diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'nss/lib/jar/jarver.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | nss/lib/jar/jarver.c | 1170 |
1 files changed, 1170 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/nss/lib/jar/jarver.c b/nss/lib/jar/jarver.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fa3c8a0 --- /dev/null +++ b/nss/lib/jar/jarver.c @@ -0,0 +1,1170 @@ +/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +/* + * JARVER + * + * Jarnature Parsing & Verification + */ + +#include "nssrenam.h" +#include "jar.h" +#include "jarint.h" +#include "certdb.h" +#include "certt.h" +#include "secpkcs7.h" +#include "secder.h" + +#define SZ 512 + +static int +jar_validate_pkcs7(JAR *jar, JAR_Signer *signer, char *data, long length); + +static void +jar_catch_bytes(void *arg, const char *buf, unsigned long len); + +static int +jar_gather_signers(JAR *jar, JAR_Signer *signer, SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo); + +static char * +jar_eat_line(int lines, int eating, char *data, long *len); + +static JAR_Digest * +jar_digest_section(char *manifest, long length); + +static JAR_Digest *jar_get_mf_digest(JAR *jar, char *path); + +static int +jar_parse_digital_signature(char *raw_manifest, JAR_Signer *signer, + long length, JAR *jar); + +static int +jar_add_cert(JAR *jar, JAR_Signer *signer, int type, CERTCertificate *cert); + +static char *jar_basename(const char *path); + +static int +jar_signal(int status, JAR *jar, const char *metafile, char *pathname); + +#ifdef DEBUG +static int jar_insanity_check(char *data, long length); +#endif + +int +jar_parse_mf(JAR *jar, char *raw_manifest, long length, + const char *path, const char *url); + +int +jar_parse_sf(JAR *jar, char *raw_manifest, long length, + const char *path, const char *url); + +int +jar_parse_sig(JAR *jar, const char *path, char *raw_manifest, + long length); + +int +jar_parse_any(JAR *jar, int type, JAR_Signer *signer, + char *raw_manifest, long length, const char *path, + const char *url); + +static int +jar_internal_digest(JAR *jar, const char *path, char *x_name, JAR_Digest *dig); + +/* + * J A R _ p a r s e _ m a n i f e s t + * + * Pass manifest files to this function. They are + * decoded and placed into internal representations. + * + * Accepts both signature and manifest files. Use + * the same "jar" for both. + * + */ +int +JAR_parse_manifest(JAR *jar, char *raw_manifest, long length, + const char *path, const char *url) +{ + int filename_free = 0; + + /* fill in the path, if supplied. This is the location + of the jar file on disk, if known */ + + if (jar->filename == NULL && path) { + jar->filename = PORT_Strdup(path); + if (jar->filename == NULL) + return JAR_ERR_MEMORY; + filename_free = 1; + } + + /* fill in the URL, if supplied. This is the place + from which the jar file was retrieved. */ + + if (jar->url == NULL && url) { + jar->url = PORT_Strdup(url); + if (jar->url == NULL) { + if (filename_free) { + PORT_Free(jar->filename); + } + return JAR_ERR_MEMORY; + } + } + + /* Determine what kind of file this is from the META-INF + directory. It could be MF, SF, or a binary RSA/DSA file */ + + if (!PORT_Strncasecmp (raw_manifest, "Manifest-Version:", 17)) { + return jar_parse_mf(jar, raw_manifest, length, path, url); + } + else if (!PORT_Strncasecmp (raw_manifest, "Signature-Version:", 18)) + { + return jar_parse_sf(jar, raw_manifest, length, path, url); + } else { + /* This is probably a binary signature */ + return jar_parse_sig(jar, path, raw_manifest, length); + } +} + +/* + * j