a new session. */ + for (i = 0; i + 1 < suites->len; i += 2) { + PRUint16 suite_i = (suites->data[i] << 8) | suites->data[i + 1]; + if (suite_i == suite->cipher_suite) { + rv = ssl3_SetCipherSuite(ss, suite_i, PR_TRUE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + desc = internal_error; + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto alert_loser; + } + + /* Use the cached compression method. */ + ss->ssl3.hs.compression = + sid->u.ssl3.compression; + goto compression_found; + } + } + } while (0); +/* START A NEW SESSION */ #ifndef PARANOID /* Look for a matching cipher suite. */ j = ssl3_config_match_init(ss); - if (j <= 0) { /* no ciphers are working/supported by PK11 */ - errCode = PORT_GetError(); /* error code is already set. */ - goto alert_loser; + if (j <= 0) { /* no ciphers are working/supported by PK11 */ + desc = internal_error; + errCode = PORT_GetError(); /* error code is already set. */ + goto alert_loser; } #endif - /* Select a cipher suite. - ** - ** NOTE: This suite selection algorithm should be the same as the one in - ** ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello(). - ** - ** If TLS 1.0 is enabled, we could handle the case where the client - ** offered TLS 1.1 but offered only export cipher suites by choosing TLS - ** 1.0 and selecting one of those export cipher suites. However, a secure - ** TLS 1.1 client should not have export cipher suites enabled at all, - ** and a TLS 1.1 client should definitely not be offering *only* export - ** cipher suites. Therefore, we refuse to negotiate export cipher suites - ** with any client that indicates support for TLS 1.1 or higher when we - ** (the server) have TLS 1.1 support enabled. - */ - for (j = 0; j < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; j++) { - ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite = &ss->cipherSuites[j]; - SSLVersionRange vrange = {ss->version, ss->version}; - if (!config_match(suite, ss->ssl3.policy, PR_TRUE, &vrange, ss)) { - continue; - } - for (i = 0; i + 1 < suites.len; i += 2) { - PRUint16 suite_i = (suites.data[i] << 8) | suites.data[i + 1]; - if (suite_i == suite->cipher_suite) { - ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite = suite->cipher_suite; - ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def = - ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite); - ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo |= ssl_preinfo_cipher_suite; - goto suite_found; - } - } - } - errCode = SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP; - goto alert_loser; - -suite_found: - if (canOfferSessionTicket) - canOfferSessionTicket = ssl3_KEAAllowsSessionTicket( - ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def->key_exchange_alg); - - if (canOfferSessionTicket) { - ssl3_RegisterServerHelloExtensionSender(ss, - ssl_session_ticket_xtn, ssl3_SendSessionTicketXtn); + rv = ssl3_NegotiateCipherSuite(ss, suites, PR_TRUE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + desc = handshake_failure; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP; + goto alert_loser; } /* Select a compression algorithm. */ - for (i = 0; i < comps.len; i++) { - if (!compressionEnabled(ss, comps.data[i])) - continue; - for (j = 0; j < compressionMethodsCount; j++) { - if (comps.data[i] == compressions[j]) { - ss->ssl3.hs.compression = - (SSLCompressionMethod)compressions[j]; - goto compression_found; - } - } + for (i = 0; i < comps->len; i++) { + SSLCompressionMethod method = (SSLCompressionMethod)comps->data[i]; + if (!ssl_CompressionEnabled(ss, method)) + continue; + for (j = 0; j < ssl_compression_method_count; j++) { + if (method == ssl_compression_methods[j]) { + ss->ssl3.hs.compression = ssl_compression_methods[j]; + goto compression_found; + } + } } errCode = SSL_ERROR_NO_COMPRESSION_OVERLAP; - /* null compression must be supported */ + /* null compression must be supported */ goto alert_loser; compression_found: - suites.data = NULL; - comps.data = NULL; - - ss->sec.send = ssl3_SendApplicationData; + suites->data = NULL; + comps->data = NULL; /* If there are any failures while processing the old sid, * we don't consider them to be errors. Instead, We just behave @@ -8295,374 +8745,249 @@ compression_found: * The exception here is attempts to resume extended_master_secret * sessions without the extension, which causes an alert. */ - if (sid != NULL) do { - ssl3CipherSpec *pwSpec; - SECItem wrappedMS; /* wrapped key */ - - if (sid->version != ss->version || - sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite != ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite || - sid->u.ssl3.compression != ss->ssl3.hs.compression) { - break; /* not an error */ - } - - /* [draft-ietf-tls-session-hash-06; Section 5.3] - * o If the original session did not use the "extended_master_secret" - * extension but the new ClientHello contains the extension, then the - * server MUST NOT perform the abbreviated handshake. Instead, it - * SHOULD continue with a full handshake (as described in - * Section 5.2) to negotiate a new session. - * - * o If the original session used the "extended_master_secret" - * extension but the new ClientHello does not contain the extension, - * the server MUST abort the abbreviated handshake. - */ - if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_extended_master_secret_xtn)) { - if (!sid->u.ssl3.keys.extendedMasterSecretUsed) { - break; /* not an error */ - } - } else { - if (sid->u.ssl3.keys.extendedMasterSecretUsed) { - /* Note: we do not destroy the session */ - desc = handshake_failure; - errCode = SSL_ERROR_MISSING_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET; - goto alert_loser; - } - } - - if (ss->sec.ci.sid) { - if (ss->sec.uncache) - ss->sec.uncache(ss->sec.ci.sid); - PORT_Assert(ss->sec.ci.sid != sid); /* should be impossible, but ... */ - if (ss->sec.ci.sid != sid) { - ssl_FreeSID(ss->sec.ci.sid); - } - ss->sec.ci.sid = NULL; - } - /* we need to resurrect the master secret.... */ - - ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); haveSpecWriteLock = PR_TRUE; - pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec; - if (sid->u.ssl3.keys.msIsWrapped) { - PK11SymKey * wrapKey; /* wrapping key */ - CK_FLAGS keyFlags = 0; -#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS - if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) { - /* we cannot restart a non-bypass session in a - ** bypass socket. - */ - break; - } -#endif - - wrapKey = getWrappingKey(ss, NULL, sid->u.ssl3.exchKeyType, - sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech, - ss->pkcs11PinArg); - if (!wrapKey) { - /* we have a SID cache entry, but no wrapping key for it??? */ - break; - } - - if (ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) { /* isTLS */ - keyFlags = CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY; - } - - wrappedMS.data = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret; - wrappedMS.len = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len; - - /* unwrap the master secret. */ - pwSpec->master_secret = - PK11_UnwrapSymKeyWithFlags(wrapKey, sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech, - NULL, &wrappedMS, CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, - CKA_DERIVE, sizeof(SSL3MasterSecret), keyFlags); - PK11_FreeSymKey(wrapKey); - if (pwSpec->master_secret == NULL) { - break; /* not an error */ - } -#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS - } else if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) { - wrappedMS.data = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret; - wrappedMS.len = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len; - memcpy(pwSpec->raw_master_secret, wrappedMS.data, wrappedMS.len); - pwSpec->msItem.data = pwSpec->raw_master_secret; - pwSpec->msItem.len = wrappedMS.len; -#endif - } else { - /* We CAN restart a bypass session in a non-bypass socket. */ - /* need to import the raw master secret to session object */ - PK11SlotInfo * slot; - wrappedMS.data = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret; - wrappedMS.len = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len; - slot = PK11_GetInternalSlot(); - pwSpec->master_secret = - PK11_ImportSymKey(slot, CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, - PK11_OriginUnwrap, CKA_ENCRYPT, &wrappedMS, - NULL); - PK11_FreeSlot(slot); - if (pwSpec->master_secret == NULL) { - break; /* not an error */ - } - } - ss->sec.ci.sid = sid; - if (sid->peerCert != NULL) { - ss->sec.peerCert = CERT_DupCertificate(sid->peerCert); - } - - /* - * Old SID passed all tests, so resume this old session. - * - * XXX make sure compression still matches - */ - SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(& ssl3stats.hch_sid_cache_hits ); - if (ss->statelessResume) - SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(& ssl3stats.hch_sid_stateless_resumes ); - ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming = PR_TRUE; - - ss->sec.authAlgorithm = sid->authAlgorithm; - ss->sec.authKeyBits = sid->authKeyBits; - ss->sec.keaType = sid->keaType; - ss->sec.keaKeyBits = sid->keaKeyBits; - - /* server sids don't remember the server cert we previously sent, - ** but they do remember the kea type we originally used, so we - ** can locate it again, provided that the current ssl socket - ** has had its server certs configured the same as the previous one. - */ - ss->sec.localCert = - CERT_DupCertificate(ss->serverCerts[sid->keaType].serverCert); - - /* Copy cached name in to pending spec */ - if (sid != NULL && - sid->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0 && - sid->u.ssl3.srvName.len && sid->u.ssl3.srvName.data) { - /* Set server name from sid */ - SECItem *sidName = &sid->u.ssl3.srvName; - SECItem *pwsName = &ss->ssl3.pwSpec->srvVirtName; - if (pwsName->data) { - SECITEM_FreeItem(pwsName, PR_FALSE); - } - rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, pwsName, sidName); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - errCode = PORT_GetError(); - desc = internal_error; - goto alert_loser; + if (sid != NULL) + do { + ssl3CipherSpec *pwSpec; + SECItem wrappedMS; /* wrapped key */ + const sslServerCert *serverCert; + + if (sid->version != ss->version || + sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite != ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite || + sid->u.ssl3.compression != ss->ssl3.hs.compression) { + break; /* not an error */ } - } - - /* Clean up sni name array */ - if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_server_name_xtn) && - ss->xtnData.sniNameArr) { - PORT_Free(ss->xtnData.sniNameArr); - ss->xtnData.sniNameArr = NULL; - ss->xtnData.sniNameArrSize = 0; - } - - ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); haveXmitBufLock = PR_TRUE; - - rv = ssl3_SendServerHello(ss); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - errCode = PORT_GetError(); - goto loser; - } - - if (haveSpecWriteLock) { - ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); - haveSpecWriteLock = PR_FALSE; - } - - /* NULL value for PMS because we are re-using the old MS */ - rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(ss, NULL); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - errCode = PORT_GetError(); - goto loser; - } - - rv = ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs(ss); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - errCode = PORT_GetError(); - goto loser; - } - rv = ssl3_SendFinished(ss, 0); - ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_change_cipher; - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - errCode = PORT_GetError(); - goto loser; - } - - if (haveXmitBufLock) { - ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); - haveXmitBufLock = PR_FALSE; - } - - return SECSuccess; - } while (0); - - if (haveSpecWriteLock) { - ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); - haveSpecWriteLock = PR_FALSE; - } - - if (sid) { /* we had a sid, but it's no longer valid, free it */ - SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(& ssl3stats.hch_sid_cache_not_ok ); - if (ss->sec.uncache) - ss->sec.uncache(sid); - ssl_FreeSID(sid); - sid = NULL; - } - SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(& ssl3stats.hch_sid_cache_misses ); - - if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_server_name_xtn)) { - int ret = 0; - if (ss->sniSocketConfig) do { /* not a loop */ - PORT_Assert((ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo & ssl_preinfo_all) == - ssl_preinfo_all); - ret = SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT; - /* If extension is negotiated, the len of names should > 0. */ - if (ss->xtnData.sniNameArrSize) { - /* Calling client callback to reconfigure the socket. */ - ret = (SECStatus)(*ss->sniSocketConfig)(ss->fd, - ss->xtnData.sniNameArr, - ss->xtnData.sniNameArrSize, - ss->sniSocketConfigArg); - } - if (ret <= SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT) { - /* Application does not know the name or was not able to - * properly reconfigure the socket. */ - errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME_ALERT; - desc = unrecognized_name; + serverCert = ssl_FindServerCert(ss, &sid->certType); + if (!serverCert || !serverCert->serverCert) { + /* A compatible certificate must not have been configured. It + * might not be the same certificate, but we only find that out + * when the ticket fails to decrypt. */ break; - } else if (ret == SSL_SNI_CURRENT_CONFIG_IS_USED) { - SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; - SECItem * cwsName, *pwsName; + } - ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); /*******************************/ - pwsName = &ss->ssl3.pwSpec->srvVirtName; - cwsName = &ss->ssl3.cwSpec->srvVirtName; -#ifndef SSL_SNI_ALLOW_NAME_CHANGE_2HS - /* not allow name change on the 2d HS */ - if (ss->firstHsDone) { - if (ssl3_ServerNameCompare(pwsName, cwsName)) { - ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /******************/ - errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME_ALERT; - desc = handshake_failure; - ret = SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT; - break; - } + /* [draft-ietf-tls-session-hash-06; Section 5.3] + * o If the original session did not use the "extended_master_secret" + * extension but the new ClientHello contains the extension, then the + * server MUST NOT perform the abbreviated handshake. Instead, it + * SHOULD continue with a full handshake (as described in + * Section 5.2) to negotiate a new session. + * + * o If the original session used the "extended_master_secret" + * extension but the new ClientHello does not contain the extension, + * the server MUST abort the abbreviated handshake. + */ + if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_extended_master_secret_xtn)) { + if (!sid->u.ssl3.keys.extendedMasterSecretUsed) { + break; /* not an error */ } -#endif - if (pwsName->data) { - SECITEM_FreeItem(pwsName, PR_FALSE); + } else { + if (sid->u.ssl3.keys.extendedMasterSecretUsed) { + /* Note: we do not destroy the session */ + desc = handshake_failure; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_MISSING_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET; + goto alert_loser; } - if (cwsName->data) { - rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, pwsName, cwsName); + } + + if (ss->sec.ci.sid) { + ss->sec.uncache(ss->sec.ci.sid); + PORT_Assert(ss->sec.ci.sid != sid); /* should be impossible, but ... */ + if (ss->sec.ci.sid != sid) { + ssl_FreeSID(ss->sec.ci.sid); } - ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /**************************/ - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - errCode = SSL_ERROR_INTERNAL_ERROR_ALERT; - desc = internal_error; - ret = SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT; + ss->sec.ci.sid = NULL; + } + /* we need to resurrect the master secret.... */ + + ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); + haveSpecWriteLock = PR_TRUE; + pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec; + if (sid->u.ssl3.keys.msIsWrapped) { + PK11SymKey *wrapKey; /* wrapping key */ + CK_FLAGS keyFlags = 0; + + wrapKey = ssl3_GetWrappingKey(ss, NULL, serverCert, + sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech, + ss->pkcs11PinArg); + if (!wrapKey) { + /* we have a SID cache entry, but no wrapping key for it??? */ break; } - } else if ((unsigned int)ret < ss->xtnData.sniNameArrSize) { - /* Application has configured new socket info. Lets check it - * and save the name. */ - SECStatus rv; - SECItem * name = &ss->xtnData.sniNameArr[ret]; - int configedCiphers; - SECItem * pwsName; - /* get rid of the old name and save the newly picked. */ - /* This code is protected by ssl3HandshakeLock. */ - ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); /*******************************/ -#ifndef SSL_SNI_ALLOW_NAME_CHANGE_2HS - /* not allow name change on the 2d HS */ - if (ss->firstHsDone) { - SECItem *cwsName = &ss->ssl3.cwSpec->srvVirtName; - if (ssl3_ServerNameCompare(name, cwsName)) { - ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /******************/ - errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME_ALERT; - desc = handshake_failure; - ret = SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT; - break; - } + if (ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) { /* isTLS */ + keyFlags = CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY; } -#endif - pwsName = &ss->ssl3.pwSpec->srvVirtName; + + wrappedMS.data = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret; + wrappedMS.len = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len; + + /* unwrap the master secret. */ + pwSpec->master_secret = + PK11_UnwrapSymKeyWithFlags(wrapKey, sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech, + NULL, &wrappedMS, CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, + CKA_DERIVE, sizeof(SSL3MasterSecret), keyFlags); + PK11_FreeSymKey(wrapKey); + if (pwSpec->master_secret == NULL) { + break; /* not an error */ + } + } else { + /* need to import the raw master secret to session object */ + PK11SlotInfo *slot; + wrappedMS.data = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret; + wrappedMS.len = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len; + slot = PK11_GetInternalSlot(); + pwSpec->master_secret = + PK11_ImportSymKey(slot, CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, + PK11_OriginUnwrap, CKA_ENCRYPT, &wrappedMS, + NULL); + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + if (pwSpec->master_secret == NULL) { + break; /* not an error */ + } + } + ss->sec.ci.sid = sid; + if (sid->peerCert != NULL) { + ss->sec.peerCert = CERT_DupCertificate(sid->peerCert); + } + + /* + * Old SID passed all tests, so resume this old session. + * + * XXX make sure compression still matches + */ + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.hch_sid_cache_hits); + if (ss->statelessResume) + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.hch_sid_stateless_resumes); + ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming = PR_TRUE; + + ss->sec.authType = sid->authType; + ss->sec.authKeyBits = sid->authKeyBits; + ss->sec.keaType = sid->keaType; + ss->sec.keaKeyBits = sid->keaKeyBits; + + /* server sids don't remember the server cert we previously sent, + ** but they do remember the slot we originally used, so we + ** can locate it again, provided that the current ssl socket + ** has had its server certs configured the same as the previous one. + */ + ss->sec.serverCert = serverCert; + ss->sec.localCert = CERT_DupCertificate(serverCert->serverCert); + + /* Copy cached name in to pending spec */ + if (sid != NULL && + sid->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0 && + sid->u.ssl3.srvName.len && sid->u.ssl3.srvName.data) { + /* Set server name from sid */ + SECItem *sidName = &sid->u.ssl3.srvName; + SECItem *pwsName = &ss->ssl3.hs.srvVirtName; if (pwsName->data) { SECITEM_FreeItem(pwsName, PR_FALSE); } - rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, pwsName, name); - ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /***************************/ + rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, pwsName, sidName); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - errCode = SSL_ERROR_INTERNAL_ERROR_ALERT; - desc = internal_error; - ret = SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT; - break; - } - configedCiphers = ssl3_config_match_init(ss); - if (configedCiphers <= 0) { - /* no ciphers are working/supported */ errCode = PORT_GetError(); - desc = handshake_failure; - ret = SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT; - break; + desc = internal_error; + goto alert_loser; } - /* Need to tell the client that application has picked - * the name from the offered list and reconfigured the socket. - */ - ssl3_RegisterServerHelloExtensionSender(ss, ssl_server_name_xtn, - ssl3_SendServerNameXtn); - } else { - /* Callback returned index outside of the boundary. */ - PORT_Assert((unsigned int)ret < ss->xtnData.sniNameArrSize); - errCode = SSL_ERROR_INTERNAL_ERROR_ALERT; - desc = internal_error; - ret = SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT; - break; } + + /* Clean up sni name array */ + ssl3_FreeSniNameArray(&ss->xtnData); + + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); + haveXmitBufLock = PR_TRUE; + + rv = ssl3_SendServerHello(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto loser; + } + + if (haveSpecWriteLock) { + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); + haveSpecWriteLock = PR_FALSE; + } + + /* NULL value for PMS because we are re-using the old MS */ + rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(ss, NULL); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto loser; + } + + rv = ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto loser; + } + rv = ssl3_SendFinished(ss, 0); + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_change_cipher; + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto loser; + } + + if (haveXmitBufLock) { + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + } + + return SECSuccess; } while (0); - /* Free sniNameArr. The data that each SECItem in the array - * points into is the data from the input buffer "b". It will - * not be available outside the scope of this or it's child - * functions.*/ - if (ss->xtnData.sniNameArr) { - PORT_Free(ss->xtnData.sniNameArr); - ss->xtnData.sniNameArr = NULL; - ss->xtnData.sniNameArrSize = 0; - } - if (ret <= SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT) { - /* desc and errCode should be set. */ - goto alert_loser; - } + + if (haveSpecWriteLock) { + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); + haveSpecWriteLock = PR_FALSE; } -#ifndef SSL_SNI_ALLOW_NAME_CHANGE_2HS - else if (ss->firstHsDone) { - /* Check that we don't have the name is current spec - * if this extension was not negotiated on the 2d hs. */ - PRBool passed = PR_TRUE; - ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); /*******************************/ - if (ss->ssl3.cwSpec->srvVirtName.data) { - passed = PR_FALSE; - } - ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /***************************/ - if (!passed) { - errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME_ALERT; - desc = handshake_failure; - goto alert_loser; - } + + if (sid) { /* we had a sid, but it's no longer valid, free it */ + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.hch_sid_cache_not_ok); + ss->sec.uncache(sid); + ssl_FreeSID(sid); + sid = NULL; + } + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.hch_sid_cache_misses); + + /* We only send a session ticket extension if the client supports + * the extension and we are unable to resume. + * + * TODO: send a session ticket if performing a stateful + * resumption. (As per RFC4507, a server may issue a session + * ticket while doing a (stateless or stateful) session resume, + * but OpenSSL-0.9.8g does not accept session tickets while + * resuming.) + */ + if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_session_ticket_xtn) && + ssl3_KEASupportsTickets(ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def)) { + ssl3_RegisterExtensionSender(ss, &ss->xtnData, + ssl_session_ticket_xtn, + ssl3_SendSessionTicketXtn); + } + + rv = ssl3_ServerCallSNICallback(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + /* The alert has already been sent. */ + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto loser; + } + + rv = ssl3_SelectServerCert(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + desc = handshake_failure; + goto alert_loser; } -#endif sid = ssl3_NewSessionID(ss, PR_TRUE); if (sid == NULL) { - errCode = PORT_GetError(); - goto loser; /* memory error is set. */ + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto loser; /* memory error is set. */ } ss->sec.ci.sid = sid; sid->u.ssl3.keys.extendedMasterSecretUsed = - ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_extended_master_secret_xtn); + ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_extended_master_secret_xtn); ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming = PR_FALSE; + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); rv = ssl3_SendServerHelloSequence(ss); ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); @@ -8673,28 +8998,30 @@ compression_found: } if (haveXmitBufLock) { - ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); - haveXmitBufLock = PR_FALSE; + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); } return SECSuccess; alert_loser: if (haveSpecWriteLock) { - ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); - haveSpecWriteLock = PR_FALSE; + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); + haveSpecWriteLock = PR_FALSE; } - (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, level, desc); - /* FALLTHRU */ + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc); +/* FALLTHRU */ loser: + if (sid && sid != ss->sec.ci.sid) { + ss->sec.uncache(sid); + ssl_FreeSID(sid); + } + if (haveSpecWriteLock) { - ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); - haveSpecWriteLock = PR_FALSE; + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); } if (haveXmitBufLock) { - ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); - haveXmitBufLock = PR_FALSE; + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); } PORT_SetError(errCode); @@ -8704,107 +9031,111 @@ loser: /* * ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello is used when a V2 formatted hello comes * in asking to use the V3 handshake. - * Called from ssl2_HandleClientHelloMessage() in sslcon.c */ SECStatus -ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello(sslSocket *ss, unsigned char *buffer, int length) +ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello(sslSocket *ss, unsigned char *buffer, int length, + PRUint8 padding) { - sslSessionID * sid = NULL; - unsigned char * suites; - unsigned char * random; + sslSessionID *sid = NULL; + unsigned char *suites; + unsigned char *random; SSL3ProtocolVersion version; - SECStatus rv; - int i; - int j; - int sid_length; - int suite_length; - int rand_length; - int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO; - SSL3AlertDescription desc = handshake_failure; + SECStatus rv; + int i; + int j; + int sid_length; + int suite_length; + int rand_length; + int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO; + SSL3AlertDescription desc = handshake_failure; + unsigned int total = SSL_HL_CLIENT_HELLO_HBYTES; SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle v2 client_hello", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); - PORT_Memset(&ss->xtnData, 0, sizeof(TLSExtensionData)); + ssl3_ResetExtensionData(&ss->xtnData); + + version = (buffer[1] << 8) | buffer[2]; + if (version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) { + goto loser; + } rv = ssl3_InitState(ss); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); - return rv; /* ssl3_InitState has set the error code. */ + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + return rv; /* ssl3_InitState has set the error code. */ } rv = ssl3_RestartHandshakeHashes(ss); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); - return rv; + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + return rv; } if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_client_hello) { - desc = unexpected_message; - errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CLIENT_HELLO; - goto loser; /* alert_loser */ + desc = unexpected_message; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CLIENT_HELLO; + goto alert_loser; } - version = (buffer[1] << 8) | buffer[2]; - suite_length = (buffer[3] << 8) | buffer[4]; - sid_length = (buffer[5] << 8) | buffer[6]; - rand_length = (buffer[7] << 8) | buffer[8]; + total += suite_length = (buffer[3] << 8) | buffer[4]; + total += sid_length = (buffer[5] << 8) | buffer[6]; + total += rand_length = (buffer[7] << 8) | buffer[8]; + total += padding; ss->clientHelloVersion = version; - rv = ssl3_NegotiateVersion(ss, version, PR_TRUE); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - /* send back which ever alert client will understand. */ - desc = (version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) ? protocol_version - : handshake_failure; - errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION; - goto alert_loser; + if (version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + /* [draft-ietf-tls-tls-11; C.3] forbids sending a TLS 1.3 + * ClientHello using the backwards-compatible format. */ + desc = illegal_parameter; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO; + goto alert_loser; } - ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo |= ssl_preinfo_version; - rv = ssl3_InitHandshakeHashes(ss); + rv = ssl3_NegotiateVersion(ss, version, PR_TRUE); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - desc = internal_error; - errCode = PORT_GetError(); - goto alert_loser; + /* send back which ever alert client will understand. */ + desc = (version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) ? protocol_version + : handshake_failure; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION; + goto alert_loser; } + ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo |= ssl_preinfo_version; /* if we get a non-zero SID, just ignore it. */ - if (length != - SSL_HL_CLIENT_HELLO_HBYTES + suite_length + sid_length + rand_length) { - SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: bad v2 client hello message, len=%d should=%d", - SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, length, - SSL_HL_CLIENT_HELLO_HBYTES + suite_length + sid_length + - rand_length)); - goto loser; /* malformed */ /* alert_loser */ + if (length != total) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: bad v2 client hello message, len=%d should=%d", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, length, total)); + desc = illegal_parameter; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO; + goto alert_loser; } suites = buffer + SSL_HL_CLIENT_HELLO_HBYTES; random = suites + suite_length + sid_length; if (rand_length < SSL_MIN_CHALLENGE_BYTES || - rand_length > SSL_MAX_CHALLENGE_BYTES) { - goto loser; /* malformed */ /* alert_loser */ + rand_length > SSL_MAX_CHALLENGE_BYTES) { + desc = illegal_parameter; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO; + goto alert_loser; } PORT_Assert(SSL_MAX_CHALLENGE_BYTES == SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); PORT_Memset(&ss->ssl3.hs.client_random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); PORT_Memcpy( - &ss->ssl3.hs.client_random.rand[SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH - rand_length], - random, rand_length); + &ss->ssl3.hs.client_random.rand[SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH - rand_length], + random, rand_length); PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "client random:", &ss->ssl3.hs.client_random.rand[0], - SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH)); -#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC - /* Disable any ECC cipher suites for which we have no cert. */ - ssl3_FilterECCipherSuitesByServerCerts(ss); -#endif + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH)); i = ssl3_config_match_init(ss); if (i <= 0) { - errCode = PORT_GetError(); /* error code is already set. */ - goto alert_loser; + errCode = PORT_GetError(); /* error code is already set. */ + goto alert_loser; } /* Select a cipher suite. @@ -8815,56 +9146,77 @@ ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello(sslSocket *ss, unsigned char *buffer, int length) ** See the comments about export cipher suites in ssl3_HandleClientHello(). */ for (j = 0; j < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; j++) { - ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite = &ss->cipherSuites[j]; - SSLVersionRange vrange = {ss->version, ss->version}; - if (!config_match(suite, ss->ssl3.policy, PR_TRUE, &vrange, ss)) { - continue; - } - for (i = 0; i+2 < suite_length; i += 3) { - PRUint32 suite_i = (suites[i] << 16)|(suites[i+1] << 8)|suites[i+2]; - if (suite_i == suite->cipher_suite) { - ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite = suite->cipher_suite; - ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def = - ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite); - ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo |= ssl_preinfo_cipher_suite; - goto suite_found; - } - } + ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite = &ss->cipherSuites[j]; + SSLVersionRange vrange = { ss->version, ss->version }; + if (!config_match(suite, ss->ssl3.policy, &vrange, ss)) { + continue; + } + for (i = 0; i + 2 < suite_length; i += 3) { + PRUint32 suite_i = (suites[i] << 16) | (suites[i + 1] << 8) | suites[i + 2]; + if (suite_i == suite->cipher_suite) { + rv = ssl3_SetCipherSuite(ss, suite_i, PR_TRUE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + desc = internal_error; + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto alert_loser; + } + goto suite_found; + } + } } errCode = SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP; goto alert_loser; suite_found: - /* Look for the SCSV, and if found, treat it just like an empty RI + /* If the ClientHello version is less than our maximum version, check for a + * TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV and reject the connection if found. */ + if (ss->vrange.max > ss->clientHelloVersion) { + for (i = 0; i + 2 < suite_length; i += 3) { + PRUint16 suite_i = (suites[i] << 16) | (suites[i + 1] << 8) | suites[i + 2]; + if (suite_i == TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV) { + desc = inappropriate_fallback; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK_ALERT; + goto alert_loser; + } + } + } + + /* Look for the SCSV, and if found, treat it just like an empty RI * extension by processing a local copy of an empty RI extension. */ - for (i = 0; i+2 < suite_length; i += 3) { - PRUint32 suite_i = (suites[i] << 16) | (suites[i+1] << 8) | suites[i+2]; - if (suite_i == TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV) { - SSL3Opaque * b2 = (SSL3Opaque *)emptyRIext; - PRUint32 L2 = sizeof emptyRIext; - (void)ssl3_HandleHelloExtensions(ss, &b2, &L2); - break; - } + for (i = 0; i + 2 < suite_length; i += 3) { + PRUint32 suite_i = (suites[i] << 16) | (suites[i + 1] << 8) | suites[i + 2]; + if (suite_i == TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV) { + SSL3Opaque *b2 = (SSL3Opaque *)emptyRIext; + PRUint32 L2 = sizeof emptyRIext; + (void)ssl3_HandleExtensions(ss, &b2, &L2, client_hello); + break; + } } if (ss->opt.requireSafeNegotiation && - !ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn)) { - desc = handshake_failure; - errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNSAFE_NEGOTIATION; - goto alert_loser; + !ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn)) { + desc = handshake_failure; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNSAFE_NEGOTIATION; + goto alert_loser; } ss->ssl3.hs.compression = ssl_compression_null; - ss->sec.send = ssl3_SendApplicationData; + + rv = ssl3_SelectServerCert(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + desc = handshake_failure; + goto alert_loser; + } /* we don't even search for a cache hit here. It's just a miss. */ - SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(& ssl3stats.hch_sid_cache_misses ); + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.hch_sid_cache_misses); sid = ssl3_NewSessionID(ss, PR_TRUE); if (sid == NULL) { - errCode = PORT_GetError(); - goto loser; /* memory error is set. */ + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto loser; /* memory error is set. */ } ss->sec.ci.sid = sid; /* do not worry about memory leak of sid since it now belongs to ci */ @@ -8872,25 +9224,18 @@ suite_found: /* We have to update the handshake hashes before we can send stuff */ rv = ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(ss, buffer, length); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - errCode = PORT_GetError(); - goto loser; + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto loser; } ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); rv = ssl3_SendServerHelloSequence(ss); ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - errCode = PORT_GetError(); - goto loser; + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto loser; } - /* XXX_1 The call stack to here is: - * ssl_Do1stHandshake -> ssl2_HandleClientHelloMessage -> here. - * ssl2_HandleClientHelloMessage returns whatever we return here. - * ssl_Do1stHandshake will continue looping if it gets back either - * SECSuccess or SECWouldBlock. - * SECSuccess is preferable here. See XXX_1 in sslgathr.c. - */ ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); return SECSuccess; @@ -8905,150 +9250,135 @@ loser: /* The negotiated version number has been already placed in ss->version. ** ** Called from: ssl3_HandleClientHello (resuming session), -** ssl3_SendServerHelloSequence <- ssl3_HandleClientHello (new session), -** ssl3_SendServerHelloSequence <- ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello (new session) +** ssl3_SendServerHelloSequence <- ssl3_HandleClientHello (new session), +** ssl3_SendServerHelloSequence <- ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello (new session) */ -static SECStatus +SECStatus ssl3_SendServerHello(sslSocket *ss) { sslSessionID *sid; - SECStatus rv; - PRUint32 maxBytes = 65535; - PRUint32 length; - PRInt32 extensions_len = 0; + SECStatus rv; + PRUint32 maxBytes = 65535; + PRUint32 length; + PRInt32 extensions_len = 0; SSL3ProtocolVersion version; SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send server_hello handshake", SSL_GETPID(), - ss->fd)); + ss->fd)); - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); - - if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) { - PORT_Assert(MSB(ss->version) == MSB(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0)); - - if (MSB(ss->version) != MSB(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0)) { - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP); - return SECFailure; - } - } else { - PORT_Assert(MSB(ss->version) == MSB(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_DTLS_1_0)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); - if (MSB(ss->version) != MSB(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_DTLS_1_0)) { - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP); - return SECFailure; - } + PORT_Assert(MSB(ss->version) == MSB(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0)); + if (MSB(ss->version) != MSB(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0)) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP); + return SECFailure; } sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; - extensions_len = ssl3_CallHelloExtensionSenders(ss, PR_FALSE, maxBytes, - &ss->xtnData.serverSenders[0]); + extensions_len = ssl3_CallHelloExtensionSenders( + ss, PR_FALSE, maxBytes, &ss->xtnData.serverHelloSenders[0]); if (extensions_len > 0) - extensions_len += 2; /* Add sizeof total extension length */ + extensions_len += 2; /* Add sizeof total extension length */ + + /* TLS 1.3 doesn't use the session_id or compression_method + * fields in the ServerHello. */ + length = sizeof(SSL3ProtocolVersion) + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH; + if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + length += 1 + ((sid == NULL) ? 0 : sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength); + } + length += sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite); + if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + length += 1; /* Compression */ + } + length += extensions_len; - length = sizeof(SSL3ProtocolVersion) + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH + 1 + - ((sid == NULL) ? 0: sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength) + - sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite) + 1 + extensions_len; rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, server_hello, length); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ } - if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { - version = dtls_TLSVersionToDTLSVersion(ss->version); + if (IS_DTLS(ss) && ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + version = dtls_TLSVersionToDTLSVersion(ss->version); } else { - version = ss->version; + version = tls13_EncodeDraftVersion(ss->version); } rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, version, 2); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ - } - rv = ssl3_GetNewRandom(&ss->ssl3.hs.server_random); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_GENERATE_RANDOM_FAILURE); - return rv; + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ } + /* Random already generated in ssl3_HandleClientHello */ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake( - ss, &ss->ssl3.hs.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); + ss, &ss->ssl3.hs.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ } - if (sid) - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable( - ss, sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength, 1); - else - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 1); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + if (sid) { + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable( + ss, sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength, 1); + } else { + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 1); + } + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } } rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite, 2); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ } - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.compression, 1); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.compression, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } } if (extensions_len) { - PRInt32 sent_len; - - extensions_len -= 2; - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, extensions_len, 2); - if (rv != SECSuccess) - return rv; /* err set by ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec */ - sent_len = ssl3_CallHelloExtensionSenders(ss, PR_TRUE, extensions_len, - &ss->xtnData.serverSenders[0]); + PRInt32 sent_len; + + extensions_len -= 2; + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, extensions_len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber */ + sent_len = ssl3_CallHelloExtensionSenders(ss, PR_TRUE, extensions_len, + &ss->xtnData.serverHelloSenders[0]); PORT_Assert(sent_len == extensions_len); - if (sent_len != extensions_len) { - if (sent_len >= 0) - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); - return SECFailure; - } + if (sent_len != extensions_len) { + if (sent_len >= 0) + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } } - rv = ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec(ss); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return rv; /* err set by ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec */ + + if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + rv = ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec */ + } } return SECSuccess; } -static SECStatus -ssl3_PickSignatureHashAlgorithm(sslSocket *ss, - SSLSignatureAndHashAlg* out); - -static SECStatus -ssl3_SendDHServerKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss) +SECStatus +ssl_CreateDHEKeyPair(const sslNamedGroupDef *groupDef, + const ssl3DHParams *params, + sslEphemeralKeyPair **keyPair) { - const ssl3KEADef * kea_def = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def; - SECStatus rv = SECFailure; - int length; - PRBool isTLS; - SECItem signed_hash = {siBuffer, NULL, 0}; - SSL3Hashes hashes; - SSLSignatureAndHashAlg sigAndHash; SECKEYDHParams dhParam; - - ssl3KeyPair *keyPair = NULL; - SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey = NULL; /* Ephemeral DH key */ + SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey = NULL; /* Ephemeral DH key */ SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey = NULL; /* Ephemeral DH key */ - int certIndex = -1; - - if (kea_def->kea != kea_dhe_dss && kea_def->kea != kea_dhe_rsa) { - /* TODO: Support DH_anon. It might be sufficient to drop the signature. - See bug 1170510. */ - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); - return SECFailure; - } + sslEphemeralKeyPair *pair; - dhParam.prime.data = ss->dheParams->prime.data; - dhParam.prime.len = ss->dheParams->prime.len; - dhParam.base.data = ss->dheParams->base.data; - dhParam.base.len = ss->dheParams->base.len; + dhParam.prime.data = params->prime.data; + dhParam.prime.len = params->prime.len; + dhParam.base.data = params->base.data; + dhParam.base.len = params->base.len; PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "Server DH p", dhParam.prime.data, dhParam.prime.len)); @@ -9059,395 +9389,265 @@ ssl3_SendDHServerKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss) privKey = SECKEY_CreateDHPrivateKey(&dhParam, &pubKey, NULL); if (!privKey || !pubKey) { ssl_MapLowLevelError(SEC_ERROR_KEYGEN_FAIL); - rv = SECFailure; - goto loser; + return SECFailure; } - keyPair = ssl3_NewKeyPair(privKey, pubKey); - if (!keyPair) { - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SEC_ERROR_KEYGEN_FAIL); - goto loser; + pair = ssl_NewEphemeralKeyPair(groupDef, privKey, pubKey); + if (!pair) { + SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privKey); + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey); + + return SECFailure; } - PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "DH public value:", - pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.data, - pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.len)); + *keyPair = pair; + return SECSuccess; +} - if (ssl3_PickSignatureHashAlgorithm(ss, &sigAndHash) != SECSuccess) { +static SECStatus +ssl3_SendDHServerKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss) +{ + const ssl3KEADef *kea_def = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def; + SECStatus rv = SECFailure; + int length; + SECItem signed_hash = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + SSL3Hashes hashes; + SSLHashType hashAlg; + + const ssl3DHParams *params; + sslEphemeralKeyPair *keyPair; + SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey; + SECKEYPrivateKey *certPrivateKey; + const sslNamedGroupDef *groupDef; + + if (kea_def->kea != kea_dhe_dss && kea_def->kea != kea_dhe_rsa) { + /* TODO: Support DH_anon. It might be sufficient to drop the signature. + See bug 1170510. */ + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = ssl_SelectDHEGroup(ss, &groupDef); + if (rv == SECFailure) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP); + return SECFailure; + } + ss->sec.keaGroup = groupDef; + + params = ssl_GetDHEParams(groupDef); + rv = ssl_CreateDHEKeyPair(groupDef, params, &keyPair); + if (rv == SECFailure) { ssl_MapLowLevelError(SEC_ERROR_KEYGEN_FAIL); - goto loser; + return SECFailure; + } + PR_APPEND_LINK(&keyPair->link, &ss->ephemeralKeyPairs); + + if (ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { + hashAlg = ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType(ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme); + } else { + /* Use ssl_hash_none to represent the MD5+SHA1 combo. */ + hashAlg = ssl_hash_none; } - rv = ssl3_ComputeDHKeyHash(sigAndHash.hashAlg, + pubKey = keyPair->keys->pubKey; + PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "DH public value:", + pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.data, + pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.len)); + rv = ssl3_ComputeDHKeyHash(ss, hashAlg, &hashes, pubKey->u.dh.prime, pubKey->u.dh.base, pubKey->u.dh.publicValue, - &ss->ssl3.hs.client_random, - &ss->ssl3.hs.server_random, - &hashes, ss->opt.bypassPKCS11); + PR_TRUE /* padY */); if (rv != SECSuccess) { ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); goto loser; } - /* It has been suggested to test kea_def->signKeyType instead, and to use - * ssl_auth_* instead. Investigate what to do. See bug 102794. */ - if (kea_def->kea == kea_dhe_rsa) - certIndex = ssl_kea_rsa; - else - certIndex = ssl_kea_dh; - - isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); - rv = ssl3_SignHashes(&hashes, ss->serverCerts[certIndex].SERVERKEY, - &signed_hash, isTLS); + certPrivateKey = ss->sec.serverCert->serverKeyPair->privKey; + rv = ssl3_SignHashes(ss, &hashes, certPrivateKey, &signed_hash); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto loser; /* ssl3_SignHashes has set err. */ - } - if (signed_hash.data == NULL) { - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); - goto loser; + goto loser; /* ssl3_SignHashes has set err. */ } + length = 2 + pubKey->u.dh.prime.len + - 2 + pubKey->u.dh.base.len + - 2 + pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.len + - 2 + signed_hash.len; + 2 + pubKey->u.dh.base.len + + 2 + pubKey->u.dh.prime.len + + 2 + signed_hash.len; if (ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { - length += 2; + length += 2; } rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, server_key_exchange, length); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ } rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, pubKey->u.dh.prime.data, pubKey->u.dh.prime.len, 2); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ } rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, pubKey->u.dh.base.data, pubKey->u.dh.base.len, 2); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ } - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.data, - pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.len, 2); + rv = ssl_AppendPaddedDHKeyShare(ss, pubKey, PR_TRUE); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ } if (ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { - rv = ssl3_AppendSignatureAndHashAlgorithm(ss, &sigAndHash); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ - } + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } } rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, signed_hash.data, signed_hash.len, 2); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ } PORT_Free(signed_hash.data); - ss->dheKeyPair = keyPair; return SECSuccess; loser: if (signed_hash.data) PORT_Free(signed_hash.data); - if (privKey) - SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privKey); - if (pubKey) - SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey); return SECFailure; } -/* ssl3_PickSignatureHashAlgorithm selects a hash algorithm to use when signing - * elements of the handshake. (The negotiated cipher suite determines the - * signature algorithm.) Prior to TLS 1.2, the MD5/SHA1 combination is always - * used. With TLS 1.2, a client may advertise its support for signature and - * hash combinations. */ -static SECStatus -ssl3_PickSignatureHashAlgorithm(sslSocket *ss, - SSLSignatureAndHashAlg* out) -{ - SSLSignType sigAlg; - PRUint32 policy; - unsigned int i, j; - - switch (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea) { - case kea_rsa: - case kea_rsa_export: - case kea_rsa_export_1024: - case kea_dh_rsa: - case kea_dh_rsa_export: - case kea_dhe_rsa: - case kea_dhe_rsa_export: - case kea_rsa_fips: - case kea_ecdh_rsa: - case kea_ecdhe_rsa: - sigAlg = ssl_sign_rsa; - break; - case kea_dh_dss: - case kea_dh_dss_export: - case kea_dhe_dss: - case kea_dhe_dss_export: - sigAlg = ssl_sign_dsa; - break; - case kea_ecdh_ecdsa: - case kea_ecdhe_ecdsa: - sigAlg = ssl_sign_ecdsa; - break; - default: - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG); - return SECFailure; - } - out->sigAlg = sigAlg; - - if (ss->version <= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1) { - /* SEC_OID_UNKNOWN means the MD5/SHA1 combo hash used in TLS 1.1 and - * prior. */ - out->hashAlg = ssl_hash_none; - return SECSuccess; - } - - if (ss->ssl3.hs.numClientSigAndHash == 0) { - /* If the client didn't provide any signature_algorithms extension then - * we can assume that they support SHA-1: - * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1 */ - out->hashAlg = ssl_hash_sha1; - return SECSuccess; - } - - /* Here we look for the first server preference that the client has - * indicated support for in their signature_algorithms extension. */ - for (i = 0; i < ss->ssl3.signatureAlgorithmCount; ++i) { - const SSLSignatureAndHashAlg *serverPref = - &ss->ssl3.signatureAlgorithms[i]; - SECOidTag hashOID; - if (serverPref->sigAlg != sigAlg) { - continue; - } - hashOID = ssl3_TLSHashAlgorithmToOID(serverPref->hashAlg); - if ((NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(hashOID, &policy) != SECSuccess) - || !(policy & NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX)) { - /* we ignore hashes we don't support */ - continue; - } - for (j = 0; j < ss->ssl3.hs.numClientSigAndHash; j++) { - const SSLSignatureAndHashAlg *clientPref = - &ss->ssl3.hs.clientSigAndHash[j]; - if (clientPref->hashAlg == serverPref->hashAlg && - clientPref->sigAlg == sigAlg) { - out->hashAlg = serverPref->hashAlg; - return SECSuccess; - } - } - } - - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_HASH_ALGORITHM); - return SECFailure; -} - - static SECStatus ssl3_SendServerKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss) { - const ssl3KEADef * kea_def = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def; - SECStatus rv = SECFailure; - int length; - PRBool isTLS; - SECItem signed_hash = {siBuffer, NULL, 0}; - SSL3Hashes hashes; - SECKEYPublicKey * sdPub; /* public key for step-down */ - SSLSignatureAndHashAlg sigAndHash; + const ssl3KEADef *kea_def = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def; SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send server_key_exchange handshake", - SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); - - if (ssl3_PickSignatureHashAlgorithm(ss, &sigAndHash) != SECSuccess) { - return SECFailure; - } + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); switch (kea_def->exchKeyType) { - case kt_rsa: - /* Perform SSL Step-Down here. */ - sdPub = ss->stepDownKeyPair->pubKey; - PORT_Assert(sdPub != NULL); - if (!sdPub) { - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); - return SECFailure; - } - rv = ssl3_ComputeExportRSAKeyHash(sigAndHash.hashAlg, - sdPub->u.rsa.modulus, - sdPub->u.rsa.publicExponent, - &ss->ssl3.hs.client_random, - &ss->ssl3.hs.server_random, - &hashes, ss->opt.bypassPKCS11); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); - return rv; - } + case ssl_kea_dh: { + return ssl3_SendDHServerKeyExchange(ss); + } - isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); - rv = ssl3_SignHashes(&hashes, ss->serverCerts[kt_rsa].SERVERKEY, - &signed_hash, isTLS); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto loser; /* ssl3_SignHashes has set err. */ - } - if (signed_hash.data == NULL) { - /* how can this happen and rv == SECSuccess ?? */ - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); - goto loser; - } - length = 2 + sdPub->u.rsa.modulus.len + - 2 + sdPub->u.rsa.publicExponent.len + - 2 + signed_hash.len; - - if (ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { - length += 2; - } - - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, server_key_exchange, length); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ - } - - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, sdPub->u.rsa.modulus.data, - sdPub->u.rsa.modulus.len, 2); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ - } - - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable( - ss, sdPub->u.rsa.publicExponent.data, - sdPub->u.rsa.publicExponent.len, 2); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ - } - - if (ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { - rv = ssl3_AppendSignatureAndHashAlgorithm(ss, &sigAndHash); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ - } - } - - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, signed_hash.data, - signed_hash.len, 2); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ - } - PORT_Free(signed_hash.data); - return SECSuccess; - - case ssl_kea_dh: { - rv = ssl3_SendDHServerKeyExchange(ss); - return rv; - } - -#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC - case kt_ecdh: { - rv = ssl3_SendECDHServerKeyExchange(ss, &sigAndHash); - return rv; - } -#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */ - - case kt_null: - default: - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG); - break; + case ssl_kea_ecdh: { + return ssl3_SendECDHServerKeyExchange(ss); + } + + case ssl_kea_rsa: + case ssl_kea_null: + default: + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + break; } -loser: - if (signed_hash.data != NULL) - PORT_Free(signed_hash.data); + return SECFailure; } -static SECStatus -ssl3_EncodeCertificateRequestSigAlgs(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *buf, - unsigned maxLen, PRUint32 *len) +SECStatus +ssl3_EncodeSigAlgs(const sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *buf, unsigned maxLen, PRUint32 *len) { unsigned int i; + PRUint8 *p = buf; - PORT_Assert(maxLen >= ss->ssl3.signatureAlgorithmCount * 2); - if (maxLen < ss->ssl3.signatureAlgorithmCount * 2) { + PORT_Assert(maxLen >= ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount * 2); + if (maxLen < ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount * 2) { PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); return SECFailure; } - *len = 0; - for (i = 0; i < ss->ssl3.signatureAlgorithmCount; ++i) { - const SSLSignatureAndHashAlg *alg = &ss->ssl3.signatureAlgorithms[i]; - /* Note that we don't support a handshake hash with anything other than - * SHA-256, so asking for a signature from clients for something else - * would be inviting disaster. */ - if (alg->hashAlg == ssl_hash_sha256) { - buf[(*len)++] = (PRUint8)alg->hashAlg; - buf[(*len)++] = (PRUint8)alg->sigAlg; + for (i = 0; i < ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount; ++i) { + PRUint32 policy = 0; + SSLHashType hashType = ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType( + ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[i]); + SECOidTag hashOID = ssl3_HashTypeToOID(hashType); + + /* Skip RSA-PSS schemes if there are no tokens to verify them. */ + if (ssl_IsRsaPssSignatureScheme(ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[i]) && + !PK11_TokenExists(auth_alg_defs[ssl_auth_rsa_pss])) { + continue; + } + + if ((NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(hashOID, &policy) != SECSuccess) || + (policy & NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX)) { + p = ssl_EncodeUintX((PRUint32)ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[i], 2, p); } } - if (*len == 0) { + if (p == buf) { PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_SUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM); return SECFailure; } + *len = p - buf; return SECSuccess; } -static SECStatus -ssl3_SendCertificateRequest(sslSocket *ss) +void +ssl3_GetCertificateRequestCAs(sslSocket *ss, int *calen, SECItem **names, + int *nnames) { - PRBool isTLS12; - SECItem * name; + SECItem *name; CERTDistNames *ca_list; - const PRUint8 *certTypes; - SECItem * names = NULL; - SECStatus rv; - int length; - int i; - int calen = 0; - int nnames = 0; - int certTypesLength; - PRUint8 sigAlgs[MAX_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS * 2]; - unsigned int sigAlgsLength = 0; - - SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send certificate_request handshake", - SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); - - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + int i; - isTLS12 = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2); + *calen = 0; + *names = NULL; + *nnames = 0; /* ssl3.ca_list is initialized to NULL, and never changed. */ ca_list = ss->ssl3.ca_list; if (!ca_list) { - ca_list = ssl3_server_ca_list; + ca_list = ssl3_server_ca_list; } if (ca_list != NULL) { - names = ca_list->names; - nnames = ca_list->nnames; + *names = ca_list->names; + *nnames = ca_list->nnames; } - for (i = 0, name = names; i < nnames; i++, name++) { - calen += 2 + name->len; + for (i = 0, name = *names; i < *nnames; i++, name++) { + *calen += 2 + name->len; } +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_SendCertificateRequest(sslSocket *ss) +{ + PRBool isTLS12; + const PRUint8 *certTypes; + SECStatus rv; + int length; + SECItem *names; + int calen; + int nnames; + SECItem *name; + int i; + int certTypesLength; + PRUint8 sigAlgs[MAX_SIGNATURE_SCHEMES * 2]; + unsigned int sigAlgsLength = 0; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send certificate_request handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); - certTypes = certificate_types; + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + isTLS12 = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2); + + ssl3_GetCertificateRequestCAs(ss, &calen, &names, &nnames); + certTypes = certificate_types; certTypesLength = sizeof certificate_types; length = 1 + certTypesLength + 2 + calen; if (isTLS12) { - rv = ssl3_EncodeCertificateRequestSigAlgs(ss, sigAlgs, sizeof(sigAlgs), - &sigAlgsLength); + rv = ssl3_EncodeSigAlgs(ss, sigAlgs, sizeof(sigAlgs), &sigAlgsLength); if (rv != SECSuccess) { return rv; } @@ -9456,27 +9656,27 @@ ssl3_SendCertificateRequest(sslSocket *ss) rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, certificate_request, length); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ } rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, certTypes, certTypesLength, 1); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ } if (isTLS12) { - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, sigAlgs, sigAlgsLength, 2); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ - } + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, sigAlgs, sigAlgsLength, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } } rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, calen, 2); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ } for (i = 0, name = names; i < nnames; i++, name++) { - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, name->data, name->len, 2); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ - } + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, name->data, name->len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } } return SECSuccess; @@ -9488,100 +9688,116 @@ ssl3_SendServerHelloDone(sslSocket *ss) SECStatus rv; SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send server_hello_done handshake", - SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, server_hello_done, 0); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ } rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, 0); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return rv; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */ + return rv; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */ } return SECSuccess; } -/* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete - * ssl3 Certificate Verify message +/* Called from ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered + * a complete ssl3 Certificate Verify message * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. */ static SECStatus ssl3_HandleCertificateVerify(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length, - SSL3Hashes *hashes) + SSL3Hashes *hashes) { - SECItem signed_hash = {siBuffer, NULL, 0}; - SECStatus rv; - int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_VERIFY; - SSL3AlertDescription desc = handshake_failure; - PRBool isTLS, isTLS12; - SSLSignatureAndHashAlg sigAndHash; + SECItem signed_hash = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + SECStatus rv; + int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_VERIFY; + SSL3AlertDescription desc = handshake_failure; + PRBool isTLS; + SSLSignatureScheme sigScheme; + SSLHashType hashAlg; + SSL3Hashes localHashes; + SSL3Hashes *hashesForVerify = NULL; SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle certificate_verify handshake", - SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + /* TLS 1.3 is handled by tls13_HandleCertificateVerify */ + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version <= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2); isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); - isTLS12 = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2); if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_cert_verify) { - desc = unexpected_message; - errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_VERIFY; - goto alert_loser; + desc = unexpected_message; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_VERIFY; + goto alert_loser; } if (!hashes) { PORT_Assert(0); - desc = internal_error; - errCode = SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE; - goto alert_loser; + desc = internal_error; + errCode = SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE; + goto alert_loser; } - if (isTLS12) { - rv = ssl3_ConsumeSignatureAndHashAlgorithm(ss, &b, &length, - &sigAndHash); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto loser; /* malformed or unsupported. */ - } - rv = ssl3_CheckSignatureAndHashAlgorithmConsistency( - ss, &sigAndHash, ss->sec.peerCert); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - errCode = PORT_GetError(); - desc = decrypt_error; - goto alert_loser; - } - - /* We only support CertificateVerify messages that use the handshake - * hash. */ - if (sigAndHash.hashAlg != hashes->hashAlg) { - errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_HASH_ALGORITHM; - desc = decrypt_error; - goto alert_loser; - } + if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_record) { + rv = ssl_ConsumeSignatureScheme(ss, &b, &length, &sigScheme); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* malformed or unsupported. */ + } + rv = ssl_CheckSignatureSchemeConsistency(ss, sigScheme, + ss->sec.peerCert); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + desc = decrypt_error; + goto alert_loser; + } + + hashAlg = ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType(sigScheme); + + if (hashes->u.pointer_to_hash_input.data) { + rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHash(hashes->u.pointer_to_hash_input.data, + hashes->u.pointer_to_hash_input.len, + hashAlg, &localHashes); + } else { + rv = SECFailure; + } + + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + hashesForVerify = &localHashes; + } else { + errCode = SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE; + desc = decrypt_error; + goto alert_loser; + } + } else { + hashesForVerify = hashes; + sigScheme = ssl_sig_none; } rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &signed_hash, 2, &b, &length); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto loser; /* malformed. */ + goto loser; /* malformed. */ } /* XXX verify that the key & kea match */ - rv = ssl3_VerifySignedHashes(hashes, ss->sec.peerCert, &signed_hash, - isTLS, ss->pkcs11PinArg); + rv = ssl3_VerifySignedHashes(ss, sigScheme, hashesForVerify, &signed_hash); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - errCode = PORT_GetError(); - desc = isTLS ? decrypt_error : handshake_failure; - goto alert_loser; + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + desc = isTLS ? decrypt_error : handshake_failure; + goto alert_loser; } signed_hash.data = NULL; if (length != 0) { - desc = isTLS ? decode_error : illegal_parameter; - goto alert_loser; /* malformed */ + desc = isTLS ? decode_error : illegal_parameter; + goto alert_loser; /* malformed */ } ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_change_cipher; return SECSuccess; @@ -9593,78 +9809,76 @@ loser: return SECFailure; } - /* find a slot that is able to generate a PMS and wrap it with RSA. * Then generate and return the PMS. * If the serverKeySlot parameter is non-null, this function will use * that slot to do the job, otherwise it will find a slot. * - * Called from ssl3_DeriveConnectionKeysPKCS11() (above) - * sendRSAClientKeyExchange() (above) - * ssl3_HandleRSAClientKeyExchange() (below) + * Called from ssl3_DeriveConnectionKeys() (above) + * ssl3_SendRSAClientKeyExchange() (above) + * ssl3_HandleRSAClientKeyExchange() (below) * Caller must hold the SpecWriteLock, the SSL3HandshakeLock */ static PK11SymKey * ssl3_GenerateRSAPMS(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec, - PK11SlotInfo * serverKeySlot) + PK11SlotInfo *serverKeySlot) { - PK11SymKey * pms = NULL; - PK11SlotInfo * slot = serverKeySlot; - void * pwArg = ss->pkcs11PinArg; - SECItem param; - CK_VERSION version; + PK11SymKey *pms = NULL; + PK11SlotInfo *slot = serverKeySlot; + void *pwArg = ss->pkcs11PinArg; + SECItem param; + CK_VERSION version; CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism_array[3]; - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); if (slot == NULL) { - SSLCipherAlgorithm calg; - /* The specReadLock would suffice here, but we cannot assert on - ** read locks. Also, all the callers who call with a non-null - ** slot already hold the SpecWriteLock. - */ - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSpecWriteLock(ss)); - PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec == ss->ssl3.pwSpec); + SSLCipherAlgorithm calg; + /* The specReadLock would suffice here, but we cannot assert on + ** read locks. Also, all the callers who call with a non-null + ** slot already hold the SpecWriteLock. + */ + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSpecWriteLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec == ss->ssl3.pwSpec); calg = spec->cipher_def->calg; - PORT_Assert(alg2Mech[calg].calg == calg); - /* First get an appropriate slot. */ - mechanism_array[0] = CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN; - mechanism_array[1] = CKM_RSA_PKCS; - mechanism_array[2] = alg2Mech[calg].cmech; - - slot = PK11_GetBestSlotMultiple(mechanism_array, 3, pwArg); - if (slot == NULL) { - /* can't find a slot with all three, find a slot with the minimum */ - slot = PK11_GetBestSlotMultiple(mechanism_array, 2, pwArg); - if (slot == NULL) { - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOKEN_SLOT_NOT_FOUND); - return pms; /* which is NULL */ - } - } + /* First get an appropriate slot. */ + mechanism_array[0] = CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN; + mechanism_array[1] = CKM_RSA_PKCS; + mechanism_array[2] = ssl3_Alg2Mech(calg); + + slot = PK11_GetBestSlotMultiple(mechanism_array, 3, pwArg); + if (slot == NULL) { + /* can't find a slot with all three, find a slot with the minimum */ + slot = PK11_GetBestSlotMultiple(mechanism_array, 2, pwArg); + if (slot == NULL) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOKEN_SLOT_NOT_FOUND); + return pms; /* which is NULL */ + } + } } /* Generate the pre-master secret ... */ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { - SSL3ProtocolVersion temp; + SSL3ProtocolVersion temp; - temp = dtls_TLSVersionToDTLSVersion(ss->clientHelloVersion); - version.major = MSB(temp); - version.minor = LSB(temp); + temp = dtls_TLSVersionToDTLSVersion(ss->clientHelloVersion); + version.major = MSB(temp); + version.minor = LSB(temp); } else { - version.major = MSB(ss->clientHelloVersion); - version.minor = LSB(ss->clientHelloVersion); + version.major = MSB(ss->clientHelloVersion); + version.minor = LSB(ss->clientHelloVersion); } param.data = (unsigned char *)&version; - param.len = sizeof version; + param.len = sizeof version; pms = PK11_KeyGen(slot, CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN, ¶m, 0, pwArg); if (!serverKeySlot) - PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); if (pms == NULL) { - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); } return pms; } @@ -9684,192 +9898,120 @@ ssl3_GenerateRSAPMS(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec, static SECStatus ssl3_HandleRSAClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, - PRUint32 length, - SECKEYPrivateKey *serverKey) -{ -#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS - unsigned char * cr = (unsigned char *)&ss->ssl3.hs.client_random; - unsigned char * sr = (unsigned char *)&ss->ssl3.hs.server_random; - ssl3CipherSpec * pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec; - unsigned int outLen = 0; - PRBool isTLS = PR_FALSE; - SECItem pmsItem = {siBuffer, NULL, 0}; - unsigned char rsaPmsBuf[SSL3_RSA_PMS_LENGTH]; -#endif - SECStatus rv; - SECItem enc_pms; + PRUint32 length, + sslKeyPair *serverKeyPair) +{ + SECStatus rv; + SECItem enc_pms; + PK11SymKey *tmpPms[2] = { NULL, NULL }; + PK11SlotInfo *slot; + int useFauxPms = 0; - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); - PORT_Assert( ss->ssl3.prSpec == ss->ssl3.pwSpec ); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec == ss->ssl3.pwSpec); enc_pms.data = b; - enc_pms.len = length; -#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS - pmsItem.data = rsaPmsBuf; - pmsItem.len = sizeof rsaPmsBuf; -#endif + enc_pms.len = length; if (ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) { /* isTLS */ - PRInt32 kLen; - kLen = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &enc_pms.data, &enc_pms.len); - if (kLen < 0) { - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); - return SECFailure; - } - if ((unsigned)kLen < enc_pms.len) { - enc_pms.len = kLen; - } -#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS - isTLS = PR_TRUE; -#endif - } else { -#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS - isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->tls_keygen != 0); -#endif + PRInt32 kLen; + kLen = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &enc_pms.data, &enc_pms.len); + if (kLen < 0) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + if ((unsigned)kLen < enc_pms.len) { + enc_pms.len = kLen; + } } -#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS - if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) { - /* We have not implemented a tls_ExtendedMasterKeyDeriveBypass - * and will not negotiate this extension in bypass mode. This - * assert just double-checks that. - */ - PORT_Assert( - !ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_extended_master_secret_xtn)); - - /* TRIPLE BYPASS, get PMS directly from RSA decryption. - * Use PK11_PrivDecryptPKCS1 to decrypt the PMS to a buffer, - * then, check for version rollback attack, then - * do the equivalent of ssl3_DeriveMasterSecret, placing the MS in - * pwSpec->msItem. Finally call ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec with - * ss and NULL, so that it will use the MS we've already derived here. - */ - - rv = PK11_PrivDecryptPKCS1(serverKey, rsaPmsBuf, &outLen, - sizeof rsaPmsBuf, enc_pms.data, enc_pms.len); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - /* triple bypass failed. Let's try for a double bypass. */ - goto double_bypass; - } else if (ss->opt.detectRollBack) { - SSL3ProtocolVersion client_version = - (rsaPmsBuf[0] << 8) | rsaPmsBuf[1]; - - if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { - client_version = dtls_DTLSVersionToTLSVersion(client_version); - } - - if (client_version != ss->clientHelloVersion) { - /* Version roll-back detected. ensure failure. */ - rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(rsaPmsBuf, sizeof rsaPmsBuf); - } - } - /* have PMS, build MS without PKCS11 */ - rv = ssl3_MasterSecretDeriveBypass(pwSpec, cr, sr, &pmsItem, isTLS, - PR_TRUE); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - pwSpec->msItem.data = pwSpec->raw_master_secret; - pwSpec->msItem.len = SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH; - PK11_GenerateRandom(pwSpec->msItem.data, pwSpec->msItem.len); - } - rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(ss, NULL); - } else -#endif - { - PK11SymKey *tmpPms[2] = {NULL, NULL}; - PK11SlotInfo *slot; - int useFauxPms = 0; #define currentPms tmpPms[!useFauxPms] -#define unusedPms tmpPms[useFauxPms] -#define realPms tmpPms[1] -#define fauxPms tmpPms[0] +#define unusedPms tmpPms[useFauxPms] +#define realPms tmpPms[1] +#define fauxPms tmpPms[0] -#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS -double_bypass: -#endif + /* + * Get as close to algorithm 2 from RFC 5246; Section 7.4.7.1 + * as we can within the constraints of the PKCS#11 interface. + * + * 1. Unconditionally generate a bogus PMS (what RFC 5246 + * calls R). + * 2. Attempt the RSA decryption to recover the PMS (what + * RFC 5246 calls M). + * 3. Set PMS = (M == NULL) ? R : M + * 4. Use ssl3_ComputeMasterSecret(PMS) to attempt to derive + * the MS from PMS. This includes performing the version + * check and length check. + * 5. If either the initial RSA decryption failed or + * ssl3_ComputeMasterSecret(PMS) failed, then discard + * M and set PMS = R. Else, discard R and set PMS = M. + * + * We do two derivations here because we can't rely on having + * a function that only performs the PMS version and length + * check. The only redundant cost is that this runs the PRF, + * which isn't necessary here. + */ - /* - * Get as close to algorithm 2 from RFC 5246; Section 7.4.7.1 - * as we can within the constraints of the PKCS#11 interface. - * - * 1. Unconditionally generate a bogus PMS (what RFC 5246 - * calls R). - * 2. Attempt the RSA decryption to recover the PMS (what - * RFC 5246 calls M). - * 3. Set PMS = (M == NULL) ? R : M - * 4. Use ssl3_ComputeMasterSecret(PMS) to attempt to derive - * the MS from PMS. This includes performing the version - * check and length check. - * 5. If either the initial RSA decryption failed or - * ssl3_ComputeMasterSecret(PMS) failed, then discard - * M and set PMS = R. Else, discard R and set PMS = M. - * - * We do two derivations here because we can't rely on having - * a function that only performs the PMS version and length - * check. The only redundant cost is that this runs the PRF, - * which isn't necessary here. - */ + /* Generate the bogus PMS (R) */ + slot = PK11_GetSlotFromPrivateKey(serverKeyPair->privKey); + if (!slot) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } - /* Generate the bogus PMS (R) */ - slot = PK11_GetSlotFromPrivateKey(serverKey); + if (!PK11_DoesMechanism(slot, CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE)) { + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + slot = PK11_GetBestSlot(CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, NULL); if (!slot) { PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); return SECFailure; } + } - if (!PK11_DoesMechanism(slot, CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE)) { - PK11_FreeSlot(slot); - slot = PK11_GetBestSlot(CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, NULL); - if (!slot) { - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); - return SECFailure; - } - } - - ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); - fauxPms = ssl3_GenerateRSAPMS(ss, ss->ssl3.prSpec, slot); - ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); - PK11_FreeSlot(slot); - - if (fauxPms == NULL) { - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); - return SECFailure; - } + ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); + fauxPms = ssl3_GenerateRSAPMS(ss, ss->ssl3.prSpec, slot); + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); - /* - * unwrap pms out of the incoming buffer - * Note: CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE is NOT the mechanism used to do - * the unwrap. Rather, it is the mechanism with which the - * unwrapped pms will be used. - */ - realPms = PK11_PubUnwrapSymKey(serverKey, &enc_pms, - CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, CKA_DERIVE, 0); - /* Temporarily use the PMS if unwrapping the real PMS fails. */ - useFauxPms |= (realPms == NULL); + if (fauxPms == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } - /* Attempt to derive the MS from the PMS. This is the only way to - * check the version field in the RSA PMS. If this fails, we - * then use the faux PMS in place of the PMS. Note that this - * operation should never fail if we are using the faux PMS - * since it is correctly formatted. */ - rv = ssl3_ComputeMasterSecret(ss, currentPms, NULL); + /* + * unwrap pms out of the incoming buffer + * Note: CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE is NOT the mechanism used to do + * the unwrap. Rather, it is the mechanism with which the + * unwrapped pms will be used. + */ + realPms = PK11_PubUnwrapSymKey(serverKeyPair->privKey, &enc_pms, + CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, CKA_DERIVE, 0); + /* Temporarily use the PMS if unwrapping the real PMS fails. */ + useFauxPms |= (realPms == NULL); - /* If we succeeded, then select the true PMS and discard the - * FPMS. Else, select the FPMS and select the true PMS */ - useFauxPms |= (rv != SECSuccess); + /* Attempt to derive the MS from the PMS. This is the only way to + * check the version field in the RSA PMS. If this fails, we + * then use the faux PMS in place of the PMS. Note that this + * operation should never fail if we are using the faux PMS + * since it is correctly formatted. */ + rv = ssl3_ComputeMasterSecret(ss, currentPms, NULL); - if (unusedPms) { - PK11_FreeSymKey(unusedPms); - } + /* If we succeeded, then select the true PMS and discard the + * FPMS. Else, select the FPMS and select the true PMS */ + useFauxPms |= (rv != SECSuccess); - /* This step will derive the MS from the PMS, among other things. */ - rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(ss, currentPms); - PK11_FreeSymKey(currentPms); + if (unusedPms) { + PK11_FreeSymKey(unusedPms); } + /* This step will derive the MS from the PMS, among other things. */ + rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(ss, currentPms); + PK11_FreeSymKey(currentPms); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { - SEND_ALERT - return SECFailure; /* error code set by ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec */ + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, handshake_failure); + return SECFailure; /* error code set by ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec */ } #undef currentPms @@ -9884,238 +10026,231 @@ static SECStatus ssl3_HandleDHClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length, - SECKEYPublicKey *srvrPubKey, - SECKEYPrivateKey *serverKey) + sslKeyPair *serverKeyPair) { - PK11SymKey *pms; - SECStatus rv; - SECKEYPublicKey clntPubKey; - CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target; - PRBool isTLS; + PK11SymKey *pms; + SECStatus rv; + SECKEYPublicKey clntPubKey; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target; + PRBool isTLS; - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); - PORT_Assert( srvrPubKey ); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); clntPubKey.keyType = dhKey; - clntPubKey.u.dh.prime.len = srvrPubKey->u.dh.prime.len; - clntPubKey.u.dh.prime.data = srvrPubKey->u.dh.prime.data; - clntPubKey.u.dh.base.len = srvrPubKey->u.dh.base.len; - clntPubKey.u.dh.base.data = srvrPubKey->u.dh.base.data; + clntPubKey.u.dh.prime.len = serverKeyPair->pubKey->u.dh.prime.len; + clntPubKey.u.dh.prime.data = serverKeyPair->pubKey->u.dh.prime.data; + clntPubKey.u.dh.base.len = serverKeyPair->pubKey->u.dh.base.len; + clntPubKey.u.dh.base.data = serverKeyPair->pubKey->u.dh.base.data; rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &clntPubKey.u.dh.publicValue, - 2, &b, &length); + 2, &b, &length); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto loser; + return SECFailure; + } + + if (!ssl_IsValidDHEShare(&serverKeyPair->pubKey->u.dh.prime, + &clntPubKey.u.dh.publicValue)) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_DHE_KEY_SHARE); + return SECFailure; } isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); - if (isTLS) target = CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH; - else target = CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH; + if (isTLS) + target = CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH; + else + target = CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH; - /* Determine the PMS */ - pms = PK11_PubDerive(serverKey, &clntPubKey, PR_FALSE, NULL, NULL, + /* Determine the PMS */ + pms = PK11_PubDerive(serverKeyPair->privKey, &clntPubKey, PR_FALSE, NULL, NULL, CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, target, CKA_DERIVE, 0, NULL); if (pms == NULL) { - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); - goto loser; + ssl_FreeEphemeralKeyPairs(ss); + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; } - rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(ss, pms); - PK11_FreeSymKey(pms); pms = NULL; - -loser: - if (ss->dheKeyPair) { - ssl3_FreeKeyPair(ss->dheKeyPair); - ss->dheKeyPair = NULL; - } + rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(ss, pms); + PK11_FreeSymKey(pms); + ssl_FreeEphemeralKeyPairs(ss); return rv; } - -/* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete - * ssl3 ClientKeyExchange message from the remote client +/* Called from ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered + * a complete ssl3 ClientKeyExchange message from the remote client * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. */ static SECStatus ssl3_HandleClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length) { - SECKEYPrivateKey *serverKey = NULL; - SECStatus rv; + sslKeyPair *serverKeyPair = NULL; + SECStatus rv; const ssl3KEADef *kea_def; - ssl3KeyPair *serverKeyPair = NULL; - SECKEYPublicKey *serverPubKey = NULL; SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle client_key_exchange handshake", - SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_client_key) { - SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CLIENT_KEY_EXCH); - return SECFailure; - } - - kea_def = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def; - - if (ss->ssl3.hs.usedStepDownKey) { - PORT_Assert(kea_def->is_limited /* XXX OR cert is signing only */ - && kea_def->exchKeyType == kt_rsa - && ss->stepDownKeyPair != NULL); - if (!kea_def->is_limited || - kea_def->exchKeyType != kt_rsa || - ss->stepDownKeyPair == NULL) { - /* shouldn't happen, don't use step down if it does */ - goto skip; - } - serverKeyPair = ss->stepDownKeyPair; - ss->sec.keaKeyBits = EXPORT_RSA_KEY_LENGTH * BPB; - } else -skip: - if (kea_def->kea == kea_dhe_dss || - kea_def->kea == kea_dhe_rsa) { - if (ss->dheKeyPair) { - serverKeyPair = ss->dheKeyPair; - if (serverKeyPair->pubKey) { - ss->sec.keaKeyBits = - SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(serverKeyPair->pubKey); - } - } - } else -#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC - /* XXX Using SSLKEAType to index server certifiates - * does not work for (EC)DHE ciphers. Until we have - * an indexing mechanism general enough for all key - * exchange algorithms, we'll need to deal with each - * one seprately. - */ - if ((kea_def->kea == kea_ecdhe_rsa) || - (kea_def->kea == kea_ecdhe_ecdsa)) { - if (ss->ephemeralECDHKeyPair != NULL) { - serverKeyPair = ss->ephemeralECDHKeyPair; - if (serverKeyPair->pubKey) { - ss->sec.keaKeyBits = - SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(serverKeyPair->pubKey); - } - } - } else -#endif - { - sslServerCerts * sc = ss->serverCerts + kea_def->exchKeyType; - serverKeyPair = sc->serverKeyPair; - ss->sec.keaKeyBits = sc->serverKeyBits; + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CLIENT_KEY_EXCH); + return SECFailure; } - if (serverKeyPair) { - serverKey = serverKeyPair->privKey; + kea_def = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def; + + if (kea_def->ephemeral) { + sslEphemeralKeyPair *keyPair; + /* There should be exactly one pair. */ + PORT_Assert(!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs)); + PORT_Assert(PR_PREV_LINK(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs) == + PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs)); + keyPair = (sslEphemeralKeyPair *)PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs); + serverKeyPair = keyPair->keys; + ss->sec.keaKeyBits = + SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(serverKeyPair->pubKey); + } else { + serverKeyPair = ss->sec.serverCert->serverKeyPair; + ss->sec.keaKeyBits = ss->sec.serverCert->serverKeyBits; } - if (serverKey == NULL) { - SEND_ALERT - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_SERVER_KEY_FOR_ALG); - return SECFailure; + if (!serverKeyPair) { + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, handshake_failure); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_SERVER_KEY_FOR_ALG); + return SECFailure; } + PORT_Assert(serverKeyPair->pubKey); + PORT_Assert(serverKeyPair->privKey); - ss->sec.keaType = kea_def->exchKeyType; + ss->sec.keaType = kea_def->exchKeyType; switch (kea_def->exchKeyType) { - case kt_rsa: - rv = ssl3_HandleRSAClientKeyExchange(ss, b, length, serverKey); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - SEND_ALERT - return SECFailure; /* error code set */ - } - break; - - case ssl_kea_dh: - if (ss->dheKeyPair && ss->dheKeyPair->pubKey) { - serverPubKey = ss->dheKeyPair->pubKey; - } - if (!serverPubKey) { - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY_FAILURE); - return SECFailure; - } - rv = ssl3_HandleDHClientKeyExchange(ss, b, length, - serverPubKey, serverKey); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, handshake_failure); - return SECFailure; /* error code set */ - } - break; - -#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC - case kt_ecdh: - /* XXX We really ought to be able to store multiple - * EC certs (a requirement if we wish to support both - * ECDH-RSA and ECDH-ECDSA key exchanges concurrently). - * When we make that change, we'll need an index other - * than kt_ecdh to pick the right EC certificate. - */ - if (serverKeyPair) { - serverPubKey = serverKeyPair->pubKey; - } - if (serverPubKey == NULL) { - /* XXX Is this the right error code? */ - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY_FAILURE); - return SECFailure; - } - rv = ssl3_HandleECDHClientKeyExchange(ss, b, length, - serverPubKey, serverKey); - if (ss->ephemeralECDHKeyPair) { - ssl3_FreeKeyPair(ss->ephemeralECDHKeyPair); - ss->ephemeralECDHKeyPair = NULL; - } - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return SECFailure; /* error code set */ - } - break; -#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */ - - default: - (void) ssl3_HandshakeFailure(ss); - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG); - return SECFailure; - } - ss->ssl3.hs.ws = ss->sec.peerCert ? wait_cert_verify : wait_change_cipher; - return SECSuccess; + case ssl_kea_rsa: + rv = ssl3_HandleRSAClientKeyExchange(ss, b, length, serverKeyPair); + break; + + case ssl_kea_dh: + rv = ssl3_HandleDHClientKeyExchange(ss, b, length, serverKeyPair); + break; + + case ssl_kea_ecdh: + rv = ssl3_HandleECDHClientKeyExchange(ss, b, length, serverKeyPair); + break; + default: + (void)ssl3_HandshakeFailure(ss); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG); + return SECFailure; + } + ssl_FreeEphemeralKeyPairs(ss); + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = ss->sec.peerCert ? wait_cert_verify : wait_change_cipher; + } else { + /* PORT_SetError has been called by all the Handle*ClientKeyExchange + * functions above. However, not all error paths result in an alert, so + * this ensures that the server knows about the error. Note that if an + * alert was already sent, SSL3_SendAlert() is a noop. */ + PRErrorCode errCode = PORT_GetError(); + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, handshake_failure); + PORT_SetError(errCode); + } + return rv; } /* This is TLS's equivalent of sending a no_certificate alert. */ -static SECStatus +SECStatus ssl3_SendEmptyCertificate(sslSocket *ss) { - SECStatus rv; + SECStatus rv; + unsigned int len = 0; + PRBool isTLS13 = PR_FALSE; + const SECItem *context; - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, certificate, 3); - if (rv == SECSuccess) { - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 3); + if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.certificateRequest); + context = &ss->ssl3.hs.certificateRequest->context; + len = context->len + 1; + isTLS13 = PR_TRUE; } - return rv; /* error, if any, set by functions called above. */ + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, certificate, len + 3); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; + } + + if (isTLS13) { + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, context->data, context->len, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; + } + } + + return ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 3); } -SECStatus +/* + * NewSessionTicket + * Called from ssl3_HandleFinished + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_SendNewSessionTicket(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECItem ticket = { 0, NULL, 0 }; + SECStatus rv; + NewSessionTicket nticket = { 0 }; + + rv = ssl3_EncodeSessionTicket(ss, &nticket, &ticket); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + + /* Serialize the handshake message. Length = + * lifetime (4) + ticket length (2) + ticket. */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, new_session_ticket, + 4 + 2 + ticket.len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + + /* This is a fixed value. */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, TLS_EX_SESS_TICKET_LIFETIME_HINT, 4); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + + /* Encode the ticket. */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, ticket.data, ticket.len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + + rv = SECSuccess; + +loser: + if (ticket.data) { + SECITEM_FreeItem(&ticket, PR_FALSE); + } + return rv; +} + +static SECStatus ssl3_HandleNewSessionTicket(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length) { SECStatus rv; SECItem ticketData; SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle session_ticket handshake", - SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.ticket.data); PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.receivedNewSessionTicket); if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_new_session_ticket) { - SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET); - return SECFailure; + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET); + return SECFailure; } /* RFC5077 Section 3.3: "The client MUST NOT treat the ticket as valid @@ -10124,28 +10259,28 @@ ssl3_HandleNewSessionTicket(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length) */ ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.received_timestamp = ssl_Time(); if (length < 4) { - (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error); - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET); - return SECFailure; + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET); + return SECFailure; } ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.ticket_lifetime_hint = - (PRUint32)ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 4, &b, &length); + (PRUint32)ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 4, &b, &length); rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &ticketData, 2, &b, &length); if (rv != SECSuccess || length != 0) { - (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error); - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET); - return SECFailure; /* malformed */ + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET); + return SECFailure; /* malformed */ } /* If the server sent a zero-length ticket, ignore it and keep the * existing ticket. */ if (ticketData.len != 0) { - rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.ticket, - &ticketData); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return rv; - } - ss->ssl3.hs.receivedNewSessionTicket = PR_TRUE; + rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.ticket, + &ticketData); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; + } + ss->ssl3.hs.receivedNewSessionTicket = PR_TRUE; } ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_change_cipher; @@ -10155,54 +10290,54 @@ ssl3_HandleNewSessionTicket(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length) #ifdef NISCC_TEST static PRInt32 connNum = 0; -static SECStatus +static SECStatus get_fake_cert(SECItem *pCertItem, int *pIndex) { PRFileDesc *cf; - char * testdir; - char * startat; - char * stopat; + char *testdir; + char *startat; + char *stopat; const char *extension; - int fileNum; - PRInt32 numBytes = 0; - PRStatus prStatus; - PRFileInfo info; - char cfn[100]; + int fileNum; + PRInt32 numBytes = 0; + PRStatus prStatus; + PRFileInfo info; + char cfn[100]; pCertItem->data = 0; - if ((testdir = PR_GetEnv("NISCC_TEST")) == NULL) { - return SECSuccess; + if ((testdir = PR_GetEnvSecure("NISCC_TEST")) == NULL) { + return SECSuccess; } - *pIndex = (NULL != strstr(testdir, "root")); + *pIndex = (NULL != strstr(testdir, "root")); extension = (strstr(testdir, "simple") ? "" : ".der"); - fileNum = PR_ATOMIC_INCREMENT(&connNum) - 1; - if ((startat = PR_GetEnv("START_AT")) != NULL) { - fileNum += atoi(startat); + fileNum = PR_ATOMIC_INCREMENT(&connNum) - 1; + if ((startat = PR_GetEnvSecure("START_AT")) != NULL) { + fileNum += atoi(startat); } - if ((stopat = PR_GetEnv("STOP_AT")) != NULL && - fileNum >= atoi(stopat)) { - *pIndex = -1; - return SECSuccess; + if ((stopat = PR_GetEnvSecure("STOP_AT")) != NULL && + fileNum >= atoi(stopat)) { + *pIndex = -1; + return SECSuccess; } sprintf(cfn, "%s/%08d%s", testdir, fileNum, extension); cf = PR_Open(cfn, PR_RDONLY, 0); if (!cf) { - goto loser; + goto loser; } prStatus = PR_GetOpenFileInfo(cf, &info); if (prStatus != PR_SUCCESS) { - PR_Close(cf); - goto loser; + PR_Close(cf); + goto loser; } pCertItem = SECITEM_AllocItem(NULL, pCertItem, info.size); if (pCertItem) { - numBytes = PR_Read(cf, pCertItem->data, info.size); + numBytes = PR_Read(cf, pCertItem->data, info.size); } PR_Close(cf); if (numBytes != info.size) { - SECITEM_FreeItem(pCertItem, PR_FALSE); - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_IO); - goto loser; + SECITEM_FreeItem(pCertItem, PR_FALSE); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_IO); + goto loser; } fprintf(stderr, "using %s\n", cfn); return SECSuccess; @@ -10221,76 +10356,80 @@ loser: static SECStatus ssl3_SendCertificate(sslSocket *ss) { - SECStatus rv; + SECStatus rv; CERTCertificateList *certChain; - int len = 0; - int i; - SSL3KEAType certIndex; + int certChainLen = 0; + int i; #ifdef NISCC_TEST - SECItem fakeCert; - int ndex = -1; + SECItem fakeCert; + int ndex = -1; #endif + PRBool isTLS13 = ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3; + SECItem context = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + unsigned int contextLen = 0; SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send certificate handshake", - SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); if (ss->sec.localCert) - CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->sec.localCert); + CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->sec.localCert); if (ss->sec.isServer) { - sslServerCerts * sc = NULL; - - /* XXX SSLKEAType isn't really a good choice for - * indexing certificates (it breaks when we deal - * with (EC)DHE-* cipher suites. This hack ensures - * the RSA cert is picked for (EC)DHE-RSA. - * Revisit this when we add server side support - * for ECDHE-ECDSA or client-side authentication - * using EC certificates. - */ - if ((ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_ecdhe_rsa) || - (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_dhe_rsa)) { - certIndex = kt_rsa; - } else { - certIndex = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType; - } - sc = ss->serverCerts + certIndex; - certChain = sc->serverCertChain; - ss->sec.authKeyBits = sc->serverKeyBits; - ss->sec.authAlgorithm = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->signKeyType; - ss->sec.localCert = CERT_DupCertificate(sc->serverCert); + /* A server certificate is selected in ssl3_HandleClientHello. */ + PORT_Assert(ss->sec.serverCert); + + certChain = ss->sec.serverCert->serverCertChain; + ss->sec.localCert = CERT_DupCertificate(ss->sec.serverCert->serverCert); } else { - certChain = ss->ssl3.clientCertChain; - ss->sec.localCert = CERT_DupCertificate(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate); + certChain = ss->ssl3.clientCertChain; + ss->sec.localCert = CERT_DupCertificate(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate); } #ifdef NISCC_TEST rv = get_fake_cert(&fakeCert, &ndex); #endif + if (isTLS13) { + contextLen = 1; /* Size of the context length */ + if (!ss->sec.isServer) { + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.certificateRequest); + context = ss->ssl3.hs.certificateRequest->context; + contextLen += context.len; + } + } if (certChain) { - for (i = 0; i < certChain->len; i++) { + for (i = 0; i < certChain->len; i++) { #ifdef NISCC_TEST - if (fakeCert.len > 0 && i == ndex) { - len += fakeCert.len + 3; - } else { - len += certChain->certs[i].len + 3; - } + if (fakeCert.len > 0 && i == ndex) { + certChainLen += fakeCert.len + 3; + } else { + certChainLen += certChain->certs[i].len + 3; + } #else - len += certChain->certs[i].len + 3; + certChainLen += certChain->certs[i].len + 3; #endif - } + } } - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, certificate, len + 3); + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, certificate, + contextLen + certChainLen + 3); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + + if (isTLS13) { + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, context.data, + context.len, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } } - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, len, 3); + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, certChainLen, 3); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ } if (certChain) { for (i = 0; i < certChain->len; i++) { @@ -10308,7 +10447,7 @@ ssl3_SendCertificate(sslSocket *ss) certChain->certs[i].len, 3); #endif if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ } } } @@ -10320,54 +10459,49 @@ ssl3_SendCertificate(sslSocket *ss) * Used by server only. * single-stapling, send only a single cert status */ -static SECStatus +SECStatus ssl3_SendCertificateStatus(sslSocket *ss) { SECStatus rv; int len = 0; SECItemArray *statusToSend = NULL; - SSL3KEAType certIndex; + const sslServerCert *serverCert; SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send certificate status handshake", - SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); - PORT_Assert( ss->sec.isServer); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->sec.isServer); if (!ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_cert_status_xtn)) - return SECSuccess; + return SECSuccess; /* Use certStatus based on the cert being used. */ - if ((ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_ecdhe_rsa) || - (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_dhe_rsa)) { - certIndex = kt_rsa; - } else { - certIndex = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType; - } - if (ss->certStatusArray[certIndex] && ss->certStatusArray[certIndex]->len) { - statusToSend = ss->certStatusArray[certIndex]; + serverCert = ss->sec.serverCert; + if (serverCert->certStatusArray && serverCert->certStatusArray->len) { + statusToSend = serverCert->certStatusArray; } if (!statusToSend) - return SECSuccess; + return SECSuccess; /* Use the array's first item only (single stapling) */ len = 1 + statusToSend->items[0].len + 3; rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, certificate_status, len); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ } rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 1 /*ocsp*/, 1); if (rv != SECSuccess) - return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, - statusToSend->items[0].data, - statusToSend->items[0].len, - 3); + statusToSend->items[0].data, + statusToSend->items[0].len, + 3); if (rv != SECSuccess) - return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ return SECSuccess; } @@ -10375,30 +10509,38 @@ ssl3_SendCertificateStatus(sslSocket *ss) /* This is used to delete the CA certificates in the peer certificate chain * from the cert database after they've been validated. */ -static void +void ssl3_CleanupPeerCerts(sslSocket *ss) { - PLArenaPool * arena = ss->ssl3.peerCertArena; + PLArenaPool *arena = ss->ssl3.peerCertArena; ssl3CertNode *certs = (ssl3CertNode *)ss->ssl3.peerCertChain; for (; certs; certs = certs->next) { - CERT_DestroyCertificate(certs->cert); + CERT_DestroyCertificate(certs->cert); } - if (arena) PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE); + if (arena) + PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE); ss->ssl3.peerCertArena = NULL; ss->ssl3.peerCertChain = NULL; + + if (ss->sec.peerCert != NULL) { + if (ss->sec.peerKey) { + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(ss->sec.peerKey); + ss->sec.peerKey = NULL; + } + CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->sec.peerCert); + ss->sec.peerCert = NULL; + } } -/* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete - * ssl3 CertificateStatus message. +/* Called from ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered + * a complete ssl3 CertificateStatus message. * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. - * This is always called before ssl3_HandleCertificate, even if the Certificate - * message is sent first. */ static SECStatus ssl3_HandleCertificateStatus(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length) { - PRInt32 status, len; + SECStatus rv; if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_certificate_status) { (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); @@ -10406,84 +10548,96 @@ ssl3_HandleCertificateStatus(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length) return SECFailure; } + rv = ssl_ReadCertificateStatus(ss, b, length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* code already set */ + } + + return ssl3_AuthCertificate(ss); +} + +SECStatus +ssl_ReadCertificateStatus(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length) +{ + PRInt32 status, len; + PORT_Assert(!ss->sec.isServer); /* Consume the CertificateStatusType enum */ status = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 1, &b, &length); if (status != 1 /* ocsp */) { - goto format_loser; + ssl3_DecodeError(ss); /* sets error code */ + return SECFailure; } len = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 3, &b, &length); if (len != length) { - goto format_loser; + ssl3_DecodeError(ss); /* sets error code */ + return SECFailure; } -#define MAX_CERTSTATUS_LEN 0x1ffff /* 128k - 1 */ - if (length > MAX_CERTSTATUS_LEN) - goto format_loser; +#define MAX_CERTSTATUS_LEN 0x1ffff /* 128k - 1 */ + if (length > MAX_CERTSTATUS_LEN) { + ssl3_DecodeError(ss); /* sets error code */ + return SECFailure; + } #undef MAX_CERTSTATUS_LEN /* Array size 1, because we currently implement single-stapling only */ SECITEM_AllocArray(NULL, &ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus, 1); if (!ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus.items) - return SECFailure; + return SECFailure; /* code already set */ ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus.items[0].data = PORT_Alloc(length); if (!ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus.items[0].data) { SECITEM_FreeArray(&ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus, PR_FALSE); - return SECFailure; + return SECFailure; /* code already set */ } PORT_Memcpy(ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus.items[0].data, b, length); ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus.items[0].len = length; ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus.items[0].type = siBuffer; - - return ssl3_AuthCertificate(ss); - -format_loser: - return ssl3_DecodeError(ss); + return SECSuccess; } -/* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete - * ssl3 Certificate message. +/* Called from ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered + * a complete ssl3 Certificate message. * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. */ static SECStatus ssl3_HandleCertificate(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length) { - ssl3CertNode * c; - ssl3CertNode * lastCert = NULL; - PRInt32 remaining = 0; - PRInt32 size; - SECStatus rv; - PRBool isServer = (PRBool)(!!ss->sec.isServer); - PRBool isTLS; - SSL3AlertDescription desc; - int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERTIFICATE; - SECItem certItem; - SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle certificate handshake", - SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); - if ((isServer && ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_client_cert) || - (!isServer && ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_server_cert)) { - desc = unexpected_message; - errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERTIFICATE; - goto alert_loser; + if ((ss->sec.isServer && ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_client_cert) || + (!ss->sec.isServer && ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_server_cert)) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERTIFICATE); + return SECFailure; } - if (ss->sec.peerCert != NULL) { - if (ss->sec.peerKey) { - SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(ss->sec.peerKey); - ss->sec.peerKey = NULL; - } - CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->sec.peerCert); - ss->sec.peerCert = NULL; - } + return ssl3_CompleteHandleCertificate(ss, b, length); +} + +/* Called from ssl3_HandleCertificate + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_CompleteHandleCertificate(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length) +{ + ssl3CertNode *c; + ssl3CertNode *lastCert = NULL; + PRInt32 remaining = 0; + PRInt32 size; + SECStatus rv; + PRBool isServer = ss->sec.isServer; + PRBool isTLS; + SSL3AlertDescription desc; + int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERTIFICATE; + SECItem certItem; ssl3_CleanupPeerCerts(ss); isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); @@ -10493,98 +10647,103 @@ ssl3_HandleCertificate(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length) ** normal no_certificates message to maximize interoperability. */ if (length) { - remaining = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 3, &b, &length); - if (remaining < 0) - goto loser; /* fatal alert already sent by ConsumeHandshake. */ - if ((PRUint32)remaining > length) - goto decode_loser; + remaining = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 3, &b, &length); + if (remaining < 0) + goto loser; /* fatal alert already sent by ConsumeHandshake. */ + if ((PRUint32)remaining > length) + goto decode_loser; } if (!remaining) { - if (!(isTLS && isServer)) { - desc = bad_certificate; - goto alert_loser; - } - /* This is TLS's version of a no_certificate alert. */ - /* I'm a server. I've requested a client cert. He hasn't got one. */ - rv = ssl3_HandleNoCertificate(ss); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - errCode = PORT_GetError(); - goto loser; - } - ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_client_key; - return SECSuccess; + if (!(isTLS && isServer)) { + desc = bad_certificate; + goto alert_loser; + } + /* This is TLS's version of a no_certificate alert. */ + /* I'm a server. I've requested a client cert. He hasn't got one. */ + rv = ssl3_HandleNoCertificate(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto loser; + } + + if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_client_key; + } else { + TLS13_SET_HS_STATE(ss, wait_finished); + } + return SECSuccess; } ss->ssl3.peerCertArena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE); if (ss->ssl3.peerCertArena == NULL) { - goto loser; /* don't send alerts on memory errors */ + goto loser; /* don't send alerts on memory errors */ } /* First get the peer cert. */ remaining -= 3; if (remaining < 0) - goto decode_loser; + goto decode_loser; size = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 3, &b, &length); if (size <= 0) - goto loser; /* fatal alert already sent by ConsumeHandshake. */ + goto loser; /* fatal alert already sent by ConsumeHandshake. */ if (remaining < size) - goto decode_loser; + goto decode_loser; certItem.data = b; certItem.len = size; - b += size; + b += size; length -= size; remaining -= size; ss->sec.peerCert = CERT_NewTempCertificate(ss->dbHandle, &certItem, NULL, - PR_FALSE, PR_TRUE); + PR_FALSE, PR_TRUE); if (ss->sec.peerCert == NULL) { - /* We should report an alert if the cert was bad, but not if the - * problem was just some local problem, like memory error. - */ - goto ambiguous_err; + /* We should report an alert if the cert was bad, but not if the + * problem was just some local problem, like memory error. + */ + goto ambiguous_err; } /* Now get all of the CA certs. */ while (remaining > 0) { - remaining -= 3; - if (remaining < 0) - goto decode_loser; - - size = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 3, &b, &length); - if (size <= 0) - goto loser; /* fatal alert already sent by ConsumeHandshake. */ - - if (remaining < size) - goto decode_loser; - - certItem.data = b; - certItem.len = size; - b += size; - length -= size; - remaining -= size; - - c = PORT_ArenaNew(ss->ssl3.peerCertArena, ssl3CertNode); - if (c == NULL) { - goto loser; /* don't send alerts on memory errors */ - } - - c->cert = CERT_NewTempCertificate(ss->dbHandle, &certItem, NULL, - PR_FALSE, PR_TRUE); - if (c->cert == NULL) { - goto ambiguous_err; - } - - c->next = NULL; - if (lastCert) { - lastCert->next = c; - } else { - ss->ssl3.peerCertChain = c; - } - lastCert = c; + remaining -= 3; + if (remaining < 0) + goto decode_loser; + + size = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 3, &b, &length); + if (size <= 0) + goto loser; /* fatal alert already sent by ConsumeHandshake. */ + + if (remaining < size) + goto decode_loser; + + certItem.data = b; + certItem.len = size; + b += size; + length -= size; + remaining -= size; + + c = PORT_ArenaNew(ss->ssl3.peerCertArena, ssl3CertNode); + if (c == NULL) { + goto loser; /* don't send alerts on memory errors */ + } + + c->cert = CERT_NewTempCertificate(ss->dbHandle, &certItem, NULL, + PR_FALSE, PR_TRUE); + if (c->cert == NULL) { + goto ambiguous_err; + } + + c->next = NULL; + if (lastCert) { + lastCert->next = c; + } else { + ss->ssl3.peerCertChain = c; + } + lastCert = c; } if (remaining != 0) @@ -10592,11 +10751,13 @@ ssl3_HandleCertificate(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length) SECKEY_UpdateCertPQG(ss->sec.peerCert); - if (!isServer && ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_cert_status_xtn)) { - ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_certificate_status; - rv = SECSuccess; + if (!isServer && + ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 && + ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_cert_status_xtn)) { + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_certificate_status; + rv = SECSuccess; } else { - rv = ssl3_AuthCertificate(ss); /* sets ss->ssl3.hs.ws */ + rv = ssl3_AuthCertificate(ss); /* sets ss->ssl3.hs.ws */ } return rv; @@ -10604,14 +10765,14 @@ ssl3_HandleCertificate(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length) ambiguous_err: errCode = PORT_GetError(); switch (errCode) { - case PR_OUT_OF_MEMORY_ERROR: - case SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATABASE: - case SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY: - if (isTLS) { - desc = internal_error; - goto alert_loser; - } - goto loser; + case PR_OUT_OF_MEMORY_ERROR: + case SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATABASE: + case SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY: + if (isTLS) { + desc = internal_error; + goto alert_loser; + } + goto loser; } ssl3_SendAlertForCertError(ss, errCode); goto loser; @@ -10627,12 +10788,12 @@ loser: return SECFailure; } -static SECStatus +SECStatus ssl3_AuthCertificate(sslSocket *ss) { - SECStatus rv; - PRBool isServer = (PRBool)(!!ss->sec.isServer); - int errCode; + SECStatus rv; + PRBool isServer = ss->sec.isServer; + int errCode; ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending = PR_FALSE; @@ -10642,30 +10803,29 @@ ssl3_AuthCertificate(sslSocket *ss) * Ask caller-supplied callback function to validate cert chain. */ rv = (SECStatus)(*ss->authCertificate)(ss->authCertificateArg, ss->fd, - PR_TRUE, isServer); - if (rv) { - errCode = PORT_GetError(); - if (rv != SECWouldBlock) { - if (ss->handleBadCert) { - rv = (*ss->handleBadCert)(ss->badCertArg, ss->fd); - } - } - - if (rv == SECWouldBlock) { - if (ss->sec.isServer) { - errCode = SSL_ERROR_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_SERVERS; - rv = SECFailure; - goto loser; - } - - ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending = PR_TRUE; - rv = SECSuccess; - } - - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - ssl3_SendAlertForCertError(ss, errCode); - goto loser; - } + PR_TRUE, isServer); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + if (rv != SECWouldBlock) { + if (ss->handleBadCert) { + rv = (*ss->handleBadCert)(ss->badCertArg, ss->fd); + } + } + + if (rv == SECWouldBlock) { + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + errCode = SSL_ERROR_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_SERVERS; + goto loser; + } + + ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending = PR_TRUE; + rv = SECSuccess; + } + + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl3_SendAlertForCertError(ss, errCode); + goto loser; + } } ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCert = CERT_DupCertificate(ss->sec.peerCert); @@ -10673,84 +10833,106 @@ ssl3_AuthCertificate(sslSocket *ss) if (!ss->sec.isServer) { CERTCertificate *cert = ss->sec.peerCert; - /* set the server authentication and key exchange types and sizes - ** from the value in the cert. If the key exchange key is different, - ** it will get fixed when we handle the server key exchange message. - */ - SECKEYPublicKey * pubKey = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(cert); - ss->sec.authAlgorithm = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->signKeyType; - ss->sec.keaType = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType; - if (pubKey) { - KeyType pubKeyType; - PRInt32 minKey; - ss->sec.keaKeyBits = ss->sec.authKeyBits = - SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(pubKey); + /* set the server authentication type and size from the value + ** in the cert. */ + SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(cert); + if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + /* These are filled in in tls13_HandleCertificateVerify and + * tls13_HandleServerKeyShare. */ + ss->sec.authType = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->authKeyType; + ss->sec.keaType = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType; + } + if (pubKey) { + KeyType pubKeyType; + PRInt32 minKey; + /* This partly fixes Bug 124230 and may cause problems for + * callers which depend on the old (wrong) behavior. */ + ss->sec.authKeyBits = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(pubKey); pubKeyType = SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(pubKey); - minKey = ss->sec.authKeyBits; - switch (pubKeyType) { - case rsaKey: - case rsaPssKey: - case rsaOaepKey: - rv = NSS_OptionGet(NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &minKey); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - minKey = SSL_RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS; - } - break; - case dsaKey: - rv = NSS_OptionGet(NSS_DSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &minKey); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - minKey = SSL_DSA_MIN_P_BITS; - } - break; - case dhKey: - rv = NSS_OptionGet(NSS_DH_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &minKey); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - minKey = SSL_DH_MIN_P_BITS; - } - break; - default: - break; - } + minKey = ss->sec.authKeyBits; + switch (pubKeyType) { + case rsaKey: + case rsaPssKey: + case rsaOaepKey: + rv = + NSS_OptionGet(NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &minKey); + if (rv != + SECSuccess) { + minKey = + SSL_RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS; + } + break; + case dsaKey: + rv = + NSS_OptionGet(NSS_DSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &minKey); + if (rv != + SECSuccess) { + minKey = + SSL_DSA_MIN_P_BITS; + } + break; + case dhKey: + rv = + NSS_OptionGet(NSS_DH_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &minKey); + if (rv != + SECSuccess) { + minKey = + SSL_DH_MIN_P_BITS; + } + break; + default: + break; + } /* Too small: not good enough. Send a fatal alert. */ /* We aren't checking EC here on the understanding that we only * support curves we like, a decision that might need revisiting. */ - if ( ss->sec.authKeyBits < minKey) { + if (ss->sec.authKeyBits < minKey) { PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_WEAK_SERVER_CERT_KEY); (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0 - ? insufficient_security - : illegal_parameter); + ? insufficient_security + : illegal_parameter); SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey); return SECFailure; } - SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey); - pubKey = NULL; - } - - /* Ephemeral suites require ServerKeyExchange. Export cipher suites - * with RSA key exchange also require ServerKeyExchange if the - * authentication key exceeds the key size limit. */ - if (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->ephemeral || - (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->is_limited && - ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType == ssl_kea_rsa && - ss->sec.authKeyBits > ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->key_size_limit)) { - ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_server_key; /* require server_key_exchange */ + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey); + pubKey = NULL; + } + + if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + TLS13_SET_HS_STATE(ss, wait_cert_verify); } else { - ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_cert_request; /* disallow server_key_exchange */ + /* Ephemeral suites require ServerKeyExchange. */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->ephemeral) { + /* require server_key_exchange */ + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_server_key; + } else { + /* disallow server_key_exchange */ + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_cert_request; + /* This is static RSA key exchange so set the key exchange + * details to compensate for that. */ + ss->sec.keaKeyBits = ss->sec.authKeyBits; + ss->sec.signatureScheme = ssl_sig_none; + ss->sec.keaGroup = NULL; + } } } else { - ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_client_key; + /* Server */ + if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_client_key; + } else { + TLS13_SET_HS_STATE(ss, wait_cert_verify); + } } PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - errCode = SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE; - rv = SECFailure; - goto loser; + errCode = SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE; + goto loser; } - return rv; + return SECSuccess; loser: (void)ssl_MapLowLevelError(errCode); @@ -10760,7 +10942,7 @@ loser: static SECStatus ssl3_FinishHandshake(sslSocket *ss); static SECStatus -ssl3_AlwaysFail(sslSocket * ss) +ssl3_AlwaysFail(sslSocket *ss) { PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_STATE_ERROR); return SECFailure; @@ -10776,61 +10958,63 @@ ssl3_AuthCertificateComplete(sslSocket *ss, PRErrorCode error) PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss)); if (ss->sec.isServer) { - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_SERVERS); - return SECFailure; + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_SERVERS); + return SECFailure; } ssl_GetRecvBufLock(ss); ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); if (!ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending) { - PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_STATE_ERROR); - rv = SECFailure; - goto done; + PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_STATE_ERROR); + rv = SECFailure; + goto done; } ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending = PR_FALSE; if (error != 0) { - ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget = ssl3_AlwaysFail; - ssl3_SendAlertForCertError(ss, error); - rv = SECSuccess; + ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget = ssl3_AlwaysFail; + ssl3_SendAlertForCertError(ss, error); + rv = SECSuccess; } else if (ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget != NULL) { - sslRestartTarget target = ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget; - ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget = NULL; - - if (target == ssl3_FinishHandshake) { - SSL_TRC(3,("%d: SSL3[%p]: certificate authentication lost the race" - " with peer's finished message", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); - } - - rv = target(ss); - /* Even if we blocked here, we have accomplished enough to claim - * success. Any remaining work will be taken care of by subsequent - * calls to SSL_ForceHandshake/PR_Send/PR_Read/etc. - */ - if (rv == SECWouldBlock) { - rv = SECSuccess; - } + sslRestartTarget target = ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget; + ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget = NULL; + + if (target == ssl3_FinishHandshake) { + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%p]: certificate authentication lost the race" + " with peer's finished message", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + } + + rv = target(ss); + /* Even if we blocked here, we have accomplished enough to claim + * success. Any remaining work will be taken care of by subsequent + * calls to SSL_ForceHandshake/PR_Send/PR_Read/etc. + */ + if (rv == SECWouldBlock) { + rv = SECSuccess; + } } else { - SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%p]: certificate authentication won the race with" - " peer's finished message", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); - - PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming); - PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.ws != idle_handshake); - - if (ss->opt.enableFalseStart && - !ss->firstHsDone && - !ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming && - ssl3_WaitingForStartOfServerSecondRound(ss)) { - /* ssl3_SendClientSecondRound deferred the false start check because - * certificate authentication was pending, so we do it now if we still - * haven't received any of the server's second round yet. - */ - rv = ssl3_CheckFalseStart(ss); - } else { - rv = SECSuccess; - } + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%p]: certificate authentication won the race with" + " peer's finished message", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming); + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.ws != idle_handshake); + + if (ss->opt.enableFalseStart && + !ss->firstHsDone && + !ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming && + ssl3_WaitingForServerSecondRound(ss)) { + /* ssl3_SendClientSecondRound deferred the false start check because + * certificate authentication was pending, so we do it now if we still + * haven't received all of the server's second round yet. + */ + rv = ssl3_CheckFalseStart(ss); + } else { + rv = SECSuccess; + } } done: @@ -10841,44 +11025,44 @@ done: } static SECStatus -ssl3_ComputeTLSFinished(ssl3CipherSpec *spec, - PRBool isServer, - const SSL3Hashes * hashes, - TLSFinished * tlsFinished) +ssl3_ComputeTLSFinished(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec, + PRBool isServer, + const SSL3Hashes *hashes, + TLSFinished *tlsFinished) { SECStatus rv; CK_TLS_MAC_PARAMS tls_mac_params; - SECItem param = {siBuffer, NULL, 0}; + SECItem param = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; PK11Context *prf_context; unsigned int retLen; - if (!spec->master_secret || spec->bypassCiphers) { - const char *label = isServer ? "server finished" : "client finished"; - unsigned int len = 15; - - return ssl3_TLSPRFWithMasterSecret(spec, label, len, hashes->u.raw, - hashes->len, tlsFinished->verify_data, - sizeof tlsFinished->verify_data); + if (!spec->master_secret) { + const char *label = isServer ? "server finished" : "client finished"; + unsigned int len = 15; + HASH_HashType hashType = ssl3_GetTls12HashType(ss); + return ssl3_TLSPRFWithMasterSecret(spec, label, len, hashes->u.raw, + hashes->len, tlsFinished->verify_data, + sizeof tlsFinished->verify_data, hashType); } if (spec->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { - tls_mac_params.prfMechanism = CKM_TLS_PRF; + tls_mac_params.prfMechanism = CKM_TLS_PRF; } else { - tls_mac_params.prfMechanism = CKM_SHA256; + tls_mac_params.prfMechanism = ssl3_GetPrfHashMechanism(ss); } tls_mac_params.ulMacLength = 12; tls_mac_params.ulServerOrClient = isServer ? 1 : 2; param.data = (unsigned char *)&tls_mac_params; param.len = sizeof(tls_mac_params); prf_context = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(CKM_TLS_MAC, CKA_SIGN, - spec->master_secret, ¶m); + spec->master_secret, ¶m); if (!prf_context) - return SECFailure; + return SECFailure; - rv = PK11_DigestBegin(prf_context); + rv = PK11_DigestBegin(prf_context); rv |= PK11_DigestOp(prf_context, hashes->u.raw, hashes->len); rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(prf_context, tlsFinished->verify_data, &retLen, - sizeof tlsFinished->verify_data); + sizeof tlsFinished->verify_data); PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || retLen == sizeof tlsFinished->verify_data); PK11_DestroyContext(prf_context, PR_TRUE); @@ -10892,55 +11076,36 @@ ssl3_ComputeTLSFinished(ssl3CipherSpec *spec, */ SECStatus ssl3_TLSPRFWithMasterSecret(ssl3CipherSpec *spec, const char *label, - unsigned int labelLen, const unsigned char *val, unsigned int valLen, - unsigned char *out, unsigned int outLen) + unsigned int labelLen, const unsigned char *val, unsigned int valLen, + unsigned char *out, unsigned int outLen, HASH_HashType tls12HashType) { SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; - if (spec->master_secret && !spec->bypassCiphers) { - SECItem param = {siBuffer, NULL, 0}; - CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech = CKM_TLS_PRF_GENERAL; - PK11Context *prf_context; - unsigned int retLen; - - if (spec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { - mech = CKM_NSS_TLS_PRF_GENERAL_SHA256; - } - prf_context = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(mech, CKA_SIGN, - spec->master_secret, ¶m); - if (!prf_context) - return SECFailure; - - rv = PK11_DigestBegin(prf_context); - rv |= PK11_DigestOp(prf_context, (unsigned char *) label, labelLen); - rv |= PK11_DigestOp(prf_context, val, valLen); - rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(prf_context, out, &retLen, outLen); - PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || retLen == outLen); - - PK11_DestroyContext(prf_context, PR_TRUE); + if (spec->master_secret) { + SECItem param = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech = CKM_TLS_PRF_GENERAL; + PK11Context *prf_context; + unsigned int retLen; + + if (spec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { + mech = CKM_NSS_TLS_PRF_GENERAL_SHA256; + } + prf_context = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(mech, CKA_SIGN, + spec->master_secret, ¶m); + if (!prf_context) + return SECFailure; + + rv = PK11_DigestBegin(prf_context); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(prf_context, (unsigned char *)label, labelLen); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(prf_context, val, valLen); + rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(prf_context, out, &retLen, outLen); + PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || retLen == outLen); + + PK11_DestroyContext(prf_context, PR_TRUE); } else { - /* bypass PKCS11 */ -#ifdef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS - PORT_Assert(spec->master_secret); - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); - rv = SECFailure; -#else - SECItem inData = { siBuffer, }; - SECItem outData = { siBuffer, }; - PRBool isFIPS = PR_FALSE; - - inData.data = (unsigned char *) val; - inData.len = valLen; - outData.data = out; - outData.len = outLen; - if (spec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { - rv = TLS_P_hash(HASH_AlgSHA256, &spec->msItem, label, &inData, - &outData, isFIPS); - } else { - rv = TLS_PRF(&spec->msItem, label, &inData, &outData, isFIPS); - } - PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || outData.len == outLen); -#endif + PORT_Assert(spec->master_secret); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + rv = SECFailure; } return rv; } @@ -10953,31 +11118,32 @@ ssl3_SendNextProto(sslSocket *ss) { SECStatus rv; int padding_len; - static const unsigned char padding[32] = {0}; + static const unsigned char padding[32] = { 0 }; - if (ss->ssl3.nextProto.len == 0 || - ss->ssl3.nextProtoState == SSL_NEXT_PROTO_SELECTED) { - return SECSuccess; + if (ss->xtnData.nextProto.len == 0 || + ss->xtnData.nextProtoState == SSL_NEXT_PROTO_SELECTED) { + return SECSuccess; } - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); - padding_len = 32 - ((ss->ssl3.nextProto.len + 2) % 32); + padding_len = 32 - ((ss->xtnData.nextProto.len + 2) % 32); - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, next_proto, ss->ssl3.nextProto.len + - 2 + padding_len); + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, next_proto, ss->xtnData.nextProto.len + + 2 + + padding_len); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshakeHeader */ + return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshakeHeader */ } - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, ss->ssl3.nextProto.data, - ss->ssl3.nextProto.len, 1); + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, ss->xtnData.nextProto.data, + ss->xtnData.nextProto.len, 1); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake */ + return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake */ } rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, padding, padding_len, 1); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake */ + return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake */ } return rv; } @@ -10989,31 +11155,32 @@ ssl3_SendNextProto(sslSocket *ss) static void ssl3_RecordKeyLog(sslSocket *ss) { +#ifdef NSS_ALLOW_SSLKEYLOGFILE SECStatus rv; SECItem *keyData; char buf[14 /* "CLIENT_RANDOM " */ + - SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH*2 /* client_random */ + - 1 /* " " */ + - 48*2 /* master secret */ + + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH * 2 /* client_random */ + + 1 /* " " */ + + 48 * 2 /* master secret */ + 1 /* new line */]; unsigned int j; - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); if (!ssl_keylog_iob) - return; + return; rv = PK11_ExtractKeyValue(ss->ssl3.cwSpec->master_secret); if (rv != SECSuccess) - return; + return; ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); /* keyData does not need to be freed. */ keyData = PK11_GetKeyData(ss->ssl3.cwSpec->master_secret); if (!keyData || !keyData->data || keyData->len != 48) { - ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); - return; + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); + return; } /* https://developer.mozilla.org/en/NSS_Key_Log_Format */ @@ -11025,10 +11192,10 @@ ssl3_RecordKeyLog(sslSocket *ss) memcpy(buf, "CLIENT_RANDOM ", 14); j = 14; hexEncode(buf + j, ss->ssl3.hs.client_random.rand, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); - j += SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH*2; + j += SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH * 2; buf[j++] = ' '; hexEncode(buf + j, keyData->data, 48); - j += 48*2; + j += 48 * 2; buf[j++] = '\n'; PORT_Assert(j == sizeof(buf)); @@ -11039,6 +11206,7 @@ ssl3_RecordKeyLog(sslSocket *ss) return; fflush(ssl_keylog_iob); return; +#endif } /* called from ssl3_SendClientSecondRound @@ -11049,59 +11217,59 @@ static SECStatus ssl3_SendFinished(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 flags) { ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec; - PRBool isTLS; - PRBool isServer = ss->sec.isServer; - SECStatus rv; - SSL3Sender sender = isServer ? sender_server : sender_client; - SSL3Hashes hashes; - TLSFinished tlsFinished; + PRBool isTLS; + PRBool isServer = ss->sec.isServer; + SECStatus rv; + SSL3Sender sender = isServer ? sender_server : sender_client; + SSL3Hashes hashes; + TLSFinished tlsFinished; SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send finished handshake", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); cwSpec = ss->ssl3.cwSpec; isTLS = (PRBool)(cwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(ss, cwSpec, &hashes, sender); if (isTLS && rv == SECSuccess) { - rv = ssl3_ComputeTLSFinished(cwSpec, isServer, &hashes, &tlsFinished); + rv = ssl3_ComputeTLSFinished(ss, cwSpec, isServer, &hashes, &tlsFinished); } ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto fail; /* err code was set by ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes */ + goto fail; /* err code was set by ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes */ } if (isTLS) { - if (isServer) - ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.tFinished[1] = tlsFinished; - else - ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.tFinished[0] = tlsFinished; - ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes = sizeof tlsFinished; - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, finished, sizeof tlsFinished); - if (rv != SECSuccess) - goto fail; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, &tlsFinished, sizeof tlsFinished); - if (rv != SECSuccess) - goto fail; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + if (isServer) + ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.tFinished[1] = tlsFinished; + else + ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.tFinished[0] = tlsFinished; + ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes = sizeof tlsFinished; + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, finished, sizeof tlsFinished); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto fail; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, &tlsFinished, sizeof tlsFinished); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto fail; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ } else { - if (isServer) - ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.sFinished[1] = hashes.u.s; - else - ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.sFinished[0] = hashes.u.s; - PORT_Assert(hashes.len == sizeof hashes.u.s); - ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes = sizeof hashes.u.s; - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, finished, sizeof hashes.u.s); - if (rv != SECSuccess) - goto fail; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ - rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, &hashes.u.s, sizeof hashes.u.s); - if (rv != SECSuccess) - goto fail; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + if (isServer) + ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.sFinished[1] = hashes.u.s; + else + ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.sFinished[0] = hashes.u.s; + PORT_Assert(hashes.len == sizeof hashes.u.s); + ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes = sizeof hashes.u.s; + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, finished, sizeof hashes.u.s); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto fail; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, &hashes.u.s, sizeof hashes.u.s); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto fail; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ } rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, flags); if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto fail; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */ + goto fail; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */ } ssl3_RecordKeyLog(ss); @@ -11117,298 +11285,315 @@ fail: */ SECStatus ssl3_CacheWrappedMasterSecret(sslSocket *ss, sslSessionID *sid, - ssl3CipherSpec *spec, SSL3KEAType effectiveExchKeyType) -{ - PK11SymKey * wrappingKey = NULL; - PK11SlotInfo * symKeySlot; - void * pwArg = ss->pkcs11PinArg; - SECStatus rv = SECFailure; - PRBool isServer = ss->sec.isServer; - CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism = CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM; + ssl3CipherSpec *spec, SSLAuthType authType) +{ + PK11SymKey *wrappingKey = NULL; + PK11SlotInfo *symKeySlot; + void *pwArg = ss->pkcs11PinArg; + SECStatus rv = SECFailure; + PRBool isServer = ss->sec.isServer; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism = CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM; + symKeySlot = PK11_GetSlotFromKey(spec->master_secret); if (!isServer) { - int wrapKeyIndex; - int incarnation; - - /* these next few functions are mere accessors and don't fail. */ - sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapIndex = wrapKeyIndex = - PK11_GetCurrentWrapIndex(symKeySlot); - PORT_Assert(wrapKeyIndex == 0); /* array has only one entry! */ - - sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapSeries = incarnation = - PK11_GetSlotSeries(symKeySlot); - sid->u.ssl3.masterSlotID = PK11_GetSlotID(symKeySlot); - sid->u.ssl3.masterModuleID = PK11_GetModuleID(symKeySlot); - sid->u.ssl3.masterValid = PR_TRUE; - /* Get the default wrapping key, for wrapping the master secret before - * placing it in the SID cache entry. */ - wrappingKey = PK11_GetWrapKey(symKeySlot, wrapKeyIndex, - CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, incarnation, - pwArg); - if (wrappingKey) { - mechanism = PK11_GetMechanism(wrappingKey); /* can't fail. */ - } else { - int keyLength; - /* if the wrappingKey doesn't exist, attempt to create it. - * Note: we intentionally ignore errors here. If we cannot - * generate a wrapping key, it is not fatal to this SSL connection, - * but we will not be able to restart this session. - */ - mechanism = PK11_GetBestWrapMechanism(symKeySlot); - keyLength = PK11_GetBestKeyLength(symKeySlot, mechanism); - /* Zero length means fixed key length algorithm, or error. - * It's ambiguous. - */ - wrappingKey = PK11_KeyGen(symKeySlot, mechanism, NULL, - keyLength, pwArg); - if (wrappingKey) { - PK11_SetWrapKey(symKeySlot, wrapKeyIndex, wrappingKey); - } - } + int wrapKeyIndex; + int incarnation; + + /* these next few functions are mere accessors and don't fail. */ + sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapIndex = wrapKeyIndex = + PK11_GetCurrentWrapIndex(symKeySlot); + PORT_Assert(wrapKeyIndex == 0); /* array has only one entry! */ + + sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapSeries = incarnation = + PK11_GetSlotSeries(symKeySlot); + sid->u.ssl3.masterSlotID = PK11_GetSlotID(symKeySlot); + sid->u.ssl3.masterModuleID = PK11_GetModuleID(symKeySlot); + sid->u.ssl3.masterValid = PR_TRUE; + /* Get the default wrapping key, for wrapping the master secret before + * placing it in the SID cache entry. */ + wrappingKey = PK11_GetWrapKey(symKeySlot, wrapKeyIndex, + CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, incarnation, + pwArg); + if (wrappingKey) { + mechanism = PK11_GetMechanism(wrappingKey); /* can't fail. */ + } else { + int keyLength; + /* if the wrappingKey doesn't exist, attempt to create it. + * Note: we intentionally ignore errors here. If we cannot + * generate a wrapping key, it is not fatal to this SSL connection, + * but we will not be able to restart this session. + */ + mechanism = PK11_GetBestWrapMechanism(symKeySlot); + keyLength = PK11_GetBestKeyLength(symKeySlot, mechanism); + /* Zero length means fixed key length algorithm, or error. + * It's ambiguous. + */ + wrappingKey = PK11_KeyGen(symKeySlot, mechanism, NULL, + keyLength, pwArg); + if (wrappingKey) { + PK11_SetWrapKey(symKeySlot, wrapKeyIndex, wrappingKey); + } + } } else { - /* server socket using session cache. */ - mechanism = PK11_GetBestWrapMechanism(symKeySlot); - if (mechanism != CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM) { - wrappingKey = - getWrappingKey(ss, symKeySlot, effectiveExchKeyType, - mechanism, pwArg); - if (wrappingKey) { - mechanism = PK11_GetMechanism(wrappingKey); /* can't fail. */ - } - } + /* server socket using session cache. */ + mechanism = PK11_GetBestWrapMechanism(symKeySlot); + if (mechanism != CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM) { + wrappingKey = + ssl3_GetWrappingKey(ss, symKeySlot, ss->sec.serverCert, + mechanism, pwArg); + if (wrappingKey) { + mechanism = PK11_GetMechanism(wrappingKey); /* can't fail. */ + } + } } sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech = mechanism; PK11_FreeSlot(symKeySlot); if (wrappingKey) { - SECItem wmsItem; + SECItem wmsItem; - wmsItem.data = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret; - wmsItem.len = sizeof sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret; - rv = PK11_WrapSymKey(mechanism, NULL, wrappingKey, - spec->master_secret, &wmsItem); - /* rv is examined below. */ - sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len = wmsItem.len; - PK11_FreeSymKey(wrappingKey); + wmsItem.data = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret; + wmsItem.len = sizeof sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret; + rv = PK11_WrapSymKey(mechanism, NULL, wrappingKey, + spec->master_secret, &wmsItem); + /* rv is examined below. */ + sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len = wmsItem.len; + PK11_FreeSymKey(wrappingKey); } return rv; } -/* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete - * ssl3 Finished message from the peer. +/* Called from ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered + * a complete ssl3 Finished message from the peer. * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. */ static SECStatus ssl3_HandleFinished(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length, - const SSL3Hashes *hashes) + const SSL3Hashes *hashes) { - sslSessionID * sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; - SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; - PRBool isServer = ss->sec.isServer; - PRBool isTLS; - SSL3KEAType effectiveExchKeyType; + sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + PRBool isServer = ss->sec.isServer; + PRBool isTLS; - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle finished handshake", - SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_finished) { - SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_FINISHED); - return SECFailure; + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_FINISHED); + return SECFailure; } if (!hashes) { PORT_Assert(0); - SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, internal_error); + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, internal_error); PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); return SECFailure; } isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.crSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); if (isTLS) { - TLSFinished tlsFinished; - - if (length != sizeof tlsFinished) { - (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error); - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_FINISHED); - return SECFailure; - } - rv = ssl3_ComputeTLSFinished(ss->ssl3.crSpec, !isServer, - hashes, &tlsFinished); - if (!isServer) - ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.tFinished[1] = tlsFinished; - else - ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.tFinished[0] = tlsFinished; - ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes = sizeof tlsFinished; - if (rv != SECSuccess || - 0 != NSS_SecureMemcmp(&tlsFinished, b, length)) { - (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decrypt_error); - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE); - return SECFailure; - } + TLSFinished tlsFinished; + + if (length != sizeof(tlsFinished)) { +#ifndef UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_FINISHED); + return SECFailure; +#endif + } + rv = ssl3_ComputeTLSFinished(ss, ss->ssl3.crSpec, !isServer, + hashes, &tlsFinished); + if (!isServer) + ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.tFinished[1] = tlsFinished; + else + ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.tFinished[0] = tlsFinished; + ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes = sizeof(tlsFinished); + if (rv != SECSuccess || + 0 != NSS_SecureMemcmp(&tlsFinished, b, + PR_MIN(length, ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes))) { +#ifndef UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decrypt_error); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE); + return SECFailure; +#endif + } } else { - if (length != sizeof(SSL3Finished)) { - (void)ssl3_IllegalParameter(ss); - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_FINISHED); - return SECFailure; - } - - if (!isServer) - ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.sFinished[1] = hashes->u.s; - else - ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.sFinished[0] = hashes->u.s; - PORT_Assert(hashes->len == sizeof hashes->u.s); - ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes = sizeof hashes->u.s; - if (0 != NSS_SecureMemcmp(&hashes->u.s, b, length)) { - (void)ssl3_HandshakeFailure(ss); - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE); - return SECFailure; - } - } - - ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); /*************************************/ + if (length != sizeof(SSL3Finished)) { + (void)ssl3_IllegalParameter(ss); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_FINISHED); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (!isServer) + ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.sFinished[1] = hashes->u.s; + else + ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.sFinished[0] = hashes->u.s; + PORT_Assert(hashes->len == sizeof hashes->u.s); + ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes = sizeof hashes->u.s; + if (0 != NSS_SecureMemcmp(&hashes->u.s, b, length)) { + (void)ssl3_HandshakeFailure(ss); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE); + return SECFailure; + } + } + + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); /*************************************/ if ((isServer && !ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming) || - (!isServer && ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming)) { - PRInt32 flags = 0; - - /* Send a NewSessionTicket message if the client sent us - * either an empty session ticket, or one that did not verify. - * (Note that if either of these conditions was met, then the - * server has sent a SessionTicket extension in the - * ServerHello message.) - */ - if (isServer && !ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming && - ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_session_ticket_xtn) && - ssl3_KEAAllowsSessionTicket(ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def->key_exchange_alg)) { - /* RFC 5077 Section 3.3: "In the case of a full handshake, the - * server MUST verify the client's Finished message before sending - * the ticket." Presumably, this also means that the client's - * certificate, if any, must be verified beforehand too. - */ - rv = ssl3_SendNewSessionTicket(ss); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto xmit_loser; - } - } - - rv = ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs(ss); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto xmit_loser; /* err is set. */ - } - /* If this thread is in SSL_SecureSend (trying to write some data) - ** then set the ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER flag, so that the - ** last two handshake messages (change cipher spec and finished) - ** will be sent in the same send/write call as the application data. - */ - if (ss->writerThread == PR_GetCurrentThread()) { - flags = ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER; - } - - if (!isServer && !ss->firstHsDone) { - rv = ssl3_SendNextProto(ss); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto xmit_loser; /* err code was set. */ - } - } - - if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { - flags |= ssl_SEND_FLAG_NO_RETRANSMIT; - } - - rv = ssl3_SendFinished(ss, flags); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto xmit_loser; /* err is set. */ - } + (!isServer && ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming)) { + PRInt32 flags = 0; + + /* Send a NewSessionTicket message if the client sent us + * either an empty session ticket, or one that did not verify. + * (Note that if either of these conditions was met, then the + * server has sent a SessionTicket extension in the + * ServerHello message.) + */ + if (isServer && !ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming && + ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_session_ticket_xtn) && + ssl3_KEASupportsTickets(ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def)) { + /* RFC 5077 Section 3.3: "In the case of a full handshake, the + * server MUST verify the client's Finished message before sending + * the ticket." Presumably, this also means that the client's + * certificate, if any, must be verified beforehand too. + */ + rv = ssl3_SendNewSessionTicket(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto xmit_loser; + } + } + + rv = ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto xmit_loser; /* err is set. */ + } + /* If this thread is in SSL_SecureSend (trying to write some data) + ** then set the ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER flag, so that the + ** last two handshake messages (change cipher spec and finished) + ** will be sent in the same send/write call as the application data. + */ + if (ss->writerThread == PR_GetCurrentThread()) { + flags = ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER; + } + + if (!isServer && !ss->firstHsDone) { + rv = ssl3_SendNextProto(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto xmit_loser; /* err code was set. */ + } + } + + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + flags |= ssl_SEND_FLAG_NO_RETRANSMIT; + } + + rv = ssl3_SendFinished(ss, flags); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto xmit_loser; /* err is set. */ + } } xmit_loser: - ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); /*************************************/ + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); /*************************************/ if (rv != SECSuccess) { return rv; } - if (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_ecdhe_rsa || - ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_dhe_rsa) { - effectiveExchKeyType = kt_rsa; - } else { - effectiveExchKeyType = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType; - } + if (sid->cached == never_cached && !ss->opt.noCache) { + rv = ssl3_FillInCachedSID(ss, sid); - if (sid->cached == never_cached && !ss->opt.noCache && ss->sec.cache) { - /* fill in the sid */ - sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite = ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite; - sid->u.ssl3.compression = ss->ssl3.hs.compression; - sid->u.ssl3.policy = ss->ssl3.policy; -#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC - sid->u.ssl3.negotiatedECCurves = ss->ssl3.hs.negotiatedECCurves; -#endif - sid->u.ssl3.exchKeyType = effectiveExchKeyType; - sid->version = ss->version; - sid->authAlgorithm = ss->sec.authAlgorithm; - sid->authKeyBits = ss->sec.authKeyBits; - sid->keaType = ss->sec.keaType; - sid->keaKeyBits = ss->sec.keaKeyBits; - sid->lastAccessTime = sid->creationTime = ssl_Time(); - sid->expirationTime = sid->creationTime + ssl3_sid_timeout; - sid->localCert = CERT_DupCertificate(ss->sec.localCert); - - ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); /*************************************/ - - /* Copy the master secret (wrapped or unwrapped) into the sid */ - if (ss->ssl3.crSpec->msItem.len && ss->ssl3.crSpec->msItem.data) { - sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len = - ss->ssl3.crSpec->msItem.len; - memcpy(sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret, - ss->ssl3.crSpec->msItem.data, ss->ssl3.crSpec->msItem.len); - sid->u.ssl3.masterValid = PR_TRUE; - sid->u.ssl3.keys.msIsWrapped = PR_FALSE; - rv = SECSuccess; - } else { - rv = ssl3_CacheWrappedMasterSecret(ss, ss->sec.ci.sid, - ss->ssl3.crSpec, - effectiveExchKeyType); - sid->u.ssl3.keys.msIsWrapped = PR_TRUE; - } - ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /*************************************/ - - /* If the wrap failed, we don't cache the sid. - * The connection continues normally however. - */ - ss->ssl3.hs.cacheSID = rv == SECSuccess; + /* If the wrap failed, we don't cache the sid. + * The connection continues normally however. + */ + ss->ssl3.hs.cacheSID = rv == SECSuccess; } if (ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending) { - if (ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget) { - PR_NOT_REACHED("ssl3_HandleFinished: unexpected restartTarget"); - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); - return SECFailure; - } + if (ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget) { + PR_NOT_REACHED("ssl3_HandleFinished: unexpected restartTarget"); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } - ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget = ssl3_FinishHandshake; - return SECWouldBlock; + ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget = ssl3_FinishHandshake; + return SECWouldBlock; } rv = ssl3_FinishHandshake(ss); return rv; } +SECStatus +ssl3_FillInCachedSID(sslSocket *ss, sslSessionID *sid) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + /* fill in the sid */ + sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite = ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite; + sid->u.ssl3.compression = ss->ssl3.hs.compression; + sid->u.ssl3.policy = ss->ssl3.policy; + sid->version = ss->version; + sid->authType = ss->sec.authType; + sid->authKeyBits = ss->sec.authKeyBits; + sid->keaType = ss->sec.keaType; + sid->keaKeyBits = ss->sec.keaKeyBits; + sid->lastAccessTime = sid->creationTime = ssl_Time(); + sid->expirationTime = sid->creationTime + ssl3_sid_timeout; + sid->localCert = CERT_DupCertificate(ss->sec.localCert); + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + memcpy(&sid->certType, &ss->sec.serverCert->certType, sizeof(sid->certType)); + } else { + sid->certType.authType = ssl_auth_null; + } + + if (ss->xtnData.nextProtoState != SSL_NEXT_PROTO_NO_SUPPORT && + ss->xtnData.nextProto.data) { + if (SECITEM_CopyItem( + NULL, &sid->u.ssl3.alpnSelection, &ss->xtnData.nextProto) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* error already set. */ + } + } + + ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); /*************************************/ + + /* Copy the master secret (wrapped or unwrapped) into the sid */ + if (ss->ssl3.crSpec->msItem.len && ss->ssl3.crSpec->msItem.data) { + sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len = + ss->ssl3.crSpec->msItem.len; + memcpy(sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret, + ss->ssl3.crSpec->msItem.data, ss->ssl3.crSpec->msItem.len); + sid->u.ssl3.masterValid = PR_TRUE; + sid->u.ssl3.keys.msIsWrapped = PR_FALSE; + rv = SECSuccess; + } else { + rv = ssl3_CacheWrappedMasterSecret(ss, ss->sec.ci.sid, + ss->ssl3.crSpec, + ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->authKeyType); + sid->u.ssl3.keys.msIsWrapped = PR_TRUE; + } + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /*************************************/ + + return rv; +} + /* The return type is SECStatus instead of void because this function needs * to have type sslRestartTarget. */ SECStatus -ssl3_FinishHandshake(sslSocket * ss) +ssl3_FinishHandshake(sslSocket *ss) { - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); - PORT_Assert( ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget == NULL ); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget == NULL); /* The first handshake is now completed. */ - ss->handshake = NULL; + ss->handshake = NULL; /* RFC 5077 Section 3.3: "The client MUST NOT treat the ticket as valid * until it has verified the server's Finished message." When the server @@ -11416,23 +11601,23 @@ ssl3_FinishHandshake(sslSocket * ss) * the handshake is finished (we have verified the server's Finished * AND the server's certificate) before we update the ticket in the sid. * - * This must be done before we call (*ss->sec.cache)(ss->sec.ci.sid) + * This must be done before we call ss->sec.cache(ss->sec.ci.sid) * because CacheSID requires the session ticket to already be set, and also * because of the lazy lock creation scheme used by CacheSID and * ssl3_SetSIDSessionTicket. */ if (ss->ssl3.hs.receivedNewSessionTicket) { - PORT_Assert(!ss->sec.isServer); - ssl3_SetSIDSessionTicket(ss->sec.ci.sid, &ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket); - /* The sid took over the ticket data */ - PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.ticket.data); + PORT_Assert(!ss->sec.isServer); + ssl3_SetSIDSessionTicket(ss->sec.ci.sid, &ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket); + /* The sid took over the ticket data */ + PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.ticket.data); ss->ssl3.hs.receivedNewSessionTicket = PR_FALSE; } if (ss->ssl3.hs.cacheSID) { - PORT_Assert(ss->sec.ci.sid->cached == never_cached); - (*ss->sec.cache)(ss->sec.ci.sid); - ss->ssl3.hs.cacheSID = PR_FALSE; + PORT_Assert(ss->sec.ci.sid->cached == never_cached); + ss->sec.cache(ss->sec.ci.sid); + ss->ssl3.hs.cacheSID = PR_FALSE; } ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart = PR_FALSE; /* False Start phase is complete */ @@ -11448,89 +11633,134 @@ ssl3_FinishHandshake(sslSocket * ss) * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. */ SECStatus -ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length) +ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length, + PRBool endOfRecord) { - SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; - SSL3HandshakeType type = ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type; - SSL3Hashes hashes; /* computed hashes are put here. */ - SSL3Hashes *hashesPtr = NULL; /* Set when hashes are computed */ - PRUint8 hdr[4]; - PRUint8 dtlsData[8]; - - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + SSL3HandshakeType type = ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type; + SSL3Hashes hashes; /* computed hashes are put here. */ + SSL3Hashes *hashesPtr = NULL; /* Set when hashes are computed */ + PRUint8 hdr[4]; + PRUint8 dtlsData[8]; + PRBool computeHashes = PR_FALSE; + PRUint16 epoch; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); /* * We have to compute the hashes before we update them with the * current message. */ - ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); /************************************/ - if(((type == finished) && (ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_finished)) || - ((type == certificate_verify) && (ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_cert_verify))) { - SSL3Sender sender = (SSL3Sender)0; - ssl3CipherSpec *rSpec = ss->ssl3.prSpec; - - if (type == finished) { - sender = ss->sec.isServer ? sender_client : sender_server; - rSpec = ss->ssl3.crSpec; - } - rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(ss, rSpec, &hashes, sender); + if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + if ((type == finished) && (ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_finished)) { + computeHashes = PR_TRUE; + } else if ((type == certificate_verify) && (ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_cert_verify)) { + if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_record) { + /* We cannot compute the hash yet. We must wait until we have + * decoded the certificate_verify message in + * ssl3_HandleCertificateVerify, which will tell us which + * hash function we must use. + * + * (ssl3_HandleCertificateVerify cannot simply look at the + * buffer length itself, because at the time we reach it, + * additional handshake messages will have been added to the + * buffer, e.g. the certificate_verify message itself.) + * + * Therefore, we use SSL3Hashes.u.pointer_to_hash_input + * to signal the current state of the buffer. + * + * ssl3_HandleCertificateVerify will detect + * hashType == handshake_hash_record + * and use that information to calculate the hash. + */ + hashes.u.pointer_to_hash_input.data = ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf; + hashes.u.pointer_to_hash_input.len = ss->ssl3.hs.messages.len; + hashesPtr = &hashes; + } else { + computeHashes = PR_TRUE; + } + } + } else { + if (type == certificate_verify) { + computeHashes = TLS13_IN_HS_STATE(ss, wait_cert_verify); + } else if (type == finished) { + computeHashes = + TLS13_IN_HS_STATE(ss, wait_cert_request, wait_finished); + } + } + + ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); /************************************/ + if (computeHashes) { + SSL3Sender sender = (SSL3Sender)0; + ssl3CipherSpec *rSpec = ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 ? ss->ssl3.crSpec + : ss->ssl3.prSpec; + + if (type == finished) { + sender = ss->sec.isServer ? sender_client : sender_server; + rSpec = ss->ssl3.crSpec; + } + rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(ss, rSpec, &hashes, sender); if (rv == SECSuccess) { hashesPtr = &hashes; } } ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /************************************/ if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return rv; /* error code was set by ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes*/ + return rv; /* error code was set by ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes*/ } - SSL_TRC(30,("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle handshake message: %s", SSL_GETPID(), - ss->fd, ssl3_DecodeHandshakeType(ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type))); + SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle handshake message: %s", SSL_GETPID(), + ss->fd, ssl3_DecodeHandshakeType(ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type))); hdr[0] = (PRUint8)ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type; hdr[1] = (PRUint8)(length >> 16); - hdr[2] = (PRUint8)(length >> 8); - hdr[3] = (PRUint8)(length ); + hdr[2] = (PRUint8)(length >> 8); + hdr[3] = (PRUint8)(length); - /* Start new handshake hashes when we start a new handshake */ - if (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type == client_hello) { - rv = ssl3_RestartHandshakeHashes(ss); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return rv; - } + /* Start new handshake hashes when we start a new handshake. Unless this is + * TLS 1.3 and we sent a HelloRetryRequest. */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type == client_hello && !ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) { + rv = ssl3_RestartHandshakeHashes(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; + } } /* We should not include hello_request and hello_verify_request messages * in the handshake hashes */ if ((ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type != hello_request) && - (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type != hello_verify_request)) { - rv = ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(ss, (unsigned char*) hdr, 4); - if (rv != SECSuccess) return rv; /* err code already set. */ - - /* Extra data to simulate a complete DTLS handshake fragment */ - if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { - /* Sequence number */ - dtlsData[0] = MSB(ss->ssl3.hs.recvMessageSeq); - dtlsData[1] = LSB(ss->ssl3.hs.recvMessageSeq); - - /* Fragment offset */ - dtlsData[2] = 0; - dtlsData[3] = 0; - dtlsData[4] = 0; - - /* Fragment length */ - dtlsData[5] = (PRUint8)(length >> 16); - dtlsData[6] = (PRUint8)(length >> 8); - dtlsData[7] = (PRUint8)(length ); + (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type != hello_verify_request)) { + rv = ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(ss, (unsigned char *)hdr, 4); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return rv; /* err code already set. */ - rv = ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(ss, (unsigned char*) dtlsData, - sizeof(dtlsData)); - if (rv != SECSuccess) return rv; /* err code already set. */ - } + /* Extra data to simulate a complete DTLS handshake fragment */ + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + /* Sequence number */ + dtlsData[0] = MSB(ss->ssl3.hs.recvMessageSeq); + dtlsData[1] = LSB(ss->ssl3.hs.recvMessageSeq); + + /* Fragment offset */ + dtlsData[2] = 0; + dtlsData[3] = 0; + dtlsData[4] = 0; + + /* Fragment length */ + dtlsData[5] = (PRUint8)(length >> 16); + dtlsData[6] = (PRUint8)(length >> 8); + dtlsData[7] = (PRUint8)(length); + + rv = ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(ss, (unsigned char *)dtlsData, + sizeof(dtlsData)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return rv; /* err code already set. */ + } - /* The message body */ - rv = ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(ss, b, length); - if (rv != SECSuccess) return rv; /* err code already set. */ + /* The message body */ + rv = ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(ss, b, length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return rv; /* err code already set. */ } - PORT_SetError(0); /* each message starts with no error. */ + PORT_SetError(0); /* each message starts with no error. */ if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_certificate_status && ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type != certificate_status) { @@ -11548,115 +11778,151 @@ ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length) } } + epoch = ss->ssl3.crSpec->epoch; switch (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type) { - case hello_request: - if (length != 0) { - (void)ssl3_DecodeError(ss); - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HELLO_REQUEST); - return SECFailure; - } - if (ss->sec.isServer) { - (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_REQUEST); - return SECFailure; - } - rv = ssl3_HandleHelloRequest(ss); - break; - case client_hello: - if (!ss->sec.isServer) { - (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CLIENT_HELLO); - return SECFailure; - } - rv = ssl3_HandleClientHello(ss, b, length); - break; - case server_hello: - if (ss->sec.isServer) { - (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_SERVER_HELLO); - return SECFailure; - } - rv = ssl3_HandleServerHello(ss, b, length); - break; - case hello_verify_request: - if (!IS_DTLS(ss) || ss->sec.isServer) { - (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST); - return SECFailure; - } - rv = dtls_HandleHelloVerifyRequest(ss, b, length); - break; - case certificate: - rv = ssl3_HandleCertificate(ss, b, length); - break; - case certificate_status: - rv = ssl3_HandleCertificateStatus(ss, b, length); - break; - case server_key_exchange: - if (ss->sec.isServer) { - (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_SERVER_KEY_EXCH); - return SECFailure; - } - rv = ssl3_HandleServerKeyExchange(ss, b, length); - break; - case certificate_request: - if (ss->sec.isServer) { - (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_REQUEST); - return SECFailure; - } - rv = ssl3_HandleCertificateRequest(ss, b, length); - break; - case server_hello_done: - if (length != 0) { - (void)ssl3_DecodeError(ss); - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HELLO_DONE); - return SECFailure; - } - if (ss->sec.isServer) { - (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_DONE); - return SECFailure; - } - rv = ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone(ss); - break; - case certificate_verify: - if (!ss->sec.isServer) { - (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_VERIFY); - return SECFailure; - } - rv = ssl3_HandleCertificateVerify(ss, b, length, hashesPtr); - break; - case client_key_exchange: - if (!ss->sec.isServer) { - (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CLIENT_KEY_EXCH); - return SECFailure; - } - rv = ssl3_HandleClientKeyExchange(ss, b, length); - break; - case new_session_ticket: - if (ss->sec.isServer) { - (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET); - return SECFailure; - } - rv = ssl3_HandleNewSessionTicket(ss, b, length); - break; - case finished: - rv = ssl3_HandleFinished(ss, b, length, hashesPtr); - break; - default: - (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNKNOWN_HANDSHAKE); - rv = SECFailure; + case client_hello: + if (!ss->sec.isServer) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CLIENT_HELLO); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = ssl3_HandleClientHello(ss, b, length); + break; + case server_hello: + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_SERVER_HELLO); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = ssl3_HandleServerHello(ss, b, length); + break; + default: + if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + rv = ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage(ss, b, length, hashesPtr); + } else { + rv = tls13_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage(ss, b, length, + hashesPtr); + } + break; + } + if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 && + (epoch != ss->ssl3.crSpec->epoch) && !endOfRecord) { + /* If we changed read cipher states, there must not be any + * data in the input queue. */ + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HANDSHAKE); + return SECFailure; } if (IS_DTLS(ss) && (rv != SECFailure)) { - /* Increment the expected sequence number */ - ss->ssl3.hs.recvMessageSeq++; + /* Increment the expected sequence number */ + ss->ssl3.hs.recvMessageSeq++; + } + return rv; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, + PRUint32 length, SSL3Hashes *hashesPtr) +{ + SECStatus rv; + PORT_Assert(ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); + + switch (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type) { + case hello_request: + if (length != 0) { + (void)ssl3_DecodeError(ss); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HELLO_REQUEST); + return SECFailure; + } + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_REQUEST); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = ssl3_HandleHelloRequest(ss); + break; + + case hello_retry_request: + /* This arrives here because - as a client - we haven't received a + * final decision on the version from the server. */ + rv = tls13_HandleHelloRetryRequest(ss, b, length); + break; + + case hello_verify_request: + if (!IS_DTLS(ss) || ss->sec.isServer) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = dtls_HandleHelloVerifyRequest(ss, b, length); + break; + case certificate: + rv = ssl3_HandleCertificate(ss, b, length); + break; + case certificate_status: + rv = ssl3_HandleCertificateStatus(ss, b, length); + break; + case server_key_exchange: + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_SERVER_KEY_EXCH); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = ssl3_HandleServerKeyExchange(ss, b, length); + break; + case certificate_request: + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_REQUEST); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = ssl3_HandleCertificateRequest(ss, b, length); + break; + case server_hello_done: + if (length != 0) { + (void)ssl3_DecodeError(ss); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HELLO_DONE); + return SECFailure; + } + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_DONE); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone(ss); + break; + case certificate_verify: + if (!ss->sec.isServer) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_VERIFY); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = ssl3_HandleCertificateVerify(ss, b, length, hashesPtr); + break; + case client_key_exchange: + if (!ss->sec.isServer) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CLIENT_KEY_EXCH); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = ssl3_HandleClientKeyExchange(ss, b, length); + break; + case new_session_ticket: + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = ssl3_HandleNewSessionTicket(ss, b, length); + break; + case finished: + rv = ssl3_HandleFinished(ss, b, length, hashesPtr); + break; + default: + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNKNOWN_HANDSHAKE); + rv = SECFailure; } return rv; @@ -11680,109 +11946,111 @@ ssl3_HandleHandshake(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *origBuf) sslBuffer *buf = &ss->ssl3.hs.msgState; /* do not lose the original buffer pointer */ SECStatus rv; - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); if (buf->buf == NULL) { - *buf = *origBuf; + *buf = *origBuf; } while (buf->len > 0) { - if (ss->ssl3.hs.header_bytes < 4) { - PRUint8 t; - t = *(buf->buf++); - buf->len--; - if (ss->ssl3.hs.header_bytes++ == 0) - ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type = (SSL3HandshakeType)t; - else - ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len = (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len << 8) + t; - if (ss->ssl3.hs.header_bytes < 4) - continue; - -#define MAX_HANDSHAKE_MSG_LEN 0x1ffff /* 128k - 1 */ - if (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len > MAX_HANDSHAKE_MSG_LEN) { - (void)ssl3_DecodeError(ss); - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HANDSHAKE); - return SECFailure; - } + if (ss->ssl3.hs.header_bytes < 4) { + PRUint8 t; + t = *(buf->buf++); + buf->len--; + if (ss->ssl3.hs.header_bytes++ == 0) + ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type = (SSL3HandshakeType)t; + else + ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len = (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len << 8) + t; + if (ss->ssl3.hs.header_bytes < 4) + continue; + +#define MAX_HANDSHAKE_MSG_LEN 0x1ffff /* 128k - 1 */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len > MAX_HANDSHAKE_MSG_LEN) { + (void)ssl3_DecodeError(ss); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HANDSHAKE); + return SECFailure; + } #undef MAX_HANDSHAKE_MSG_LEN - /* If msg_len is zero, be sure we fall through, - ** even if buf->len is zero. - */ - if (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len > 0) - continue; - } - - /* - * Header has been gathered and there is at least one byte of new - * data available for this message. If it can be done right out - * of the original buffer, then use it from there. - */ - if (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len == 0 && buf->len >= ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len) { - /* handle it from input buffer */ - rv = ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage(ss, buf->buf, ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len); - if (rv == SECFailure) { - /* This test wants to fall through on either - * SECSuccess or SECWouldBlock. - * ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage MUST set the error code. - */ - return rv; - } - buf->buf += ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len; - buf->len -= ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len; - ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len = 0; - ss->ssl3.hs.header_bytes = 0; - if (rv != SECSuccess) { /* return if SECWouldBlock. */ - return rv; - } - } else { - /* must be copied to msg_body and dealt with from there */ - unsigned int bytes; - - PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len < ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len); - bytes = PR_MIN(buf->len, ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len - ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len); - - /* Grow the buffer if needed */ - rv = sslBuffer_Grow(&ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body, ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - /* sslBuffer_Grow has set a memory error code. */ - return SECFailure; - } - - PORT_Memcpy(ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.buf + ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len, - buf->buf, bytes); - ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len += bytes; - buf->buf += bytes; - buf->len -= bytes; - - PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len <= ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len); - - /* if we have a whole message, do it */ - if (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len == ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len) { - rv = ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage( - ss, ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.buf, ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len); - if (rv == SECFailure) { - /* This test wants to fall through on either - * SECSuccess or SECWouldBlock. - * ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage MUST set error code. - */ - return rv; - } - ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len = 0; - ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len = 0; - ss->ssl3.hs.header_bytes = 0; - if (rv != SECSuccess) { /* return if SECWouldBlock. */ - return rv; - } - } else { - PORT_Assert(buf->len == 0); - break; - } - } - } /* end loop */ - - origBuf->len = 0; /* So ssl3_GatherAppDataRecord will keep looping. */ - buf->buf = NULL; /* not a leak. */ + /* If msg_len is zero, be sure we fall through, + ** even if buf->len is zero. + */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len > 0) + continue; + } + + /* + * Header has been gathered and there is at least one byte of new + * data available for this message. If it can be done right out + * of the original buffer, then use it from there. + */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len == 0 && buf->len >= ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len) { + /* handle it from input buffer */ + rv = ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage(ss, buf->buf, ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len, + buf->len == ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len); + if (rv == SECFailure) { + /* This test wants to fall through on either + * SECSuccess or SECWouldBlock. + * ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage MUST set the error code. + */ + return rv; + } + buf->buf += ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len; + buf->len -= ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len; + ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len = 0; + ss->ssl3.hs.header_bytes = 0; + if (rv != SECSuccess) { /* return if SECWouldBlock. */ + return rv; + } + } else { + /* must be copied to msg_body and dealt with from there */ + unsigned int bytes; + + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len < ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len); + bytes = PR_MIN(buf->len, ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len - ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len); + + /* Grow the buffer if needed */ + rv = sslBuffer_Grow(&ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body, ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + /* sslBuffer_Grow has set a memory error code. */ + return SECFailure; + } + + PORT_Memcpy(ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.buf + ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len, + buf->buf, bytes); + ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len += bytes; + buf->buf += bytes; + buf->len -= bytes; + + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len <= ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len); + + /* if we have a whole message, do it */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len == ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len) { + rv = ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage( + ss, ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.buf, ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len, + buf->len == 0); + if (rv == SECFailure) { + /* This test wants to fall through on either + * SECSuccess or SECWouldBlock. + * ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage MUST set error code. + */ + return rv; + } + ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len = 0; + ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len = 0; + ss->ssl3.hs.header_bytes = 0; + if (rv != SECSuccess) { /* return if SECWouldBlock. */ + return rv; + } + } else { + PORT_Assert(buf->len == 0); + break; + } + } + } /* end loop */ + + origBuf->len = 0; /* So ssl3_GatherAppDataRecord will keep looping. */ + buf->buf = NULL; /* not a leak. */ return SECSuccess; } @@ -11790,7 +12058,7 @@ ssl3_HandleHandshake(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *origBuf) * bits. They use the fact that arithmetic shift shifts-in the sign bit. * However, this is not ensured by the C standard so you may need to replace * them with something else for odd compilers. */ -#define DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(x) ( (unsigned)( (int)(x) >> (sizeof(int)*8-1) ) ) +#define DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(x) ((unsigned)((int)(x) >> (sizeof(int) * 8 - 1))) #define DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL_8(x) ((unsigned char)(DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(x))) /* SECStatusToMask returns, in constant time, a mask value of all ones if @@ -11823,10 +12091,17 @@ ssl_ConstantTimeEQ8(unsigned char a, unsigned char b) return DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL_8(c); } +/* ssl_constantTimeSelect return a if mask is 0xFF and b if mask is 0x00 */ +static unsigned char +ssl_constantTimeSelect(unsigned char mask, unsigned char a, unsigned char b) +{ + return (mask & a) | (~mask & b); +} + static SECStatus ssl_RemoveSSLv3CBCPadding(sslBuffer *plaintext, - unsigned int blockSize, - unsigned int macSize) + unsigned int blockSize, + unsigned int macSize) { unsigned int paddingLength, good, t; const unsigned int overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + macSize; @@ -11834,23 +12109,23 @@ ssl_RemoveSSLv3CBCPadding(sslBuffer *plaintext, /* These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant * time. */ if (overhead > plaintext->len) { - return SECFailure; + return SECFailure; } - paddingLength = plaintext->buf[plaintext->len-1]; + paddingLength = plaintext->buf[plaintext->len - 1]; /* SSLv3 padding bytes are random and cannot be checked. */ t = plaintext->len; - t -= paddingLength+overhead; + t -= paddingLength + overhead; /* If len >= paddingLength+overhead then the MSB of t is zero. */ good = DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(~t); /* SSLv3 requires that the padding is minimal. */ - t = blockSize - (paddingLength+1); + t = blockSize - (paddingLength + 1); good &= DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(~t); - plaintext->len -= good & (paddingLength+1); + plaintext->len -= good & (paddingLength + 1); return (good & SECSuccess) | (~good & SECFailure); } -static SECStatus +SECStatus ssl_RemoveTLSCBCPadding(sslBuffer *plaintext, unsigned int macSize) { unsigned int paddingLength, good, t, toCheck, i; @@ -11859,12 +12134,12 @@ ssl_RemoveTLSCBCPadding(sslBuffer *plaintext, unsigned int macSize) /* These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant * time. */ if (overhead > plaintext->len) { - return SECFailure; + return SECFailure; } - paddingLength = plaintext->buf[plaintext->len-1]; + paddingLength = plaintext->buf[plaintext->len - 1]; t = plaintext->len; - t -= paddingLength+overhead; + t -= paddingLength + overhead; /* If len >= paddingLength+overhead then the MSB of t is zero. */ good = DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(~t); @@ -11877,20 +12152,20 @@ ssl_RemoveTLSCBCPadding(sslBuffer *plaintext, unsigned int macSize) * decrypted information. Therefore we always have to check the maximum * amount of padding possible. (Again, the length of the record is * public information so we can use it.) */ - toCheck = 255; /* maximum amount of padding. */ - if (toCheck > plaintext->len-1) { - toCheck = plaintext->len-1; + toCheck = 256; /* maximum amount of padding + 1. */ + if (toCheck > plaintext->len) { + toCheck = plaintext->len; } for (i = 0; i < toCheck; i++) { - unsigned int t = paddingLength - i; - /* If i <= paddingLength then the MSB of t is zero and mask is - * 0xff. Otherwise, mask is 0. */ - unsigned char mask = DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(~t); - unsigned char b = plaintext->buf[plaintext->len-1-i]; - /* The final |paddingLength+1| bytes should all have the value - * |paddingLength|. Therefore the XOR should be zero. */ - good &= ~(mask&(paddingLength ^ b)); + unsigned int t = paddingLength - i; + /* If i <= paddingLength then the MSB of t is zero and mask is + * 0xff. Otherwise, mask is 0. */ + unsigned char mask = DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(~t); + unsigned char b = plaintext->buf[plaintext->len - 1 - i]; + /* The final |paddingLength+1| bytes should all have the value + * |paddingLength|. Therefore the XOR should be zero. */ + good &= ~(mask & (paddingLength ^ b)); } /* If any of the final |paddingLength+1| bytes had the wrong value, @@ -11900,10 +12175,10 @@ ssl_RemoveTLSCBCPadding(sslBuffer *plaintext, unsigned int macSize) good &= good >> 4; good &= good >> 2; good &= good >> 1; - good <<= sizeof(good)*8-1; + good <<= sizeof(good) * 8 - 1; good = DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(good); - plaintext->len -= good & (paddingLength+1); + plaintext->len -= good & (paddingLength + 1); return (good & SECSuccess) | (~good & SECFailure); } @@ -11914,9 +12189,9 @@ ssl_RemoveTLSCBCPadding(sslBuffer *plaintext, unsigned int macSize) */ static void ssl_CBCExtractMAC(sslBuffer *plaintext, - unsigned int originalLength, - SSL3Opaque* out, - unsigned int macSize) + unsigned int originalLength, + SSL3Opaque *out, + unsigned int macSize) { unsigned char rotatedMac[MAX_MAC_LENGTH]; /* macEnd is the index of |plaintext->buf| just after the end of the @@ -11926,44 +12201,280 @@ ssl_CBCExtractMAC(sslBuffer *plaintext, /* scanStart contains the number of bytes that we can ignore because * the MAC's position can only vary by 255 bytes. */ unsigned scanStart = 0; - unsigned i, j, divSpoiler; + unsigned i, j; unsigned char rotateOffset; - if (originalLength > macSize + 255 + 1) - scanStart = originalLength - (macSize + 255 + 1); + if (originalLength > macSize + 255 + 1) { + scanStart = originalLength - (macSize + 255 + 1); + } - /* divSpoiler contains a multiple of macSize that is used to cause the - * modulo operation to be constant time. Without this, the time varies - * based on the amount of padding when running on Intel chips at least. - * - * The aim of right-shifting macSize is so that the compiler doesn't - * figure out that it can remove divSpoiler as that would require it - * to prove that macSize is always even, which I hope is beyond it. */ - divSpoiler = macSize >> 1; - divSpoiler <<= (sizeof(divSpoiler)-1)*8; - rotateOffset = (divSpoiler + macStart - scanStart) % macSize; + /* We want to compute + * rotateOffset = (macStart - scanStart) % macSize + * But the time to compute this varies based on the amount of padding. Thus + * we explicitely handle all mac sizes with (hopefully) constant time modulo + * using Barrett reduction: + * q := (rotateOffset * m) >> k + * rotateOffset -= q * n + * if (n <= rotateOffset) rotateOffset -= n + */ + rotateOffset = macStart - scanStart; + /* rotateOffset < 255 + 1 + 48 = 304 */ + if (macSize == 16) { + rotateOffset &= 15; + } else if (macSize == 20) { + /* + * Correctness: rotateOffset * ( 1/20 - 25/2^9 ) < 1 + * with rotateOffset <= 853 + */ + unsigned q = (rotateOffset * 25) >> 9; + rotateOffset -= q * 20; + rotateOffset -= ssl_constantTimeSelect(ssl_ConstantTimeGE(rotateOffset, 20), + 20, 0); + } else if (macSize == 32) { + rotateOffset &= 31; + } else if (macSize == 48) { + /* + * Correctness: rotateOffset * ( 1/48 - 10/2^9 ) < 1 + * with rotateOffset < 768 + */ + unsigned q = (rotateOffset * 10) >> 9; + rotateOffset -= q * 48; + rotateOffset -= ssl_constantTimeSelect(ssl_ConstantTimeGE(rotateOffset, 48), + 48, 0); + } else { + /* + * SHA384 (macSize == 48) is the largest we support. We should never + * get here. + */ + PORT_Assert(0); + rotateOffset = rotateOffset % macSize; + } memset(rotatedMac, 0, macSize); for (i = scanStart; i < originalLength;) { - for (j = 0; j < macSize && i < originalLength; i++, j++) { - unsigned char macStarted = ssl_ConstantTimeGE(i, macStart); - unsigned char macEnded = ssl_ConstantTimeGE(i, macEnd); - unsigned char b = 0; - b = plaintext->buf[i]; - rotatedMac[j] |= b & macStarted & ~macEnded; - } + for (j = 0; j < macSize && i < originalLength; i++, j++) { + unsigned char macStarted = ssl_ConstantTimeGE(i, macStart); + unsigned char macEnded = ssl_ConstantTimeGE(i, macEnd); + unsigned char b = 0; + b = plaintext->buf[i]; + rotatedMac[j] |= b & macStarted & ~macEnded; + } } /* Now rotate the MAC. If we knew that the MAC fit into a CPU cache line * we could line-align |rotatedMac| and rotate in place. */ memset(out, 0, macSize); + rotateOffset = macSize - rotateOffset; + rotateOffset = ssl_constantTimeSelect(ssl_ConstantTimeGE(rotateOffset, macSize), + 0, rotateOffset); for (i = 0; i < macSize; i++) { - unsigned char offset = - (divSpoiler + macSize - rotateOffset + i) % macSize; - for (j = 0; j < macSize; j++) { - out[j] |= rotatedMac[i] & ssl_ConstantTimeEQ8(j, offset); - } + for (j = 0; j < macSize; j++) { + out[j] |= rotatedMac[i] & ssl_ConstantTimeEQ8(j, rotateOffset); + } + rotateOffset++; + rotateOffset = ssl_constantTimeSelect(ssl_ConstantTimeGE(rotateOffset, macSize), + 0, rotateOffset); + } +} + +/* Unprotect an SSL3 record and leave the result in plaintext. + * + * If SECFailure is returned, we: + * 1. Set |*alert| to the alert to be sent. + * 2. Call PORT_SetError() with an appropriate code. + * + * Called by ssl3_HandleRecord. Caller must hold the spec read lock. + * Therefore, we MUST not call SSL3_SendAlert(). + * + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_UnprotectRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Ciphertext *cText, sslBuffer *plaintext, + SSL3AlertDescription *alert) +{ + ssl3CipherSpec *crSpec = ss->ssl3.crSpec; + const ssl3BulkCipherDef *cipher_def = crSpec->cipher_def; + PRBool isTLS; + unsigned int good; + unsigned int ivLen = 0; + SSL3ContentType rType; + unsigned int minLength; + unsigned int originalLen = 0; + unsigned char header[13]; + unsigned int headerLen; + SSL3Opaque hash[MAX_MAC_LENGTH]; + SSL3Opaque givenHashBuf[MAX_MAC_LENGTH]; + SSL3Opaque *givenHash; + unsigned int hashBytes = MAX_MAC_LENGTH + 1; + SECStatus rv; + + good = ~0U; + minLength = crSpec->mac_size; + if (cipher_def->type == type_block) { + /* CBC records have a padding length byte at the end. */ + minLength++; + if (crSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1) { + /* With >= TLS 1.1, CBC records have an explicit IV. */ + minLength += cipher_def->iv_size; + } + } else if (cipher_def->type == type_aead) { + minLength = cipher_def->explicit_nonce_size + cipher_def->tag_size; + } + + /* We can perform this test in variable time because the record's total + * length and the ciphersuite are both public knowledge. */ + if (cText->buf->len < minLength) { + goto decrypt_loser; + } + + if (cipher_def->type == type_block && + crSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1) { + /* Consume the per-record explicit IV. RFC 4346 Section 6.2.3.2 states + * "The receiver decrypts the entire GenericBlockCipher structure and + * then discards the first cipher block corresponding to the IV + * component." Instead, we decrypt the first cipher block and then + * discard it before decrypting the rest. + */ + SSL3Opaque iv[MAX_IV_LENGTH]; + int decoded; + + ivLen = cipher_def->iv_size; + if (ivLen < 8 || ivLen > sizeof(iv)) { + *alert = internal_error; + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + PRINT_BUF(80, (ss, "IV (ciphertext):", cText->buf->buf, ivLen)); + + /* The decryption result is garbage, but since we just throw away + * the block it doesn't matter. The decryption of the next block + * depends only on the ciphertext of the IV block. + */ + rv = crSpec->decode(crSpec->decodeContext, iv, &decoded, + sizeof(iv), cText->buf->buf, ivLen); + + good &= SECStatusToMask(rv); + } + + PRINT_BUF(80, (ss, "ciphertext:", cText->buf->buf + ivLen, + cText->buf->len - ivLen)); + + isTLS = (PRBool)(crSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + + if (isTLS && cText->buf->len - ivLen > (MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 2048)) { + *alert = record_overflow; + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_RECORD_TOO_LONG); + return SECFailure; + } + + rType = cText->type; + if (cipher_def->type == type_aead) { + /* XXX For many AEAD ciphers, the plaintext is shorter than the + * ciphertext by a fixed byte count, but it is not true in general. + * Each AEAD cipher should provide a function that returns the + * plaintext length for a given ciphertext. */ + unsigned int decryptedLen = + cText->buf->len - cipher_def->explicit_nonce_size - + cipher_def->tag_size; + headerLen = ssl3_BuildRecordPseudoHeader( + header, IS_DTLS(ss) ? cText->seq_num : crSpec->read_seq_num, + rType, isTLS, cText->version, IS_DTLS(ss), decryptedLen); + PORT_Assert(headerLen <= sizeof(header)); + rv = crSpec->aead( + ss->sec.isServer ? &crSpec->client : &crSpec->server, + PR_TRUE, /* do decrypt */ + plaintext->buf, /* out */ + (int *)&plaintext->len, /* outlen */ + plaintext->space, /* maxout */ + cText->buf->buf, /* in */ + cText->buf->len, /* inlen */ + header, headerLen); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + good = 0; + } + } else { + if (cipher_def->type == type_block && + ((cText->buf->len - ivLen) % cipher_def->block_size) != 0) { + goto decrypt_loser; + } + + /* decrypt from cText buf to plaintext. */ + rv = crSpec->decode( + crSpec->decodeContext, plaintext->buf, (int *)&plaintext->len, + plaintext->space, cText->buf->buf + ivLen, cText->buf->len - ivLen); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto decrypt_loser; + } + + PRINT_BUF(80, (ss, "cleartext:", plaintext->buf, plaintext->len)); + + originalLen = plaintext->len; + + /* If it's a block cipher, check and strip the padding. */ + if (cipher_def->type == type_block) { + const unsigned int blockSize = cipher_def->block_size; + const unsigned int macSize = crSpec->mac_size; + + if (!isTLS) { + good &= SECStatusToMask(ssl_RemoveSSLv3CBCPadding( + plaintext, blockSize, macSize)); + } else { + good &= SECStatusToMask(ssl_RemoveTLSCBCPadding( + plaintext, macSize)); + } + } + + /* compute the MAC */ + headerLen = ssl3_BuildRecordPseudoHeader( + header, IS_DTLS(ss) ? cText->seq_num : crSpec->read_seq_num, + rType, isTLS, cText->version, IS_DTLS(ss), + plaintext->len - crSpec->mac_size); + PORT_Assert(headerLen <= sizeof(header)); + if (cipher_def->type == type_block) { + rv = ssl3_ComputeRecordMACConstantTime( + crSpec, (PRBool)(!ss->sec.isServer), header, headerLen, + plaintext->buf, plaintext->len, originalLen, + hash, &hashBytes); + + ssl_CBCExtractMAC(plaintext, originalLen, givenHashBuf, + crSpec->mac_size); + givenHash = givenHashBuf; + + /* plaintext->len will always have enough space to remove the MAC + * because in ssl_Remove{SSLv3|TLS}CBCPadding we only adjust + * plaintext->len if the result has enough space for the MAC and we + * tested the unadjusted size against minLength, above. */ + plaintext->len -= crSpec->mac_size; + } else { + /* This is safe because we checked the minLength above. */ + plaintext->len -= crSpec->mac_size; + + rv = ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC( + crSpec, (PRBool)(!ss->sec.isServer), header, headerLen, + plaintext->buf, plaintext->len, hash, &hashBytes); + + /* We can read the MAC directly from the record because its location + * is public when a stream cipher is used. */ + givenHash = plaintext->buf + plaintext->len; + } + + good &= SECStatusToMask(rv); + + if (hashBytes != (unsigned)crSpec->mac_size || + NSS_SecureMemcmp(givenHash, hash, crSpec->mac_size) != 0) { + /* We're allowed to leak whether or not the MAC check was correct */ + good = 0; + } + } + + if (good == 0) { + decrypt_loser: + /* always log mac error, in case attacker can read server logs. */ + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_MAC_READ); + *alert = bad_record_mac; + return SECFailure; } + return SECSuccess; } /* if cText is non-null, then decipher, check MAC, and decompress the @@ -11991,40 +12502,29 @@ ssl_CBCExtractMAC(sslBuffer *plaintext, SECStatus ssl3_HandleRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Ciphertext *cText, sslBuffer *databuf) { - const ssl3BulkCipherDef *cipher_def; - ssl3CipherSpec * crSpec; - SECStatus rv; - unsigned int hashBytes = MAX_MAC_LENGTH + 1; - PRBool isTLS; - SSL3ContentType rType; - SSL3Opaque hash[MAX_MAC_LENGTH]; - SSL3Opaque givenHashBuf[MAX_MAC_LENGTH]; - SSL3Opaque *givenHash; - sslBuffer *plaintext; - sslBuffer temp_buf; - PRUint64 dtls_seq_num = 0; - unsigned int ivLen = 0; - unsigned int originalLen = 0; - unsigned int good; - unsigned int minLength; - unsigned char header[13]; - unsigned int headerLen; - - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); + SECStatus rv; + PRBool isTLS; + sslSequenceNumber seq_num = 0; + ssl3CipherSpec *crSpec; + SSL3ContentType rType; + sslBuffer *plaintext; + sslBuffer temp_buf; + SSL3AlertDescription alert = internal_error; + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); if (!ss->ssl3.initialized) { - ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); - rv = ssl3_InitState(ss); - ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return rv; /* ssl3_InitState has set the error code. */ - } + ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + rv = ssl3_InitState(ss); + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* ssl3_InitState has set the error code. */ + } } /* check for Token Presence */ if (!ssl3_ClientAuthTokenPresent(ss->sec.ci.sid)) { - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOKEN_INSERTION_REMOVAL); - return SECFailure; + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOKEN_INSERTION_REMOVAL); + return SECFailure; } /* cText is NULL when we're called from ssl3_RestartHandshakeAfterXXX(). @@ -12032,257 +12532,113 @@ ssl3_HandleRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Ciphertext *cText, sslBuffer *databuf) * message. */ if (cText == NULL) { - SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: HandleRecord, resuming handshake", - SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); - rType = content_handshake; - goto process_it; + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: HandleRecord, resuming handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + rType = content_handshake; + goto process_it; } ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); /******************************************/ - crSpec = ss->ssl3.crSpec; - cipher_def = crSpec->cipher_def; - - /* - * DTLS relevance checks: - * Note that this code currently ignores all out-of-epoch packets, - * which means we lose some in the case of rehandshake + - * loss/reordering. Since DTLS is explicitly unreliable, this - * seems like a good tradeoff for implementation effort and is - * consistent with the guidance of RFC 6347 Sections 4.1 and 4.2.4.1 - */ - if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { - DTLSEpoch epoch = (cText->seq_num.high >> 16) & 0xffff; - - if (crSpec->epoch != epoch) { - ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); - SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: HandleRecord, received packet " - "from irrelevant epoch %d", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, epoch)); - /* Silently drop the packet */ - databuf->len = 0; /* Needed to ensure data not left around */ - return SECSuccess; - } - - dtls_seq_num = (((PRUint64)(cText->seq_num.high & 0xffff)) << 32) | - ((PRUint64)cText->seq_num.low); - - if (dtls_RecordGetRecvd(&crSpec->recvdRecords, dtls_seq_num) != 0) { - ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); - SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: HandleRecord, rejecting " - "potentially replayed packet", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); - /* Silently drop the packet */ - databuf->len = 0; /* Needed to ensure data not left around */ - return SECSuccess; - } - } + isTLS = (PRBool)(crSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); - good = ~0U; - minLength = crSpec->mac_size; - if (cipher_def->type == type_block) { - /* CBC records have a padding length byte at the end. */ - minLength++; - if (crSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1) { - /* With >= TLS 1.1, CBC records have an explicit IV. */ - minLength += cipher_def->iv_size; - } - } else if (cipher_def->type == type_aead) { - minLength = cipher_def->explicit_nonce_size + cipher_def->tag_size; - } + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + PRBool sameEpoch; + if (!dtls_IsRelevant(ss, cText, &sameEpoch, &seq_num)) { + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /*****************************/ + databuf->len = 0; /* Needed to ensure data not left around */ - /* We can perform this test in variable time because the record's total - * length and the ciphersuite are both public knowledge. */ - if (cText->buf->len < minLength) { - goto decrypt_loser; + /* Maybe retransmit if needed. */ + return dtls_MaybeRetransmitHandshake(ss, cText, sameEpoch); + } + } else { + seq_num = crSpec->read_seq_num + 1; } - - if (cipher_def->type == type_block && - crSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1) { - /* Consume the per-record explicit IV. RFC 4346 Section 6.2.3.2 states - * "The receiver decrypts the entire GenericBlockCipher structure and - * then discards the first cipher block corresponding to the IV - * component." Instead, we decrypt the first cipher block and then - * discard it before decrypting the rest. - */ - SSL3Opaque iv[MAX_IV_LENGTH]; - int decoded; - - ivLen = cipher_def->iv_size; - if (ivLen < 8 || ivLen > sizeof(iv)) { - ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); - return SECFailure; - } - - PRINT_BUF(80, (ss, "IV (ciphertext):", cText->buf->buf, ivLen)); - - /* The decryption result is garbage, but since we just throw away - * the block it doesn't matter. The decryption of the next block - * depends only on the ciphertext of the IV block. - */ - rv = crSpec->decode(crSpec->decodeContext, iv, &decoded, - sizeof(iv), cText->buf->buf, ivLen); - - good &= SECStatusToMask(rv); + if (seq_num >= crSpec->cipher_def->max_records) { + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /*****************************/ + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: read sequence number at limit 0x%0llx", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, seq_num)); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOO_MANY_RECORDS); + return SECFailure; } /* If we will be decompressing the buffer we need to decrypt somewhere * other than into databuf */ if (crSpec->decompressor) { - temp_buf.buf = NULL; - temp_buf.space = 0; - plaintext = &temp_buf; + temp_buf.buf = NULL; + temp_buf.space = 0; + plaintext = &temp_buf; } else { - plaintext = databuf; + plaintext = databuf; } - plaintext->len = 0; /* filled in by decode call below. */ + plaintext->len = 0; /* filled in by Unprotect call below. */ if (plaintext->space < MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) { - rv = sslBuffer_Grow(plaintext, MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 2048); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); - SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: HandleRecord, tried to get %d bytes", - SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 2048)); - /* sslBuffer_Grow has set a memory error code. */ - /* Perhaps we should send an alert. (but we have no memory!) */ - return SECFailure; - } + rv = sslBuffer_Grow(plaintext, MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 2048); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /*************************/ + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: HandleRecord, tried to get %d bytes", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 2048)); + /* sslBuffer_Grow has set a memory error code. */ + /* Perhaps we should send an alert. (but we have no memory!) */ + return SECFailure; + } } - PRINT_BUF(80, (ss, "ciphertext:", cText->buf->buf + ivLen, - cText->buf->len - ivLen)); - - isTLS = (PRBool)(crSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); - - if (isTLS && cText->buf->len - ivLen > (MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 2048)) { - ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); - SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, record_overflow); - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_RECORD_TOO_LONG); - return SECFailure; + /* We're waiting for another ClientHello, which will appear unencrypted. + * Use the content type to tell whether this is should be discarded. + * + * XXX If we decide to remove the content type from encrypted records, this + * will become much more difficult to manage. */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttIgnore == ssl_0rtt_ignore_hrr && + cText->type == content_application_data) { + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /*****************************/ + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_client_hello); + databuf->len = 0; + return SECSuccess; } - rType = cText->type; - if (cipher_def->type == type_aead) { - /* XXX For many AEAD ciphers, the plaintext is shorter than the - * ciphertext by a fixed byte count, but it is not true in general. - * Each AEAD cipher should provide a function that returns the - * plaintext length for a given ciphertext. */ - unsigned int decryptedLen = - cText->buf->len - cipher_def->explicit_nonce_size - - cipher_def->tag_size; - headerLen = ssl3_BuildRecordPseudoHeader( - header, IS_DTLS(ss) ? cText->seq_num : crSpec->read_seq_num, - rType, isTLS, cText->version, IS_DTLS(ss), decryptedLen); - PORT_Assert(headerLen <= sizeof(header)); - rv = crSpec->aead( - ss->sec.isServer ? &crSpec->client : &crSpec->server, - PR_TRUE, /* do decrypt */ - plaintext->buf, /* out */ - (int*) &plaintext->len, /* outlen */ - plaintext->space, /* maxout */ - cText->buf->buf, /* in */ - cText->buf->len, /* inlen */ - header, headerLen); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - good = 0; - } +#ifdef UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE + rv = Null_Cipher(NULL, plaintext->buf, (int *)&plaintext->len, + plaintext->space, cText->buf->buf, cText->buf->len); +#else + /* IMPORTANT: Unprotect functions MUST NOT send alerts + * because we still hold the spec read lock. Instead, if they + * return SECFailure, they set *alert to the alert to be sent. */ + if (crSpec->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 || + crSpec->cipher_def->calg == ssl_calg_null) { + /* Unencrypted TLS 1.3 records use the pre-TLS 1.3 format. */ + rv = ssl3_UnprotectRecord(ss, cText, plaintext, &alert); } else { - if (cipher_def->type == type_block && - ((cText->buf->len - ivLen) % cipher_def->block_size) != 0) { - goto decrypt_loser; - } - - /* decrypt from cText buf to plaintext. */ - rv = crSpec->decode( - crSpec->decodeContext, plaintext->buf, (int *)&plaintext->len, - plaintext->space, cText->buf->buf + ivLen, cText->buf->len - ivLen); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto decrypt_loser; - } - - PRINT_BUF(80, (ss, "cleartext:", plaintext->buf, plaintext->len)); - - originalLen = plaintext->len; - - /* If it's a block cipher, check and strip the padding. */ - if (cipher_def->type == type_block) { - const unsigned int blockSize = cipher_def->block_size; - const unsigned int macSize = crSpec->mac_size; - - if (!isTLS) { - good &= SECStatusToMask(ssl_RemoveSSLv3CBCPadding( - plaintext, blockSize, macSize)); - } else { - good &= SECStatusToMask(ssl_RemoveTLSCBCPadding( - plaintext, macSize)); - } - } - - /* compute the MAC */ - headerLen = ssl3_BuildRecordPseudoHeader( - header, IS_DTLS(ss) ? cText->seq_num : crSpec->read_seq_num, - rType, isTLS, cText->version, IS_DTLS(ss), - plaintext->len - crSpec->mac_size); - PORT_Assert(headerLen <= sizeof(header)); - if (cipher_def->type == type_block) { - rv = ssl3_ComputeRecordMACConstantTime( - crSpec, (PRBool)(!ss->sec.isServer), header, headerLen, - plaintext->buf, plaintext->len, originalLen, - hash, &hashBytes); - - ssl_CBCExtractMAC(plaintext, originalLen, givenHashBuf, - crSpec->mac_size); - givenHash = givenHashBuf; - - /* plaintext->len will always have enough space to remove the MAC - * because in ssl_Remove{SSLv3|TLS}CBCPadding we only adjust - * plaintext->len if the result has enough space for the MAC and we - * tested the unadjusted size against minLength, above. */ - plaintext->len -= crSpec->mac_size; - } else { - /* This is safe because we checked the minLength above. */ - plaintext->len -= crSpec->mac_size; - - rv = ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC( - crSpec, (PRBool)(!ss->sec.isServer), header, headerLen, - plaintext->buf, plaintext->len, hash, &hashBytes); - - /* We can read the MAC directly from the record because its location - * is public when a stream cipher is used. */ - givenHash = plaintext->buf + plaintext->len; - } - - good &= SECStatusToMask(rv); - - if (hashBytes != (unsigned)crSpec->mac_size || - NSS_SecureMemcmp(givenHash, hash, crSpec->mac_size) != 0) { - /* We're allowed to leak whether or not the MAC check was correct */ - good = 0; - } + rv = tls13_UnprotectRecord(ss, cText, plaintext, &alert); } +#endif - if (good == 0) { -decrypt_loser: - /* must not hold spec lock when calling SSL3_SendAlert. */ - ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); - - SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: decryption failed", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); - - if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) { - SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, bad_record_mac); - /* always log mac error, in case attacker can read server logs. */ - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_MAC_READ); - return SECFailure; - } else { - /* Silently drop the packet */ + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /***************************/ + + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: decryption failed", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + if (IS_DTLS(ss) || + (ss->sec.isServer && + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttIgnore == ssl_0rtt_ignore_trial)) { + /* Silently drop the packet */ databuf->len = 0; /* Needed to ensure data not left around */ - return SECSuccess; - } + return SECSuccess; + } else { + int errCode = PORT_GetError(); + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, alert); + /* Reset the error code in case SSL3_SendAlert called + * PORT_SetError(). */ + PORT_SetError(errCode); + return SECFailure; + } } - if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) { - ssl3_BumpSequenceNumber(&crSpec->read_seq_num); - } else { - dtls_RecordSetRecvd(&crSpec->recvdRecords, dtls_seq_num); + /* SECSuccess */ + crSpec->read_seq_num = seq_num; + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + dtls_RecordSetRecvd(&crSpec->recvdRecords, seq_num); } ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /*****************************************/ @@ -12290,86 +12646,95 @@ decrypt_loser: /* * The decrypted data is now in plaintext. */ + rType = cText->type; /* This must go after decryption because TLS 1.3 + * has encrypted content types. */ /* possibly decompress the record. If we aren't using compression then * plaintext == databuf and so the uncompressed data is already in * databuf. */ if (crSpec->decompressor) { - if (databuf->space < plaintext->len + SSL3_COMPRESSION_MAX_EXPANSION) { - rv = sslBuffer_Grow( - databuf, plaintext->len + SSL3_COMPRESSION_MAX_EXPANSION); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: HandleRecord, tried to get %d bytes", - SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, - plaintext->len + SSL3_COMPRESSION_MAX_EXPANSION)); - /* sslBuffer_Grow has set a memory error code. */ - /* Perhaps we should send an alert. (but we have no memory!) */ - PORT_Free(plaintext->buf); - return SECFailure; - } - } - - rv = crSpec->decompressor(crSpec->decompressContext, - databuf->buf, - (int*) &databuf->len, - databuf->space, - plaintext->buf, - plaintext->len); - - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - int err = ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE); - SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, - isTLS ? decompression_failure : bad_record_mac); - - /* There appears to be a bug with (at least) Apache + OpenSSL where - * resumed SSLv3 connections don't actually use compression. See - * comments 93-95 of - * https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=275744 - * - * So, if we get a decompression error, and the record appears to - * be already uncompressed, then we return a more specific error - * code to hopefully save somebody some debugging time in the - * future. - */ - if (plaintext->len >= 4) { - unsigned int len = ((unsigned int) plaintext->buf[1] << 16) | - ((unsigned int) plaintext->buf[2] << 8) | - (unsigned int) plaintext->buf[3]; - if (len == plaintext->len - 4) { - /* This appears to be uncompressed already */ - err = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_UNCOMPRESSED_RECORD; - } - } - - PORT_Free(plaintext->buf); - PORT_SetError(err); - return SECFailure; - } - - PORT_Free(plaintext->buf); + if (databuf->space < plaintext->len + SSL3_COMPRESSION_MAX_EXPANSION) { + rv = sslBuffer_Grow( + databuf, plaintext->len + SSL3_COMPRESSION_MAX_EXPANSION); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: HandleRecord, tried to get %d bytes", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, + plaintext->len + + SSL3_COMPRESSION_MAX_EXPANSION)); + /* sslBuffer_Grow has set a memory error code. */ + /* Perhaps we should send an alert. (but we have no memory!) */ + PORT_Free(plaintext->buf); + return SECFailure; + } + } + + rv = crSpec->decompressor(crSpec->decompressContext, + databuf->buf, + (int *)&databuf->len, + databuf->space, + plaintext->buf, + plaintext->len); + + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + int err = ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE); + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, + isTLS ? decompression_failure + : bad_record_mac); + + /* There appears to be a bug with (at least) Apache + OpenSSL where + * resumed SSLv3 connections don't actually use compression. See + * comments 93-95 of + * https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=275744 + * + * So, if we get a decompression error, and the record appears to + * be already uncompressed, then we return a more specific error + * code to hopefully save somebody some debugging time in the + * future. + */ + if (plaintext->len >= 4) { + unsigned int len = ((unsigned int)plaintext->buf[1] << 16) | + ((unsigned int)plaintext->buf[2] << 8) | + (unsigned int)plaintext->buf[3]; + if (len == plaintext->len - 4) { + /* This appears to be uncompressed already */ + err = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_UNCOMPRESSED_RECORD; + } + } + + PORT_Free(plaintext->buf); + PORT_SetError(err); + return SECFailure; + } + + PORT_Free(plaintext->buf); } /* - ** Having completed the decompression, check the length again. + ** Having completed the decompression, check the length again. */ if (isTLS && databuf->len > (MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 1024)) { - SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, record_overflow); - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_RECORD_TOO_LONG); - return SECFailure; + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, record_overflow); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_RECORD_TOO_LONG); + return SECFailure; } /* Application data records are processed by the caller of this ** function, not by this function. */ if (rType == content_application_data) { - if (ss->firstHsDone) - return SECSuccess; - (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_APPLICATION_DATA); - return SECFailure; + if (ss->firstHsDone) + return SECSuccess; + if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 && + ss->sec.isServer && + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_accepted) { + return tls13_HandleEarlyApplicationData(ss, databuf); + } + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_APPLICATION_DATA); + return SECFailure; } - /* It's a record that must be handled by ssl itself, not the application. +/* It's a record that must be handled by ssl itself, not the application. */ process_it: /* XXX Get the xmit lock here. Odds are very high that we'll be xmiting @@ -12381,29 +12746,29 @@ process_it: ** they return SECFailure or SECWouldBlock. */ switch (rType) { - case content_change_cipher_spec: - rv = ssl3_HandleChangeCipherSpecs(ss, databuf); - break; - case content_alert: - rv = ssl3_HandleAlert(ss, databuf); - break; - case content_handshake: - if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) { - rv = ssl3_HandleHandshake(ss, databuf); - } else { - rv = dtls_HandleHandshake(ss, databuf); - } - break; - /* - case content_application_data is handled before this switch - */ - default: - SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: bogus content type=%d", - SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, cText->type)); - /* XXX Send an alert ??? */ - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNKNOWN_RECORD_TYPE); - rv = SECFailure; - break; + case content_change_cipher_spec: + rv = ssl3_HandleChangeCipherSpecs(ss, databuf); + break; + case content_alert: + rv = ssl3_HandleAlert(ss, databuf); + break; + case content_handshake: + if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) { + rv = ssl3_HandleHandshake(ss, databuf); + } else { + rv = dtls_HandleHandshake(ss, databuf); + } + break; + /* + case content_application_data is handled before this switch + */ + default: + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: bogus content type=%d", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, cText->type)); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNKNOWN_RECORD_TYPE); + ssl3_DecodeError(ss); + rv = SECFailure; + break; } ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); @@ -12414,94 +12779,113 @@ process_it: * Initialization functions */ +void +ssl_InitSecState(sslSecurityInfo *sec) +{ + sec->authType = ssl_auth_null; + sec->authKeyBits = 0; + sec->signatureScheme = ssl_sig_none; + sec->keaType = ssl_kea_null; + sec->keaKeyBits = 0; + sec->keaGroup = NULL; +} + /* Called from ssl3_InitState, immediately below. */ /* Caller must hold the SpecWriteLock. */ -static void -ssl3_InitCipherSpec(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec) +void +ssl3_InitCipherSpec(ssl3CipherSpec *spec) { - spec->cipher_def = &bulk_cipher_defs[cipher_null]; + spec->cipher_def = &bulk_cipher_defs[cipher_null]; PORT_Assert(spec->cipher_def->cipher == cipher_null); - spec->mac_def = &mac_defs[mac_null]; + spec->mac_def = &mac_defs[mac_null]; PORT_Assert(spec->mac_def->mac == mac_null); - spec->encode = Null_Cipher; - spec->decode = Null_Cipher; - spec->destroy = NULL; - spec->compressor = NULL; - spec->decompressor = NULL; - spec->destroyCompressContext = NULL; + spec->encode = Null_Cipher; + spec->decode = Null_Cipher; + spec->compressor = NULL; + spec->decompressor = NULL; + spec->destroyCompressContext = NULL; spec->destroyDecompressContext = NULL; - spec->mac_size = 0; - spec->master_secret = NULL; - spec->bypassCiphers = PR_FALSE; + spec->mac_size = 0; + spec->master_secret = NULL; - spec->msItem.data = NULL; - spec->msItem.len = 0; + spec->msItem.data = NULL; + spec->msItem.len = 0; - spec->client.write_key = NULL; - spec->client.write_mac_key = NULL; + spec->client.write_key = NULL; + spec->client.write_mac_key = NULL; spec->client.write_mac_context = NULL; - spec->server.write_key = NULL; - spec->server.write_mac_key = NULL; + spec->server.write_key = NULL; + spec->server.write_mac_key = NULL; spec->server.write_mac_context = NULL; - spec->write_seq_num.high = 0; - spec->write_seq_num.low = 0; - - spec->read_seq_num.high = 0; - spec->read_seq_num.low = 0; + spec->write_seq_num = 0; + spec->read_seq_num = 0; + spec->epoch = 0; - spec->epoch = 0; + spec->refCt = 128; /* Arbitrarily high number to prevent + * non-TLS 1.3 cipherSpecs from being + * GCed. This will be overwritten with + * a valid refCt for TLS 1.3. */ dtls_InitRecvdRecords(&spec->recvdRecords); - - spec->version = ss->vrange.max; } -/* Called from: ssl3_SendRecord -** ssl3_StartHandshakeHash() <- ssl2_BeginClientHandshake() -** ssl3_SendClientHello() -** ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello() -** ssl3_HandleRecord() +/* Called from: ssl3_SendRecord +** ssl3_SendClientHello() +** ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello() +** ssl3_HandleRecord() ** ** This function should perhaps acquire and release the SpecWriteLock. ** ** */ -static SECStatus +SECStatus ssl3_InitState(sslSocket *ss) { - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); if (ss->ssl3.initialized) - return SECSuccess; /* Function should be idempotent */ + return SECSuccess; /* Function should be idempotent */ ss->ssl3.policy = SSL_ALLOWED; + ssl_InitSecState(&ss->sec); + ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); ss->ssl3.crSpec = ss->ssl3.cwSpec = &ss->ssl3.specs[0]; ss->ssl3.prSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec = &ss->ssl3.specs[1]; + ssl3_InitCipherSpec(ss->ssl3.crSpec); + ssl3_InitCipherSpec(ss->ssl3.prSpec); + ss->ssl3.crSpec->version = ss->ssl3.prSpec->version = ss->vrange.max; + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); + ss->ssl3.hs.sendingSCSV = PR_FALSE; - ssl3_InitCipherSpec(ss, ss->ssl3.crSpec); - ssl3_InitCipherSpec(ss, ss->ssl3.prSpec); ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo = 0; - ss->ssl3.hs.ws = (ss->sec.isServer) ? wait_client_hello : wait_server_hello; -#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC - ss->ssl3.hs.negotiatedECCurves = ssl3_GetSupportedECCurveMask(ss); -#endif - ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); - - PORT_Memset(&ss->xtnData, 0, sizeof(TLSExtensionData)); + ssl3_ResetExtensionData(&ss->xtnData); + PR_INIT_CLIST(&ss->ssl3.hs.remoteExtensions); if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { - ss->ssl3.hs.sendMessageSeq = 0; - ss->ssl3.hs.recvMessageSeq = 0; - ss->ssl3.hs.rtTimeoutMs = INITIAL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_MS; - ss->ssl3.hs.rtRetries = 0; - ss->ssl3.hs.recvdHighWater = -1; - PR_INIT_CLIST(&ss->ssl3.hs.lastMessageFlight); - dtls_SetMTU(ss, 0); /* Set the MTU to the highest plateau */ - } + ss->ssl3.hs.sendMessageSeq = 0; + ss->ssl3.hs.recvMessageSeq = 0; + ss->ssl3.hs.rtTimeoutMs = DTLS_RETRANSMIT_INITIAL_MS; + ss->ssl3.hs.rtRetries = 0; + ss->ssl3.hs.recvdHighWater = -1; + PR_INIT_CLIST(&ss->ssl3.hs.lastMessageFlight); + dtls_SetMTU(ss, 0); /* Set the MTU to the highest plateau */ + } + + ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret = NULL; + ss->ssl3.hs.resumptionMasterSecret = NULL; + ss->ssl3.hs.dheSecret = NULL; + ss->ssl3.hs.pskBinderKey = NULL; + ss->ssl3.hs.clientEarlyTrafficSecret = NULL; + ss->ssl3.hs.clientHsTrafficSecret = NULL; + ss->ssl3.hs.serverHsTrafficSecret = NULL; + ss->ssl3.hs.clientTrafficSecret = NULL; + ss->ssl3.hs.serverTrafficSecret = NULL; + ss->ssl3.hs.certificateRequest = NULL; + PR_INIT_CLIST(&ss->ssl3.hs.cipherSpecs); PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf && !ss->ssl3.hs.messages.space); ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf = NULL; @@ -12509,83 +12893,14 @@ ssl3_InitState(sslSocket *ss) ss->ssl3.hs.receivedNewSessionTicket = PR_FALSE; PORT_Memset(&ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket, 0, - sizeof(ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket)); + sizeof(ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket)); - ss->ssl3.initialized = PR_TRUE; - return SECSuccess; -} - -/* Returns a reference counted object that contains a key pair. - * Or NULL on failure. Initial ref count is 1. - * Uses the keys in the pair as input. - */ -ssl3KeyPair * -ssl3_NewKeyPair( SECKEYPrivateKey * privKey, SECKEYPublicKey * pubKey) -{ - ssl3KeyPair * pair; + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState = ssl_0rtt_none; - if (!privKey || !pubKey) { - PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR); - return NULL; - } - pair = PORT_ZNew(ssl3KeyPair); - if (!pair) - return NULL; /* error code is set. */ - pair->refCount = 1; - pair->privKey = privKey; - pair->pubKey = pubKey; - return pair; /* success */ -} - -ssl3KeyPair * -ssl3_GetKeyPairRef(ssl3KeyPair * keyPair) -{ - PR_ATOMIC_INCREMENT(&keyPair->refCount); - return keyPair; -} + ssl_FilterSupportedGroups(ss); -void -ssl3_FreeKeyPair(ssl3KeyPair * keyPair) -{ - PRInt32 newCount = PR_ATOMIC_DECREMENT(&keyPair->refCount); - if (!newCount) { - if (keyPair->privKey) - SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(keyPair->privKey); - if (keyPair->pubKey) - SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey( keyPair->pubKey); - PORT_Free(keyPair); - } -} - -/* - * Creates the public and private RSA keys for SSL Step down. - * Called from SSL_ConfigSecureServer in sslsecur.c - */ -SECStatus -ssl3_CreateRSAStepDownKeys(sslSocket *ss) -{ - SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; - SECKEYPrivateKey * privKey; /* RSA step down key */ - SECKEYPublicKey * pubKey; /* RSA step down key */ - - if (ss->stepDownKeyPair) - ssl3_FreeKeyPair(ss->stepDownKeyPair); - ss->stepDownKeyPair = NULL; -#ifndef HACKED_EXPORT_SERVER - /* Sigh, should have a get key strength call for private keys */ - if (PK11_GetPrivateModulusLen(ss->serverCerts[kt_rsa].SERVERKEY) > - EXPORT_RSA_KEY_LENGTH) { - /* need to ask for the key size in bits */ - privKey = SECKEY_CreateRSAPrivateKey(EXPORT_RSA_KEY_LENGTH * BPB, - &pubKey, NULL); - if (!privKey || !pubKey || - !(ss->stepDownKeyPair = ssl3_NewKeyPair(privKey, pubKey))) { - ssl_MapLowLevelError(SEC_ERROR_KEYGEN_FAIL); - rv = SECFailure; - } - } -#endif - return rv; + ss->ssl3.initialized = PR_TRUE; + return SECSuccess; } /* record the export policy for this cipher suite */ @@ -12594,9 +12909,9 @@ ssl3_SetPolicy(ssl3CipherSuite which, int policy) { ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite; - suite = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(which, cipherSuites); + suite = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfgMutable(which, cipherSuites); if (suite == NULL) { - return SECFailure; /* err code was set by ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg */ + return SECFailure; /* err code was set by ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg */ } suite->policy = policy; @@ -12606,17 +12921,17 @@ ssl3_SetPolicy(ssl3CipherSuite which, int policy) SECStatus ssl3_GetPolicy(ssl3CipherSuite which, PRInt32 *oPolicy) { - ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite; - PRInt32 policy; - SECStatus rv; + const ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite; + PRInt32 policy; + SECStatus rv; suite = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(which, cipherSuites); if (suite) { - policy = suite->policy; - rv = SECSuccess; + policy = suite->policy; + rv = SECSuccess; } else { - policy = SSL_NOT_ALLOWED; - rv = SECFailure; /* err code was set by Lookup. */ + policy = SSL_NOT_ALLOWED; + rv = SECFailure; /* err code was set by Lookup. */ } *oPolicy = policy; return rv; @@ -12628,9 +12943,9 @@ ssl3_CipherPrefSetDefault(ssl3CipherSuite which, PRBool enabled) { ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite; - suite = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(which, cipherSuites); + suite = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfgMutable(which, cipherSuites); if (suite == NULL) { - return SECFailure; /* err code was set by ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg */ + return SECFailure; /* err code was set by ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg */ } suite->enabled = enabled; return SECSuccess; @@ -12640,17 +12955,17 @@ ssl3_CipherPrefSetDefault(ssl3CipherSuite which, PRBool enabled) SECStatus ssl3_CipherPrefGetDefault(ssl3CipherSuite which, PRBool *enabled) { - ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite; - PRBool pref; - SECStatus rv; + const ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite; + PRBool pref; + SECStatus rv; suite = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(which, cipherSuites); if (suite) { - pref = suite->enabled; - rv = SECSuccess; + pref = suite->enabled; + rv = SECSuccess; } else { - pref = SSL_NOT_ALLOWED; - rv = SECFailure; /* err code was set by Lookup. */ + pref = SSL_NOT_ALLOWED; + rv = SECFailure; /* err code was set by Lookup. */ } *enabled = pref; return rv; @@ -12661,67 +12976,77 @@ ssl3_CipherPrefSet(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSuite which, PRBool enabled) { ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite; - suite = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(which, ss->cipherSuites); + suite = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfgMutable(which, ss->cipherSuites); if (suite == NULL) { - return SECFailure; /* err code was set by ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg */ + return SECFailure; /* err code was set by ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg */ } suite->enabled = enabled; return SECSuccess; } SECStatus -ssl3_CipherPrefGet(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSuite which, PRBool *enabled) +ssl3_CipherPrefGet(const sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSuite which, PRBool *enabled) { - ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite; - PRBool pref; - SECStatus rv; + const ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite; + PRBool pref; + SECStatus rv; suite = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(which, ss->cipherSuites); if (suite) { - pref = suite->enabled; - rv = SECSuccess; + pref = suite->enabled; + rv = SECSuccess; } else { - pref = SSL_NOT_ALLOWED; - rv = SECFailure; /* err code was set by Lookup. */ + pref = SSL_NOT_ALLOWED; + rv = SECFailure; /* err code was set by Lookup. */ } *enabled = pref; return rv; } SECStatus -SSL_SignaturePrefSet(PRFileDesc *fd, const SSLSignatureAndHashAlg *algorithms, - unsigned int count) +SSL_SignatureSchemePrefSet(PRFileDesc *fd, const SSLSignatureScheme *schemes, + unsigned int count) { sslSocket *ss; unsigned int i; + unsigned int supported = 0; ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); if (!ss) { - SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SSL_SignaturePrefSet", + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SSL_SignatureSchemePrefSet", SSL_GETPID(), fd)); PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); return SECFailure; } - if (!count || count > MAX_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS) { + if (!count) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + for (i = 0; i < count; ++i) { + if (ssl_IsSupportedSignatureScheme(schemes[i])) { + ++supported; + } + } + /* We don't check for duplicates, so it's possible to get too many. */ + if (supported > MAX_SIGNATURE_SCHEMES) { PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); return SECFailure; } - ss->ssl3.signatureAlgorithmCount = 0; + ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount = 0; for (i = 0; i < count; ++i) { - if (!ssl3_IsSupportedSignatureAlgorithm(&algorithms[i])) { - SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: invalid signature algorithm set %d/%d", - SSL_GETPID(), fd, algorithms[i].sigAlg, - algorithms[i].hashAlg)); + if (!ssl_IsSupportedSignatureScheme(schemes[i])) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: invalid signature scheme %d ignored", + SSL_GETPID(), fd, schemes[i])); continue; } - ss->ssl3.signatureAlgorithms[ss->ssl3.signatureAlgorithmCount++] = - algorithms[i]; + ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount++] = schemes[i]; } - if (ss->ssl3.signatureAlgorithmCount == 0) { + if (ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount == 0) { PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_SUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM); return SECFailure; } @@ -12729,11 +13054,51 @@ SSL_SignaturePrefSet(PRFileDesc *fd, const SSLSignatureAndHashAlg *algorithms, } SECStatus +SSL_SignaturePrefSet(PRFileDesc *fd, const SSLSignatureAndHashAlg *algorithms, + unsigned int count) +{ + SSLSignatureScheme schemes[MAX_SIGNATURE_SCHEMES]; + unsigned int i; + + count = PR_MIN(PR_ARRAY_SIZE(schemes), count); + for (i = 0; i < count; ++i) { + schemes[i] = (algorithms[i].hashAlg << 8) | algorithms[i].sigAlg; + } + return SSL_SignatureSchemePrefSet(fd, schemes, count); +} + +SECStatus +SSL_SignatureSchemePrefGet(PRFileDesc *fd, SSLSignatureScheme *schemes, + unsigned int *count, unsigned int maxCount) +{ + sslSocket *ss; + + ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SSL_SignatureSchemePrefGet", + SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (!schemes || !count || + maxCount < ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + PORT_Memcpy(schemes, ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes, + ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount * sizeof(SSLSignatureScheme)); + *count = ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount; + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus SSL_SignaturePrefGet(PRFileDesc *fd, SSLSignatureAndHashAlg *algorithms, unsigned int *count, unsigned int maxCount) { sslSocket *ss; - unsigned int requiredSpace; + unsigned int i; ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); if (!ss) { @@ -12744,73 +13109,37 @@ SSL_SignaturePrefGet(PRFileDesc *fd, SSLSignatureAndHashAlg *algorithms, } if (!algorithms || !count || - maxCount < ss->ssl3.signatureAlgorithmCount) { + maxCount < ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount) { PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); return SECFailure; } - requiredSpace = - ss->ssl3.signatureAlgorithmCount * sizeof(SSLSignatureAndHashAlg); - PORT_Memcpy(algorithms, ss->ssl3.signatureAlgorithms, requiredSpace); - *count = ss->ssl3.signatureAlgorithmCount; + for (i = 0; i < ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount; ++i) { + algorithms[i].hashAlg = (ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[i] >> 8) & 0xff; + algorithms[i].sigAlg = ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[i] & 0xff; + } + *count = ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount; return SECSuccess; } unsigned int -SSL_SignatureMaxCount() { - return MAX_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS; +SSL_SignatureMaxCount() +{ + return MAX_SIGNATURE_SCHEMES; } /* copy global default policy into socket. */ void ssl3_InitSocketPolicy(sslSocket *ss) { - PORT_Memcpy(ss->cipherSuites, cipherSuites, sizeof cipherSuites); - PORT_Memcpy(ss->ssl3.signatureAlgorithms, defaultSignatureAlgorithms, - sizeof(defaultSignatureAlgorithms)); - ss->ssl3.signatureAlgorithmCount = PR_ARRAY_SIZE(defaultSignatureAlgorithms); -} - -/* ssl3_config_match_init must have already been called by - * the caller of this function. - */ -SECStatus -ssl3_ConstructV2CipherSpecsHack(sslSocket *ss, unsigned char *cs, int *size) -{ - int i, count = 0; - - PORT_Assert(ss != 0); - if (!ss) { - PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR); - return SECFailure; - } - if (SSL3_ALL_VERSIONS_DISABLED(&ss->vrange)) { - *size = 0; - return SECSuccess; - } - if (cs == NULL) { - *size = count_cipher_suites(ss, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE); - return SECSuccess; - } - - /* ssl3_config_match_init was called by the caller of this function. */ - for (i = 0; i < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; i++) { - ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite = &ss->cipherSuites[i]; - if (config_match(suite, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, &ss->vrange, ss)) { - if (cs != NULL) { - *cs++ = 0x00; - *cs++ = (suite->cipher_suite >> 8) & 0xFF; - *cs++ = suite->cipher_suite & 0xFF; - } - count++; - } - } - *size = count; - return SECSuccess; + PORT_Memcpy(ss->cipherSuites, cipherSuites, sizeof(cipherSuites)); + PORT_Memcpy(ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes, defaultSignatureSchemes, + sizeof(defaultSignatureSchemes)); + ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount = PR_ARRAY_SIZE(defaultSignatureSchemes); } /* -** If ssl3 socket has completed the first handshake, and is in idle state, +** If ssl3 socket has completed the first handshake, and is in idle state, ** then start a new handshake. ** If flushCache is true, the SID cache will be flushed first, forcing a ** "Full" handshake (not a session restart handshake), to be done. @@ -12820,41 +13149,42 @@ ssl3_ConstructV2CipherSpecsHack(sslSocket *ss, unsigned char *cs, int *size) SECStatus ssl3_RedoHandshake(sslSocket *ss, PRBool flushCache) { - sslSessionID * sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; - SECStatus rv; + sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; + SECStatus rv; - PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); if (!ss->firstHsDone || - ((ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) && - ss->ssl3.initialized && - (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != idle_handshake))) { - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_NOT_COMPLETED); - return SECFailure; + (ss->ssl3.initialized && (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != idle_handshake))) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_NOT_COMPLETED); + return SECFailure; } if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { - dtls_RehandshakeCleanup(ss); + dtls_RehandshakeCleanup(ss); } - if (ss->opt.enableRenegotiation == SSL_RENEGOTIATE_NEVER) { - PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED); - return SECFailure; + if (ss->opt.enableRenegotiation == SSL_RENEGOTIATE_NEVER || + ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED); + return SECFailure; } if (sid && flushCache) { - if (ss->sec.uncache) - ss->sec.uncache(sid); /* remove it from whichever cache it's in. */ - ssl_FreeSID(sid); /* dec ref count and free if zero. */ - ss->sec.ci.sid = NULL; + ss->sec.uncache(sid); /* remove it from whichever cache it's in. */ + ssl_FreeSID(sid); /* dec ref count and free if zero. */ + ss->sec.ci.sid = NULL; } - ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); /**************************************/ + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); /**************************************/ /* start off a new handshake. */ - rv = (ss->sec.isServer) ? ssl3_SendHelloRequest(ss) - : ssl3_SendClientHello(ss, PR_FALSE); + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + rv = ssl3_SendHelloRequest(ss); + } else { + rv = ssl3_SendClientHello(ss, client_hello_renegotiation); + } - ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); /**************************************/ + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); /**************************************/ return rv; } @@ -12864,70 +13194,146 @@ ssl3_DestroySSL3Info(sslSocket *ss) { if (ss->ssl3.clientCertificate != NULL) - CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate); + CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate); if (ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey != NULL) - SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey); + SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey); if (ss->ssl3.peerCertArena != NULL) - ssl3_CleanupPeerCerts(ss); + ssl3_CleanupPeerCerts(ss); if (ss->ssl3.clientCertChain != NULL) { - CERT_DestroyCertificateList(ss->ssl3.clientCertChain); - ss->ssl3.clientCertChain = NULL; + CERT_DestroyCertificateList(ss->ssl3.clientCertChain); + ss->ssl3.clientCertChain = NULL; + } + if (ss->ssl3.ca_list) { + CERT_FreeDistNames(ss->ssl3.ca_list); } /* clean up handshake */ -#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS - if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) { - if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_combo) { - SHA1_DestroyContext((SHA1Context *)ss->ssl3.hs.sha_cx, PR_FALSE); - MD5_DestroyContext((MD5Context *)ss->ssl3.hs.md5_cx, PR_FALSE); - } else if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_single) { - ss->ssl3.hs.sha_obj->destroy(ss->ssl3.hs.sha_cx, PR_FALSE); - } - } -#endif if (ss->ssl3.hs.md5) { - PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.md5,PR_TRUE); + PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.md5, PR_TRUE); } if (ss->ssl3.hs.sha) { - PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.sha,PR_TRUE); - } - if (ss->ssl3.hs.clientSigAndHash) { - PORT_Free(ss->ssl3.hs.clientSigAndHash); + PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.sha, PR_TRUE); } if (ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf) { - PORT_Free(ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf); - ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf = NULL; - ss->ssl3.hs.messages.len = 0; - ss->ssl3.hs.messages.space = 0; + sslBuffer_Clear(&ss->ssl3.hs.messages); } /* free the SSL3Buffer (msg_body) */ PORT_Free(ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.buf); SECITEM_FreeItem(&ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.ticket, PR_FALSE); + SECITEM_FreeItem(&ss->ssl3.hs.srvVirtName, PR_FALSE); + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.certificateRequest) { + PORT_FreeArena(ss->ssl3.hs.certificateRequest->arena, PR_FALSE); + ss->ssl3.hs.certificateRequest = NULL; + } /* free up the CipherSpecs */ - ssl3_DestroyCipherSpec(&ss->ssl3.specs[0], PR_TRUE/*freeSrvName*/); - ssl3_DestroyCipherSpec(&ss->ssl3.specs[1], PR_TRUE/*freeSrvName*/); + ssl3_DestroyCipherSpec(&ss->ssl3.specs[0], PR_TRUE /*freeSrvName*/); + ssl3_DestroyCipherSpec(&ss->ssl3.specs[1], PR_TRUE /*freeSrvName*/); /* Destroy the DTLS data */ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { - dtls_FreeHandshakeMessages(&ss->ssl3.hs.lastMessageFlight); - if (ss->ssl3.hs.recvdFragments.buf) { - PORT_Free(ss->ssl3.hs.recvdFragments.buf); - } + dtls_FreeHandshakeMessages(&ss->ssl3.hs.lastMessageFlight); + if (ss->ssl3.hs.recvdFragments.buf) { + PORT_Free(ss->ssl3.hs.recvdFragments.buf); + } } - if (ss->ssl3.dheGroups) { - PORT_Free(ss->ssl3.dheGroups); - } + /* Destroy remote extensions */ + ssl3_DestroyRemoteExtensions(&ss->ssl3.hs.remoteExtensions); + ssl3_ResetExtensionData(&ss->xtnData); + + /* Destroy TLS 1.3 cipher specs */ + tls13_DestroyCipherSpecs(&ss->ssl3.hs.cipherSpecs); + + /* Destroy TLS 1.3 keys */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret) + PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret); + if (ss->ssl3.hs.resumptionMasterSecret) + PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.resumptionMasterSecret); + if (ss->ssl3.hs.dheSecret) + PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.dheSecret); + if (ss->ssl3.hs.pskBinderKey) + PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.pskBinderKey); + if (ss->ssl3.hs.clientEarlyTrafficSecret) + PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.clientEarlyTrafficSecret); + if (ss->ssl3.hs.clientHsTrafficSecret) + PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.clientHsTrafficSecret); + if (ss->ssl3.hs.serverHsTrafficSecret) + PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.serverHsTrafficSecret); + if (ss->ssl3.hs.clientTrafficSecret) + PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.clientTrafficSecret); + if (ss->ssl3.hs.serverTrafficSecret) + PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.serverTrafficSecret); + if (ss->ssl3.hs.earlyExporterSecret) + PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.earlyExporterSecret); + if (ss->ssl3.hs.exporterSecret) + PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.exporterSecret); + + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState = ssl_0rtt_none; + /* Destroy TLS 1.3 buffered early data. */ + tls13_DestroyEarlyData(&ss->ssl3.hs.bufferedEarlyData); ss->ssl3.initialized = PR_FALSE; - SECITEM_FreeItem(&ss->ssl3.nextProto, PR_FALSE); + SECITEM_FreeItem(&ss->xtnData.nextProto, PR_FALSE); +} + +#define MAP_NULL(x) (((x) != 0) ? (x) : SEC_OID_NULL_CIPHER) + +SECStatus +ssl3_ApplyNSSPolicy(void) +{ + unsigned i; + SECStatus rv; + PRUint32 policy = 0; + + rv = NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(SEC_OID_APPLY_SSL_POLICY, &policy); + if (rv != SECSuccess || !(policy & NSS_USE_POLICY_IN_SSL)) { + return SECSuccess; /* do nothing */ + } + + /* disable every ciphersuite */ + for (i = 1; i < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(cipher_suite_defs); ++i) { + const ssl3CipherSuiteDef *suite = &cipher_suite_defs[i]; + SECOidTag policyOid; + + policyOid = MAP_NULL(kea_defs[suite->key_exchange_alg].oid); + rv = NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(policyOid, &policy); + if (rv == SECSuccess && !(policy & NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX)) { + ssl_CipherPrefSetDefault(suite->cipher_suite, PR_FALSE); + ssl_CipherPolicySet(suite->cipher_suite, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED); + continue; + } + + policyOid = MAP_NULL(ssl_GetBulkCipherDef(suite)->oid); + rv = NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(policyOid, &policy); + if (rv == SECSuccess && !(policy & NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL)) { + ssl_CipherPrefSetDefault(suite->cipher_suite, PR_FALSE); + ssl_CipherPolicySet(suite->cipher_suite, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED); + continue; + } + + if (ssl_GetBulkCipherDef(suite)->type != type_aead) { + policyOid = MAP_NULL(mac_defs[suite->mac_alg].oid); + rv = NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(policyOid, &policy); + if (rv == SECSuccess && !(policy & NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL)) { + ssl_CipherPrefSetDefault(suite->cipher_suite, PR_FALSE); + ssl_CipherPolicySet(suite->cipher_suite, + SSL_NOT_ALLOWED); + continue; + } + } + } + + rv = ssl3_ConstrainRangeByPolicy(); + + return rv; } /* End of ssl3con.c */ |