a r _ p a r s e _ s i g + * + * Pass some manner of RSA or DSA digital signature + * on, after checking to see if it comes at an appropriate state. + * + */ +int +jar_parse_sig(JAR *jar, const char *path, char *raw_manifest, + long length) +{ + JAR_Signer *signer; + int status = JAR_ERR_ORDER; + + if (length <= 128) { + /* signature is way too small */ + return JAR_ERR_SIG; + } + + /* make sure that MF and SF have already been processed */ + + if (jar->globalmeta == NULL) + return JAR_ERR_ORDER; + + /* Determine whether or not this RSA file has + has an associated SF file */ + + if (path) { + char *owner; + owner = jar_basename(path); + + if (owner == NULL) + return JAR_ERR_MEMORY; + + signer = jar_get_signer(jar, owner); + PORT_Free(owner); + } else + signer = jar_get_signer(jar, "*"); + + if (signer == NULL) + return JAR_ERR_ORDER; + + + /* Do not pass a huge pointer to this function, + since the underlying security code is unaware. We will + never pass >64k through here. */ + + if (length > 64000) { + /* this digital signature is way too big */ + return JAR_ERR_SIG; + } + + /* don't expense unneeded calloc overhead on non-win16 */ + status = jar_parse_digital_signature(raw_manifest, signer, length, jar); + + return status; +} + +/* + * j a r _ p a r s e _ m f + * + * Parse the META-INF/manifest.mf file, whose + * information applies to all signers. + * + */ +int +jar_parse_mf(JAR *jar, char *raw_manifest, long length, + const char *path, const char *url) +{ + if (jar->globalmeta) { + /* refuse a second manifest file, if passed for some reason */ + return JAR_ERR_ORDER; + } + + /* remember a digest for the global section */ + jar->globalmeta = jar_digest_section(raw_manifest, length); + if (jar->globalmeta == NULL) + return JAR_ERR_MEMORY; + return jar_parse_any(jar, jarTypeMF, NULL, raw_manifest, length, + path, url); +} + +/* + * j a r _ p a r s e _ s f + * + * Parse META-INF/xxx.sf, a digitally signed file + * pointing to a subset of MF sections. + * + */ +int +jar_parse_sf(JAR *jar, char *raw_manifest, long length, + const char *path, const char *url) +{ + JAR_Signer *signer = NULL; + int status = JAR_ERR_MEMORY; + + if (jar->globalmeta == NULL) { + /* It is a requirement that the MF file be passed before the SF file */ + return JAR_ERR_ORDER; + } + + signer = JAR_new_signer(); + if (signer == NULL) + goto loser; + + if (path) { + signer->owner = jar_basename(path); + if (signer->owner == NULL) + goto loser; + } + + /* check for priors. When someone doctors a jar file + to contain identical path entries, prevent the second + one from affecting JAR functions */ + if (jar_get_signer(jar, signer->owner)) { + /* someone is trying to spoof us */ + status = JAR_ERR_ORDER; + goto loser; + } + + /* remember its digest */ + signer->digest = JAR_calculate_digest (raw_manifest, length); + if (signer->digest == NULL) + goto loser; + + /* Add this signer to the jar */ + ADDITEM(jar->signers, jarTypeOwner, signer->owner, signer, + sizeof (JAR_Signer)); + + return jar_parse_any(jar, jarTypeSF, signer, raw_manifest, length, + path, url); + +loser: + if (signer) + JAR_destroy_signer (signer); + return status; +} + +/* + * j a r _ p a r s e _ a n y + * + * Parse a MF or SF manifest file. + * + */ +int +jar_parse_any(JAR *jar, int type, JAR_Signer *signer, + char *raw_manifest, long length, const char *path, + const char *url) +{ + int status; + long raw_len; + JAR_Digest *dig, *mfdig = NULL; + char line [SZ]; + char x_name [SZ], x_md5 [SZ], x_sha [SZ]; + char *x_info; + char *sf_md5 = NULL, *sf_sha1 = NULL; + + *x_name = 0; + *x_md5 = 0; + *x_sha = 0; + + PORT_Assert( length > 0 ); + raw_len = length; + +#ifdef DEBUG + if ((status = jar_insanity_check(raw_manifest, raw_len)) < 0) + return status; +#endif + + /* null terminate the first line */ + raw_manifest = jar_eat_line(0, PR_TRUE, raw_manifest, &raw_len); + + /* skip over the preliminary section */ + /* This is one section at the top of the file with global metainfo */ + while (raw_len > 0) { + JAR_Metainfo *met; + + raw_manifest = jar_eat_line(1, PR_TRUE, raw_manifest, &raw_len); + if (raw_len <= 0 || !*raw_manifest) + break; + + met = PORT_ZNew(JAR_Metainfo); + if (met == NULL) + return JAR_ERR_MEMORY; + + /* Parse out the header & info */ + if (PORT_Strlen (raw_manifest) >= SZ) { + /* almost certainly nonsense */ + PORT_Free(met); + continue; + } + + PORT_Strcpy (line, raw_manifest); + x_info = line; + + while (*x_info && *x_info != ' ' && *x_info != '\t' && *x_info != ':') + x_info++; + + if (*x_info) + *x_info++ = 0; + + while (*x_info == ' ' || *x_info == '\t') + x_info++; + + /* metainfo (name, value) pair is now (line, x_info) */ + met->header = PORT_Strdup(line); + met->info = PORT_Strdup(x_info); + + if (type == jarTypeMF) { + ADDITEM (jar->metainfo, jarTypeMeta, + /* pathname */ NULL, met, sizeof (JAR_Metainfo)); + } + + /* For SF files, this metadata may be the digests + of the MF file, still in the "met" structure. */ + + if (type == jarTypeSF) { + if (!PORT_Strcasecmp(line, "MD5-Digest")) + sf_md5 = (char *) met->info; + + if (!PORT_Strcasecmp(line, "SHA1-Digest") || + !PORT_Strcasecmp(line, "SHA-Digest")) + sf_sha1 = (char *) met->info; + } + + if (type != jarTypeMF) { + PORT_Free(met->header); + if (type != jarTypeSF) { + PORT_Free(met->info); + } + PORT_Free(met); + } + } + + if (type == jarTypeSF && jar->globalmeta) { + /* this is a SF file which may contain a digest of the manifest.mf's + global metainfo. */ + + int match = 0; + JAR_Digest *glob = jar->globalmeta; + + if (sf_md5) { + unsigned int md5_length; + unsigned char *md5_digest; + + md5_digest = ATOB_AsciiToData (sf_md5, &md5_length); + PORT_Assert( md5_length == MD5_LENGTH ); + + if (md5_length != MD5_LENGTH) + return JAR_ERR_CORRUPT; + + match = PORT_Memcmp(md5_digest, glob->md5, MD5_LENGTH); + } + + if (sf_sha1 && match == 0) { + unsigned int sha1_length; + unsigned char *sha1_digest; + + sha1_digest = ATOB_AsciiToData (sf_sha1, &sha1_length); + PORT_Assert( sha1_length == SHA1_LENGTH ); + + if (sha1_length != SHA1_LENGTH) + return JAR_ERR_CORRUPT; + + match = PORT_Memcmp(sha1_digest, glob->sha1, SHA1_LENGTH); + } + + if (match != 0) { + /* global digest doesn't match, SF file therefore invalid */ + jar->valid = JAR_ERR_METADATA; + return JAR_ERR_METADATA; + } + } + + /* done with top section of global data */ + while (raw_len > 0) { + *x_md5 = 0; + *x_sha = 0; + *x_name = 0; + + /* If this is a manifest file, attempt to get a digest of the following + section, without damaging it. This digest will be saved later. */ + + if (type == jarTypeMF) { + char *sec; + long sec_len = raw_len; + + if (!*raw_manifest || *raw_manifest == '\n') { + /* skip the blank line */ + sec = jar_eat_line(1, PR_FALSE, raw_manifest, &sec_len); + } else + sec = raw_manifest; + + if (sec_len > 0 && !PORT_Strncasecmp(sec, "Name:", 5)) { + if (type == jarTypeMF) + mfdig = jar_digest_section(sec, sec_len); + else + mfdig = NULL; + } + } + + + while (raw_len > 0) { + raw_manifest = jar_eat_line(1, PR_TRUE, raw_manifest, &raw_len); + if (raw_len <= 0 || !*raw_manifest) + break; /* blank line, done with this entry */ + + if (PORT_Strlen(raw_manifest) >= SZ) { + /* almost certainly nonsense */ + continue; + } + + /* Parse out the name/value pair */ + PORT_Strcpy(line, raw_manifest); + x_info = line; + + while (*x_info && *x_info != ' ' && *x_info != '\t' && + *x_info != ':') + x_info++; + + if (*x_info) + *x_info++ = 0; + + while (*x_info == ' ' || *x_info == '\t') + x_info++; + + if (!PORT_Strcasecmp(line, "Name")) + PORT_Strcpy(x_name, x_info); + else if (!PORT_Strcasecmp(line, "MD5-Digest")) + PORT_Strcpy(x_md5, x_info); + else if (!PORT_Strcasecmp(line, "SHA1-Digest") + || !PORT_Strcasecmp(line, "SHA-Digest")) + PORT_Strcpy(x_sha, x_info); + + /* Algorithm list is meta info we don't care about; keeping it out + of metadata saves significant space for large jar files */ + else if (!PORT_Strcasecmp(line, "Digest-Algorithms") + || !PORT_Strcasecmp(line, "Hash-Algorithms")) + continue; + + /* Meta info is only collected for the manifest.mf file, + since the JAR_get_metainfo call does not support identity */ + else if (type == jarTypeMF) { + JAR_Metainfo *met; + + /* this is meta-data */ + met = PORT_ZNew(JAR_Metainfo); + if (met == NULL) + return JAR_ERR_MEMORY; + + /* metainfo (name, value) pair is now (line, x_info) */ + if ((met->header = PORT_Strdup(line)) == NULL) { + PORT_Free(met); + return JAR_ERR_MEMORY; + } + + if ((met->info = PORT_Strdup(x_info)) == NULL) { + PORT_Free(met->header); + PORT_Free(met); + return JAR_ERR_MEMORY; + } + + ADDITEM (jar->metainfo, jarTypeMeta, + x_name, met, sizeof (JAR_Metainfo)); + } + } + + if (!*x_name) { + /* Whatever that was, it wasn't an entry, because we didn't get a + name. We don't really have anything, so don't record this. */ + continue; + } + + dig = PORT_ZNew(JAR_Digest); + if (dig == NULL) + return JAR_ERR_MEMORY; + + if (*x_md5) { + unsigned int binary_length; + unsigned char *binary_digest; + + binary_digest = ATOB_AsciiToData (x_md5, &binary_length); + PORT_Assert( binary_length == MD5_LENGTH ); + if (binary_length != MD5_LENGTH) { + PORT_Free(dig); + return JAR_ERR_CORRUPT; + } + memcpy (dig->md5, binary_digest, MD5_LENGTH); + dig->md5_status = jarHashPresent; + } + + if (*x_sha ) { + unsigned int binary_length; + unsigned char *binary_digest; + + binary_digest = ATOB_AsciiToData (x_sha, &binary_length); + PORT_Assert( binary_length == SHA1_LENGTH ); + if (binary_length != SHA1_LENGTH) { + PORT_Free(dig); + return JAR_ERR_CORRUPT; + } + memcpy (dig->sha1, binary_digest, SHA1_LENGTH); + dig->sha1_status = jarHashPresent; + } + + PORT_Assert( type == jarTypeMF || type == jarTypeSF ); + if (type == jarTypeMF) { + ADDITEM (jar->hashes, jarTypeMF, x_name, dig, sizeof (JAR_Digest)); + } else if (type == jarTypeSF) { + ADDITEM (signer->sf, jarTypeSF, x_name, dig, sizeof (JAR_Digest)); + } else { + PORT_Free(dig); + return JAR_ERR_ORDER; + } + + /* we're placing these calculated digests of manifest.mf + sections in a list where they can subsequently be forgotten */ + if (type == jarTypeMF && mfdig) { + ADDITEM (jar->manifest, jarTypeSect, + x_name, mfdig, sizeof (JAR_Digest)); + mfdig = NULL; + } + + /* Retrieve our saved SHA1 digest from saved copy and check digests. + This is just comparing the digest of the MF section as indicated in + the SF file with the one we remembered from parsing the MF file */ + + if (type == jarTypeSF) { + if ((status = jar_internal_digest(jar, path, x_name, dig)) < 0) + return status; + } + } + + return 0; +} + +static int +jar_internal_digest(JAR *jar, const char *path, char *x_name, JAR_Digest *dig) +{ + int cv; + int status; + + JAR_Digest *savdig; + + savdig = jar_get_mf_digest(jar, x_name); + if (savdig == NULL) { + /* no .mf digest for this pathname */ + status = jar_signal(JAR_ERR_ENTRY, jar, path, x_name); + if (status < 0) + return 0; /* was continue; */ + return status; + } + + /* check for md5 consistency */ + if (dig->md5_status) { + cv = PORT_Memcmp(savdig->md5, dig->md5, MD5_LENGTH); + /* md5 hash of .mf file is not what expected */ + if (cv) { + status = jar_signal(JAR_ERR_HASH, jar, path, x_name); + + /* bad hash, man */ + dig->md5_status = jarHashBad; + savdig->md5_status = jarHashBad; + + if (status < 0) + return 0; /* was continue; */ + return status; + } + } + + /* check for sha1 consistency */ + if (dig->sha1_status) { + cv = PORT_Memcmp(savdig->sha1, dig->sha1, SHA1_LENGTH); + /* sha1 hash of .mf file is not what expected */ + if (cv) { + status = jar_signal(JAR_ERR_HASH, jar, path, x_name); + + /* bad hash, man */ + dig->sha1_status = jarHashBad; + savdig->sha1_status = jarHashBad; + + if (status < 0) + return 0; /* was continue; */ + return status; + } + } + return 0; +} + +#ifdef DEBUG +/* + * j a r _ i n s a n i t y _ c h e c k + * + * Check for illegal characters (or possibly so) + * in the manifest files, to detect potential memory + * corruption by our neighbors. Debug only, since + * not I18N safe. + * + */ +static int +jar_insanity_check(char *data, long length) +{ + int c; + long off; + + for (off = 0; off < length; off++) { + c = data [off]; + if (c == '\n' || c == '\r' || (c >= ' ' && c <= 128)) + continue; + return JAR_ERR_CORRUPT; + } + return 0; +} +#endif + +/* + * j a r _ p a r s e _ d i g i t a l _ s i g n a t u r e + * + * Parse an RSA or DSA (or perhaps other) digital signature. + * Right now everything is PKCS7. + * + */ +static int +jar_parse_digital_signature(char *raw_manifest, JAR_Signer *signer, + long length, JAR *jar) +{ + return jar_validate_pkcs7 (jar, signer, raw_manifest, length); +} + +/* + * j a r _ a d d _ c e r t + * + * Add information for the given certificate + * (or whatever) to the JAR linked list. A pointer + * is passed for some relevant reference, say + * for example the original certificate. + * + */ +static int +jar_add_cert(JAR *jar, JAR_Signer *signer, int type, CERTCertificate *cert) +{ + JAR_Cert *fing; + unsigned char *keyData; + + if (cert == NULL) + return JAR_ERR_ORDER; + + fing = PORT_ZNew(JAR_Cert); + if (fing == NULL) + goto loser; + + fing->cert = CERT_DupCertificate (cert); + + /* get the certkey */ + fing->length = cert->derIssuer.len + 2 + cert->serialNumber.len; + fing->key = keyData = (unsigned char *) PORT_ZAlloc(fing->length); + if (fing->key == NULL) + goto loser; + keyData[0] = ((cert->derIssuer.len) >> 8) & 0xff; + keyData[1] = ((cert->derIssuer.len) & 0xff); + PORT_Memcpy(&keyData[2], cert->derIssuer.data, cert->derIssuer.len); + PORT_Memcpy(&keyData[2+cert->derIssuer.len], cert->serialNumber.data, + cert->serialNumber.len); + + ADDITEM (signer->certs, type, NULL, fing, sizeof (JAR_Cert)); + return 0; + +loser: + if (fing) { + if (fing->cert) + CERT_DestroyCertificate (fing->cert); + PORT_Free(fing); + } + return JAR_ERR_MEMORY; +} + +/* + * e a t _ l i n e + * + * Reads and/or modifies input buffer "data" of length "*len". + * This function does zero, one or two of the following tasks: + * 1) if "lines" is non-zero, it reads and discards that many lines from + * the input. NUL characters are treated as end-of-line characters, + * not as end-of-input characters. The input is NOT NUL terminated. + * Note: presently, all callers pass either 0 or 1 for lines. + * 2) After skipping the specified number of input lines, if "eating" is + * non-zero, it finds the end of the next line of input and replaces + * the end of line character(s) with a NUL character. + * This function modifies the input buffer, containing the file, in place. + * This function handles PC, Mac, and Unix style text files. + * On entry, *len contains the maximum number of characters that this + * function should ever examine, starting with the character in *data. + * On return, *len is reduced by the number of characters skipped by the + * first task, if any; + * If lines is zero and eating is false, this function returns + * the value in the data argument, but otherwise does nothing. + */ +static char * +jar_eat_line(int lines, int eating, char *data, long *len) +{ + char *start = data; + long maxLen = *len; + + if (maxLen <= 0) + return start; + +#define GO_ON ((data - start) < maxLen) + + /* Eat the requisite number of lines, if any; + prior to terminating the current line with a 0. */ + for (/* yip */ ; lines > 0; lines--) { + while (GO_ON && *data && *data != '\r' && *data != '\n') + data++; + + /* Eat any leading CR */ + if (GO_ON && *data == '\r') + data++; + + /* After the CR, ok to eat one LF */ + if (GO_ON && *data == '\n') + data++; + + /* If there are NULs, this function probably put them there */ + while (GO_ON && !*data) + data++; + } + maxLen -= data - start; /* we have this many characters left. */ + *len = maxLen; + start = data; /* now start again here. */ + if (maxLen > 0 && eating) { + /* Terminate this line with a 0 */ + while (GO_ON && *data && *data != '\n' && *data != '\r') + data++; + + /* If not past the end, we are allowed to eat one CR */ + if (GO_ON && *data == '\r') + *data++ = 0; + + /* After the CR (if any), if not past the end, ok to eat one LF */ + if (GO_ON && *data == '\n') + *data++ = 0; + } + return start; +} +#undef GO_ON + +/* + * j a r _ d i g e s t _ s e c t i o n + * + * Return the digests of the next section of the manifest file. + * Does not damage the manifest file, unlike parse_manifest. + * + */ +static JAR_Digest * +jar_digest_section(char *manifest, long length) +{ + long global_len; + char *global_end; + + global_end = manifest; + global_len = length; + + while (global_len > 0) { + global_end = jar_eat_line(1, PR_FALSE, global_end, &global_len); + if (global_len > 0 && (*global_end == 0 || *global_end == '\n')) + break; + } + return JAR_calculate_digest (manifest, global_end - manifest); +} + +/* + * J A R _ v e r i f y _ d i g e s t + * + * Verifies that a precalculated digest matches the + * expected value in the manifest. + * + */ +int PR_CALLBACK +JAR_verify_digest(JAR *jar, const char *name, JAR_Digest *dig) +{ + JAR_Item *it; + JAR_Digest *shindig; + ZZLink *link; + ZZList *list = jar->hashes; + int result1 = 0; + int result2 = 0; + + + if (jar->valid < 0) { + /* signature not valid */ + return JAR_ERR_SIG; + } + if (ZZ_ListEmpty (list)) { + /* empty list */ + return JAR_ERR_PNF; + } + + for (link = ZZ_ListHead (list); + !ZZ_ListIterDone (list, link); + link = link->next) { + it = link->thing; + if (it->type == jarTypeMF + && it->pathname && !PORT_Strcmp(it->pathname, name)) { + shindig = (JAR_Digest *) it->data; + if (shindig->md5_status) { + if (shindig->md5_status == jarHashBad) + return JAR_ERR_HASH; + result1 = memcmp (dig->md5, shindig->md5, MD5_LENGTH); + } + if (shindig->sha1_status) { + if (shindig->sha1_status == jarHashBad) + return JAR_ERR_HASH; + result2 = memcmp (dig->sha1, shindig->sha1, SHA1_LENGTH); + } + return (result1 == 0 && result2 == 0) ? 0 : JAR_ERR_HASH; + } + } + return JAR_ERR_PNF; +} + + + + + + + +/* + * J A R _ f e t c h _ c e r t + * + * Given an opaque identifier of a certificate, + * return the full certificate. + * + * The new function, which retrieves by key. + * + */ +CERTCertificate * +JAR_fetch_cert(long length, void *key) +{ + CERTIssuerAndSN issuerSN; + CERTCertificate *cert = NULL; + CERTCertDBHandle *certdb; + + certdb = JAR_open_database(); + if (certdb) { + unsigned char *keyData = (unsigned char *)key; + issuerSN.derIssuer.len = (keyData[0] << 8) + keyData[0]; + issuerSN.derIssuer.data = &keyData[2]; + issuerSN.serialNumber.len = length - (2 + issuerSN.derIssuer.len); + issuerSN.serialNumber.data = &keyData[2+issuerSN.derIssuer.len]; + cert = CERT_FindCertByIssuerAndSN (certdb, &issuerSN); + JAR_close_database (certdb); + } + return cert; +} + +/* + * j a r _ g e t _ m f _ d i g e s t + * + * Retrieve a corresponding saved digest over a section + * of the main manifest file. + * + */ +static JAR_Digest * +jar_get_mf_digest(JAR *jar, char *pathname) +{ + JAR_Item *it; + JAR_Digest *dig; + ZZLink *link; + ZZList *list = jar->manifest; + + if (ZZ_ListEmpty (list)) + return NULL; + + for (link = ZZ_ListHead (list); + !ZZ_ListIterDone (list, link); + link = link->next) { + it = link->thing; + if (it->type == jarTypeSect + && it->pathname && !PORT_Strcmp(it->pathname, pathname)) { + dig = (JAR_Digest *) it->data; + return dig; + } + } + return NULL; +} + +/* + * j a r _ b a s e n a m e + * + * Return the basename -- leading components of path stripped off, + * extension ripped off -- of a path. + * + */ +static char * +jar_basename(const char *path) +{ + char *pith, *e, *basename, *ext; + + if (path == NULL) + return PORT_Strdup(""); + + pith = PORT_Strdup(path); + basename = pith; + while (1) { + for (e = basename; *e && *e != '/' && *e != '\\'; e++) + /* yip */ ; + if (*e) + basename = ++e; + else + break; + } + + if ((ext = PORT_Strrchr(basename, '.')) != NULL) + *ext = 0; + + /* We already have the space allocated */ + PORT_Strcpy(pith, basename); + return pith; +} + +/* + * + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + * + * CRYPTO ROUTINES FOR JAR + * + * The following functions are the cryptographic + * interface to PKCS7 for Jarnatures. + * + * + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + * + */ + +/* + * j a r _ c a t c h _ b y t e s + * + * In the event signatures contain enveloped data, it will show up here. + * But note that the lib/pkcs7 routines aren't ready for it. + * + */ +static void +jar_catch_bytes(void *arg, const char *buf, unsigned long len) +{ + /* Actually this should never be called, since there is + presumably no data in the signature itself. */ +} + +/* + * j a r _ v a l i d a t e _ p k c s 7 + * + * Validate (and decode, if necessary) a binary pkcs7 + * signature in DER format. + * + */ +static int +jar_validate_pkcs7(JAR *jar, JAR_Signer *signer, char *data, long length) +{ + + SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo = NULL; + SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext *dcx; + PRBool goodSig; + int status = 0; + SECItem detdig; + + PORT_Assert( jar != NULL && signer != NULL ); + + if (jar == NULL || signer == NULL) + return JAR_ERR_ORDER; + + signer->valid = JAR_ERR_SIG; + + /* We need a context if we can get one */ + dcx = SEC_PKCS7DecoderStart(jar_catch_bytes, NULL /*cb_arg*/, + NULL /*getpassword*/, jar->mw, + NULL, NULL, NULL); + if (dcx == NULL) { + /* strange pkcs7 failure */ + return JAR_ERR_PK7; + } + + SEC_PKCS7DecoderUpdate (dcx, data, length); + cinfo = SEC_PKCS7DecoderFinish (dcx); + if (cinfo == NULL) { + /* strange pkcs7 failure */ + return JAR_ERR_PK7; + } + if (SEC_PKCS7ContentIsEncrypted (cinfo)) { + /* content was encrypted, fail */ + return JAR_ERR_PK7; + } + if (SEC_PKCS7ContentIsSigned (cinfo) == PR_FALSE) { + /* content was not signed, fail */ + return JAR_ERR_PK7; + } + + PORT_SetError(0); + + /* use SHA1 only */ + detdig.len = SHA1_LENGTH; + detdig.data = signer->digest->sha1; + goodSig = SEC_PKCS7VerifyDetachedSignature(cinfo, + certUsageObjectSigner, + &detdig, HASH_AlgSHA1, + PR_FALSE); + jar_gather_signers(jar, signer, cinfo); + if (goodSig == PR_TRUE) { + /* signature is valid */ + signer->valid = 0; + } else { + status = PORT_GetError(); + PORT_Assert( status < 0 ); + if (status >= 0) + status = JAR_ERR_SIG; + jar->valid = status; + signer->valid = status; + } + jar->pkcs7 = PR_TRUE; + signer->pkcs7 = PR_TRUE; + SEC_PKCS7DestroyContentInfo(cinfo); + return status; +} + +/* + * j a r _ g a t h e r _ s i g n e r s + * + * Add the single signer of this signature to the + * certificate linked list. + * + */ +static int +jar_gather_signers(JAR *jar, JAR_Signer *signer, SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo) +{ + int result; + CERTCertificate *cert; + CERTCertDBHandle *certdb; + SEC_PKCS7SignedData *sdp = cinfo->content.signedData; + SEC_PKCS7SignerInfo **pksigners, *pksigner; + + if (sdp == NULL) + return JAR_ERR_PK7; + + pksigners = sdp->signerInfos; + /* permit exactly one signer */ + if (pksigners == NULL || pksigners [0] == NULL || pksigners [1] != NULL) + return JAR_ERR_PK7; + + pksigner = *pksigners; + cert = pksigner->cert; + + if (cert == NULL) + return JAR_ERR_PK7; + + certdb = JAR_open_database(); + if (certdb == NULL) + return JAR_ERR_GENERAL; + + result = jar_add_cert(jar, signer, jarTypeSign, cert); + JAR_close_database (certdb); + return result; +} + +/* + * j a r _ o p e n _ d a t a b a s e + * + * Open the certificate database, + * for use by JAR functions. + * + */ +CERTCertDBHandle * +JAR_open_database(void) +{ + return CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(); +} + +/* + * j a r _ c l o s e _ d a t a b a s e + * + * Close the certificate database. + * For use by JAR functions. + * + */ +int +JAR_close_database(CERTCertDBHandle *certdb) +{ + return 0; +} + + +/* + * j a r _ s i g n a l + * + * Nonfatal errors come here to callback Java. + * + */ +static int +jar_signal(int status, JAR *jar, const char *metafile, char *pathname) +{ + char *errstring = JAR_get_error (status); + if (jar->signal) { + (*jar->signal) (status, jar, metafile, pathname, errstring); + return 0; + } + return status; +} + +/* + * j a r _ a p p e n d + * + * Tack on an element to one of a JAR's linked + * lists, with rudimentary error handling. + * + */ +int +jar_append(ZZList *list, int type, char *pathname, void *data, size_t size) +{ + JAR_Item *it = PORT_ZNew(JAR_Item); + ZZLink *entity; + + if (it == NULL) + goto loser; + + if (pathname) { + it->pathname = PORT_Strdup(pathname); + if (it->pathname == NULL) + goto loser; + } + + it->type = (jarType)type; + it->data = (unsigned char *) data; + it->size = size; + entity = ZZ_NewLink (it); + if (entity) { + ZZ_AppendLink (list, entity); + return 0; + } + +loser: + if (it) { + if (it->pathname) + PORT_Free(it->pathname); + PORT_Free(it); + } + return JAR_ERR_MEMORY; +} |